Stopgap spending: Iraq's budget ambitions clash with fiscal reality
Despite a record three-year budget approved in 2023, the government has resorted to reallocating tax trust funds to cover public sector wages, in an unusual move that lawmakers see as a 'clear signal' of tightening liquidity.
This budget, passed under Law No. 13, is based on a crude oil benchmark of $70 per barrel, but revenues briefly exceeded expectations early in the year, with oil trading around $75. However, prices have since fallen below $62 following the removal of OPEC+ production limits, cutting into the country's main revenue stream.
With oil accounting for nearly 90% of government income, the fiscal impact has been immediate. Lawmaker Zuhair al-Fatlawi confirmed that the government had drawn from contractor-held tax deposits to meet payroll obligations. 'This reflects a shortfall in liquid funds,' he told Shafaq News. 'Routine revenue flows are proving inadequate.'
Ministries such as Health and Water Resources are operating without full allocations. Capital projects in Babil, Al-Diwaniyah, and Karbala have either slowed or halted due to inconsistent disbursements. 'Some regions are funded, others are left waiting,' al-Fatlawi emphasized.
Revenue Rigidity
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's Financial and Economic Advisor, Mudher Mohammad Saleh, defended the fiscal approach, pointing to mechanisms within the budget law that allow for flexibility. 'The budget operates on the principle of fiscal space,' he explained. 'It enables borrowing, resource reallocation, and controlled spending adjustments.' The government is authorized to borrow up to 64 trillion Iraqi dinars ($48.89B) if needed.
Iraq's vulnerability is less about the oil price itself and more about the absence of diversified revenue sources. Non-oil tax collection remains underdeveloped, and budget execution is inconsistent across agencies. 'Oil volatility is a risk, but institutional rigidity is the larger issue,' said a Baghdad-based analyst.
Notably, payment delays to contractors are triggering liquidity problems in the private sector, and further disbursement lags could freeze project pipelines and reduce market activity in a heavily state-led economy.
'Liquidity stress is contagious in Iraq's fiscal ecosystem,' public finance expert Mustafa al-Faraj affirmed. 'When escrow funds are repurposed, it undermines financial discipline and signals deeper structural imbalance.'
The IMF has noted that delayed infrastructure investment can cut expected GDP impact by up to 40%, weakening the effectiveness of public spending even when funding is eventually restored.
Tools Available, but Reforms Lag
Iraq's Central Bank holds more than $100 billion in foreign reserves, offering a strategic buffer. However, economist Safwan Qusay cautioned against using reserves to plug structural gaps. 'These reserves are meant for external stability, not internal liquidity.'
Qusay advocated for accelerating domestic reforms: enforcing utility payments, monetizing idle public assets, and revising land-use fees. 'The state needs to act more like an investor and less like a passive payer,' he emphasized, estimating that if prices stay below projections, Iraq could face monthly shortfalls exceeding $1.5 billion.
In that scenario, options include tapping domestic bond markets or seeking external financing—a move that could further test fiscal credibility.
Disparities in budget transfers across provinces have also raised concerns about equity and governance. With the next national elections set for November 2025, prolonged underfunding in public services may carry political consequences, particularly in provinces already expressing frustration over project delays and financial uncertainty.
For now, Iraq is not in immediate fiscal crisis, but the warning signs are evident. Reliance on short-term measures to manage a structurally rigid and oil-dependent system has narrowed policy space, and without faster reform and revenue diversification, fiscal pressures could escalate into grave economic and political risks.
