Latest news with #Afrobarometer
IOL News
5 days ago
- Business
- IOL News
South Africa not a failed state, say market commentators
South Africa remains economically and institutionally intact, despite persistent service delivery issues and declining public trust in parts of the state. Image: Picture: Henk Kruger/ Independent Newspapers South Africa remains economically and institutionally intact, despite persistent service delivery issues and declining public trust in parts of the state. According to Old Mutual chief economist Johann Els, the country does not meet the definition of a failed state when assessed against key economic indicators, institutional strength, and its continued ability to attract foreign investment. 'We're moving in the right direction,' Els stated. Yet, the 2024 Edelman Trust Barometer found that only 22% of South Africans trust government institutions to do what is right, while a 2023 Afrobarometer survey showed that 70% of respondents expressed low trust in Parliament. Despite this, South Africa recorded R11.7 billion in direct investment inflows in the first quarter of 2025, a 56% increase, according to the South African Reserve Bank. Els attributes the country's resilience to strong legal and regulatory systems, a stable constitution, and a political environment that, while volatile, has allowed for peaceful transitions of power. Els said South Africa compares favourably with peer emerging markets such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Russia, India, and China. While corruption remains a significant issue, he notes that South Africa performs better than several of these countries and remains well ahead of states such as Zimbabwe and Russia. Although it does not rank among the top performers like Mauritius, South Africa's institutional foundations remain intact. The 2025 IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook ranked South Africa 58th out of 67 economies. While this was a decline from the previous year, the country still scored relatively well on institutional strength, legal frameworks, and public finance - key components that underpin economic stability. Els said that although there are widespread failures in parts of the state, such as in municipalities, state-owned enterprises, and some national departments, this does not constitute overall state failure. Issues such as water and electricity supply interruptions, potholes, and other service delivery breakdowns are symptoms of dysfunction in parts of the state, not the collapse of the state itself. Els added that political developments have had a direct impact on investor sentiment. The formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) in June 2024 eased investment concerns, increasing confidence that the state would be able to implement economic policy. While some uncertainty returned earlier this year due to budget-related issues and questions about the sustainability of the GNU, Els says overall political risk has moderated. Political analyst and author Prince Mashele also maintains that South Africa is not a failed or failing state. He says a key marker of state failure is a refusal by ruling parties to accept electoral defeat or their use of violence to remain in office, dynamics that are not present in South Africa. He argues that the ANC's willingness to enter into a GNU following the 2024 national elections demonstrates political maturity and an adherence to constitutional processes. 'The ANC is not resisting... The ANC is not destabilising the country politically,' said Mashele. Mashele adds that the ANC is being 'processed out of power', a trend he says has so far been peaceful. He warns, however, that ANC deployees in government are intensifying corruption as individuals prioritise personal gain in anticipation of losing political power. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Next Stay Close ✕ The GNU as a coalition of political opponents, rather than aligned partners, said Mashele. The ANC and DA, as the two largest parties in the arrangement, are not pulling in the same direction, and Mashele said both parties view participation as a strategic opportunity to weaken the other. He noted that while there has been no agreed policy platform or joint strategy meeting since the GNU was formed, the arrangement is likely to continue because both parties want to avoid being blamed for its collapse. Looking ahead, Mashele predicts a further decline in ANC dominance, particularly in urban metros such as Johannesburg, where he expects the DA to grow its support in the 2026 local government elections. He also anticipates that the GNU will endure until at least 2027, when the ANC holds its next elective conference. At that point, Mashele said internal party dynamics could lead to the GNU's collapse, especially if a new ANC leadership emerges on an anti-Ramaphosa and anti-coalition platform. Despite internal tensions and a lack of unified policy direction, Mashele says the GNU's continued existence creates space for the private sector to function under a relatively stable government. He notes that, while the arrangement is weak, it is not expected to collapse in the short term. IOL
The Star
09-07-2025
- Politics
- The Star
Analysis-Kenya's Ruto faces tough task taming protests and winning over Gen Z
NAIROBI (Reuters) -Protesters braving police batons, water cannon and occasional bullets on Kenya's streets this week have taken up a rallying cry that is likely to unnerve its embattled president, William Ruto: "Ruto wantam", or Ruto one-term. Ruto won power almost three years ago vowing to protect the poor and end police violence, but he is facing mounting public dissatisfaction over high living costs, corruption and police brutality that could yet seal his fate as a "wantam" leader. As the faint drum beat of the 2027 election grows louder, analysts say, his administration will need not only to deliver on its economic promises but also adopt a more conciliatory tone to win over a younger, better-educated population. "Persistent economic hardship and widespread allegations of police violence pose serious challenges to any ambitions he may have for securing re-election in 2027," said Mucahid Durmaz, Senior Africa Analyst at risk intelligence firm Verisk Maplecroft. A government-funded rights