
Druze Revolts, Then And Now
Exactly a century ago, what began as a dispute about local power in the Druze majority region of Southern Syria erupted into a long-lasting anti-imperialist revolt, one that would have a lasting regional impact. In July 2025, a different Druze revolt threatened to change the trajectory of political change in Syria and is already havening regional implications. The Druze, a relatively small and compact ethnic and religious minority found mostly in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, are once again in the spotlight.
On July 21, 1925, Druze feudal leader Sultan Al-Atrash announced a revolt against the French Mandate in the Levant. French rule in Syria, part of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between Britain and France, had already been rocky from the start. French efforts at modernizing and controlling Syria had also been characterized by a considerable amount of meddling and heavy-handed micromanaging. The powerful Al-Atrash family (the Turshan, plural of Atrash) had sent representatives to iron out differences with the French only to have them jailed as hostages in order to secure good behavior from the Druze.
The French did not quite know who they were dealing with. Sultan Al-Atrash had lost a father to the Ottomans, been drafted into the Turkish Army and later had fought the French in past battles.[1] This was a warrior chief from among a warrior people. Jealous of his personal power and feudal privileges, the Great Syrian Revolt Al-Atrash ignited was not a parochial one but framed in the potent language of Syrian Arab Nationalism, anti-imperialism and freedom. His revolutionary manifesto (drafted by Damascus intellectuals) even called for the "application of the principles of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man." The humble Arab masses, what Al-Atrash dubbed "the patchers of cloaks" were especially inspired by this cause.[2]
Despite many small victories and undoubted bravery, Al-Atrash would eventually lose the war to the French but become a legendary figure, even in the West (he was portrayed heroically in the December 1925 issue of The Atlantic, in an article written by a Revisionist Zionist).[3] While he may have lost on the battlefield, Al-Atrash's cause won politically, giving a tremendous boost to both Syrian patriotism and Arab Nationalism, a feat that would later earn him the praise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hafiz Al-Assad.
And yet in 1946, 20 years after that nationalist revolt, the Al-Atrash clan fought fiercely against the newly independent Arab government in Damascus (under Presidents Shukri Al-Quwatli and Adib Shishakli) to maintain Druze rights and autonomy. The Druze, like the Alawites, and like the Christians of neighboring Lebanon, seemed to have had two quarreling factions within their ranks: those seeking unity with the greater whole – either with the state and/or the Arab nation – and those leaning towards greater autonomy, federalism, or separation.[4]
Clipping of PLO Chief Yasser Arafat with an ailing Sultan Al-Atrash
The Turshan still exist but they are not the leading political figures of the Syrian Druze today. As with other polities and individuals in Syria over the past 15 years, the Druze have had to maneuver and scheme in their relations with the state, with each other, with the Assad regime, during the brutal Syrian Civil War, and now with the new Syrian government headed by Islamist President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. There were Syrian Druze who fought against Assad and there were Syrian Druze who collaborated with and indeed held high military rank in the Assad regime army.
A (pro-Al-Hijri) Druze fighter desecrating the tomb of Wahid Al-Balous (July 2025)
Syria's most prominent Druze figures today represent the two sides of that historic Druze duality and ambivalence. 30-year-old Laith Al-Balous represents the more Syrian Arab nationalist Druze tendency, looking towards today's Damascus government. The Al-Balous (through Laith's father, Wahid Al-Balous, who was assassinated by the Assad regime in 2015) raised their own militia which fought against Jihadists and against aggressive Bedouin (Sunni Arab) neighbors but which also mostly leaned against the Assad regime.[5]
Druze fighter posing with dead Syrian government troops (July 2025)
The traditional Druze religious leadership, especially in the person of Venezuela-born 60-year-old Hikmat Al-Hijri (many Druze have ties with South America, especially Venezuela), leaned much more decisively towards the Assad regime through the years. Al-Hijri broke with the Assad regime only at the very end, and much more clearly represents the autonomy-seeking tendency among the Druze.[6] And although Al-Hijri's powerbase was initially religious, he is now very much a political player, with his own militia base and international ties (to the Israeli Druze).[7] Critics also accuse Al-Hijri of having recruited former Assad regime officers among the Syrian Druze and to be deeply involved in the Syrian drug trade across the border into Jordan.
