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Indian Express
2 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
BLOs' refrain: Many still not able to file one of 11 documents needed
On Sunday, the Election Commission announced that volunteers will help electors obtain the official documents required to meet the submission deadline of September 1 in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in poll-bound Bihar. They have their task cut out. The Indian Express spoke to a dozen BLOs from across the state — including from the capital Patna, Samastipur in North Bihar, Purnea in the Seemanchal region, and Banka in South Bihar. After the month-long SIR exercise, their refrain: most of those who had to submit one of the 11 documents have not been able to do so. Consider: * A BLO from the Danapur Assembly constituency said: 'Out of 1,200 voters who submitted enumeration forms in my booth, 550 were in the 2003 voters' list. Of the remaining 650 voters, only about 60 people have submitted forms with one of the 11 documents, mainly Class 10, residential and caste certificates. There has been intense pressure on us to get documents from such electors who have only submitted forms.' She said the BLOs were still accepting forms from some people. 'We are told to accept them until Monday (July 28), as the first electoral draft would be published by August 1.' Asked if they had been asked to upload one of the 11 documents against the forms during the claims-and-objection phase between August 1 and September 1, she said: 'We have heard about it, but there is no clear instruction on how to go about it and what if we do not get any documents from voters in that period.' * A Banka Assembly seat BLO said: 'My booth has about 1,300 voters. Over 500 of them are in the 2003 list. Of the remaining electors, only 50 people have submitted forms along with one of 11 documents. As my uploaded documents' percentage is very poor, I was asked to get at least 20-30% in the column on 'status of mandated 11 documents'. I am marking an exaggerated number, assuming I would be able to get the required documents at a later stage. EROs (Electoral Registration Officers) perhaps want to show a good percentage.' In the 13-column form needed to be filled up by the BLOs before the publication of the first draft of rolls, there is a break-up of details on the 2003 list voters, post-2003 voters with details on documents, numbers of deceased, permanently shifted, and repeated voters. There is also a column on 'other documents'. The Banka BLO added that his booth had uploaded over 80% of enumeration forms, as a section of migrant voters, mainly permanently shifted, had not turned up to fill up their forms, online or offline. * A BLO from the Sarairanjan Assembly seat echoed similar views. 'My area is dominated by Dalits and EBCs (Extremely Backward Classes). Of 900 voters in my booth, only 400 are in the 2003 rolls. But, only 25 persons have submitted caste or residential certificates so far. Most of them don't have documents. Some have been waiting for residential certificates. I am even spending money from my pocket for getting photocopies of the 2003 roll entries for its voters,' he said. * A BLO from Purnea's Srinagar block said: 'It is very difficult to get forms attached with one of the 11 documents. My booth has about 1,000 voters, half of which were on the 2003 list. Despite my area having a better educational status, only 100 people have submitted either Class 10 Board or residential certificates.' He added, 'I doubt whether even one extra month's time to submit the mandated documents could change things much.' * A BLO in Balrampur block of Katihar said: 'Out of 990 electors in my polling booth, about 425 were on the 2003 list. Only about 150 people submitted forms with one of 11 documents, mostly Class 10 board certificates, including from the madarsa board, family registers and passports. About 85 people, either dead or permanently shifted were deleted from the list.' * In the Araria block of Araria district, a BLO said: 'My booth had 950 voters, including 450 on the 2003 list. About 250 people submitted forms with documents such as residential certificates, passports and land papers. About 220 submitted enumeration forms with other documents. Thirty people, dead or permanently shifted, were dropped from the list.' * A BLO from Kishanganj said: 'Out of about 1,100 voters in my booth, 550 are on the 2003 voters' list. About 250 people submitted their forms with one of 11 documents including Class 10 board certificates and passports. Only 36 voters, dead or permanently shifted, were deleted from the list.' * A BLO from Tarapur in Munger said: 'Out of 770 voters, 650 filled their forms with or without documents. About 220 were on the 2003 list, and 120 more submitted forms with one of the documents needed, mostly residential and Class 10 certificates. Thirty people, dead or permanently shifted, had to be dropped from the list for publication of the first draft.' * A BLO from Sasaram Nagar Nigam in Rohtas said: 'Out of 1,240 voters, about 440 are on the 2003 voters' list. About 150 have submitted their enumeration forms with one of 11 documents.' * In Bhagwanpur (Kaimur), a BLO said: 'The total number of voters in my booth is 1,470, including 500 on the 2003 list. A total of 1,296 