Moment female assassin shoots top anti-Russian activist in failed hit before she is bundled to the ground in Ukraine
Serhii Sternenko, a vocal Moscow critic and active fundraiser for Kyiv 's military, was subject to an assassination attempt involving a firearm, according to Ukraine's Security Service.
Harrowing footage taken by CCTV shows a woman standing outside a residential building as the activist walks towards his car.
She immediately opens fire on Sternenko, but is apprehended seconds later by one of his companions, while the other bundles him into the vehicle before they escape.
She is then seen struggling as the man disarms and detains her. Later on, she is pictured against a wall with her hands behind her back and with her face covered.
In a post on Telegram, Sternenko wrote after the attack: 'I was attacked. I was wounded.
'I am grateful to the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) for their quick response. If not for them, I wouldn't be able to write anything anymore. They quite literally saved my life.'
The SBU said: 'Operational and investigative actions are ongoing.
'We will inform you about the progress of the situation separately.'
Earlier today they said the detainee was a 45-year-old woman from Odessa who lived in Kyiv.
The SBU said she was 'recruited remotely by Russian special services late last year when she was looking for a "quick way to make money" on the internet.'
After some initial trivial tasks monitoring and photographing cars, she was instructed to make a homemade explosive device as her 'contact' told her to move to Kyiv.
From mid-April, her instructions were to follow Sternenko and track his movements.
She was later given instructions on where to pick up a pistol and ammunition, before being told to kill the activist near his home yesterday.
'Thanks to previous observations, the attacker already knew the make of the car and the approximate time the volunteer would leave his home,' the SBU said.
She was later given instructions on where to pick up a pistol and ammunition, before being told to kill the activist near his home on May 1
'As Serhiy Sternenko was leaving the house, a Russian agent fired several shots: one of the bullets hit him in the leg. The attacker was immediately detained on the spot by the Security Service of Ukraine.
'The searches revealed a phone with evidence of working in the Russian Federation, as well as components for an improvised explosive device that she had stored in another apartment.
'The SBU pre-trial investigation is ongoing. Comprehensive measures are being taken to establish all the circumstances of the crime and bring the perpetrators to justice.'
She now faces up to 15 years in prison.
Sternenko is one of the most well-known Ukrainian activists on social media, with over two million YouTube subscribers and 840,000 Telegram followers.
The lawyer has raised funds to help supply over 550 military units, and played a key role in popularising first-person view (FPV) drones.
The Sternenko Community Foundation, set up in January, has raised enough to purchase over 176,000 drones.
Sternenko has been the target of four assassination attempts due to his public activism, however.
He was attacked several times during the 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine which saw the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, who was keen to develop closer ties with Russia instead of the EU.
In 2018, he was attacked by a gang who beat him with a bat, before narrowly surviving a gunman attempt months later.
In May that year, he killed one of two attackers who had come to assault him.