group said 31 people were killed nationwide in the latest anti-government protests on Monday, held to mark the 35th anniversary of pro-democracy rallies. Police fired to disperse the demonstrators after also using tear gas and water cannon. "We can't feed our families, so we have to be on the street to stop the increasing prices, to stop the (police) abductions, and to stand up for our country," said Festus Muiruri, a 22-year-old protester in the capital Nairobi. "We want the president to hear us." But Ruto's government has been consistently slow to respond to public discontent. Last year, he only abandoned proposed tax hikes after protesters overran parliament in unprecedented scenes flashed across TV screens around the world. His interior minister, Kipchumba Murkomen, branded last month's protests as a "coup attempt" by what he called "criminal anarchists". GEN Z Unlike his predecessors, Ruto faces a generation of uncompromising young Kenyans desperate for economic opportunities, who can mobilise amorphously through social media, bypassing opposition parties and leaders. The so-called "Gen Z" protesters, the product of free schooling introduced two decades ago, have no recollection of authoritarian rule. Many were not yet born when Kenya introduced multi-party elections in 1992. With up to 800,000 young people entering the job market each year, Gen Z are more educated than their elders, but also more likely to be unemployed, according to a report by Afrobarometer, a pollster. "They have no memory of the rough times," said Macharia Munene, a professor of history and international relations at the United States International University (USIU) in Nairobi. "They've learned how to ask questions." Discontent with the government found a lightning rod last month with the death of blogger Albert Ojwang in police custody. On June 25 some 19 people lost their lives in demonstrations over Ojwang's death. The administration's hardline response to protesters has rattled investors in East Africa's largest economy. Business expectations fell to their second-lowest level on record in May, according to a survey by Stanbic Bank Kenya. "Repeated protests and shutdowns will continue to erode investor confidence and disrupt economic activity, especially if the government continues to prioritise force over dialogue," said Jervin Naidoo from Oxford Economics. 'BLIND, DEAF AND DUMB' Despite the swelling disillusionment, Kenyans are left with few options for now. Ruto's large parliamentary majority ensures he won't be unseated prematurely. He also faces a weak and fractured opposition which is yet to find a standard bearer for the next election. Following last year's protests, Ruto brought former Prime Minister Raila Odinga into his government, neutralising his main threat. He has two more years to turn things around, or use his incumbency to help ensure a second term. Ruto will hope that his increased social spending and programmes aimed at tackling youth unemployment, combined with positive economic prospects and a decline in inflation, will bolster his appeal, according to Control Risks. However, that may not be enough to avoid "wantam", said Javas Bigambo, a political commentator. "The government is perceived to be blind, deaf and dumb by the young people. This perception needs to be managed. Dealing with the protesters with this condescending attitude will only worsen Ruto's re-election prospects," he said. "It is urgent that measures are taken to bridge the divide." (Reporting by Edwin Okoth and Hereward HollandEditing by Ammu Kannampilly and Gareth Jones)
Zawya
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Zawya
Government responsiveness and democracy are important drivers of citizen engagement in Africa, new Afrobarometer flagship report reveals
Government responsiveness and democratic performance, along with unmet socioeconomic needs, are important drivers of citizen engagement in Africa, a new Afrobarometer flagship report ( reveals. Citizens are more likely to participate in political and civic activities if they are satisfied with the way their democracy works, believe that their elections are free and fair, and see their local elected officials as responsive to their needs. And contrary to theories and findings from the Global North, Africa's least-wealthy citizens, and least-wealthy countries, report higher rates of engagement than their better-off counterparts. The report, the second in an annual series on high-priority topics, draws on data spanning the past decade, including the latest round of nationally representative surveys in 39 countries, representing the views of more than three-fourths of the continent's population. The analysis focuses on key indicators of citizen engagement: voting, political party affiliation, political discussion, attending community meetings, joining with others to raise an issue, contacting leaders, and protesting. The findings, based on 53,444 face-to-face interviews, show that most Africans participate in multiple political and civic activities, with voting being the predominant form of engagement and protesting being the least common. But gaps exist, especially among youth and women. Poorer, less educated, and rural Africans tend to participate more in political and civic activities than their wealthier, more educated, and urban counterparts. The report also shows that across 30 countries surveyed consistently over the past decade, participation levels are declining for attending community meetings, raising issues, and identifying with a political party, but they are increasing for contacting leaders. The new flagship report is accompanied by country scorecards ( on citizen engagement that provide an at-a-glance snapshot of the key indicators of citizen participation at the national level for each of the surveyed countries. Afrobarometer survey Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life. Nine survey rounds in up to 42 countries have been completed since 1999. Round 9 surveys (2021/2023) cover 39 countries. Afrobarometer's national partners conduct face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice. National samples of 1,200-2,400 yield country-level results with margins of error of +/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. Key findings The scope of