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Rudaw Net
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Iraqi parliament fails to discuss drone attacks on Kurdistan Region
Also in Iraq Iraq's top court rejects lawsuits against Kurdish parliament PM Sudani welcomes new commander of anti-ISIS coalition Iraq cannot control militias attacking Kurdistan Region, says MP Iraq records 16 new cases of Crimean-Congo fever A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Iraq's parliament wrapped up a session Monday without addressing recent drone strikes on Kurdistan Region oil infrastructure, after Kurdish factions boycotted the session for unknown reasons, sources told Rudaw. The session's agenda included two main topics: the deadly fire at a shopping mall in Iraq's Kut and drone attacks targeting the Kurdistan Region's oil and energy infrastructure. The parliament said in a statement only the former topic was discussed without elaborating. Lawmakers from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) boycotted the session. Only three Kurdish parliamentarians attended it, according to Soran Omar from the Islamist Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal). Two of them left the session before it ended. 'The first item was discussed, but because Kurdish parliamentarians did not participate, I requested Muhsin al-Mandalawi, Deputy Speaker of Parliament who was chairing the session, to remove the drone attacks item from the session agenda. He removed it and it was not discussed,' Omar told Rudaw. The first agenda item was a massive fire late Wednesday at a newly opened shopping mall in Kut, the capital of Wasit province, which killed at least 77 people. Most victims died from smoke inhalation, and the incident sparked public outrage over the lack of emergency exits and lax safety standards. According to Omar, Mandalawi expressed his surprise at the absence of Kurdish lawmakers, saying, 'They themselves had requested the session, yet now they have not participated in the session.' Dara Sekaniani, a Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) lawmaker and member of the Iraqi parliament's legal committee, said he left after it became clear the drone strikes would not be discussed. Showan Kalari and Sherwan Dubardani, KDP lawmakers, later told Rudaw they were instructed by party leadership not to attend, without knowing the reason. 'We have no information, they just said not to participate and we did not participate,' they said. PUK lawmaker Srwa Mohammed also confirmed her party's absence but did not provide further details. Omar criticized the Region's ruling parties for not participating, especially since the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has directly accused Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of being behind the drone attacks - a claim denied by Baghdad. Omar said that since the interior ministry has made the accusation, the Region's ruling parties - the KDP and the PUK - should have attended the session and voiced their concerns. Since early July, nearly 20 drone attacks have hit the Kurdistan Region, mostly targeting oil fields and causing significant financial losses. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks and there have been no new attacks since Erbil and Baghdad reached a new agreement on finances and oil exports on Thursday. The map shows the approximate locations of drone attacks on the Kurdistan Region recorded by Rudaw English between July 1-17. Iraq's parliament on Friday launched an investigation into recent drone attacks. 'Next week we, as the Security and Defense Committee, will have a visit to learn the details of the incident and who is behind this incident,' Mohammed Rasul, a member of parliament's Security and Defense Committee, told Rudaw on Friday. The Kurdistan Region's Presidency, Council of Ministers, and Ministry of Natural Resources have all strongly condemned the attacks, describing them as attempts to cripple the Region's vital oil infrastructure. They called on the federal government to hold the perpetrators to account. The international community has also condemned the attacks. KRG Deputy Chief of Staff Aziz Ahmad said last week that drone strikes by 'criminal militias on the Iraqi government payroll' have led to the loss of nearly 200,000 barrels of oil production per day. Ahmad also said that the drones were launched from Kirkuk province.
Memri
30 minutes ago
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Druze Revolts, Then And Now
Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash in exile in Saudi Arabia Exactly a century ago, what began as a dispute about local power in the Druze majority region of Southern Syria erupted into a long-lasting anti-imperialist revolt, one that would have a lasting regional impact. In July 2025, a different Druze revolt threatened to change the trajectory of political change in Syria and is already havening regional implications. The Druze, a relatively small and compact ethnic and religious minority found mostly in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, are once again in the spotlight. On July 21, 1925, Druze feudal leader Sultan Al-Atrash announced a revolt against the French Mandate in the Levant. French rule in Syria, part of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between Britain and France, had already been rocky from the start. French efforts at modernizing and controlling Syria had also been characterized by a considerable amount of meddling and heavy-handed micromanaging. The powerful Al-Atrash family (the Turshan, plural of Atrash) had sent representatives to iron out differences with the French only to have them jailed as hostages in order to secure good behavior from the Druze. The French did not quite know who they were dealing with. Sultan Al-Atrash had lost a father to the Ottomans, been drafted into the Turkish Army and later had fought the French in past battles.