Both Al-Balous and Al-Hijri are connected, in different ways, in the recent violence in Syria's Druze majority Suwayda Governorate. One of the challenges the new government in Damascus faces is how to incorporate breakaway provinces back into a centrally-ruled Syria. This is a major problem with the Kurdish ruled Syrian Northeast and with Druze Suwayda.[8] Earlier this month, the Damascus government saw what seemed a golden opportunity to reincorporate Suwayda into Syria.
The 1925 war was triggered by a dead cat belonging to a French officer. The ostensible trigger for the 2025 war was the stealing of a Druze vegetable truck at a pro-government Bedouin-run checkpoint. Both local events were, of course, intimately connected to larger questions of power and authority in Syria, a century ago under French military, today, under Syria's new Islamist rulers.
Anti "Al-Hijri Gangs" propaganda on Twitter (July 2025)
With the vegetable truck incident, tensions between Bedouin and Druze (which are nothing new) then exploded into outright conflict, with kidnappings and murders on both sides. Al-Hijri's men – already regarded suspiciously by Damascus because of the international ties, the Assad officer connection and the smuggling question – were prominent in fighting (and killing) their Bedouin rivals. Damascus saw the sending of troops as a way to solve several problems – restore order, extend state power, curtail (or maybe eliminate) a troublesome local potentate, perhaps also build up a more amenable local figure in Laith Al-Balous.[9]
Infamous image of Druze cleric having his mustache clipped by government soldier (July 2025)
But disaster struck. The Damascus units initially sent in had two major problems. They seem to have been made up of raw recruits and they were contaminated by open religious animus. Videos of government soldiers mocking the Druze including several showing government fighters forcibly shaving the mustaches of Druze elders peppered social media. Islamists called for "no Druze mustaches (shawarib) or baggy pants (the traditional Druze sherwal)." And if insults were not bad enough, government troops and the pro-government Bedouin militias committed many human rights abuses against Druze civilians (not just against Al-Hijri's fighters) while Al-Hijri's forces seem to not just ambushed government troops but also slaughtered civilian prisoners and taken hostages.
All of this, the rhetoric, the videos, calls for revenge, calls to slaughter the Druze (not just "the criminal Al-Hijri") fed into larger regional and international narratives.[10] Enemies of the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government in Damascus, including Iran and its allies, Assad regime types, and the Syrian Kurds, wasted no time in highlighting the abuses, and there was plenty of real material to work with.
Pro-Syrian government forces stand on image of Druze flag and Sultan Al-Atrash
With its own Druze population, a valued part of the state of Israel's history and armed forces, rhetoric (and real violence) against the Syrian Druze and deeply ambivalent about Islamist rule in Damascus, the IDF intervened directly on the side of the Druze (meaning on the side of Al-Hijri).[11] Israel has long considered Southern Syria an area of deep strategic concern. Israel not only hit local government units and militias confronting Druze forces but spectacularly bombing the Syrian Defense Ministry in Damascus on live television.
With the help of American mediation, Damascus tried to forge a de-escalation agreement with the Druze which may or may not last. Government troops pulled back which led to even worse violence which then seems to be leading to government forces returning to the region.[12] There are simultaneously community-generated efforts at vendetta and at peacebuilding happening between Druze and non-Druze.
Anti-Druze, pro-government propaganda on Twitter (July 2025)
Much blood has been spilt and hearts hardened, especially among the Syrian Sunni majority against the Druze. There is deep rage and fury on both sides. While pro-government voices seek to place all the blame on the mercurial Druze warlord Al-Hijri, the fact remains that many Druze (and some Christians) were slaughtered, raped or kidnapped by pro-government forces (whether Bedouin or uniformed government units) with no regard to political affiliation.[13]
Syrian Bedouin Tribes Meet to Demand Disarming of Al-Hijri's militia (January 2025)
Both sides are being portrayed as either victims or villains and both are portrayed too often, falsely, as uniform fronts.[14] There has been so much rhetoric and so much twisting, for political or ideological reasons, of the facts or exaggeration that it is important to make some general statements about the situation:
1) Tension and violence between Syrian Bedouin and Druze are not new. In addition, elements of both groups have connections with and are competitors in the lucrative smuggling (drugs and guns) business. They are not just in conflict because of religion or ethnicity.