forms were submitted but only 20 had one of the 11 documents attached.' * A BLO in Darbhanga's Keoti said: 'Out of 1,110 voters, 515 are on the 2003 list. About 425 submitted forms with one of 11 documents.' * A BLO from Sahebpur Kamal in Begusarai said: 'Out of 1,005 voters in my booth, 560 are on the 2003 list. About 375 submitted forms with one of the 11 documents.' As part of the SIR, the EC has deployed 38 DEOs (District Election Officers), 243 EROs, 2,976 AEROs (Assistant EROs) and 77,895 BLOs. An ERO said, 'Eventually, we will have to look at land papers, family registers, government scheme beneficiaries' details to ascertain genuine electors. We do have a column of other documents, which we can consider if EC allows it at some stage.' In its counter-affidavit filed in the Supreme Court on July 21 in the matter of various pleas challenging the Bihar SIR, the EC has not accepted the court's suggestion to consider Aadhaar, Voter ID and ration cards as proof for this exercise. Santosh Singh is a Senior Assistant Editor with The Indian Express since June 2008. He covers Bihar with main focus on politics, society and governance. Investigative and explanatory stories are also his forte. Singh has 25 years of experience in print journalism covering Bihar, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka. ... Read More
The Print
11-07-2025
- Politics
- The Print
RJD has an EBC dream in Bihar. It'll take more than tickets & tokenism
Based on an analysis of caste-wise candidate nominations by the RJD and JDU, and their respective victories in the 2020 Bihar assembly election, I argue that the RJD needs to move beyond political appointments for the mobilisation of such communities. It also needs to focus on exclusive policies intended to empower EBCs. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to break the scepticism of the EBCs. So far, though, EBCs have shown an aversion toward the RJD. Instead, they have gravitated toward the JDU, now in alliance with the BJP, which mobilised its election machinery in Bihar immediately after winning the Delhi assembly election. The question now arises whether the RJD will succeed in its efforts to attract EBCs through the appointment of Mandal. As Bihar gears up for the assembly elections later this year, the opposition Rashtriya Janata Dal has appointed Mangani Lal Mandal as its new state president—the first time it has chosen someone who belongs to the Extremely Backward Classes, or EBCs, a voting bloc that comprises 113 castes and makes up 36 per cent of the state's population. Also Read: What's behind Modi govt's U-turn on caste census & how it targets Oppn ahead of crucial Bihar polls EBC aversion to RJD in 2020 polls Bihar is well known for caste-based political mobilisation. The caste background of candidates is an important indicator of how parties build their social coalitions. It also helps us to understand the support of different castes for various political parties. Let's take a look at the caste-wise candidate nominations and wins of the RJD and JDU in the 2020 Bihar assembly election. This analysis examines the caste composition of nominees and elected representatives from the RJD and JDU in the 2020 Bihar Assembly election, based on candidate data from media reports. The graph below shows that the RJD's highest number of candidates came from the Yadav community (58). After them, only three other groups—EBCs (19), Scheduled Castes (19), and Muslims (18)—had candidates in double digits. Seen as a whole, the RJD focused primarily on its traditional MY (Muslim-Yadav) base, followed by an attempt to bring in EBCs. However, its EBC candidates performed badly. Out of 19 nominated, only four won. In contrast, JDU's EBC candidates performed impressively. It nominated 17 EBC candidates, out of which 12 won. The party's overall ticket distribution was also not concentrated on any one social group. Seven social groups—Yadav (18), EBC (17), SC (16), Kurmi (15), Kushwaha (15), Muslim (11), and Bhumihar (10)—had candidates in double digits. It's worth noting, though, that the highest number of JDU candidates also came from the Yadavs. This nomination profile might be symbolic, but it also conveys a message that the party is not against the legitimate representation of any particular social group. Here, the RJD did not appear as above board, as it had nominated only one candidate from the Kurmi caste, which is the support base of the JDU. In short, the above comparative analysis reveals EBCs have largely steered clear of the RJD. Despite nominating a larger number of candidates from the group, only four of its 19 EBC candidates won, compared to 12 of JDU's 17. Also Read: ECI's voter verification drive in Bihar is tailor-made to keep Dalits, Muslims, EBCs out RJD's inadequate strategy It is often stated that Nitish Kumar has created a constituency of women, MBCs, and Mahadalits, and these social groups have gradually become a strong support base of the JDU. To break the social base of any political party, a rival typically deploys two strategies: ticket splitting and policy changes. The former means nominating candidates from those castes and communities, while the latter involves promising policies that benefit them. The RJD relied on the first strategy, nominating a high number of EBC candidates in the 2020 election. One