[1] This was a warrior chief from among a warrior people. Jealous of his personal power and feudal privileges, the Great Syrian Revolt Al-Atrash ignited was not a parochial one but framed in the potent language of Syrian Arab Nationalism, anti-imperialism and freedom. His revolutionary manifesto (drafted by Damascus intellectuals) even called for the "application of the principles of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man." The humble Arab masses, what Al-Atrash dubbed "the patchers of cloaks" were especially inspired by this cause.[2] Despite many small victories and undoubted bravery, Al-Atrash would eventually lose the war to the French but become a legendary figure, even in the West (he was portrayed heroically in the December 1925 issue of The Atlantic, in an article written by a Revisionist Zionist).[3] While he may have lost on the battlefield, Al-Atrash's cause won politically, giving a tremendous boost to both Syrian patriotism and Arab Nationalism, a feat that would later earn him the praise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hafiz Al-Assad. And yet in 1946, 20 years after that nationalist revolt, the Al-Atrash clan fought fiercely against the newly independent Arab government in Damascus (under Presidents Shukri Al-Quwatli and Adib Shishakli) to maintain Druze rights and autonomy. The Druze, like the Alawites, and like the Christians of neighboring Lebanon, seemed to have had two quarreling factions within their ranks: those seeking unity with the greater whole – either with the state and/or the Arab nation – and those leaning towards greater autonomy, federalism, or separation.[4] Clipping of PLO Chief Yasser Arafat with an ailing Sultan Al-Atrash The Turshan still exist but they are not the leading political figures of the Syrian Druze today. As with other polities and individuals in Syria over the past 15 years, the Druze have had to maneuver and scheme in their relations with the state, with each other, with the Assad regime, during the brutal Syrian Civil War, and now with the new Syrian government headed by Islamist President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. There were Syrian Druze who fought against Assad and there were Syrian Druze who collaborated with and indeed held high military rank in the Assad regime army. A (pro-Al-Hijri) Druze fighter desecrating the tomb of Wahid Al-Balous (July 2025) Syria's most prominent Druze figures today represent the two sides of that historic Druze duality and ambivalence. 30-year-old Laith Al-Balous represents the more Syrian Arab nationalist Druze tendency, looking towards today's Damascus government. The Al-Balous (through Laith's father, Wahid Al-Balous, who was assassinated by the Assad regime in 2015) raised their own militia which fought against Jihadists and against aggressive Bedouin (Sunni Arab) neighbors but which also mostly leaned against the Assad regime.[5] Druze fighter posing with dead Syrian government troops (July 2025) The traditional Druze religious leadership, especially in the person of Venezuela-born 60-year-old Hikmat Al-Hijri (many Druze have ties with South America, especially Venezuela), leaned much more decisively towards the Assad regime through the years. Al-Hijri broke with the Assad regime only at the very end, and much more clearly represents the autonomy-seeking tendency among the Druze.[6] And although Al-Hijri's powerbase was initially religious, he is now very much a political player, with his own militia base and international ties (to the Israeli Druze).[7] Critics also accuse Al-Hijri of having recruited former Assad regime officers among the Syrian Druze and to be deeply involved in the Syrian drug trade across the border into Jordan. Both Al-Balous and Al-Hijri are connected, in different ways, in the recent violence in Syria's Druze majority Suwayda Governorate. One of the challenges the new government in Damascus faces is how to incorporate breakaway provinces back into a centrally-ruled Syria. This is a major problem with the Kurdish ruled Syrian Northeast and with Druze Suwayda.[8] Earlier this month, the Damascus government saw what seemed a golden opportunity to reincorporate Suwayda into Syria. The 1925 war was triggered by a dead cat belonging to a French officer. The ostensible trigger for the 2025 war was the stealing of a Druze vegetable truck at a pro-government Bedouin-run checkpoint. Both local events were, of course, intimately connected to larger questions of power and authority in Syria, a century ago under French military, today, under Syria's new Islamist rulers. Anti "Al-Hijri Gangs" propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) With the vegetable truck incident, tensions between Bedouin and Druze (which are nothing new) then exploded into outright conflict, with kidnappings and murders on both sides. Al-Hijri's men – already regarded suspiciously by Damascus because of the international ties, the Assad officer connection and the smuggling question – were prominent in fighting (and killing) their Bedouin rivals. Damascus saw the sending of troops as a way to solve several problems – restore order, extend state power, curtail (or maybe eliminate) a troublesome local potentate, perhaps also build up a more amenable local figure in Laith Al-Balous.