He was charged with premeditated murder and illegal possession of a weapon, but the case was dropped in 2023.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Herald Scotland
30 minutes ago
- The Herald Scotland
BRICS nations meaning explained: Donald Trump's latest tariff threat
Trump has teased negotiations over the tariff rates since, and late on July 6, said letters and deals on tariffs would start being communicated to various countries the following day. In another July 6 post on Truth Social, Trump threatened an additional 10% tariff on imports from another subset of countries. "Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff," Trump's post stated. "There will be no exceptions to this policy." What countries might he be talking about? More: US close to several trade deals ahead of tariff deadline this week, Trump officials say What does BRICS stand for? BRIC is an acronym coined in 2001 to describe rapidly developing countries that could impact the global economy. Those originally included: Brazil Russia India China South Africa joined the group in 2010, changing the acronym to BRICS, according to the Library of Congress. Over time, foreign leaders from each country began meeting and collaborating in formal summits. BRICS countries expanded in 2024 The BRICS countries make up approximately 45% of the world's population. Reuters reported in 2023 that the group of developing countries has sought to challenge the world order of Western dominance. In 2024, five more countries joined the bloc, according to Reuters. The newly admitted BRICS countries are: Iran Ethiopia Egypt Indonesia United Arab Emirates The BRICS countries issued a joint statement from their summit that started in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on July 6, warning that tariffs could hurt global trade, according to Reuters. Trump's Truth Social threat came hours later. What were the original tariff rates slated for BRICS countries? Trump has previously threatened tariffs on the BRICS countries, apparently in response to efforts to undermine the dollar. In November 2024, he posted on Truth Social a threat to issue a 100% tariff against BRICS countries. So far, the only country to receive a 100% or higher tariff rate under this Trump administration was China. After weeks of the escalating trade war between the world's second-largest economy and the U.S., the two reached an agreement to lower the triple-digit tariff rates while they discussed a trade deal. Here are the tariff rates the other BRICS countries faced as of early April. However, rates above 10% were delayed for 90 days, and the Trump administration has teased that several deals could be announced the week of July 7. Brazil - 10% Russia - 0% (The White House said there are previously imposed sanctions on exempt countries that "preclude any meaningful trade with these nations." India - 26% South Africa - 30% Iran - 10% Ethiopia - 10% Egypt - 10% Indonesia - 32% United Arab Emirates - 10% Another tariff acronym: What does TACO stand for? Financial Times columnist Robert Armstrong coined "TACO trade" in May, describing how some investors anticipate market rebounds amid Trump's on-again, off-again tariff policies. The acronym stands for "Trump always chickens out." Armstrong describes TACO trade as many investors' strategy to buy into the market that dips when Trump announces steep tariffs on the assumption that he will back off his tariff order, and the market will rebound. Trump hit back at a reporter who asked about the term on May 28, saying, "you ask a nasty question like that. It's called negotiation." Contributing: Joey Garrison, Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy, Carlie Procell, Josh Meyer, Cybele Mayes-Osterman, USA TODAY; Reuters Kinsey Crowley is the Trump Connect reporter for the USA TODAY Network. Reach her at kcrowley@ Follow her on X and TikTok @kinseycrowley or Bluesky at @
The Herald Scotland
33 minutes ago
- The Herald Scotland
Russian drone attacks on Ukraine skyrocket amid Pentagon aid cutoff
"The Ukrainians are getting pounded at an unprecedented level of intensity," said Fred Kagan, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. "They need air defense of all sorts urgently." Russia pummeled Ukraine overnight on July 3 with the largest drone and missile attack of the more-than-three-year conflict, with more than 530 drones and at least 10 missiles launched mostly at the capital, according to Ukraine's air force. At least two people were killed and more than 90 injured across the country as attacks continued into July 7. Over the past week, Russia launched around 1,270 drones and 39 missiles at Ukraine, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The escalation comes as the Pentagon has paused some weapons deliveries to Ukraine, including key air defense weapons like Patriots. Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell called it a "capability review... to ensure U.S. military aid aligns with our defense priorities." Democrats decry weapons cutoff Democratic lawmakers said Ukraine's air defenses were their largest worry. Adam Smith, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, said air defense is the "biggest concern.. without question" after the Pentagon's pause on weapons deliveries. Smith said concerns that military aid to Ukraine and Israel is depleting the U.S.'s own stockpiles were not a "legitimate excuse." "Stockpiles that I've seen are no lower than they've been during the last three and a half years," since Russia first invaded Ukraine, he said. "I'm torn between whether or not it's just really unintelligent analysis of what ournational security needs truly are," or an "excuse to let Putin have his way in Ukraine," Smith added. Sens. Jack Reed and Chris Coons, two top Democrats on the Senate Armed Services Committee, called the aid pause the "latest and most dramatic blow to our support for Ukraine" in a July 3 joint statement. "This assistance - including vital air defense interceptors and artillery munitions - was provided by Congress and designated to be delivered months ago," they said, referring to military aid procured through contracts authorized by Congress that does not draw directly from U.S. stockpiles. Kagan said concentrated Russian drone strikes "facilitate" ballistic missiles that penetrate Ukraine's defenses. A lack of Patriot interceptors "leaves Ukraine open to theRussians just shooting their ballistic missiles whenever they want." Patriots are Ukraine's only air defense system that can down ballistic missiles, he added. In recent days, both Zelenskyy and President Donald Trump have nodded to Ukraine's need for air defense, but a deal has yet to come through. "We had an extremely fruitful conversation with the President of the United States yesterday, during which we discussed air defense," Zelenskyy said in a July 5 video statement. More: Russia continues record-setting aerial attacks, US cuts off arms shipments to Ukraine Trump seemed in agreement, telling reporters aboard Air Force One the same day that Ukraine would need Patriots "for defense." "They're going to need something because they're being hit pretty hard," he said. Trump said he was "very unhappy" with a call he held days earlier with Russian President Vladimir Putin. "He wants to go all the way, just keep killing people," Trump said. Trump briefly cut off all military aid to Ukraine in March after an Oval Office meeting with Zelenskyy devolved into a verbal fight.