may counter that the RJD also adopted the strategy of policy change by promising 10 lakh government jobs, from which EBCs would also potentially benefit. So why did EBCs not respond to such promises? One answer could be low educational attainment among EBCs and their limited ability to benefit from reservation policies. Across North Indian states, EBCs have demanded a sub-categorisation within OBC reservations, arguing that they are unable to compete with politically dominant OBC groups such as Yadavs and Kurmis. The BJP responded by appointing the Justice Rohini Committee to examine this demand. At the same time, welfare schemes introduced by the Narendra Modi government have also reached these communities. Because of its alliance with the BJP, the JDU has benefited from both strategies—ticket splitting and policy response—while opposition parties like the RJD have remained stuck on the former. This could partly explain the aversion of EBCs toward the RJD. In the upcoming election, RJD's Tejashwi Yadav is promising to extend the limit of reservation, along with the introduction of a domicile policy for government jobs. However, none of these policies are specifically targeted to address the grievances of EBCs. Unless the party does that, it would be a herculean task to break the aversion. To sum up, the RJD's attempt to expand its social coalition by adding EBCs to its MY base did not deliver encouraging results in the last election. Relying on ticket-splitting alone to mobilise these communities hasn't worked. The party now needs to explore mechanisms beyond candidate nomination. Offering specific welfare schemes could be one of them. Otherwise, it may just be staring at a repeat of 2020. Arvind Kumar is a visiting lecturer in Politics & International Relations at the University of Hertfordshire, UK. He tweets @arvind_kumar__. Views are personal. (Edited by Asavari Singh)
Hindustan Times
04-07-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
SIR exercise in Bihar is akin to votebandi: CPI(ML) chief Dipankar Bhattacharya
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation general secretary Dipankar Bhattacharya, whose party is a key constituent of the Opposition INDIA bloc in Bihar, describes the ongoing special intensive revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in the poll-bound state as 'votebandi'. Edited excerpts of his interview to Saubhadra Chatterji: Dipankar Bhattacharya What are the key issues for the INDIA bloc in the upcoming Bihar elections? People feel completely let down and betrayed by the Nitish Kumar's government. Kumar's major plank was development but now you find Bihar completely mired in poverty, unemployment and people are reeling under huge debt burden. Then another major key assurance was good governance and law and order. Today, it's like a reign of complete crime. People are looking for a change. There are a lot of talks that women vote for Nitish Kumar. That was a period when women indeed preferred him. But now, when a mid-day meal worker gets only ₹1,650 for 10 months a year, that support base has eroded. Caste is a dominant factor in Bihar politics. Don't you think JD(U)-BJP alliance appeals to the upper caste, Kurmis, non-Yadav OBCs and EBCs? People often forget that caste is a very dynamic thing. Caste equations are not cast in stone. Also, caste doesn't operate in a vacuum. So, it's not that if there is huge poverty, unemployment, these things don't affect a particular caste. No caste is insulated from this kind of a crisis situation. Especially in this kind of a social and economic crisis, every other caste equation changes. There is no such thing as like a fixed equation. That's why I don't think that any particular caste is a captive vote bank of any particular party. You met the CEC over the ongoing SIR exercise in Bihar. The suddenness with which, without any consultation or prior indication, the election commission has taken up this state campaign, which is logistically impossible, it has completely changed the terms of discourse. Earlier, the citizens and the voters didn't have to prove that they were citizens. It was the job of the state to prove that so and so is an illegitimate voter. Now, the EC has shifted it to the voters. This is like 'votebandi'. Voters whose names were not there in the 2003 voter list will have to prove that they are citizens. And the conditions that have been set by EC makes it very difficult for the people of Bihar. EC has put out a figure saying that the 2003 voter list means some 5 crore (50 million) people are there, so they won't have to produce anything. But this is a statistical illusion, because of those 5 crore people, nearly one-fifth might have passed away or migrated to other states. …This means that today, when you have an adult population of more than 8 crore, roughly 4.5 to 5 crore people will have to prove their citizenship. And this has to be done in just one month, within July 26th. What is the status of seat-sharing agreement among the INDIA bloc allies? Talks are underway. We have had one-on-one talks with the Congress and RJD. All parties have submitted their lists of seats that they would like to contest. A collective call will be taken. I'm sure seat sharing won't really be a big problem. We should be able to complete it maybe within a month.
