
A recipe for repeated failure
Indeed, any positive shift in macroeconomic indicators should be welcomed but only if it stems from meaningful, sustainable reforms. Unfortunately, that's not the case. We are walking a precarious path, chasing the illusion of economic stabilization while ignoring the deep-seated flaws in our system. It's a dangerous approach, one that treats the symptoms, not the disease, and sets us up for future failures.
Take agriculture, not just a sector, but Pakistan's lifeline. Nearly 70 percent of our population relies on it, directly or indirectly.
Yet, it continues to be sidelined. According to official data, major crop production declined by 13 percent this year, which is not a marginal slip, but a clear warning sign. The wheat crisis illustrates how political considerations repeatedly trump national interest.
A failure to ensure fair pricing, combined with rising input costs like electricity and urea, has pushed farmers to the brink. With each planting season, they face higher risks and fewer rewards, definitely crushed by policy neglect dressed in populist slogans. If we cannot protect the very people who feed the nation, what kind of economic growth are we aiming for?
The government's GDP growth target of 3.56 percent, already modest compared to our historical average of 4.5 percent%, wasn't even met. Blaming global headwinds masks a more uncomfortable truth: internal mismanagement and misplaced priorities. We keep pumping money into politically motivated but economically unproductive ventures, while high-return sectors like SMEs, technology, and export industries are left gasping for support.
Our national budget is a reflection of this short-termism. Political optics consistently take precedence over long-term planning. As a result, the engines of real growth are being starved of fuel, while flashy but unsustainable projects grab headlines.
Another fundamental weakness lies in our ever-expanding informal economy. Rather than integrating it into the formal structure, our policies encourage its continued existence. It's no secret that countless businesses operate without paying taxes or following regulations.
Meanwhile, those who try to play by the rules are penalized burdened by audits, red tape, and higher taxes. In time, many either shut down or are forced to go underground just to survive. Unfortunately, budget 2025 followed by this Economic Survey has the fewest initiatives to increase the tax base.
The policy is taxing the already taxed. What's worse is that the very institutions tasked with revenue collection often enable this dysfunction. Whether through neglect or collusion, their inaction erodes faith in the system and entrenches the culture of non-compliance.
The services sector fares no better. Consider Pakistan's fast-growing freelance and remote work industry, driven by one of the youngest populations in the world. These digital workers require no subsidies and free laptops but just a clear, supportive policy environment. Yet they are met with uncertainty over payment gateways, taxation, and regulatory hurdles. Frustrated by the culture, many route their financial operations through Gulf countries, depriving Pakistan of valuable foreign exchange and economic potential.
This is a tragic missed opportunity. With minimal effort, the government could unleash the power of this low-cost, high-yield export sector, generating jobs boosting foreign earnings, and empowering the youth.
Instead, what we see is over-regulation, lack of trust, and a bureaucratic mindset that scares away innovation. Gen Z, inherently comfortable with digital finance, is a natural ally in our effort to document the economy. But rather than incentivizing their participation, the state often treats their financial activity with suspicion. The result? Fear, not confidence. Disengagement, not inclusion.
If we're serious about formalizing the economy, we must start by winning public trust, simplifying compliance, and offering incentives rather than penalties.
We've spent far too long lurching from crisis to crisis, mistaking temporary stability for genuine progress. What we need is structural transformation: bold reforms in agriculture, taxation, regulation, and service sector development. We need to stop punishing those who follow the rules and stop rewarding those who don't.
We must shift our mindset from election cycles to generational thinking. Because the truth is: Pakistan has immense potential. We have the land, the talent, the youth, and a strategic location. But unless we address the foundational issues, surface-level improvements will do little to prevent long-term decline.
Our economic managers must rise above the habit of number-polishing and narrative-spinning. The real challenge is not to lower inflation for a quarter, but to build a fair, inclusive, and future-ready economy.
