ADB cuts growth forecast for Malaysia, India, South Korea on tariffs
Lender's flagship report keeps China's projection unchanged at 4.7% for 2025
A port in Bangkok. The Asian Development Bank has lowered its growth forecast for Thailand to 1.8% from the previous 2.8% due to higher U.S. trade tariffs.
RAMON ROYANDOYAN
MANILA -- The Asian Development Bank has cut this year's growth projections across economies in the region, citing headwinds spurred by U.S. President Donald Trump's tariff policy.
The multilateral lender's flagship Asian Development Outlook report, released on Wednesday, downgraded the GDP growth forecast for "developing Asia" -- which comprises 46 ADB members, including China, India and Southeast Asian nations -- to 4.7% in 2025, from the previous projection of 4.9% in April.
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4 hours ago
Energy from the North? Japan Eyes the Promise and Perils of Alaskan Gas Investment
Among the barrage of executive orders that US President Donald Trump issued upon taking office in January 2025 is one titled Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential, which proclaims the need to tap the state's natural resources, including liquefied natural gas, to rein in inflation, create jobs, correct trade imbalances, boost America's global clout, and counter moves by foreign powers to weaponize energy supplies. In conjunction with this policy, the Trump administration is urging Japan—under pressure from tough tariff negotiations—to invest in the Alaska LNG project, a costly plan to pipe gas across the state, liquefy it, and ship it to East Asian countries. Liquefied natural gas has a long history in Alaska. Japan's very first imports of LNG, back in 1969, were shipped from the state. But apart from the name, the Alaska LNG project being pushed by the White House has very little in common with its predecessor. Under the earlier plan, natural gas was extracted from reserves on the Kenai Peninsula on the south coast of Alaska, where it was processed into LNG and loaded onto ships for export. Total capacity was only about 1.5 million tons a year. Beginning in 2015, global LNG prices dropped as supplies increased and demand weakened, and it became increasingly difficult for Alaska to compete with other suppliers. In 2017, Alaska LNG's operations were shut down. The new Alaska LNG development project proposes to tap the North Slope gas fields on the Arctic Ocean coast in northern Alaska. A 1,300-kilometer trans-Alaska pipeline would transport the gas all the way down to the Kenai Peninsula, where chilling facilities would produce up to 20 million tons of LNG annually. Alaska Gasline Development Corp. (AGDC), the independent public corporation heading up the project (including construction of a natural-gas pipeline and liquefaction plant) hopes to begin shipping LNG around 2030. Alaska depends heavily on locally extracted natural gas for its own heating and industrial purposes, and the Kenai Peninsula's gas reserves have been dwindling, with supplies expected to run out sometime in the mid-2030s. For the state, therefore, development of the North Slope fields promises a new source of affordable energy for Alaskans, as well as significant revenue from exports. LNG Demand in East Asia In February 2025, the Japanese government released its Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, which calculates the outlook for energy supply and demand in 2040. Alongside its basic energy outlook, the plan incorporates an alternative scenario in which the official targets for adoption of nonfossil fuels (such as renewable energy and hydrogen) are not met. If the goals are achieved, demand for LNG in fiscal 2040 is expected to drop from the current level of 66 million tons (fiscal 2022) to somewhere between 54 million and 60 million tons. If the country falls short of the targets, though, it will need an estimated 74 million tons of LNG. In short, a certain level of demand for LNG is expected to persist through 2040. In the interim, the long-term contracts under which Japanese utilities and trading companies purchase LNG are coming up for renewal. New contracts will have to be signed to ensure a stable energy supply farther down the road, and Alaska LNG is one potential supplier. South Korea and Taiwan are in a similar position. Much like Japan, South Korea can only guess at the amount of energy renewables will be able to supply over the next 10 or 20 years. Taiwan, which shut down its last operating nuclear power plant in May this year, has adopted an energy strategy that calls for converting coal-fired plants to natural gas. All three countries have a clear need for LNG going forward, presenting a business opportunity for Alaska LNG. Geographical Merits Clearly, Alaska LNG enjoys the Trump administration's enthusiastic backing, but what are the relative benefits for Japan and its neighbors? The biggest advantage is probably geographical proximity. Japan already imports LNG from the United States, but those shipments originate in the Gulf of Mexico. The shortest route, through the Panama Canal, is about 17,000 kilometers. Moreover, because congestion has made it difficult for LNG tankers to transit the canal, the preferred route nowadays is around the Cape of Good Hope, a 29,000-kilometer trip. The southern coast of Alaska, by contrast, is only about 6,000 kilometers from Japan. The shorter distance and shipping time would mean lower transportation costs and more flexible delivery schedules. Shipping from Alaska is also attractive from the standpoint of safety of navigation. LNG from Qatar typically passes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca before traveling north through the South China Sea. The Strait of Hormuz poses safety risks whenever the situation in the Middle East is unstable, and piracy continues to be an issue in the Strait of Malacca. China's increasingly assertive activity in the South China Sea, most of which it claims as its own territory, makes navigation problematic there. Shipping LNG from Alaska is a way of avoiding these safety risks. Cost Questions Remain But the Alaska LNG plan raises some serious questions centered on costs and lead time. Gas from the North Slope is inexpensive in and of itself, but the construction of a new gas treatment plant on the North Slope, a trans-Alaska pipeline, and a liquefaction plant on the Kenai Peninsula would incur enormous costs. An early estimate by