India Today
01-07-2025
- Politics
- India Today
Why Nitish is force multiplier, not fallback option, for BJP in Bihar
'Nitish Kumar is an asset.' Bihar deputy chief minister Samrat Choudhary of the BJP proclaimed so in a video posted on June 29. 'Even as Leader of the Opposition, I regarded him as an asset—and I do so still,' Choudhary said, asserting that the BJP had embraced Nitish as chief minister of the incumbent government even though his Janata Dal (United) had only 43 seats, and that he would be chief minister encomiums are expected from a deputy chief minister. Yet, what stands out is that only BJP leaders in Bihar—who wield no real authority to determine the chief ministerial candidate of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—have openly championed Nitish. No senior national leader of the party has publicly endorsed Nitish for another chef ministerial term. And therein lies the is the only Hindi heartland state the BJP has never governed in its own, even though it earned the second-largest-party status in the 2020 polls, securing 74 of the 243 seats. Today, with 78 MLAs, the BJP is the single-largest party in the state. Yet, it is preparing for the upcoming elections under the leadership of Nitish. This continuing reliance on Nitish reflects hard political arithmetic—and even harsher AXIS EFFECT Since 2005, Nitish has been the axis around which Bihar's politics has turned—equal parts survivor, strategist and stabiliser. Beginning with the October 2005 assembly elections, every state poll—2010, 2015 and 2020—has seen a coalition led by him emerge victorious. In national elections too, Nitish delivered emphatic mandates for the NDA: 32 of 40 seats in 2009, 39 in 2019 and 30 in only serious electoral stumble came in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls, when the JD(U) contested on its own and won just two seats. Even then, the party had polled a respectable 16.04 per cent of the votes. In 2020, despite winning only 43 assembly seats, the JD(U)'s core voter base remained largely intact. This enduring support underscores how Nitish's durable vote-bank doesn't erode easily even in adverse conditions. For the BJP, that makes him more than a fallback—in fact, a force VACUUMThe BJP in Bihar suffers from a leadership crisis. It has no mass leader with the cross-sectional appeal that Nitish commands. While the JD(U) has diminished in recent years, securing just 15.39 per cent of the votes in 2020 and losing deposits in five constituencies, Nitish's grassroots network remains intact. A longstanding reputation for delivering welfare has earned him the loyalty of Mahadalits and Extremely Backward Castes (EBCs), demographics the BJP has yet to make significant inroads the BJP struggles to field a chief ministerial face with comparable reach. The party may boast of a strong cadre and well-oiled electoral machinery, but Bihar's politics still pivots on personalities. Without a magnetic leader like Nitish, the NDA risks fragmentation in key ARITHMETIC, STABILITYCaste remains the cardinal axis of Bihar's politics. Though the BJP has made gains among EBCs and Mahadalits—traditionally considered out of its orbit—it still lags behind. These groups once formed the bedrock of Nitish's electoral durability. Even with a reduced vote-share, the JD(U)'s support remains crucial in close votes are a necessity. Without a credible ally who can consolidate backward caste support, the BJP would face steep odds in dozens of seats. Nitish's candidacy offers both insulation and ballast: a hedge against the vagaries of caste represents continuity in a volatile political landscape. His frequent realignments—breaking away from the BJP to join the mahagathbandhan in 2015, returning in 2017, switching again in 2022 and reuniting with the NDA in 2024—have painted him as an opportunist. But he has maintained administrative stability throughout. His governments have rarely been paralysed by internal dissent, and he has navigated alliance politics with unerring the BJP, known to have experimented with new chief ministers in other states, replacing Nitish with an untested chief ministerial face carries unnecessary risk. For ally JD(U), the post of chief minister remains non-negotiable. Given Bihar's tight electoral math, where a handful of seats can determine government formation, the BJP may be disinclined to upset a working formula—at least until the results are FIREWALL