2) There has been heightened anti-Druze tension for months in Syria.[15] In April 2025, there were bloodcurdling threats against Druze as a result of a suspicious video of a Druze man insulting the Prophet Muhammad which led to Syrian Sunni Muslim calls for violence against the Druze community as a whole.[16]
3) The March 2025 slaughter of Alawites by government forces on the Syrian Coast and the seeming subsequent impunity of those forces has heightened tensions with all ethnic and religious communities in the country across the board. The Druze, like the Kurds, and unlike the Christians, are armed and everyone is more leery of domination by Damascus after the March events.
4) Hikmat Al-Hijri is indeed a scheming, volatile figure who seeks to gain ultimate power within his community and is involved in all sorts of suspicious enterprises. But the indiscriminate slaughter of Druze by Bedouin/government forces seems to have boosted his popularity among Druze while Al-Balous's influence is greatly diminished in comparison.
5) The Syrian government has real ties with Syrian Bedouin which it has used and is using as a tool to project power. In this conflict, the Bedouin are not completely free actors but rather enthusiastic sub-contractors, pursuing their own vendettas and crimes (such as rape and looting) while broadly serving the political interests of the Damascus government, in a sense serving as the "bad cop" to the Syrian government's relative "good cop."[17]
6) The Damascus government – whatever President Al-Sharaa's real feelings on the matter – is itself not a free actor in this conflict either. Al-Sharaa is exquisitely aware of Qatari, and especially Turkish interests, in everything involving Syria, including the South. In a way, what happened with the Druze can be seen as a dry-run for a similar campaign to be directed against the Kurdish-led SDF in the country's Northeast, an issue of tremendous interest to the Erdogan regime. But Al-Sharaa seems to also be hampered by his own cadres, blunt and chaotic instruments who seem to be cruder and less disciplined than he would prefer.[18]
Pro-Al-Hijri Propaganda on social media comparing him to Sultan Al-Atrash (July 2025)
A century after Sultan Al-Atrash's heroism, the situation in Syria seems dire indeed, balancing on the edge of a knife. Any celebration marking the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and the great Druze warrior would ring extremely hollow today. A shaky ceasefire seems to be holding in Suwayda but what comes next?[19] The war-wrecked country's already frayed social fabric is again, deeply and severely wounded.
*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.
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Memri
27 minutes ago
- Memri
For Jolani, The Kurds Are Next
Eight months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has plunged further into sectarian and ethnic violence. The U.S. policy of legitimizing and supporting the Syrian Interim Government with the intention of stabilizing the country, has so far failed; it has instead enabled the militias to carry out numerous massacres with full impunity and no accountability. The chaos resulting from the attack against the Alawite and Druze minorities by the government has now spread across Syria. Minorities are being systematically targeted with thousands of civilians killed, women abused, and forced into sexual slavery, and hundreds of thousands of people displaced. Children massacred by Al-Nusra front, led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, August 5, 2013 After Alawites And The Druze, The Kurds Are Next Recent remarks by Tom Barrack, U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Turkey and special envoy for Syria, in which he likened Al-Sharaa – a former ISIS and Al-Qaeda member – to George Washington,[1] and rejected federalism for Kurds and other minorities,[2] have been interpreted by the Syrian government as a green light to attack Syria's minorities. After deadly attacks against the Alawites, Druze, and Christians, the Kurds are now the next target of Syrian government backed by Turkey. Since Assad's fall, Turkish proxy forces have launched several large-scale attacks against the Kurds, committing unspeakable atrocities against civilians including massacres, rape, and sexual slavery. If the U.S. pressures the Kurds to disarm, they will face mass killings at the hands of Syrian government forces and Turkish-backed militias. The Kurds have been the most reliable ally of the U.S. in Syria for over a decade; they lost more than 11,000 fighters in the fight against ISIS. Kurdish forces are guarding approximately 9,000 battle-hardened ISIS terrorists in detention facilities, described as a "ticking time bomb" and "a terrorist army in detention" by U.S. officials.[3] There is no guarantee that the Syrian government would keep these terrorists imprisoned. If the Kurds lose control over Northeast Syria, the U.S. will not only lose a loyal partner in the fight against terrorism, but also risk an ISIS resurgence. "There Is No God But Allah, Kurds Are The Enemies Of Allah" Ahmed Al-Sharaa and his militia groups have a long history of takfiri[4] jihad against the Kurds in Syria, guided not by religious difference, as the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but by their ethnic prejudices against the Kurds, who are not ethnically Arab. In 2013, sheikhs of the Al-Nusra Front led by Al-Sharaa (then Abu Muhammed Al-Jolani) issued the following fatwa against Kurds: "Kurds are kuffar [unbelievers] and killing Kurds, taking their women, plundering their property, and destroying their homes is just and fair."