political and civic participation Nearly three-quarters (72%) of Africans voted in their country's last national election preceding the Afrobarometer Round 9 survey (Figure 1). Four in 10 (41%) 'feel close to' a political party. More than six in 10 (62%) 'occasionally' or 'frequently' discuss politics with family or friends. Almost half (47%) attended a community meeting at least once during the previous year, ranging from 11% in Tunisia to 85% in Madagascar. More than four in 10 (42%) joined with others to raise an issue during the previous year. More than one-third (37%) contacted a traditional leader, 28% a local government councillor, 15% a member of Parliament (MP), and 20% a political party official during the previous year. About one in 10 respondents (9%) participated in a protest or demonstration during the previous year. Who participates? The poorest citizens are more likely than the well-off to identify with a political party, attend a community meeting, join with others to raise an issue, and contact traditional leaders, local government councillors, and political party officials, and are about equally likely to vote, protest, discuss politics, and contact MPs (Figure 2). Women continue to engage at substantially lower rates than men across all indicators included in the survey. Youth (aged 18-35) are less engaged than older generations on all types of political and civic participation except protest; the disparity is largest for voting, where an 18-percentage-point gap separates youth from elders. Compared to citizens with post-secondary education, those with no formal schooling are more likely to vote, to identify with a political party, to attend community meetings, and to contact traditional leaders, and are about equally likely to contact an MP, local government councillor, or political party official. Drivers of democratic attitudes Rates of participation, particularly in attending community meetings and joining with others to raise an issue, are higher in countries with lower levels of economic well-being (Figure 3). Countries where citizens perceive local government councillors as responsive to their needs generally have higher rates of contact with these officials. However, this pattern does not hold for national legislators, who are less accessible to ordinary citizens. Electoral participation is higher in countries where citizens are satisfied with the way democracy works; believe that elections are free, fair, and effective; and feel free to cast their ballots as they wish. In contrast, when these conditions are not present, protests are more common (Figure 4). Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Afrobarometer. For more information, please contact: Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny Director of Communications Email: jappiah@ Telephone: +233 243240933 Social Media: Facebook X LinkedIn YouTube Instagram WhatsApp Visit us online at Follow our releases on #VoicesAfrica.
Daily Maverick
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Guinea's return to constitutional order is an opportunity to strengthen women's political participation
The exclusion of women causes them to perceive politics as a field reserved for men, even though they played a significant role in Guinea's contemporary history. Current efforts to restore constitutional order must also promote their effective inclusion in public affairs. Four years after the coup against the Alpha Condé regime, Guinea's constitutional referendum scheduled for 21 September 2025 will be a major step towards normalising political life in the country. The referendum is a prerequisite for organising and conducting presidential, legislative and local elections. Adopting a new constitution will be crucial for stability after the coup, and for building an egalitarian and inclusive society, particularly by strengthening women's participation in public affairs. Although women represent 52% of Guinea's population, their presence in state decision-making bodies, whether executive or legislative, has remained marginal under both civilian and military regimes. This suggests that political transitions – often justified by the promise of inclusive reforms – tend to reproduce the same dynamics of exclusion as the previous administration. At the same time, the legal mechanisms that should promote the inclusion of women remain more symbolic than truly binding. On the plus side, Guinea's transition charter provides for a 30% minimum representation of women in the National Transitional Council (NTC), which functions as the country's temporary parliament. As a result, women now comprise 30.86% of members of this legislative body, compared with only 14.9% of parliamentarians before the coup. However, despite its commitments, the government of Prime Minister Amadou Bah Oury includes only six women among its 29 ministers – 10% less than before the coup. This decline has caused disappointment, especially among women's organisations hoping to consolidate the gains achieved through years of hard struggle. The underrepresentation of women illustrates successive governments' failure to turn legal frameworks into real progress. In particular, the quota of 30% women on electoral registers introduced in 2010 has never been met, as its application has been left to the discretion of political actors. Furthermore, the 2019 law establishing gender parity in electoral lists and public institutions was never enacted. The coexistence of this law and a 30% quota, perceived as contradictory, could have caused a deadlock. The limited impact of these ambitious initiatives can be explained by the lack of political will, shortcomings in their application, deep-rooted patriarchal traditions and women's low literacy rate (22%), according to Afrobarometer. Yet most Guineans believe women should be able to access political office on the same basis as men, Afrobarometer says. This is despite persistent obstacles that they face, such as criticism and harassment, sometimes even within their own families. The underrepresentation of women in public affairs is due to social and cultural considerations underpinning patriarchal and unequal systems. Women are excluded, causing them to perceive politics as a field reserved for men, even though they played a significant role