AGAINST OPPOSITIONTejashwi Yadav's Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) commands a firm grip over the Yadav-Muslim voter bloc—over 30 per cent of Bihar's electorate. In 2020, the RJD emerged as the single-largest party with 75 seats but failed to form government due to allies performing below par. Even in a weakened state, Nitish's party continues to eat into the RJD's appeal among non-Yadav OBCs and EBCs, thereby acting as a bulwark against Opposition Nitish from the equation and that firewall disappears. Critical voters might drift to the RJD or abstain altogether. For the BJP, Nitish thus is not just an electoral partner but a buffer against the potential resurgence of the mahagathbandhan. Nationally, the BJP's alliance with Nitish helps project a broader, more inclusive image—softening its often-cited upper-caste orientation. In Bihar, where perceptions matter as much as performance, this visual of coalition breadth is electorally THE EXCEPTIONNo BJP leader has ever served as chief minister of Bihar. Since 2005, that role has been monopolised by Nitish, except for a brief stint by Jitan Ram Manjhi in 2014-15. Even the most prominent BJP faces from the state have failed to match his popular traction. The Bihar 'exception' is not simply an oddity—it is a structural legacy that the BJP must reckon assembly polls approach, the BJP finds itself caught between its rising organisational strength and an inescapable reliance on Nitish. Among its new crop of leaders, none yet possess his blend of caste arithmetic, administrative track record, and pan-Bihari BJP may dominate national politics, but in Bihar, the formula for power still includes Nitish. Until the BJP can anoint a successor who rivals his charisma and cross-caste reach, it has little choice but to stay tethered to the man known across the state simply as 'Saheb'.Subscribe to India Today Magazine- EndsMust Watch
Indian Express
30-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Unmasking the social justice script of the Bihar Mahagathbandhan
When the Bihar government under the Mahagathbandhan banner initiated a state-level caste-based survey in 2023, it was presented as a transformative step toward social justice. Headlines glorified it, campaign speeches claimed it was a revolutionary milestone, and Tejashwi Yadav projected himself as a champion of backward caste empowerment. In reality, this was a political manoeuvre, engineered more for headlines than for genuine upliftment. Despite being marketed as a caste census, the exercise was no census in the legal or scientific sense. A census is a rigorous, legally-backed exercise typically conducted under the Census Act of 1948 by the central government. It involves trained enumerators, standardised formats, multiple rounds of verification, and most importantly, national uniformity in execution. This, however, was a state-level caste survey with no statutory backing, limited standardisation, and questionable accuracy. By contrast, the so-called 'caste survey' under the Mahagathbandhan government was a hurriedly executed, state-level data collection exercise; conducted without clear methodological transparency and was not supported by any judicial or policy framework to integrate its findings into actionable governance. In short, it was not a caste census, but a political sampler, and a poor one at that. The most glaring weakness of this exercise was its failure to move beyond numerical enumeration. It told us how many people belong to a particular caste, but it said nothing about how they live. No data was collected on: Poverty levels by caste, literacy and dropout rates, access to health and sanitation, participation in public employment or government schemes, regional disparities within caste groups, etc. In essence, the survey reduced Bahujans, Dalits, EBCs, and Adivasis to population units, not policy subjects. It provided no basis for targeted interventions, sectoral budgeting, or proportional programmatic allocation. It offered visibility without viability. Tejashwi Yadav, despite his political positioning, did little to bridge this gap. The absence of follow-up frameworks — no deprivation index, no targeted welfare expansion, no legal roadmap — shows how shallow the intent really was. The real objective was clear: Consolidate the M-Y (Muslim-Yadav) vote bank. This M-Y axis has been the bedrock of the RJD's electoral strategy since its