New Statesman
2 hours ago
- New Statesman
Don't tell Emmanuel Macron – but he's a normal politician now
This month Emmanuel Macron spoke to Vladimir Putin for the first time since September 2022. Even in the final days leading up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the French president had worked to keep a line of communication open with the Kremlin, and in a two-hour call on 1 July, this year, he again pressed Putin to seek the path of peace. For Macron believes that even if there is no common ground with his interlocutor, Paris should at least act as a bridge-builder and pivot of multilateral relations. It was in this same spirit that he responded to Donald Trump's abrupt desertion of the G7 summit in June, when the French president assured reporters that Trump had left to firm up a ceasefire between Iran and Israel. Yet, if Macron thereby suggested that he was au fait with the discussions, Trump slapped down even this face-saving exercise: the French president was 'publicity seeking' but 'always gets it wrong', the US president snarled on Truth Social. Mattering on the international stage means a lot to the French president. On this week's state visit to Britain, he will likely receive a royal welcome and address parliament. He will find a politically like-minded ally in Keir Starmer. Beyond a renewed focus on military cooperation, the two leaders are expected to confirm a deal on tightening migration controls and stopping the flow of 'small boats'. In what has been dubbed a 'one in, one out' arrangement, deportees from the United Kingdom, returned to continental Europe, would be exchanged with migrants on French soil who have a right to cross the Channel. Damned by some other European Union member states – with leaders in Italy, Spain and Greece wary of France signing a bilateral deal that could affect the whole EU – the mooted pact with London also exposes Macron's difficulties in directing either French public opinion or the EU as a bloc. Well into the latter half of his second term, Macron's international standing also matters so much to him because he has shed influence at home. While Macron has long insisted that he will press on with domestic reforms 'till the last quarter-hour' of his term, which ends in 2027, he is now hobbled by his lack of support in the National Assembly. Re-elected president in April 2022 in a run-off against Marine Le Pen, before he lost his overall parliamentary majority eight weeks later, Macron's authority cratered in summer 2024 after he made an ill-judged call for snap elections. Ever since then, his weak minority governments have been on life support – or, more specifically, depended on the goodwill of their political opponents. On 1 July, his prime minister, François Bayrou, once again survived a confidence vote only because Le Pen's party, National Rally (RN), abstained. Macron's stagnant position is a far cry from his first run for election, when he cast himself as the dynamic alternative to both a 'blocked political system' and to Le Pen's nationalist camp. He had announced his first presidential bid at a crucial moment in November 2016, just two weeks after Trump's election. With the Brexit referendum fresh in people's memory, he staked his agenda on the 'openness' and 'reforms' that could make globalisation work. A technocrat by training, Macron nonetheless presented himself as an 'outsider' who would lead a 'democratic revolution' against the old parties. In his insurgent claim to transcend the left-right divide, Macron's early rhetoric hit familiar populist notes while also challenging the nationalists more commonly called populist. He spoke of refusing to bow to the status quo or to the inevitability of the rising far right. He spoke as if he could direct events: what aides called a 'Jupiter'-like stance. Almost a decade on, this has turned out not to be true. Rather, it is events – and deeper weaknesses of the French state, as well as Europe – that have shaped his presidency. Macron once epitomised the philosopher Nancy Fraser's definition of a socially liberal, pro-business 'progressive neoliberalism'. Yet faced with a series of crises, he has retreated into more conservative positions on everything from immigration to climate policy. Macron has almost parodied a De Gaulle-esque idea of a strong French leader at the heart of Europe, but in practice he has not managed to convert bold intentions into either a renewed social consensus or a revitalisation of the EU. His tactical misstep in calling snap elections in 2024 only brought the malaise more clearly into view. With less than two years left in office, and with the nationalist right looking increasingly strong, Macron says that his job is to maintain 'stability' – an implicit recognition that his presidency has stalled. Speaking outside a United Nations conference in Nice in June, Macron seemed prickly about the idea that his snap elections call had deepened France's political crisis. 