the developer put the total expense at about $44 billion, but inflation has pushed up construction costs since then, and the challenges of laying pipeline through permafrost areas could add significantly to the expense. Any final decision must await a detailed, independent analysis, which will doubtless yield a higher price tag. For purposes of comparison, one might note that total investment in the Rio Grande LNG project, now under construction in Brownsville, Texas, is estimated at roughly $20 billion. To be sure, the two projects differ significantly in terms of the scale of construction and the kinds of expenses involved, but the comparison helps put the cost of the Alaska LNG project in perspective. The high initial investment required augments the challenges of financing the project and could also push up the selling price of the LNG thus produced. Bad Timing? The long lead time required for Alaska LNG to launch commercial operations is problematic on several counts. First, it could affect Alaska LNG's ability to compete with other LNG projects targeting Asian markets, including various US ventures, a Canadian project that began shipping LNG from the Pacific Coast in May 2025, and plans to expand production in Qatar. In short, Asian customers have multiple options for investing in and importing natural gas, and they will only choose Alaska LNG if it suits their needs with respect to timing and terms of sale. This is especially true in Japan, where most of the importers are private companies. In South Korea and Taiwan, where public corporations handle the importation of LNG, political considerations may play some role in purchasing decisions, but even so, buyers will have to decide whether the political benefits are worth the additional costs. Second, under the current timeline, Alaska LNG will not begin exporting until after the end of Trump's second term of office in January 2029. We have witnessed firsthand the policy U-turns that can result when a new president from a different party takes control in Washington. The next administration might well resurrect the environmental protections and climate-change policies that Trump has discarded, a shift that could spell trouble for Alaska LNG. Long-term business decisions require a measure of policy predictability, and in this key respect, the United States has become a high-risk country. The third issue with Alaska LNG's long lead time pertains to the target year for achieving net zero carbon emissions. Demand for LNG from Japanese and other East Asian importers is bound to decline sharply as the 2050 target year approaches. A 20-year LNG contract concluded in 2030 will last through 2049. If long-term contracts are needed to secure funding for the future, then it makes sense to begin export operations as soon as possible. Alaska LNG has very little time to spare. A Narrow Window of Opportunity Plans for tapping the North Slope's natural gas resources have been around for decades, but they have stalled repeatedly in the face of financial and political obstacles. Trump's executive order Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential presents an unprecedented opportunity for the Alaska LNG project. But given Trump's term of office and the looming net-zero deadline, the window of opportunity is narrow. Ultimately, speed and cost will determine whether Alaska LNG can tap into the East Asian market. In terms of speed, the project needs to make concrete progress—meaning a final investment decision and initial construction—soon, while the political winds are still favorable. Otherwise, the project will lose momentum, and the market will be snapped up by competing LNG projects. The importance of cost considerations goes without saying. It would be foolish to overrate the value of Alaska LNG solely on the basis of geography. That said, if Alaska LNG can offer its product at a price comparable to that of competitors, then its geographical location becomes a powerful inducement, vastly increasing its chances of claiming a share of the East Asian market. (Originally published in Japanese on July 25, 2025. Banner photo: A liquefied natural gas tanker arrives at Futtsu Power Station in Futtsu, Chiba Prefecture, in February 2023. © Kyodo.)
The Mainichi
8 hours ago
- The Mainichi
Japan's farm exports rise 16% in 1st half of 2025, set record
TOKYO (Kyodo) -- Japan's agricultural, fisheries and forestry product exports in the first half of 2025 rose 15.5 percent from a year earlier to a record 809.7 billion yen ($5.5 billion), as sales in the United States increased sharply, the government said Monday. The record for the January-June period followed a fall in the same period of the previous year. The turnaround came as Japan expanded sales channels in the United States and other areas following China's import ban on Japanese seafood in the wake of the discharge of treated radioactive wastewater from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. Exports were also likely helped by an increase in the number of Japanese restaurants operating overseas as awareness of the cuisine increased on the back of surging foreign tourism. Supermarkets outside the country are also selling more Japanese food, the farm ministry said. The record figure came as the government aims to boost Japan's farm and seafood exports to 2 trillion yen by 2025, after exports in 2024 grew 3.6 percent from the previous year to a record 1.51 trillion yen. But there is uncertainty over Japan's prospects of achieving the goal, as the United States will implement a 15 percent "reciprocal" tariff on Japanese imports on Thursday. China, however, is moving to resume imports of Japanese marine and other products. By country and region, exports to the United States topped the list with 141.0 billion yen, up 22.0 percent, boosted by strong demand for scallops, green tea and yellowtail. The increase came despite the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump imposing a new 10 percent tariff in April. Hong Kong ranked second with a 3.4 percent increase to 106.8 billion yen, followed by China, which saw 15.0 percent growth to 90.2 billion yen as exports of sake, timber logs and animal feed notably expanded, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. By item, exports of scallops surged 45.4 percent to 34.9 billion yen, while sauce mixed seasoning increased 7.6 percent to 34.0 billion yen and beef climbed 15.5 percent to 32.5 billion yen.