inception. The caste survey functioned as a numerical reaffirmation of this strategy, cloaked in the language of representation. However, the most deprived and voiceless sections of Bihar's caste spectrum, that is, the Mahadalits, SC sub-groups, Adivasis, EBCs like Nonia, Kevat, Tanti, and Musahar, remained peripheral to both data collection and policy direction. There was no outreach to Bahujan scholars, no consultation with grassroots Dalit activists, no representation from subaltern collectives in the design or analysis phase. The entire survey was structured to consolidate electoral strength, not social strength. One of the more politically charged demands emerging from Tejashwi Yadav post-survey was that the proposed 85 per cent reservation (SC+ST+OBC+EBC+others) be included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, thus insulating it from judicial scrutiny. But on what scientific basis is this 85 per cent figure determined? There is no caste-wise deprivation matrix to support it. Has there been any expert committee that has recommended this based on empirical findings? Is the Ninth Schedule a magic wand? Even laws under it can be reviewed by courts if they violate fundamental rights (IR Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007). More worryingly, there has been no formal dialogue with the Union Government, no all-party resolution, and no legal roadmap for such inclusion. It remains a talking point, not a policy position. The Mahagathbandhan government had the opportunity. It should have constituted a Backwardness Commission to analyse data and recommend proportional schemes; created a deprivation index for each caste, using indicators like access to education, employment, landholding, and healthcare; initiated sector-wise resource allocation plans based on this index; set up legal groundwork through a constitutional commission for justifying any enhancement in reservation; and launched intra-caste equity programs, especially for sub-castes within SC and OBCs that remain disadvantaged. None of this happened. There were no schemes for EBCs, no Dalit entrepreneurship missions, no targeted educational reforms. What emerged instead was a PR campaign with Tejashwi Yadav at its centre, drawing attention more for performance than policy. While he may still be seen by some as a political successor to Mandal, the delivery deficit reveals how thin the claims really are. While other parties reduced caste surveys to symbolic optics and vote-bank manipulation, Chirag Paswan emerged as a true champion of Bahujan and Dalit empowerment. As Union Minister, he strongly advocated for a scientific, nationwide caste census that goes far beyond mere headcounts. His vision incorporates real indicators — education, employment, housing, income — designed not just to represent communities, but to uplift them. Chirag Paswan's approach reflects an understanding that justice cannot rest on slogans. His insistence on reliable data, institutional accountability, and constitutionally sound implementation sets him apart from leaders who seek to use the Bahujan identity for electoral staging. By working toward policies grounded in empirical evidence and legal clarity, he has positioned himself as one of the few national leaders genuinely invested in transformative social justice. His role has not just been performative; it has been policy-oriented. His work stands as a counter-model to the politics of Tejashwi Yadav and the Congress in Telangana -— where counting was the goal, not correcting. Chirag's politics is not about how many are included in a speech but how many are included in development. The Mahagathbandhan's caste survey failed because it mistook enumeration for emancipation. It was an electoral strategy disguised as empowerment. The Bahujans, once again, were used as political capital, reduced to statistics, not stakeholders. There has been no follow-up scholarship scheme, no targeted employment drive, no caste-wise health mission, no SC/ST/OBC land redistribution proposal. Just data and drama. Social justice is not a rallying cry. It is a roadmap. It requires painstaking institutional effort, credible data architecture, and inclusive policy building. Tejashwi Yadav fails on all three counts. He merely counted the Bahujans. Chirag Paswan is fighting to count them in. The writer is Member of Parliament, Jamui (LS), Chief Whip, Lok Janshakti Party (Ramvilas)