[9] Infamous image of Druze cleric having his mustache clipped by government soldier (July 2025) But disaster struck. The Damascus units initially sent in had two major problems. They seem to have been made up of raw recruits and they were contaminated by open religious animus. Videos of government soldiers mocking the Druze including several showing government fighters forcibly shaving the mustaches of Druze elders peppered social media. Islamists called for "no Druze mustaches (shawarib) or baggy pants (the traditional Druze sherwal)." And if insults were not bad enough, government troops and the pro-government Bedouin militias committed many human rights abuses against Druze civilians (not just against Al-Hijri's fighters) while Al-Hijri's forces seem to not just ambushed government troops but also slaughtered civilian prisoners and taken hostages. All of this, the rhetoric, the videos, calls for revenge, calls to slaughter the Druze (not just "the criminal Al-Hijri") fed into larger regional and international narratives.[10] Enemies of the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government in Damascus, including Iran and its allies, Assad regime types, and the Syrian Kurds, wasted no time in highlighting the abuses, and there was plenty of real material to work with. Pro-Syrian government forces stand on image of Druze flag and Sultan Al-Atrash With its own Druze population, a valued part of the state of Israel's history and armed forces, rhetoric (and real violence) against the Syrian Druze and deeply ambivalent about Islamist rule in Damascus, the IDF intervened directly on the side of the Druze (meaning on the side of Al-Hijri).[11] Israel has long considered Southern Syria an area of deep strategic concern. Israel not only hit local government units and militias confronting Druze forces but spectacularly bombing the Syrian Defense Ministry in Damascus on live television. With the help of American mediation, Damascus tried to forge a de-escalation agreement with the Druze which may or may not last. Government troops pulled back which led to even worse violence which then seems to be leading to government forces returning to the region.[12] There are simultaneously community-generated efforts at vendetta and at peacebuilding happening between Druze and non-Druze. Anti-Druze, pro-government propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) Much blood has been spilt and hearts hardened, especially among the Syrian Sunni majority against the Druze. There is deep rage and fury on both sides. While pro-government voices seek to place all the blame on the mercurial Druze warlord Al-Hijri, the fact remains that many Druze (and some Christians) were slaughtered, raped or kidnapped by pro-government forces (whether Bedouin or uniformed government units) with no regard to political affiliation.[13] Syrian Bedouin Tribes Meet to Demand Disarming of Al-Hijri's militia (January 2025) Both sides are being portrayed as either victims or villains and both are portrayed too often, falsely, as uniform fronts.[14] There has been so much rhetoric and so much twisting, for political or ideological reasons, of the facts or exaggeration that it is important to make some general statements about the situation: 1) Tension and violence between Syrian Bedouin and Druze are not new. In addition, elements of both groups have connections with and are competitors in the lucrative smuggling (drugs and guns) business. They are not just in conflict because of religion or ethnicity. 2) There has been heightened anti-Druze tension for months in Syria.[15] In April 2025, there were bloodcurdling threats against Druze as a result of a suspicious video of a Druze man insulting the Prophet Muhammad which led to Syrian Sunni Muslim calls for violence against the Druze community as a whole.[16] 3) The March 2025 slaughter of Alawites by government forces on the Syrian Coast and the seeming subsequent impunity of those forces has heightened tensions with all ethnic and religious communities in the country across the board. The Druze, like the Kurds, and unlike the Christians, are armed and everyone is more leery of domination by Damascus after the March events. 4) Hikmat Al-Hijri is indeed a scheming, volatile figure who seeks to gain ultimate power within his community and is involved in all sorts of suspicious enterprises. But the indiscriminate slaughter of Druze by Bedouin/government forces seems to have boosted his popularity among Druze while Al-Balous's influence is greatly diminished in comparison. 5) The Syrian government has real ties with Syrian Bedouin which it has used and is using as a tool to project power. In this conflict, the Bedouin are not completely free actors but rather enthusiastic sub-contractors, pursuing their own vendettas and crimes (such as rape and looting) while broadly serving the political interests of the Damascus government, in a sense serving as the "bad cop" to the Syrian government's relative "good cop."[17] 6) The Damascus government – whatever President Al-Sharaa's real feelings on the matter – is itself not a free actor in this conflict either. Al-Sharaa is exquisitely aware of Qatari, and especially Turkish interests, in everything involving Syria, including the South. In a way, what happened with the Druze can be seen as a dry-run for a similar campaign to be directed against the Kurdish-led SDF in the country's Northeast, an issue of tremendous interest to the Erdogan regime. But Al-Sharaa seems to also be hampered by his own cadres, blunt and chaotic instruments who seem to be cruder and less disciplined than he would prefer.[18] Pro-Al-Hijri Propaganda on social media comparing him to Sultan Al-Atrash (July 2025) A century after Sultan Al-Atrash's heroism, the situation in Syria seems dire indeed, balancing on the edge of a knife. Any celebration marking the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and the great Druze warrior would ring extremely hollow today. A shaky ceasefire seems to be holding in Suwayda but what comes next?[19] The war-wrecked country's already frayed social fabric is again, deeply and severely wounded. *Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.