[5] In the first half of 2013, Al-Nusra Front, allied with ISIS and supported by Turkish forces, carried out brutal attacks across Kurdish regions. They burned Kurdish homes, killed civilians indiscriminately, and continued to kidnap many Kurds on a daily basis throughout Syria's Kurdish region, all with Turkish military support on the ground. Al-Nusra carried out numerous massacres of Kurds including approximately 450 people, mainly women and children in Tal Abyad, Tal Hassil, and Tal A'ran. Al-Nusra massacred 120 children and 330 men and women in the district of Tal Abyad on August 5, 2013. More than 1,200 Kurds, men and women, were abducted during this period.[6] In 2018-2019, Al-Sharaa's Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) militia (formerly Al-Nusra) participated in the ethnic cleansing of nearly 500,000 Kurds in northern Syria, particularly Afrin and Serekaniya, in systematic ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out by Turkey to change the demography of the region by settling Arabs, Turkmens, and families of foreign fighters in place of displaced Kurds.[7] Since Al-Sharaa declared himself president of Syria, a calculated and coordinated hate campaign has been launched against Kurds by Syrian media affiliated with the government and Turkish media, with the aim of fueling hatred and inciting violence against the Kurds. "Lā ilāha illā Allāh, a-l-Kurdī ʿaduw Allāh [There is no god but Allah, the Kurd is the enemy of Allah]" has become a popular sectarian and racist slogans chanted by supporters of Al-Sharaa.[8] Ethnic discrimination policies against Kurds have reached alarming levels. On July 21, 2025, Kurdish youths were arrested in Damascus for speaking Kurdish in public.[9] Between July 19-22, 2025, at least 25 Kurds, including underage girls, were abducted by Syrian government forces.[10] These anti-Kurd campaigns are widely seen as a preparatory stage for a military attack against the Kurds. By portraying Kurds as foreigners, saboteurs, Zionist agents, and enemies of the state, Syria and Turkey seek to rally around Arab and Turkic takfiri groups. Declaring Kurds "enemies of God" provides religious legitimacy for their murder and sexual enslavement. If the Syrian regime forces manage to occupy the Kurdish region, a full-scale genocide of Kurds and Christians is to follow in northern Syria. Turkey's Neo-Ottoman Ambitions: "The Road to Jerusalem Goes Through Damascus" The fall of Assad has effectively eliminated the influence of Iran and Russia in Syria, but it has conversely opened the door for Turkey to take control of the country and implement its neo-Ottoman colonial policies. Turkey's end goal is not a peaceful and prosperous Syria, but rather a centralized regime controlled by Ankara, which it can use as a launchpad to target Israel and destabilize the Middle East. While the Shiite "Axis of Resistance" led by Iran has been largely weakened, a new Sunni "Axis of Resistance" led by Turkey and funded by Qatar is emerging in Syria, which is, in the long run, anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli. Before the fall of Assad, the Kurdish forces were a major obstacle to IRGC expansionism in Syria due to their geographical position. Similarly, they are now a major obstacle for Turkey and Qatar's ambitions to form a Sunni coalition hostile to American and Israeli interests. Conclusion: Kurds And Other Minorities Demand Federalism In a recent interview U.S. Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack claimed, "I think all of the minority communities are smart enough to say, 'We're better off together, centralized.'"[11] This statement contradicts the consistent demands from minorities – Kurds, Alawites, Druzes, and Christians – for a decentralized, federal system, and an end to authoritarianism. Al-Sharaa's reliance on sectarian, extremist policies, have led to bloodbaths in large parts of Syria. As president of Syria, he has failed to meet U.S. expectations: Rather than guiding the country toward stability, his government has intensified repression against minorities and increased sectarian violence across Syria. Therefore, a new U.S. Syria policy is needed to prevent further sectarian and ethnic bloodshed, to prioritize a federal system that gives communities control over their regions. On top of that, Turkey must be prevented from dominating Syria and use it a staging ground to destabilize the region and undermine U.S. interests. The U.S. must continue to support the Kurds in Northern Syria who control around 30 percent of the country. If the U.S. abandons the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition, it will not only betray a loyal partner, it will also lose its foothold in Syria and risk the creation of an anti-American Sunni "Axis of Resistance." *Himdad Mustafa is special advisor to MEMRI's Kurdish Studies Project.


