US going all in on sea drones to deter Taiwan war
By all accounts, the US Navy is moving fast in that direction. Breaking Defense reported in July 2025 that the service has issued a formal call for industry proposals to rapidly prototype modular USVs, following an industry day earlier this summer.
Led by the US Navy's unmanned maritime systems office, the solicitation seeks designs that can carry containerized payloads, integrate with existing naval assets and be fielded within 18 months of contract award.
It identifies three vessel concepts, prioritizing one capable of carrying two 40‑foot containers—each weighing 36.3 metric tons and drawing 75 kilowatts—over 2,500 nautical miles at 25 knots in NATO Sea State 4.
The US Navy emphasizes affordability and scalability, favoring commercial‑standard, non‑exquisite designs to enable construction across multiple shipyards. Though no award timeline has been specified, the service plans to use Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs) to accelerate the contracting process.
Rear Admiral William Daly has highlighted the need for a simplified, mass‑producible USV, moving away from earlier bespoke Medium and Large USV programs. The shift underscores the US Navy's urgency to operationalize distributed lethality and containerized modular warfare on affordable, scalable platforms.
US planners see USVs as tools to delay or disrupt Chinese operations in a Taiwan contingency. Admiral Samuel Paparo told The Washington Post in June 2024 that the US has adopted a 'hellscape' US strategy that aims to saturate the Taiwan Strait with thousands of unmanned systems—submarines, surface vessels, and aerial drones— the moment China's invasion fleet mobilizes.
Paparo said this mass deployment is designed to harass and paralyze People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces for about a month, creating a window for US, Taiwanese and allied forces to mobilize a full defense and deny Beijing a rapid 'fait accompli.'
The strategy extends to the Philippine theater. USNI News reported in June 2025 that the US is upgrading Naval Detachment Oyster Bay on the Philippine island of Palawan to support USVs, enhancing Manila's South China Sea capabilities.
A US‑funded facility there will maintain Devil Ray T‑38 USVs already transferred to the Philippine Navy, alongside conventional boats, enabling rapid deployment to Philippine outposts near disputed waters. The US Department of Defense (DoD) anticipates issuing construction contracts within two months, reinforcing bilateral maritime cooperation.
Yet this unmanned push faces technical and operational constraints. Steven Wills wrote in April 2025 for Breaking Defense that USVs have short range, power limitations, and high vulnerability in contested environments.
He noted that small platforms require frequent servicing, struggle to endure transoceanic deployments and impose logistical strain on the fleet. He also warned that AI‑driven USV control systems are vulnerable under electronic attack, with long‑range operations susceptible to delay or interception.
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Admiral James Stavridis echoed those concerns in an October 2024 Washington Post article. While acknowledging USVs' disruptive potential, he cautioned against prematurely sidelining conventional warships, which provide endurance, force projection and layered defenses that drones cannot match.
Stavridis advocates a high‑low mix: cost‑effective swarms of USVs augmenting—but not replacing—large, manned platforms. He emphasized that in contested environments, human decision‑making and survivability remain essential, demanding a balanced modernization strategy.
Geography and strategy would compound these limits in a Taiwan or South China Sea war. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan and the Philippines cannot rely on overland resupply. China can blockade Taiwan and potentially cut off Philippine access to US reinforcements from Guam using carrier battlegroups in the Philippine Sea.
A firm US combat commitment to Taiwan risks eroding the strategic ambiguity that has helped maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, while unambiguous support for Philippine claims in the South China Sea risks pulling Washington into a wider confrontation over features of marginal strategic value to US interests.
This situation has pushed Washington toward ally self‑defense models, in which USVs feature as part of a broader denial strategy. Charles Glaser proposed in an April 2025 Washington Quarterly article a US‑supported 'self‑defense' model for Taiwan: arms sales, training and financing without US combat intervention.
He urged Taipei to embrace a porcupine strategy, relying on mobile, survivable systems—coastal defense missiles, naval mines, drones and fast attack craft—to raise the cost of a Chinese invasion.
According to Glaser, US support would include Foreign Military Financing (FMF), US$1 billion in drawdown authority and Harpoon and Stinger missile transfers, complementing Taiwan's domestic Hsiung Feng missile production.
A parallel logic applies to the Philippines. Sarang Shidore, in a February 2025 Quincy Institute report, argued for a restrained, US‑supported self‑defense posture, with aid, intelligence and training rather than direct combat.
He noted that the US has pledged $500 million to modernize the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites, increased joint exercises and deployed surveillance and mid‑range missile capabilities—building deterrence without co‑production or combat entanglement.
Reflecting an indigenous turn, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported in July 2025 that Philippine engineers have proposed a USV concept for maritime interdiction or suicide strikes against enemy warships.
In sum, Washington's unmanned gamble is to field swarms of USVs to buy time, blunt China's advance and reinforce allies under a self‑defense framework—all while avoiding a direct slide into full‑scale war.
But as Wills and Stavridis make clear, USVs are still more complements than war‑winners. They are fragile in rough seas, maintenance‑intensive and dependent on manned ships and logistics networks.
The US Navy's shift to commercial standards, mass production and OTAs reflects urgency over perfection: getting drones in the water within 18 months to enable Paparo's 'hellscape' could buy the month of breathing room that US strategy requires.
Whether that month is enough will depend on how fast Taiwan and the Philippines can convert US financing, training and technology transfer into resilient self‑defense—and on Washington's ability to deter China without igniting the war it hopes to prevent and ultimately not lose.
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