Memri
30 minutes ago
- Memri
Systematic Atrocities Against The Druze In Swaida, Syria July 2025 – WARNING: GRAPHIC
On July 20, 2025, the Druze Documentation Nexus published the following report, titled "Systematic Atrocities Against the Druze in Swaida, Syria July 2025." The report, which was provided to MEMRI, documents the brutal campaign of sectarian violence with coordinated and organized attacks by Al-Joulani regime forces, terrorist militias, and Bedouin tribes targeting the Druze community in Swaida, located in Southern Syria. Following are the text and images of the report: Silence is no longer an option. The Druze and other minorities ask only for the right to live in peace on their ancestral land. We urge you: HELP US SURVIVE! Executive Summary On July 14, 2025, the City of Swaida witnessed a brutal campaign of sectarian violence targeting the Druze community. Initially framed as retaliatory operations by Bedouin groups and extremist elements, the events quickly escalated into a coordinated campaign of systematic atrocities. What began as sporadic assaults evolved into a deliberate and sustained onslaught involving state-aligned forces, local militias, and jihadist factions. Contrary to their official mandate, units from the General Security Force of the Interior Ministry and Multiple Syrian Army Divisions operating under the Syrian Defense Ministry, not only failed to protect the Swaida civilians but actively collaborated with Bedouin militias and extremist fighters. The result was a multi-day campaign characterized by targeted killings, acts of sexual violence, use of Turkish drones to bomb civilians, mass executions, looting, burning down houses, and widespread desecration of cultural and religious sites. Coordinated And Organized Attacks By Al-Joulani Regime Forces, Terrorist Militias, And Bedouin Tribes Organized and coordinated attacks by Al-Joulani regime forces and terrorist militias against Jaramana City, Ashrafiyet Sahnaya, Sahnaya and Swaida Outskirts resulted in hundreds of victims between killed, wounded and arrested. Coordinated and organized attacks by Al-Joulani regime forces, terrorist militias and Bedouin Tribes attacked Swaida from different sides. Imams in their mosques called for jihad all over Syria. The violence intensified. Government forces officially entered the region under the pretense of restoring order but instead escalated the massacre and supported the non-state actors in brutality and Ethnic Cleansing, resulted to date in 1,017 killed and hundreds others wounded and abducted. Tens of thousands were displaced from their homes. Nature Of Atrocities Committed Extrajudicial Killings: Civilians, including entire families attempting to flee, were executed. Alawite refugees, previously displaced from coastal violence, were among the victims. Sexual Violence: Numerous credible reports emerged of women and girls being raped and abducted. More than 80 women and girls are still abducted. Targeted Humiliation and Torture: Elderly Druze men were subjected to public humiliation, including being forced to imitate animals, having their facial hair forcibly removed, and enduring torture before being executed. Medical Blockades: Hospitals were sealed off, shelled, medical equipment looted. Medical personnel Killed or Trapped, with no access to evacuation or external aid. Several wounded civilians were denied treatment and were left to die and many wounded patients were executed in the hospital. Desecration of the Dead: Bodies of the deceased were mutilated and mocked post-mortem. Video evidence shows government-aligned forces partaking in these acts. Religious and Cultural Destruction: Homes, shops, Druze shrines, and churches were systematically looted, vandalized and/or burned down. Sacred objects were defiled or destroyed in acts of sectarian symbolism. Role Of State And Non-State Actors The Syrian Ministry of Defense Army divisions and the General Security Force are directly implicated in facilitating, endorsing, and participating in the violence, massacres and destruction. Despite official state media narratives portraying the conflict as a Druze-Bedouin conflict and portraying government efforts to restore order, independent documentation and footage confirm active participation of Government authorities in the atrocities and ethnic cleansing. Non-state actors, including Bedouin militias and jihadist groups from Homs, Idlib, and other Syrian governorates operated with