4 soldiers martyred, 7 ‘India-backed terrorists' killed in KP operations: ISPR
The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said in a statement that the terrorists attempted to attack a security forces' check post in general area Shawal in North Waziristan on the night of May 28-29.
'The attempt was effectively thwarted by own troops and in [the] ensuing fire exchange, six Indian-sponsored khawarij were sent to hell,' the ISPR said.
'However, during intense fire exchange, Lieutenant Daniyal Ismail (age: 24 years, resident of District Mardan), a brave young officer who was leading his troops from [the] front, fought gallantly and embraced shahadat (martyrdom) along with his three men,' the ISPR said.
'Afghan elite' sheltering terrorists for Indian funds: DG ISPR
The three other soldiers martyred in the operation were 42-year-old Naib Subedar Kashif Raza from Chakwal district, 35-year-old Lance Naik Fiaqat Ali from Haripur district and 26-year-old Sepoy Muhammad Hameed from Abbottabad district.
In the second encounter in Chitral District, security forces successfully neutralised one 'Indian-sponsored kharji'.
In separate operations in Balochistan's Loralai and Kech districts, security forces killed five 'Indian-sponsored terrorists' on Wednesday, the ISPR said.
The slain militants, who were reportedly involved in multiple acts of terror, including attacks on N-70 near Barasham on August 26, 2024, and February 18, 2025, which claimed the lives of 30 innocent civilians, it added.
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