Memri
27 minutes ago
- Memri
Palestinian Articles: Hamas Must Release The Hostages Immediately And Disarm; The Lives Of The Gazans Are More Important Than Its Rule In Gaza
In the recent period, the Palestinian Authority (PA) press in the West Bank has been even more vociferous than before in urging Hamas to end the Gaza war by releasing the Israeli hostages and agreeing to disarm and to cede power in Gaza.[1] Many articles in the PA mouthpiece Al-Hayat Al-Jadida and in the daily Al-Ayyam blamed Hamas for the ongoing war and said it was being stubborn and manipulative in the negotiations in order to buy time and maintain its control over the Gaza Strip. Had Hamas agreed to the aforementioned demands in the first months of the war, they argued, many Gazan lives would have been spared and the total destruction of the Strip would have been avoided. The articles also criticized Hamas's leadership for spreading a false narrative of victory while sitting in Gaza's tunnels or in "seven-star hotels" in Qatar and ignoring the heavy cost in human lives and the suffering of the Gazan people. Since the October 7 attack, they said, which was an "act of collective suicide," Hamas has lost the support of the Gazans, who hold it responsible for their disaster and suffering. Therefore, if Hamas now steps down in favor of the PA this will not be a Palestinian defeat but rather a victory for the Palestinian people and their desire to live. The following are translated excerpts from several of these articles. PA Daily: Every Hour Hamas Refrains From Stepping Down Means More Destruction, Hunger, Victims And Martyrs An editorial published in the PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida on June 23, 2025, during the war between Israel and Iran, called on Hamas to release all the hostages and cede power in Gaza, stressing that the movement's insistence on continuing the war was insupportable. The editorial said: "Hamas must hurry up and hand over the hostages immediately, and explicitly declare it is ceding power in the Gaza Strip… What more has to happen before it takes a step in the direction of reason and realism? From now on, Hamas's populist rejectionism and flowery speeches will no longer help it reach negotiations in hopes of achieving some of its ambitions as a ruling [force]. The situation after the Israel-Iran war will not be the same as the situation before it… "Hamas [must] make a clear declaration about [releasing] the hostages and about the day after [the war] in the wounded [Gaza] Strip, which will be marked by a complete absence of [Hamas's] rule there… Every hour it spends waiting today is another hour of destruction, hunger, victims, martyrs and injuries. Will Hamas be wise and stop the clock of this [endless] wait? "[2] In an earlier editorial, from June 1, 2025, the daily also urged Hamas to release the Israeli hostages and put an end to the war, stressing that the lives of the Gazans "are more precious and important" than Hamas's control over Gaza, which it is so eager to maintain. The editorial said: "Many of those who applauded the [Al-Aqsa] Flood [i.e., Hamas's October 7 attack], which boomeranged against its perpetrators from the very first moment… now urge Hamas to accept the ceasefire proposal of U.S. [Envoy Steve] Witkoff… "[Oh Hamas], release the hostages you are holding… without any arrogance, verbal tricks or boastful false demands. Accept [Witkoff's] proposal… Release them, oh Hamas leaders. The lives of the people are more precious and important than your control [over Gaza], which you delusionally believe you can still maintain. Release them. There is no longer any flood except for the flood of death and destruction… Release them and step off the stage. This will not be a defeat or a surrender for the Palestinian people, but rather a triumph of its will to live…"[3] Former PA Minister: The Gazans Hold Hamas Responsible For Their Disaster And Will No Longer Tolerate Its Rule In his June 4 column in the Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, Ashraf Al-Ajrami, a former PA minister for prisoner affairs, wrote that Hamas's sole purpose in negotiating today is maintaining its control over the Gaza Strip, in disregard of the fact that Israel will never agree to this: "Twenty months after the October 7 war and [the outbreak of] the war of extermination in Gaza, Hamas's leaders have yet to realize the inevitable consequences of this war. Unfortunately, they continue their manipulations aimed at retaining control of Gaza, believing that the rules of play that applied before