impunity. Government logistical support, public endorsement, and ideological alignment between these groups and state apparatuses indicate a shared strategic and organized planning in targeting the Druze and Christian community in Swaida. Intent And Pattern The violence in Swaida bears clear markers of systematic, sectarian persecution. The intent was not merely territorial control or conflict containment but the dehumanization, terrorization, and eradication of a minority community. The pattern in alignment with earlier atrocities along the Syrian coast and Christians in multiple locations across Syria proves a recurring campaign of sectarian cleansing masked by counter-insurgency rhetoric. Conclusion And Recommendations This ongoing event in Swaida that started on July 14 represents a grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights standards. They demand immediate international scrutiny, independent investigation, and accountability for those responsible, including state actors. Recommendations - An urgent UN-mandated inquiry should be established to investigate crimes against humanity in Swaida. - Immediate humanitarian access must be granted to the region to assess and respond to the needs of surviving victims. -Sanctions and legal proceedings should target individuals and institutions within the Al-Joulani government complicit in the violence. -The international community must prioritize protection mechanisms for vulnerable minority populations in Syria to prevent recurrence. List of Victims There are more than 1,017 Druze and Christian victims in Swaida. Below is a list of more than 245 Druze and Christian victims. There remain several hundred bodies in the hospital yet to be identified and documented. Al-Radwan Guesthouse Massacre: Location: Central Swaida city. Date: July 15, 2025 Toll: 13 martyrs and 3 injured in intensive care. Incident Report Summary: A military unit, including individuals in official military uniforms, forcibly entered the Al-Radwan Guesthouse and indiscriminately opened fire on all those present. All victims were unarmed civilians. A video recording from the scene shows the bodies of the victims inside the guesthouse, providing visual evidence of the attack. Al-Qardab Crime Near Al-Basha Roundabout: Location: Al-Basha Roundabout, Swaida city. Toll: six martyrs, including three siblings and three relatives. Details: A security patrol carried out a field execution of six civilians in front of their home, in the presence of the mother of the three siblings. The victims, aged between 25 and 30, included two engineers and university students. The Killing Of Innocent Children The secret forces showed no mercy – not even to children. Many young lives were taken in cold blood. These are just a few of the innocent victims: -Yaman Maen Maklad – only 11 years old. - Zaid Dalal – 14 years old. He was shot in the head during the events in Sweida City. -Genna Helal – a 14-year-old girl killed by secret forces. -Odai and Qusai Abou Ammar – brothers aged 13 and 17. Their lives were tragically cut short. These names are not just statistics – they were children with dreams, families, and futures that were stolen from them. Al-Qantar And Al-Qassem Crime Location: In front of the victims' home, Swaida. Toll: three civilian martyrs. Details: Three civilians from the Al-Qantar and Al-Qassem families were subjected to a field execution in front of their home. Depicted below is a shocking image documenting the bodies of the victims alongside two female relatives. Killing Of Medical Doctors And Staff Dr. Faten Hussein Hilal was shot in the head while heading to Swaida National Hospital to perform her humanitarian duties, resulting in her martyrdom. Dr. Talaat Amer was killed on duty in the National Swaida Hospital. Emergency Department Dr. Lujain Alarbeed posted on her Facebook: "I am Dr. Lujain Al- Arbeed. We are trapped in the emergency department, me and the medical staff. We are being shot at from inside the hospital. If you can help us, please do. And if not, forgive us, we were supporting you until the last moment." The Execution Of U.S. Citizen Hosam Saraya More than 100 US Citizens, Green Card Holders, and their first-degree relatives have reported missing, caught in a crossfire in Swaida, or their situation is unknown. Hosam Saraya, a U.S. citizen and resident of Oklahoma, was gunned down along with his father, uncles, and cousins – every adult male in the household – all members