‘By chance, did you win a cottage in Ireland?'
She told him more about the contest; he thought it was a scam. What were the chances that she had won a worldwide raffle competition based in Britain with just three tickets? But when she received an email from Raffall, and then from Collins herself, Spangler realised it had actually happened.
'Imelda's first email mentioned how I must be in shock, but she's excited for me,' she recalled. They spoke a few hours later on WhatsApp. 'It was a great experience to be able to speak directly to her, and helped to make things real.'
Moving to Ireland would be something of a homecoming: Spangler's grandmother emigrated from County Mayo, in western Ireland, and her great-grandfather's family hailed from Sligo, a town about19 kilometres from the house. Collins, 52, was thrilled to hear that Spangler had roots in the area. 'I truly feel my home was meant to be hers,' she said.
With a newborn, a new home and a new academic venture, the Spanglers are now beginning to sort out how and when they'll take possession of the house, from the legal red tape to the tax implications.
'My husband and I have talked about someday, when we are out of the military, getting property overseas and splitting time between [there and] the United States,' she said. 'But that was obviously a future goal.'
Fortunately, they have some time. Property transfers in Ireland typically take around three months to complete, said Stelios Kounou, Raffall's CEO. The company acts as a go-between for hosts transferring their goods — which range from sports tickets to cars to homes — to the winners. In this case, Raffall will supply the legal team to oversee the due diligence for the company and for Collins. As part of her contest offer, Collins will pay for Spangler's attorney and the Irish stamp duty on the transaction.
Kounou said that Raffall's solicitors have begun the paperwork in Britain.
'The contracts are handled by the lawyers much like a traditional property sale,' he said. 'The key difference is that, since the property was won rather than purchased, the winner doesn't have the same rights as a buyer — similar to how it works at auction. Once both parties are happy with the terms, the transfer of ownership and release of funds take place simultaneously, all managed by the lawyers.'
For Collins, who decided to raffle her house after reading about another Irishwoman who had raffled her Dublin apartment, the closing of the contest brings a huge sense of relief. When she launched her raffle in October, she set a goal of selling 150,000 tickets via Raffall. At £5 apiece, that would come to £750,000, or about $1.53 million. Not bad for a house she bought for about $230,000 in 2022.
She monitored her ticket sales every day, spending nearly €25,000 (about $44,000) out of pocket for advertising and marketing. 'I accepted that I probably wasn't going to succeed, but I am an optimist and was going to remain hopeful until the very last minute,' she said.
If she fell short of 150,000 tickets, as per Raffall's terms, she could give the winner 50 per cent of the revenue and keep 40 per cent and the house, or give the house away and keep more of the revenue for herself. Until a few days before the May 20 draw, she was unsure she'd meet her goal.
But in the end, Collins said, 206,815 tickets were sold, grossing £1,034,705 (about $2.14 million). Besides the 10 per cent to Raffall, she has about €2600 to pay in affiliate fees, plus a 33 per cent capital gains tax, 1 per cent of the value of the house for stamp duty, and fees for her lawyers and the Spanglers' lawyers.
'There are days I am still in disbelief that it happened and it actually happened to me,' Collins said. 'I don't want to say I believe in miracles, but I always try and give it a go to see what happens. I'm over the moon.'
She and Spangler anticipate meeting at some point for the handing over of keys. While they wait for instruction from the attorneys, Collins is sure of one thing: 'There will be a big deal when the keys actually get transferred. I will make it very special.'
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Advertiser
7 days ago
- The Advertiser
Arbitrarily increasing defence spending would be a tremendous waste of money. Here's why
The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that. The United States is again putting a full-court press on Western nations to boost defence spending. There were reports this week that NATO members are expected to raise defence spending until they spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence. This would include almost doubling spending on defence platforms and assets (from 2 per cent of GDP to 3.5 per cent of GDP) and committing a further 1.5 per cent of GDP on defence-related investments including cyber security. The Treasurer pushed back, saying Australia had already taken significant steps by boosting spending to 2.3 per cent of GDP. He is right to rebuff this target, but not because Labor's defence spending commitment is sufficient for the job. The better reason to reject arbitrary spending levels for defence against GDP is that they tell you almost nothing about the defence capabilities Australia has - or the appropriateness of our defence spending arrangements. In truth, if Australia was to expand its defence spending but continue to spend it in the same way, there is little guarantee of a genuine improvement in our position. Unfortunately, the reality is that both sides of politics have allowed industry concerns and state government parochialism to dominate defence needs when it comes to procurement. There is no better example than our submarine program. Defence ministers continue to insist it is imperative for Australia to have the capability to design and manufacture submarines. This has led to us adopting risky, bespoke submarine designs, creating expensive orphan submarine classes (ones that are used by only one country). Risky procurements like orphan submarines inevitably run over time and over budget. There is also the potential for significant redesign and development costs - especially when those designing and constructing the submarines are effectively learning on the job. The terrible troubles that plagued the Collins Class for the first decade after it was commissioned were a case in point. The fact that we have made so little actual progress on the Collins replacement more than 15 years after the replacement project was first announced is further testament to that fact. Australia is now looking at a path of manufacturing nuclear submarines, an even more complex industry development task than the one we embarked on in the 1980s with the Collins. If Australia wanted to a see an actual return from investing money in industry development, we'd be better off committing to improving the US supply chain for Virginia Class submarines. At least, we'd know from the beginning that those companies can build and deliver a submarine. This is not at all guaranteed should we commit to building an entirely new sub here. Given the risks of cost and time blowouts are well known, why do governments like Australia