We don't need miracles. We need meaningful change and the courage to pursue it.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025

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Business Recorder
6 days ago
- Business Recorder
Budget 2025–26: Between recovery and reality
As the government tabled the federal budget for FY2025–26 on June 10, it did so against a backdrop of cautious optimism. The Pakistan Economic Survey 2024–25 painted a picture of an economy clawing its way back from the brink, supported by record-low inflation, fiscal discipline, and a current account surplus. Budget 2025–26 now attempts to build on that fragile stability, setting an ambitious fiscal trajectory while contending with the deep structural limitations of Pakistan's public finance system. The federal budget for FY2025–26 has been set at Rs 17.57 trillion, marking a 7 percent decline from the revised figures of the outgoing year. Of this, Rs 16.28 trillion is allocated to current expenditures and Rs 1 trillion to the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP). Interest payments alone are projected at Rs 8.21 trillion, while defence expenditure has been increased to Rs 2.55 trillion. The government expects a fiscal deficit of 3.9 percent of GDP and a primary surplus of 2.4 percent, in line with IMF expectations for fiscal consolidation. The Economic Survey confirms that GDP grew by 2.68 percent in FY2024–25, driven by 3.42 percent growth in industry and 3.8 percent in services. Inflation, previously a key destabilizer, fell to an average of 4.7 percent between July and April FY25, down from 26 percent a year earlier. The current account recorded a US$1.9 billion surplus, thanks to a 31 percent increase in remittances (to US$31.2 billion) and a 6.4 percent rise in exports. Foreign reserves stood at US$16.6 billion as of April. However, growth in agriculture stagnated at 0.56 percent, large-scale manufacturing contracted by 1.47 percent, and foreign direct investment remained subdued at $1.8 billion reflecting in the fact that the recovery remains fragile and uneven. To finance this year's outlay, the government expects gross revenues of Rs 19.28 trillion. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) is tasked with collecting Rs 14.13 trillion in tax revenues, a nearly 40 percent increase over the previous year. Non-tax revenues are expected to add Rs 3.58 trillion, with the petroleum levy budgeted at a record Rs 1.468 trillion. As per the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, 57.5 percent of the divisible pool will be transferred to provinces, amounting to Rs 5.14 trillion. This leaves the federal government with a shrinking share to finance debt servicing, national defence, subsidies, and federal programmes a structural constraint repeatedly highlighted in the budget document. A defining feature of the budget is its revised tax regime for salaried individuals. To provide relief to the middle class, income tax slabs have been adjusted. No tax is due on annual income up to Rs 600,000. Income between Rs 600,001 and Rs 1.2 million is taxed at 1 percent, while rates for higher income brackets are 11 percent (Rs 1.2–2.2 million), 23 percent (Rs 2.2–3.2 million), and 35 percent for income above Rs 4.1 million. These revisions aim to marginally reduce the burden on lower-income earners, though inflation continues to weigh heavily on real incomes. To broaden the tax base and crack down on informal economic activity, the government has taken a tough stance on non-filers. Withholding tax on cash withdrawals by non-filers has increased from 0.6 percent to 1 percent. Additionally, non-filers will be barred from opening bank accounts, investing in mutual funds or securities, and purchasing vehicles or immovable property. These measures are part of a broader effort to increase documentation and compliance, although past experience suggests that enforcement will remain a major challenge. On the corporate front, the government has slightly reduced the super tax on high-income corporations from 10 percent to 9 percent. A new National Tariff Policy has been announced, promising gradual reductions in additional customs and regulatory duties. A carbon levy of Rs 2.5 per liter has been introduced on petroleum products, to be raised to Rs 5 per liter next year, in line with green finance commitments under the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Facility. The budget makes space for social protection, albeit selectively. The Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) has received a record allocation of Rs 716 billion, expected to support over 9 million families. Pension outlays have been set at Rs 1.055 trillion, and subsidies for the power sector at Rs 1.036 trillion. Despite these efforts, combined allocations for education, health, and population welfare remain under 2 percent of GDP far below international benchmarks. Human capital investment continues to lag behind, undermining long-term development goals. Climate change receives token attention in the budget. While the Economic Survey mentions carbon markets, green sukuks, and Article 6 cooperation under the Paris Agreement, the budget lacks specific allocations for climate adaptation or mitigation. Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which offer immense potential in forest-based carbon credits remain excluded from federal fiscal incentives tied to environmental performance. Notably, forestry which offers one of the most viable and scalable options for carbon offset generation in Pakistan remains underfunded and absent from core budgetary priorities. Gilgit-Baltistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and parts of Balochistan, which hold significant forest reserves, could become leaders in nature-based solutions if adequately supported through fiscal incentives and carbon financing frameworks. Nominal GDP for FY2025–26 is projected at Rs 129.57 trillion, with growth expected to reach 3.6 percent. These targets hinge on sustained macroeconomic stability, improved investor confidence, and an uninterrupted flow of multilateral financing. Risks include global economic headwinds, geopolitical uncertainty, and Pakistan's limited fiscal space, which is heavily consumed by debt obligations. In essence, Budget 2025–26 reflects a cautious but necessary balancing act. It offers incremental relief to salaried taxpayers, strengthens social protection through BISP, and recommits fiscal responsibility under the IMF's watch. However, the structural issues persist: an overreliance on indirect taxation, underinvestment in people and climate, and a weak provincial-federal fiscal arrangement that curbs development ambition. The true test lies in implementation whether the promises made in this budget can be translated into lasting, inclusive, and sustainable economic resilience for the people of Pakistan. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025


Business Recorder
24-06-2025
- Business Recorder
A recipe for repeated failure
The finance minister recently presented the Pakistan Economic Survey 2024–25 with a tone of accomplishment, celebrating a six-decade low in inflation. At first glance, this appears to be good news for a country where millions continue to live below the poverty line. Indeed, any positive shift in macroeconomic indicators should be welcomed but only if it stems from meaningful, sustainable reforms. Unfortunately, that's not the case. We are walking a precarious path, chasing the illusion of economic stabilization while ignoring the deep-seated flaws in our system. It's a dangerous approach, one that treats the symptoms, not the disease, and sets us up for future failures. Take agriculture, not just a sector, but Pakistan's lifeline. Nearly 70 percent of our population relies on it, directly or indirectly. Yet, it continues to be sidelined. According to official data, major crop production declined by 13 percent this year, which is not a marginal slip, but a clear warning sign. The wheat crisis illustrates how political considerations repeatedly trump national interest. A failure to ensure fair pricing, combined with rising input costs like electricity and urea, has pushed farmers to the brink. With each planting season, they face higher risks and fewer rewards, definitely crushed by policy neglect dressed in populist slogans. If we cannot protect the very people who feed the nation, what kind of economic growth are we aiming for? The government's GDP growth target of 3.56 percent, already modest compared to our historical average of 4.5 percent%, wasn't even met. Blaming global headwinds masks a more uncomfortable truth: internal mismanagement and misplaced priorities. We keep pumping money into politically motivated but economically unproductive ventures, while high-return sectors like SMEs, technology, and export industries are left gasping for support. Our national budget is a reflection of this short-termism. Political optics consistently take precedence over long-term planning. As a result, the engines of real growth are being starved of fuel, while flashy but unsustainable projects grab headlines. Another fundamental weakness lies in our ever-expanding informal economy. Rather than integrating it into the formal structure, our policies encourage its continued existence. It's no secret that countless businesses operate without paying taxes or following regulations. Meanwhile, those who try to play by the rules are penalized burdened by audits, red tape, and higher taxes. In time, many either shut down or are forced to go underground just to survive. Unfortunately, budget 2025 followed by this Economic Survey has the fewest initiatives to increase the tax base. The policy is taxing the already taxed. What's worse is that the very institutions tasked with revenue collection often enable this dysfunction. Whether through neglect or collusion, their inaction erodes faith in the system and entrenches the culture of non-compliance. The services sector fares no better. Consider Pakistan's fast-growing freelance and remote work industry, driven by one of the youngest populations in the world. These digital workers require no subsidies and free laptops but just a clear, supportive policy environment. Yet they are met with uncertainty over payment gateways, taxation, and regulatory hurdles. Frustrated by the culture, many route their financial operations through Gulf countries, depriving Pakistan of valuable foreign exchange and economic potential. This is a tragic missed opportunity. With minimal effort, the government could unleash the power of this low-cost, high-yield export sector, generating jobs boosting foreign earnings, and empowering the youth. Instead, what we see is over-regulation, lack of trust, and a bureaucratic mindset that scares away innovation. Gen Z, inherently comfortable with digital finance, is a natural ally in our effort to document the economy. But rather than incentivizing their participation, the state often treats their financial activity with suspicion. The result? Fear, not confidence. Disengagement, not inclusion. If we're serious