'It would be a little easy to blame the president for how the French voted,' he said. Macron had announced that vote in the name of winning a fresh mandate – only for the run-off results on 7 July 2024 to produce a splintered parliament in which no coalition was close to an overall majority. If this had 'not helped clarify things' as he hoped, Macron insisted, the resulting gridlock should also be blamed on 'the intransigence among political forces'. Indeed, he added, 'some of them had previously claimed that the president has too much power', but now themselves refused to take responsibility. He refused to rule out holding further snap elections before 2027, though it is unclear that such a move will do much for his own allies' fortunes. By most evidence, the French are gloomy about the future. An Ipsos poll late in 2024 found that 87 per cent believe the country is 'in decline' though only 34 per cent considered this 'irreversible'. More broadly, surveys show worsening faith in public services, political parties and democratic institutions. While indicators of public optimism improved upon Macron's initial election, they have since worsened, and his own ratings have slumped under 30 per cent. Scepticism is warranted about claims that he is uniquely divisive: his predecessor, François Hollande, had such poor ratings that he didn't even seek re-election, and the president before that, Nicolas Sarkozy, risks a jail sentence over charges of corruption. Still, Macron's arrogant posture, and his pushing through of unpopular reforms, have heightened the perception of a man detached from public opinion. The two most illustrative flashpoints of his tenure were the November 2018 fuel-tax hike, which sparked the gilets jaunes protests, and the 2023 rise in the retirement age. In both cases, Macron's allies could cite deeper justifications: France does need to lower its dependence on fossil fuels, and the ageing population requires some kind of rebalancing of the pension bill. More questionable were the government's assumptions about whom the cost should fall upon, as well as the harsh repression of the resulting protests. Such measures especially contrasted with Macron's removal of taxes on the wealthiest households and on businesses in the name of economic stimulus. The fact that growth prospects have remained poor, and that public debt has continued to rise – especially due to pandemic-era spending – have ensured that what were called 'difficult choices' achieved little public buy-in. If Thatcherism won some new working-class support through home ownership, even as it attacked trade unions, Macronism can boast of no similar trade-off. For Thomas Piketty and Julia Cagé, it has 'the most bourgeois electorate in history.' France's fiscal position is not good. It benefited far less from EU post-pandemic funds than neighbouring Italy, and today its budget deficit (at 5.8 per cent) is at almost double the EU target of 3 per cent. It has committed to reaching this level by 2029, but progress demands austerity – or tax rises – throughout the rest of Macron's term. Since his own supporters control less than one-third of seats in parliament, and do not have a majority even when aided by the conservative Republicans, any budget can pass only with the acquiescence of other, opposed parties. In December, then-prime minister Michel Barnier's coalition was felled just three months after taking office. Under his replacement, Bayrou, both the Socialists and the RN have grabbed concessions in exchange for abstaining in key votes, vaunting their own 'responsibility' rather than bringing down the government at the first opportunity. Still, these parties' patience may not last long, as demands for budget cuts become more pressing, and the opportunity for fresh elections arises. Could Macron be credited with a great balancing act: forcing these parties to obey his priorities, and even defanging the far right? The snap elections were widely interpreted as a move to erode the RN. On this reading, even if Le Pen's party had entered government, it would have had to make tough choices rather than just carp from the sidelines. Upon nearing high office, RN has adopted less radical positions on economic policy, far from the heady days of the mid-2010s when it flirted with Frexit. The party president Jordan Bardella today speaks of 'order in the public accounts as well as in the streets' – and the Macron camp treats