persist with such a risky procurement strategy? The answer is simple: politics. When it comes to defence spending, there is enormous political pressure from states like South Australia and Victoria to use defence dollars to conduct industry policy. In the case of the submarines, Australia's defence needs have been running a distant second to the need to commit to spending the money in Adelaide. Instead of focusing on how to get the best value capabilities for the money being invested, or ensuring that Australia can fulfil its required defence goals, the states compete to outbid each other for federal defence dollars to be spent in their state. The point is not that Australian defence industry is incapable of producing quality defence equipment; it's that spending the money in Australia for its own sake does nothing for defence. In fact, a disturbing percentage of our defence spending amounts to little more than money laundering handouts to the state governments. In that sense, we are right to push back against NATO and the US. Our approach shouldn't be to raise defence spending, it should be to improve defence capability to meet the tasks required of us. In practice, this means two things. First, Australians need far more clarity on what our defence force is actually for. Without greater clarity on what we are hoping to achieve in the defence space, it is all but impossible for people to understand whether we are headed down the right path. In a world where there is enormous competition for every dollar of government spending, the defence establishment must be as vocal as any other interest group as to why it needs more money. Second, we must genuinely commit to acquiring the capabilities that will best enable us to achieve the goals we have set for our defence force. This may mean some politically unpopular decisions need to be made. So be it. Our politicians are not elected to compete with each other over who can give the most money to the states. In an environment of genuine threats to Australia's safety, we must be ruthless in culling projects that are not meeting our needs. This change in approach should enable us to be far more agile in our defence planning. At the moment, because we are beholden to state government interests, we are committing to defence expenditure decades in advance that may or may not be wasted by the time it is spent. It is clear there has been a significant change in global attitudes to defence and, in particular, defence spending. This is an opportunity for Australia to start taking the issue of defence more seriously. However, throwing tens of billions more dollars at the existing system would be a terrible way to do that.
The Age
25-06-2025
- The Age
Don't sacrifice us for beef deal with Australia, Irish farmers warn
London: Irish farmers have issued a blunt warning to European Union negotiators not to sacrifice rural livelihoods in the rush to strike a long-awaited trade agreement with Australia amid fears over unequal standards and pressure to deliver a geopolitical win. With formal negotiations between Canberra and Brussels restarting this month after a lengthy freeze, Irish farming leaders and political figures are demanding strict conditions on agricultural imports – particularly Australian beef – to ensure the deal does not undercut EU producers. 'We can't be anti-trade as Irish farmers – we export 90 per cent of our beef and 95 per cent of our dairy – but we need equivalence,' Irish Farmers' Association policy director Tadhg Buckley said. 'But we can't have a situation where products coming in ... didn't have to put up with the same level of regulation that we had.' The proposed trade pact, launched in 2018, stalled in 2023 over access for Australian beef, lamb, dairy and sugar to the European market, as well as EU demands around geographic labelling protections and environmental safeguards. But officials on both sides are returning to negotiations after US President Donald Trump's global tariff war began. Buckley said Irish farmers accepted the importance of global trade but rejected any deal that left them exposed to unfair competition, particularly hormone-treated beef from Australia. 'We do know … a significant chunk of Australian beef is hormone beef or has used hormones. I'm not saying it's unsafe ... but we can't see that coming into the EU because simply it would give that product a competitive advantage over Irish values,' he said. An estimated 40 per cent of cattle in Australia is treated with growth promotants to boost weight gain in the animals, which can improve the efficiency of meat production by about 15 per cent. Using growth hormones in beef production has been banned in the EU since 1989. 'We just want equivalence of standards. We cannot have a situation where our EU negotiators just decide to sacrifice beef farmers for getting access to services in Australia or whatever.'
Sydney Morning Herald
25-06-2025
- Sydney Morning Herald
Don't sacrifice us for beef deal with Australia, Irish farmers warn
London: Irish farmers have issued a blunt warning to European Union negotiators not to sacrifice rural livelihoods in the rush to strike a long-awaited trade agreement with Australia amid fears over unequal standards and pressure to deliver a geopolitical win. With formal negotiations between Canberra and Brussels restarting this month after a lengthy freeze, Irish farming leaders and political figures are demanding strict conditions on agricultural imports – particularly Australian beef – to ensure the deal does not undercut EU producers. 'We can't be anti-trade as Irish farmers – we export 90 per cent of our beef and 95 per cent of our dairy – but we need equivalence,' Irish Farmers' Association policy director Tadhg Buckley said. 'But we can't have a situation where products coming in ... didn't have to put up with the same level of regulation that we had.' The proposed trade pact, launched in 2018, stalled in 2023 over access for Australian beef, lamb, dairy and sugar to the European market, as well as EU demands around geographic labelling protections and environmental safeguards. But officials on both sides are returning to negotiations after US President Donald Trump's global tariff war began. Buckley said Irish farmers accepted the importance of global trade but rejected any deal that left them exposed to unfair competition, particularly hormone-treated beef from Australia. 'We do know … a significant chunk of Australian beef is hormone beef or has used hormones. I'm not saying it's unsafe ... but we can't see that coming into the EU because simply it would give that product a competitive advantage over Irish values,' he said. An estimated 40 per cent of cattle in Australia is treated with growth promotants to boost weight gain in the animals, which can improve the efficiency of meat production by about 15 per cent. Using growth hormones in beef production has been banned in the EU since 1989. 'We just want equivalence of standards. We cannot have a situation where our EU negotiators just decide to sacrifice beef farmers for getting access to services in Australia or whatever.'