October 7 will somehow become relevant again. Hamas is trying to buy as much time as possible, hoping to cause the world to accept the status quo and pressure Israel into accepting a permanent ceasefire with Hamas still [in power]. "[But] in practice, the events of October 7 created an unprecedented reality in Israel, and united the Jewish Israeli society around one [belief] – despite all the contrasts and disputes within it – [namely] that Hamas must not remain in Gaza in any way that allows it to threaten Israel. The meaning of this, as [Israeli Prime Minister] Binyamin Netanyahu has said on more than one occasion, is that the hostages must be released and Hamas must be removed from power and disarmed… Nobody is willing to accept Hamas's [continued] control over Gaza. "Had Hamas accepted these demands in the first months of the war, the Gazans' suffering would have stopped, their lives would have been saved, and the complete destruction of Gaza would have been avoided… Perhaps the number of fallen martyrs is immaterial to the Hamas leadership, who speaks of them in terms of numbers [and objects] that can be manufactured or produced again,[4] but each [of the fallen] is an entire world… If some force that purports to carry out resistance does not care about the lives and the suffering of the people, its resistance is evil – because ultimately, any resistance or national struggle are meant to defend the people and their rights and afford them a life of dignity, not to treat civilians as fuel for achieving the purposes of some organization or other, in disregard of the national goals that are a matter of national consensus. "What is Hamas currently pursuing in its negotiations?... In practice, it is negotiating for its own purposes, rather than anything else, because its main [goal] in the negotiations is to end the war while remaining in Gaza, so it can reassume control of it once the occupation army withdraws. Hamas's weapons – which it so eagerly tries to protect –are directed only inward, for this movement will not be able to pose a serious threat to Israel in the foreseeable future… "[Hamas] has lost the support of the Palestinian people in Gaza, especially of those who can no longer tolerate its existence and hold it primarily responsible for their disaster and their suffering, while this movement, [for its part], ignores the fate of the [Gaza] inhabitants. For this reason, Gaza will no longer tolerate Hamas's rule. Since the day Hamas [first] staged a coup against the legitimate PA [authorities], the Gaza Strip has been under siege… Its people cannot remember even a single good day [under] Hamas's rule, which was established by force. So how can they tolerate it today[?]… "The Palestinian people need an elected leadership that will express their aspirations and hopes. [But] in order to hold elections, the PA must return to Gaza and reunite the homeland. Every day that passes without this war coming to an end means further bloodshed and a heavy cost [in human lives]. When will Hamas rise [to the occasion], assume its national responsibility and feel the suffering of the people, who are the victims of foolishness and mistaken considerations?"[5] Former PA Minister: Hamas Leaders Ignore The Gazans' Suffering And Spread A False Narrative Of Victory In his May 25 column in the Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, Atef Abu Sayf, a former PA minister of culture, slammed Hamas for its claims of victory and urged it to let the PA assume responsibility for the negotiations to end the war. He wrote: "The war continues month after month, as though it exists just in order to continue… Hamas's [goal] can be summarized in a single sentence: restoring the situation that prevailed before October 7… Hamas's negotiators are [either its leaders abroad, who are living] in seven-star hotels in friendly capitals [such as Doha], or [its leaders in Gaza,] who are underground. Neither [of these groups] sees what is happening in Gaza or hears the sighs and the suffering of its people. Even if they watch tv, they see only one channel [the Qatari Al-Jazeera], which prettifies reality for them and presents it as a blatant victory... That is the essence of the crisis: those negotiating in the name of the [Gazan] people do not see them or notice them… "Hamas's holding of the hostages, and the Israeli army's failure to reach them, do not in themselves constitute steadfastness [on Hamas's part]… Steadfastness and sacrifice were supposed to prevent the [Israeli] army from entering Gaza, or to stop it and defend the city and its people, not leave them to face death and starvation. There is a false [Hamas] narrative that must be fought forcefully and firmly, without fearing the machine [that spews] accusations of treason or heresy or the attacks of the misguided herd.