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Memri
21-07-2025
- Politics
- Memri
Druze Revolts, Then And Now
Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash in exile in Saudi Arabia Exactly a century ago, what began as a dispute about local power in the Druze majority region of Southern Syria erupted into a long-lasting anti-imperialist revolt, one that would have a lasting regional impact. In July 2025, a different Druze revolt threatened to change the trajectory of political change in Syria and is already havening regional implications. The Druze, a relatively small and compact ethnic and religious minority found mostly in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, are once again in the spotlight. On July 21, 1925, Druze feudal leader Sultan Al-Atrash announced a revolt against the French Mandate in the Levant. French rule in Syria, part of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between Britain and France, had already been rocky from the start. French efforts at modernizing and controlling Syria had also been characterized by a considerable amount of meddling and heavy-handed micromanaging. The powerful Al-Atrash family (the Turshan, plural of Atrash) had sent representatives to iron out differences with the French only to have them jailed as hostages in order to secure good behavior from the Druze. The French did not quite know who they were dealing with. Sultan Al-Atrash had lost a father to the Ottomans, been drafted into the Turkish Army and later had fought the French in past battles.[1] This was a warrior chief from among a warrior people. Jealous of his personal power and feudal privileges, the Great Syrian Revolt Al-Atrash ignited was not a parochial one but framed in the potent language of Syrian Arab Nationalism, anti-imperialism and freedom. His revolutionary manifesto (drafted by Damascus intellectuals) even called for the "application of the principles of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man." The humble Arab masses, what Al-Atrash dubbed "the patchers of cloaks" were especially inspired by this cause.[2] Despite many small victories and undoubted bravery, Al-Atrash would eventually lose the war to the French but become a legendary figure, even in the West (he was portrayed heroically in the December 1925 issue of The Atlantic, in an article written by a Revisionist Zionist).[3] While he may have lost on the battlefield, Al-Atrash's cause won politically, giving a tremendous boost to both Syrian patriotism and Arab Nationalism, a feat that would later earn him the praise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hafiz Al-Assad. And yet in 1946, 20 years after that nationalist revolt, the Al-Atrash clan fought fiercely against the newly independent Arab government in Damascus (under Presidents Shukri Al-Quwatli and Adib Shishakli) to maintain Druze rights and autonomy. The Druze, like the Alawites, and like the Christians of neighboring Lebanon, seemed to have had two quarreling factions within their ranks: those seeking unity with the greater whole – either with the state and/or the Arab nation – and those leaning towards greater autonomy, federalism, or separation.[4] Clipping of PLO Chief Yasser Arafat with an ailing Sultan Al-Atrash The Turshan still exist but they are not the leading political figures of the Syrian Druze today. As with other polities and individuals in Syria over the past 15 years, the Druze have had to maneuver and scheme in their relations with the state, with each other, with the Assad regime, during the brutal Syrian Civil War, and now with the new Syrian government headed by Islamist President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. There were Syrian Druze who fought against Assad and there were Syrian Druze who collaborated with and indeed held high military rank in the Assad regime army. A (pro-Al-Hijri) Druze fighter desecrating the tomb of Wahid Al-Balous (July 2025) Syria's most prominent Druze figures today represent the two sides of that historic Druze duality and ambivalence. 30-year-old Laith Al-Balous represents the more Syrian Arab nationalist Druze tendency, looking towards today's Damascus government. The Al-Balous (through Laith's father, Wahid Al-Balous, who was assassinated by the Assad regime in 2015) raised their own militia which fought against Jihadists and against aggressive Bedouin (Sunni Arab) neighbors but which also mostly leaned against the Assad regime.[5] Druze fighter posing with dead Syrian government troops (July 2025) The traditional Druze religious leadership, especially in the person of Venezuela-born 60-year-old Hikmat Al-Hijri (many Druze have ties with South America, especially Venezuela), leaned much more decisively towards the Assad regime through the years. Al-Hijri broke with the Assad regime only at the very end, and much more clearly represents the autonomy-seeking tendency among the Druze.[6] And although Al-Hijri's powerbase was initially religious, he is now very much a political player, with his own militia base and international ties (to the Israeli Druze).