The Diplomat
10 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Marcos Mostly Got What He Wanted Out of Trump
Philippine President Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos Jr.'s visit last week to the White House – the first by any Southeast Asian head of state – can only be viewed as a remarkable success, despite some minor complications on trade. Senior Trump administration officials, including the president himself, profusely praised Manila for helping the United States to counter China, with Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Bridge Colby, even going so far as to tout the Philippines as a 'model ally.' This is all the more stunning given that the Philippines spends very little of its GDP on defense – roughly 1.3 percent – and yet U.S. allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific and Europe who spend more have encountered greater turbulence with Washington. Ahead of his visit, Marcos highlighted how important it would be for the two nations to sign a new trade deal to avoid triggering the Trump administration's 20 percent reciprocal tariffs on August 1. With some trepidation, he wondered aloud 'how much progress we can make' while in Washington 'to alleviate the effects of a very severe tariff schedule on the Philippines.' Additionally, Marcos hoped to receive clear support from Trump to bolster Manila's position against China's constant encroachments of its exclusive economic zone, which has now become tantamount to a gray zone war. Following their meeting, Marcos and Trump announced a new reciprocal tariff rate of 19 percent. By negotiating a reduced tariff rate, Marcos has put the Philippines in a strong position relative to its peers. Take ASEAN, for example, of which the Philippines is a member. After Singapore, with its 10 percent tariff rate, the Philippines is actually tied with Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Malaysia as having the second-lowest tariff rate. All other nations are currently at 20 percent or higher. This includes Vietnam, a key emerging strategic partner for the United States in countering China, which was unable to secure a figure below 20 percent in negotiations with the Trump administration. By another measure, out of all roughly equal-sized economies worldwide, the Philippines' rate is less than the average tariff the U.S. has imposed on them. Marcos can hardly claim total success, however. For one thing, critics have blasted him for failing to seal an 'alliance discount' in trade negotiations. It is easy for anyone to see, for example, that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia, though not U.S. security allies, received the same rate as the Philippines. Moreover, Japan – another key security ally – was able to substantially lower its reciprocal tariff rate from 25 to 15 percent, although commentators have also acknowledged the comparative advantages of Japan, particularly derived from its status as the world's third-largest economy. Marcos nonetheless tried to defend his trade deliverable by arguing that although 'one percent might seem like a very small concession…when you put it in real terms, it is a significant achievement,' reaffirming the old adage in politics that 'if you're explaining, you're losing' the battle of narratives.' To add to the confusion, Marcos clarified after the summit that Manila had lowered the tariff barrier on U.S. automobile exports to zero percent, but he did not confirm Trump's announcement that all U.S. exports would enjoy zero percent tariffs, nor did he provide any specific details on how the new trade deal might help the Philippines. The lack of clarity and apparent unilateral concessions led several Philippine legislators to sharply criticize him for participating in 'a disastrous humiliation ritual' and 'the worst insult that a host can throw at his guest.' On the defense side, the outcome was quite positive. Trump, for example, praised the Philippines, stating: 'They're a very important nation militarily, and we've had some great drills lately,' in a reference to not only recent joint military exercises in the South China Sea, but also near Taiwan, aimed at bolstering deterrence against China. Trump further endorsed some flexibility in Manila's foreign policy approach, stating: 'You could deal with China…you should deal with China.' Manila welcomed this statement because it occasionally attempts diplomacy with Beijing to resolve outstanding sovereignty disputes with Beijing, as it did in the summer of 2024 following a violent incident over the resupply of Second Thomas Shoal. Marcos and Trump's public forum in the Oval Office could only have gone better for the Philippines had it not been dominated by reporters' questions over whether Trump might release the Jeffrey Epstein files. Also, notably, the day before Marcos met Trump, he visited the State Department to discuss alliance relations with Secretary of State and Acting National Security Adviser Marco Rubio. While there, both men 'underscored the importance of the ironclad United States-Philippines alliance to maintaining peace,' an important reaffirmation using common policy lingo spanning across the first Trump and Biden administrations. This strongly suggests continuity with the past, rather than any kind of America First-driven break from it – an extremely important signal that not all allies and partners are necessarily receiving from Washington. Although Marcos' visit could have been better, particularly on trade, it also featured no obvious mistakes or missed opportunities. And to be sure, there is only so much Marcos could hope for in dealing with an unpredictable Trump. If anything, Marcos and his administration should be comfortable with the current state of U.S.-Philippines relations, as there is little evidence that anything has changed for the worse, and ample evidence that Washington continues to value the Philippines—at least as much as is possible in these extraordinary times in U.S. foreign policy.