in Guinea's contemporary history. Although civil society has a role in demanding structural change favouring women's equitable participation, the current restrictions on fundamental freedoms and civic space hamper their involvement in political life. Institute for Security Studies fieldwork respondents said military regimes were a greater obstacle than gender bias, as the latter was easier to break down than institutional barriers. Despite these difficulties, the return to constitutional order – starting with the referendum and continuing with election preparations – offers the opportunity to pass laws and mobilise against the marginalisation of women in the public sphere. The 2022 inter-Guinean dialogue, led exclusively by women, showed that they can make concrete proposals to improve their participation. Several dialogue recommendations were integrated into the new draft constitution and proposed institutional laws. The NTC adopted the draft constitution on 9 April following an outreach campaign. The draft establishes gender parity as a fundamental principle – an improvement on the transition charter. When various laws are adopted, particularly those dealing with the electoral code, gender parity and political parties, details should be provided on how the legislation will be implemented. A good starting point is to develop electoral lists that alternate between male and female candidates and allocate the remaining seats to women with the highest averages, as considered by the NTC. The same goes for allowing independent candidates in all elections, offering an alternative to women who find it difficult to be backed by a political party. These reforms, which civil society supports, could be supplemented by a women's rights observatory, composed of women's organisations. The observatory would be responsible for monitoring the progress of draft laws from submission to adoption, in order to guarantee their effective implementation. While these initiatives can strengthen women's participation in public life, they must be accompanied by greater political will from current and future transitional authorities and strong institutional support. Sufficient human, financial and operational resources are also needed to rigorously implement laws and policies. As part of Independence Day celebrated in October 2024, Guinea's head of state, General Mamady Doumbouya, visited pioneers such as former government ministers Aïcha Bah Diallo, Mariama Sow and Mariama Aribot. At the same time, several streets in Conakry were renamed after prominent female figures in Guinea's contemporary history, including M'Balia Camara, Mafory Bangoura, Rabiatou Saran Diallo and Saran Daraba Kaba. These symbolic actions recall Guinean women's commitment and role in the country's history. Addressing their marginalisation in the public sphere requires more than focusing on the number of women in political positions. The quality of their participation in nation-building must also be improved. Otherwise, Guinea's transition risks replicating, or even exacerbating, the structural inequalities that keep women on the margins of political life and development. DM
Morocco World
27-06-2025
- Politics
- Morocco World
Moroccan Youth Eye Emigration as Job Hopes Fade, Report Says
Rabat – In Morocco today, the dreams of young university graduates take shape in a landscape filled with ambition and frustration. The latest Afrobarometer survey, carried out in 2024, depicts a youth determined to build a better life, yet constantly confronted with economic and institutional barriers that slow their steps. Far from being passive, this generation keeps pushing forward. It holds on to hope but sees the cracks in the system. Education, for many, was supposed to be a ticket to stability. Instead, it often leads to a long wait, uncertain prospects, and difficult choices. Jobs top the list of concerns. Among Moroccans aged 18 to 35, the desire for stable and qualified employment is nearly universal. But reality hits hard. Only 32% of these young people say they are satisfied with the country's economic health. More than one in three faces unemployment. Of those, over half are still searching, not ready to give up. Faced with few real prospects at home, many begin to imagine a future elsewhere. The survey shows that 70% of young Moroccans have already considered leaving the country. That's not a vague idea; it's a deeply personal response to a national challenge. The urge to emigrate is not about adventure, it's about survival, opportunity, dignity. For 59% of these potential emigrants, the reason is they need work, and they cannot find it here. This growing desire to leave is not just an economic signal. It speaks to a broken sense of belonging. It reflects the feeling that talent and effort go unnoticed. Disillusionment with power Moroccan youth do not only question the economy, they also look critically at those in charge. Trust in the country's institutions is alarmingly low. Only 32% say they trust parliament. Just 35% trust the government. As for political parties, confidence drops to a mere 23%. A quarter of all citizens surveyed believe the government gives little or no account of its actions to the public. This distrust runs deep, but it does not mean young people have stopped expecting change. On the contrary, they want a government that works for them, clear, competent, and committed to solving real problems. The demands are not vague. Young graduates know what they need and expect the state to deliver. Education comes first. Improving schools and universities matters to 61% of respondents. Healthcare follows closely, with 60% saying it must improve. Then come the roads and infrastructure, essential for any real economic momentum. These are not random preferences. They reflect a belief in a stronger, fairer state. One that guarantees decent services and opens doors for those willing to work hard. The Afrobarometer findings show a young Moroccan population that sees the world clearly. These graduates recognize the weight of the challenges they face, but they have not resigned themselves to failure. They want more than survival. They want to matter. They expect those in power to act, and they will keep asking until someone answers. Tags: EducationEmigrationMoroccoMorocco youth