[6] I don't know how anyone can claim victory after everything that has happened… "Hamas, who wants to produce new [people to replace] the martyrs…[7] knows that there is only one solution, but rejects it because it is the only national solution, and [Hamas] is clearly uninterested in a nation solution. [The solution] is for its leaders to contact the Muqata'a [the PA headquarters in Ramallah] and ask President Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] to undertake the Gaza negotiations on behalf of the Palestinian people and all its factions…"[8] Palestinian Journalist: After October 7, Two Choices Remain – To Sacrifice Hamas Or To Sacrifice The People In his May 25 column in Al-Ayyam, Palestinian journalist Akram 'Atallah wrote an open letter to the Hamas leadership in which he implored the movement to realize that the October 7 attack was "an act of collective suicide" that has left the Palestinians with two main choices: "to sacrifice Hamas" and thereby save the people, or "to sacrifice the people and its future" in order to save Hamas. Addressing Hamas, he wrote: "…What you did on October 7, [2023] was a very great operation, that for several hours brought down a country that had prided itself on its security, technology and walls. Nevertheless, in all fairness, I am compelled to say that this was a collective act of suicide on the part of the [Hamas] movement. "It is true that Israel was off balance for several hours, but our people, and all the peoples who support it, cannot accept the consequences of a deed of this magnitude… With this great operation [the October 7 attack], you doomed yourselves to death… The Israelis, with the backing of the Americans and the Europeans, will not allow your [continued] existence as a force, as the ruling power in Gaza, or as an armed [movement]… The war will not stop as long as you remain in Gaza and maintain your weapons… "The time has come to think in a more realistic manner… An end to the war, and your [continued] existence after [that act of] suicide are two incompatible outcomes. If you don't understand that, the price will be higher than you and your people are able to pay. [The people] asked you to quickly announce the end of your rule in Gaza, but you were convinced that those voices were [just] intended to conspire against you and to remove you from power… "[Today] we have two options, and I do not see a third: to continue the war on the pretext that you are being persecuted and eliminated, or to commence negotiations about the day after [the war], when you will be absent, based on an understanding of the reality on the ground… What happened on October 7 was a very great event with even greater implications, and it has left Gaza with [only] two options: to sacrifice Hamas or to sacrifice the people and its future. The choice is in your hands…"[9]


Iraqi News
38 minutes ago
- Iraqi News
Iraq's Al-Sudani, Rubio discuss oil attacks and militia reform bill
Baghdad ( – Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a phone conversation to address ongoing security challenges, regional developments, and energy cooperation. Al-Sudani condemned the recent attacks on vital oil infrastructure in northern Iraq, including in Kirkuk, and Salah al-Din, linking them to efforts aimed at disrupting Iraq's economy. He noted the strikes came shortly after new agreements were signed with U.S. energy firms to develop oil fields in those areas. Iraq's security forces, Al-Sudani said, are coordinating with the international coalition to identify those behind the attacks. Rubio urged swift action to prevent further incidents and emphasized the protection of U.S.-linked facilities. Rubio also pressed Baghdad to resume crude exports via the Iraq–Turkey pipeline and ensure consistent salary payments to public employees in Iraq's Kurdistan Region. The two leaders also discussed the draft law on the Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC). Al-Sudani described it as part of Iraq's broader security restructuring. However, Rubio voiced concern that the bill could legitimize armed groups aligned with Iran, potentially threatening Iraq's sovereignty. The call reflected both countries' ongoing efforts to manage security risks, stabilize the energy sector, and maintain cooperation amid regional tensions.