Why regime change in Iran is easier said than done

Indian Express

24-06-2025

Written by Hussein Banai
In the wake of Israel's military campaign against Iran – launched on June 13 – and the subsequent US strikes on key Iranian nuclear infrastructure, it might appear, at least from the outside, that the Islamic regime in Tehran is more vulnerable than ever, despite the fragile ceasefire announced on June 23. Its deterrence has been shattered, its military and nuclear command structures exposed, and its regional proxies either dismantled or in disarray.
For some outside observers, this moment presents a long-awaited opportunity: A weakened regime ripe for popular overthrow. Yet inside Iran, a more complicated and sobering reality persists. Despite mounting grievances, persistent repression, and a discredited ruling elite, many ordinary Iranians remain hesitant to embrace the project of regime change – especially under the shadow of foreign bombardment and looming military escalation.
A people under seige
The reluctance is not born of loyalty to the regime, but informed by historical experience. Iran's political memory is haunted by the twin legacies of domestic repression and foreign intervention. The latter has often cloaked itself in the language of salvation, only to deliver chaos and further repression. From the Anglo-American coup of 1953 to the bloody eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s – during which much of the West supported Saddam Hussein – Iranian society has developed a deep skepticism of external actors claiming to act in its interest. That scepticism is neither abstract nor merely ideological; it is generational, embedded in families, and sustained by a collective understanding that foreign involvement often leads to national fragmentation.
The Israeli campaign, however tactically precise, has reinforced these anxieties. While it has effectively exposed the vulnerabilities of the Islamic Republic's military doctrine, it has also triggered fears of escalation, civilian casualties, and long-term domestic instability. The strikes have deepened the sense that Iran is under siege, a feeling the regime has long cultivated but which now resonates with uncomfortable clarity. In such moments, opposition can become indistinguishable from betrayal in the public imagination (as has already become the case between different ideological factions in the diaspora). This is not because people approve of the regime; it is because they dread the alternative.
That dread is compounded by the absence of a credible, unified opposition either at home or abroad. Decades of repression have fragmented civil society, crushed independent media, and made a mockery of reformist possibilities. Those who continue to organise inside the country do so under enormous risk and with limited resources. In the diaspora, although opposition voices have flourished online, they remain politically fractured and often disconnected from the lived realities of those inside Iran. Calls for mass mobilization, especially when voiced from exile, are met with understandable skepticism: Who will lead? What comes next? And, crucially, who will protect the country if the regime falls and secessionist movements in provinces from Azerbaijan to Kurdistan, and further to Khouzestan and Balouchestan rush for independence?
Ayatollah's regime is weak, but not weak enough
This is the trap of the current moment. The regime is profoundly weak – morally, politically, institutionally, and strategically – but it is not so weak that it cannot crush dissent. Nor is the opposition so strong that it can offer a stable, inclusive, and broadly legitimate alternative. As a result, many Iranians find themselves in an impossible position: Politically alienated from the state, but fearful that acting decisively against it will only deepen the country's exposure to external coercion and internal collapse. That is, thus far, the overwhelming sentiment traceable on social media and in the torrent of Iranian political commentary in the foreign-based press.
This does not mean that resistance has disappeared. On the contrary, Iran remains a society simmering with frustration and defiance. From the 2009 Green Movement to the 2017-2019 economic protests and the 2022 'Women, Life, Freedom' uprising, Iranians have demonstrated extraordinary courage in confronting state violence. But these uprisings have not translated into regime collapse. And in the aftermath of the June 2025 military escalation, the space for such mobilisation has contracted further. Wartime logic – amplified by the state's propaganda machine and reinforced by the threat of further strikes – tends to conflate protest with treason. This, too, is part of the regime's survival toolkit.
Moreover, the current moment lacks what past revolutions have required: A catalysing vision. The Islamic Republic was not born from despair alone — it was animated by an idea of moral renewal and sovereignty. Today, many Iranians are deeply disillusioned with that legacy. But disillusionment does not guarantee consensus around what should replace it. Secular republic? Constitutional monarchy? Federal democracy? None of these options has yet emerged as a unifying alternative.
Complexity of regime change
That said, the status quo is not sustainable. The war has dramatically accelerated the hollowing-out of the regime's legitimacy. The image of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a defiant guardian of sovereignty now rings hollow as Iranian skies are repeatedly penetrated, and top commanders are killed with impunity. The economic toll of war, layered onto years of sanctions and mismanagement, will deepen social despair. And the regime's reliance on coercion over consensus can only persist so long as its security forces remain intact and obedient.
Should the regime's capacity for repression falter, the political landscape may shift quickly. In such a scenario, popular demands are likely to reemerge with force. But whether they coalesce into a coherent movement or devolve into localized unrest is uncertain. Much will depend on whether political and civil actors, both inside and outside the country, can overcome the divisions that have long plagued them and articulate a program that speaks to both dignity and stability.
If the international community genuinely supports democratic change in Iran, it must reckon with this paradox. Change cannot be delivered from the skies, nor imposed through external pressure alone. It must be nurtured from within, supported by sustained diplomatic engagement, and informed by humility about the limits of outside influence. Military action may buy time or leverage, but it cannot substitute for legitimacy, as the recent cases of Iraq and Libya have painfully made clear.
This is the sobering truth of the current moment: The Islamic Republic is at a dead-end, but not yet headed for collapse. Its legitimacy is eroded, but its coercive apparatus remains largely intact. Its economy is strangled, yet functional enough to avert mass breakdown. And its population is disillusioned, but too wary of the alternatives – especially in wartime – to risk the leap into the unknown.
The writer is Associate Professor of International Studies at the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Indiana University. He's the author of several books on Iran's political development and US-Iran relations