about formalizing the economy, we must start by winning public trust, simplifying compliance, and offering incentives rather than penalties. We've spent far too long lurching from crisis to crisis, mistaking temporary stability for genuine progress. What we need is structural transformation: bold reforms in agriculture, taxation, regulation, and service sector development. We need to stop punishing those who follow the rules and stop rewarding those who don't. We must shift our mindset from election cycles to generational thinking. Because the truth is: Pakistan has immense potential. We have the land, the talent, the youth, and a strategic location. But unless we address the foundational issues, surface-level improvements will do little to prevent long-term decline. Our economic managers must rise above the habit of number-polishing and narrative-spinning. The real challenge is not to lower inflation for a quarter, but to build a fair, inclusive, and future-ready economy. We don't need miracles. We need meaningful change and the courage to pursue it. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025


Business Recorder
19-06-2025
- Business Recorder
Between optics and austerity
Pakistan's economic policies resemble a car with two drivers, each pulling the wheel in opposite directions. One foot accelerates through aggressive fiscal spending; the other jams the brakes via tight monetary policy. This conflicting approach makes genuine economic progress nearly impossible. Consider the recent policy stance of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). For most of fiscal year 2024–25, the SBP held interest rates at a punishing 22 percent, aiming to tame inflation. As inflation rates began to decline from over 22 percent in June 2024 to around 15 percent in November 2024, the central bank still kept rates high. According to the latest Pakistan Economic Survey 2024–25, by the fiscal year-end, inflation settled remarkably lower at 4.6 percent, validating the case for a timely rate cut. In 2025, rates were gradually reduced to 11 percent, following a final 100 basis points cut in May. This delayed monetary adjustment came with a heavy cost: interest payments soared to Rs7.764 trillion over the full year, consuming the largest share of current expenditures and crowding out space for development-oriented initiatives. Since most government securities were on floating rates, earlier relaxation of the monetary stance could have sharply reduced this burden. Such heavy borrowing costs inevitably restricted the government's budgetary room for essential public investment. The IMF has repeatedly flagged that prolonged high interest rates, while slowing inflation, also compound the fiscal burden by inflating domestic debt service costs, creating a self-defeating loop for developing economies. Pakistan's own data reflects this policy mismatch, as the IMF noted that real GDP growth in the first two quarters of FY2024–25 remained subdued—1.3 percent and 1.7 percent—despite easing headline inflation. The Economic Survey confirms the full-year GDP growth eventually stood at 2.7 percent, highlighting the missed opportunity for higher growth had the central bank pivoted sooner. At the same time, fiscal authorities projected ambitious numbers. Gross revenue receipts for FY2024–25 were budgeted at Rs17,815 billion, with Rs12,970 billion targeted from FBR taxes. However, the Pakistan Economic Survey 2024–25 revealed that the FBR collected a total of Rs10.23 trillion, falling short by a staggering Rs1.03 trillion—roughly 8 percent below target. This shortfall was concentrated in sales tax and customs duties, which underperformed due to import compression and disinflation, eroding the tax base. Sales tax collections suffered as inflation cooled and domestic consumption slowed, while customs duties fell alongside declining import volumes. In contrast, income taxes showed relative resilience, primarily because they were collected at source — via employer deductions and AWT through telecom providers — rather than through voluntary compliance. To compensate for the gap, the government leaned heavily on non-tax revenues, particularly the extraordinary SBP profits of Rs2.5 trillion (midyear figure). But these profits are tied to high interest rates and will shrink drastically as the central bank lowers rates, making them an unreliable pillar for future fiscal planning. Moreover, these profits are not 'earned' in a conventional sense; they represent accounting transfers derived largely from interest paid by the government itself to the SBP on its own borrowing, which distorts the true fiscal picture rather than strengthening it. Despite these revenue struggles, however, the government showcased a strong primary surplus—officially Rs3,604 billion (2.9 percent of GDP) by December 2024, although the IMF's adjusted calculations placed it at Rs2,264 billion (2.0 percent of GDP), discounting one-off SBP profits. At first glance, this signaled fiscal prudence, but it came at the expense of critical long-term investment. By year-end, actual federal PSDP disbursements stood at just Rs564.5 billion out of a Rs950 billion revised allocation, reflecting continued underutilization. arlier in the year, only Rs296 billion had been spent by December, with verified SAP system disbursements even lower at Rs145.4 billion. According to the Pakistan Economic Survey, despite announcing an ambitious Rs4.224 trillion development budget for FY2025–26 (including both federal and provincial components), actual public development outlays in FY2024–25 