of the Druze minority, during a raid by Al-Joulani regime forces on their family home in Tishreen City Square. Hosam was in Sweida, Syria on an extended visit to care for his family. He was planning to return to the U.S. but was trapped when Al-Joulani regime forces closed the roads into and out of the city. His family in the U.S. had already reached out to the U.S. Embassy and the State Department, who responded quickly – but tragically, it was too late. Hosam was murdered just hours later. Destruction Of Religious Sites And Symbols St. Michael Church in the village of Soura Al-Kabeera, rural Swaida, was set on fire following the takeover of the village by General Security forces affiliated with the Ministry of Defense.[1] Druze religious places and symbols were destroyed by members of the Al-Joulani General Security Forces. Genocide In Swaida Between July 14-19, 2025 Sectarian Abuse Media pages affiliated with the authorities have circulated footage showing members of Al-Joulani General Security and Army forces affiliated with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense humiliating key religious symbols and civilians by forcibly shaving mustaches (a sacred symbol of dignity and heritage).[2] Jihadi Incitement Civilian buses were spotted in areas under the control of the de facto government, bearing banners that read: "Dedicated to transporting Terrorists Mujahideen fighters to Swaida for free." Abducted Druze Woman More than 80 women and girls were reported missing including: Samar Jamil Nassar, 31; Abeer Hisham Qurdab, 24; Sawsan Khaldoun Muhanna, 33; Dima Bashar Najm Ghanem, 29; and Widad Ahd Deeb, 26. Deliberate Cutoff Of Essential Services In Swaida The Druze community in Swaida have been deliberately subjected to harsh and inhumane conditions as part of a broader campaign of collective punishment. Authorities have systematically cut off electricity, water, and internet services, decommissioned all hospitals in Swaida, and cut off food supplies to the region, aiming to starve the local population to death, as part of the tools of ethnic cleansing. Other Tragic News Hundreds of bodies belonging to members of the Druze community remain scattered in the streets of Swaida, a grim reminder of the brutality inflicted upon Swaida. Numerous videos from Swaida reveal extensive looting and destruction carried out by Al-Joulani General Security forces and his terrorist Militias across homes, shops, and public property. A three-month-old Druze infant was killed by Al-Joulani General Security forces during Swaida massacres. Foreign fighters were operating alongside Al-Joulani regime security forces. Druze in Idlib and Damascus are being actively targeted with incitement and hate speech. Several Druze students were physically assaulted inside the university of Aleppo/University of Homs/The University of Damascus. The assaults escalated to live gunfire. The streets of Swaida are now littered with bodies. The morgue refrigerators and hallways are full. All local hospitals are overwhelmed with men, women, and children – many in critical condition – lacking access to even the most basic medical supplies. Much of the city is without electricity or running water, and fuel is nearly impossible to find. Most roads remain blocked, including the vital route to Damascus, which supplies the city with food and essential goods. Al-Joulani Regime forces, disguised in tribal attire together with the rogue terrorist tribal militias continue to terrorize the outskirts, sniping at civilians attempting to return to their homes, and together with organized attacks to capture Swaida City again. The threat remains real, and the community is traumatized, exhausted, and dangerously vulnerable. We Are Urgently Calling For: - A humanitarian aid corridor from neighboring Jordan to deliver critical food, water, medical supplies, and fuel. - International protection, through the United Nations or international observers, to monitor the situation and prevent future atrocities. -A strong response from the U.S. State Department and Congress to put pressure on all parties responsible for these human rights violations. We Druze Syrians have long been marginalized and unprotected. We raised alarms months ago – following the massacres against Alawites in Western Syria, and Christians in multiple parts of Syria including the West, Central and Damascus – and once again, history has repeated itself. We cannot allow this cycle to continue.