it as a legitimate institutional actor. His prime ministers routinely sound out Le Pen's opinion; they have repeatedly leaned on RN in confidence votes; in December 2023, for the first time, an immigration bill passed only thanks to RN votes – following the harshening of its provisions on welfare for migrants. Such votes, and the surrounding political rhetoric, make it hard to credit the idea that Macron has surpassed the old left-right divide, or reined in the excesses of Le Pen's camp. Even the Socialist governments of the 1980s worried about dangers to French national identity and attempted to assert a new model of republican inclusiveness. It is nonetheless remarkable that a nominally liberal administration like Macron's should quite so often cast France as besieged by the threat of 'decivilisation'. Today's interior minister, Bruno Retailleau, a conservative, rivals Le Pen's rhetoric. Macron and his allies do not confront the idea that France is being 'submerged' by migration but promise that they will take the needed steps to stop this. The accusation that an 'immigrationiste' left wilfully promotes migration in order to transform French society is used not only by Le Pen's camp, but even by the president himself. Macron's presidency may well turn out to not just have delayed the RN's arrival in power, but also to have prepared a soft landing. The current call for tougher migration control responds to the mood of large parts of the French public – and the narrative of France's Fox News-esque channels like CNews. But this also points to limits of Macron's authority. Despite claims to be the 'Jupiterian' master of the political weather, he has routinely been caught off-guard by events. Where he called snap elections hoping that voters would offer clarity, instead they elected a fragmented parliament. Where he centered his agenda on reining in the welfare bill, instead weak growth and pandemic-era costs pushed public debt to historic highs. If he wanted the old corporatist France to become a 'start-up nation', instead private business has become more reliant on state and EU support. The same can be said for his role as a world leader. If Macron spent years seeking dialogue with Putin, or supported Israel while criticising Benjamin Netanyahu, what effect did this have on either state's policy? Macron called for the EU to secure its strategic autonomy, but European countries now only commit to rearmament under Trump's threats to disengage. Far from leading the EU as a green superpower, Macron recently watered-down its emissions-cutting targets. It is as an EU leader that Macron will most claim a legacy, in the spirit of his 2017 Sorbonne speech calling for Europe to stand stronger. Returning to those remarks at the Sorbonne last year, Macron hailed the EU's successes in the pandemic response, breaking its reliance on Russian fossil fuels, and developing common planning on everything from the green transition to military preparedness. Since the pandemic, European collective investment has more firmly established itself – albeit mainly because Germany has changed tack, including this year on defence spending. Brexit-style splits are no longer on the agenda. Yet the EU also emerges from the last decade looking weaker in important ways. On everything from electric vehicles to AI, the bloc lags behind the US and China, and in neither the Middle East nor Ukraine wars has it shown itself to be a real diplomatic superpower. What next for France? Macron is not allowed to enter the 2027 presidential contest, and currently Le Pen is also legally barred from running (as a result, Bardella surely will stand). A host of former Macron allies, from the more liberal Gabriel Attal to the Gaullist Édouard Philippe, are touted as candidates, as is hardline ex-interior minister Gérald Darmanin and incumbent Bruno Retailleau, who was recently elected the Republicans' leader. If a host of parties and individuals have at one point been part of the president's camp – known as Macronie – there seems to be little chance of a joint candidate in 2027, at least in the first round. Many of the former allies now have poor relations with Macron, and the political cohesion of this camp, once he is no longer president, is uncertain. He may fancy himself as a De Gaulle figure, called upon to fix the nation's – and the world's – messes. And perhaps he will be summoned to run once again in 2032 after some other president has brought havoc. Yet Emmanuel Macron's record in office, low poll ratings, and the flop of his remaining presidency, make an unconvincing case for him to be the man of providence. Subscribe to The New Statesman today from only £8.99 per month Subscribe Related