fell short at Rs3.483 trillion, raising doubts about realistic planning. This sharp underutilization reflects a broader pattern: when budgetary room tightens, investment is the first casualty, regardless of stated priorities. Even the IMF acknowledged in its Article IV consultations that the surplus has been achieved primarily through expenditure compression—especially in public infrastructure spending—rather than through structural revenue improvements. It also highlighted that while headline inflation had eased to 0.3% month-on-month by April 2025, core inflation persisted at 9%, reflecting stubborn price pressures in non-volatile categories. Another silent drain on the economy often overlooked is the cost of managing a high-cash economy. During July–March FY2024–25, currency in circulation rose by Rs1,108 billion. This rising demand for cash reflects limited financial inclusion and forces the government to service liquidity needs at high borrowing costs, adding another layer of fiscal inefficiency. Simultaneously, regressive taxation persists, such as advance income tax deductions on mobile phone top-ups, disproportionately affecting the lower-income population. Defense spending, projected to rise by 12.2 percent to Rs2.4 trillion in the FY2025–26 budget by the IMF, reflects the security imperatives of a region marked by persistent tensions. While national defence remains non-negotiable — especially amid the ongoing security challenges posed by recent tensions with India — it reinforces the urgency of making what remains of the fiscal envelope count, particularly for social protection and growth-oriented projects. With 110 million citizens living below the poverty line, the challenge lies in balancing essential defence spending with meaningful investment in human capital. In recent developments, the National Economic Council (NEC) approved the Annual Development Plan for FY2025–26, allocating Rs4.224 trillion for development projects—Rs1 trillion earmarked for federal schemes and Rs2.869 trillion for provincial initiatives. The ambitious Rs4 trillion-plus allocation underscores the government's renewed commitment to key sectors like health, education, infrastructure, and housing. However, credibility remains in doubt. For FY2024–25, the federal PSDP was originally set at Rs1.4 trillion but was later revised downward to Rs1.1 trillion. As of May 2025, only Rs596 billion had actually been utilized—a staggering shortfall of over Rs800 billion. This underuse not only reflects fiscal constraints and delayed releases due to IMF-agreed targets, but also exposes the limited absorption capacity of ministries. The gap between announced intentions and actual execution continues to widen, reinforcing skepticism about whether the new targets represent genuine developmental intent or political optics. This pattern highlights a persistent policy disconnect: debt servicing, inflated by high interest rates, forces cuts in long-term investment. Capital spending, meant to boost sustainable growth, becomes the first casualty in a budget strained by security needs and costly borrowing. Compounding the challenge, total government debt surged by Rs6 trillion in the first ten months of FY2024–25, reaching Rs74.936 trillion due to increased borrowing amid revenue gaps. Externally, the economic picture shows paradoxical stability. According to the Economic Survey, Pakistan's current account surplus stood at $1.9 billion from July–April FY2024–25, largely due to a robust 30.9 percent surge in remittances. Foreign exchange reserves improved to $16.64 billion by May 27, exceeding IMF targets, and the exchange rate premium narrowed significantly. Meanwhile, one critical missing link is subnational fiscal performance. Provincial governments must urgently broaden their tax base—particularly through better collection of sales tax on services, property tax, and agriculture income tax. These are constitutionally devolved responsibilities, yet provincial revenue performance remains abysmal, with excessive reliance on federal transfers. Without a meaningful push to mobilize own-source revenues at the provincial level, the burden will continue falling on a narrow federal tax base already stretched to the limit. This disconnect between external calm and internal dysfunction only emphasizes the core incoherence: while monetary policy was stuck in overcorrection, fiscal management was running on promises and patchwork. Had the SBP lowered rates sooner, debt servicing costs would not have consumed half the fiscal oxygen. Had tax targets been met, they would have equaled nearly $3 billion—roughly matching a full year's IMF disbursement under the Extended Fund Facility. Instead, Pakistan finds itself spending more to service past borrowing, all while cutting the very investments that could fuel future growth. To escape this policy gridlock, Pakistan must replace its economic tug-of-war with synchronized steering. Fiscal discipline must mean more than cosmetic primary surpluses built on cuts to growth-oriented spending. Monetary policy must respond dynamically; taking into account inflation and the broader fiscal context. Tax reform must go deeper than administrative tweaks. And capital investment must stop being treated as optional. If both drivers can agree on a common direction—growth through coordination—there is still time to turn the wheel. But without that alignment, the vehicle will keep swerving off course, stuck in a loop of conflict, correction, and chronic stagnation. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025