[7] Critics also accuse Al-Hijri of having recruited former Assad regime officers among the Syrian Druze and to be deeply involved in the Syrian drug trade across the border into Jordan. Both Al-Balous and Al-Hijri are connected, in different ways, in the recent violence in Syria's Druze majority Suwayda Governorate. One of the challenges the new government in Damascus faces is how to incorporate breakaway provinces back into a centrally-ruled Syria. This is a major problem with the Kurdish ruled Syrian Northeast and with Druze Suwayda.[8] Earlier this month, the Damascus government saw what seemed a golden opportunity to reincorporate Suwayda into Syria. The 1925 war was triggered by a dead cat belonging to a French officer. The ostensible trigger for the 2025 war was the stealing of a Druze vegetable truck at a pro-government Bedouin-run checkpoint. Both local events were, of course, intimately connected to larger questions of power and authority in Syria, a century ago under French military, today, under Syria's new Islamist rulers. Anti "Al-Hijri Gangs" propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) With the vegetable truck incident, tensions between Bedouin and Druze (which are nothing new) then exploded into outright conflict, with kidnappings and murders on both sides. Al-Hijri's men – already regarded suspiciously by Damascus because of the international ties, the Assad officer connection and the smuggling question – were prominent in fighting (and killing) their Bedouin rivals. Damascus saw the sending of troops as a way to solve several problems – restore order, extend state power, curtail (or maybe eliminate) a troublesome local potentate, perhaps also build up a more amenable local figure in Laith Al-Balous.[9] Infamous image of Druze cleric having his mustache clipped by government soldier (July 2025) But disaster struck. The Damascus units initially sent in had two major problems. They seem to have been made up of raw recruits and they were contaminated by open religious animus. Videos of government soldiers mocking the Druze including several showing government fighters forcibly shaving the mustaches of Druze elders peppered social media. Islamists called for "no Druze mustaches (shawarib) or baggy pants (the traditional Druze sherwal)." And if insults were not bad enough, government troops and the pro-government Bedouin militias committed many human rights abuses against Druze civilians (not just against Al-Hijri's fighters) while Al-Hijri's forces seem to not just ambushed government troops but also slaughtered civilian prisoners and taken hostages. All of this, the rhetoric, the videos, calls for revenge, calls to slaughter the Druze (not just "the criminal Al-Hijri") fed into larger regional and international narratives.[10] Enemies of the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government in Damascus, including Iran and its allies, Assad regime types, and the Syrian Kurds, wasted no time in highlighting the abuses, and there was plenty of real material to work with. Pro-Syrian government forces stand on image of Druze flag and Sultan Al-Atrash With its own Druze population, a valued part of the state of Israel's history and armed forces, rhetoric (and real violence) against the Syrian Druze and deeply ambivalent about Islamist rule in Damascus, the IDF intervened directly on the side of the Druze (meaning on the side of Al-Hijri).[11] Israel has long considered Southern Syria an area of deep strategic concern. Israel not only hit local government units and militias confronting Druze forces but spectacularly bombing the Syrian Defense Ministry in Damascus on live television. With the help of American mediation, Damascus tried to forge a de-escalation agreement with the Druze which may or may not last. Government troops pulled back which led to even worse violence which then seems to be leading to government forces returning to the region.[12] There are simultaneously community-generated efforts at vendetta and at peacebuilding happening between Druze and non-Druze. Anti-Druze, pro-government propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) Much blood has been spilt and hearts hardened, especially among the Syrian Sunni majority against the Druze. There is deep rage and fury on both sides. While pro-government voices seek to place all the blame on the mercurial Druze warlord Al-Hijri, the fact remains that many Druze (and some Christians) were slaughtered, raped or kidnapped by pro-government forces (whether Bedouin or uniformed government units) with no regard to political affiliation.[13] Syrian Bedouin Tribes Meet to Demand Disarming of Al-Hijri's militia (January 2025) Both sides are being portrayed as either victims or villains and both are portrayed too often, falsely, as uniform fronts.[14] There has been so much rhetoric and so much twisting, for political or ideological reasons, of the facts or exaggeration that it is important to make some general statements about the situation: 1) Tension and violence between Syrian Bedouin and Druze are not new. In addition, elements of both groups have connections with and are competitors in the lucrative smuggling (drugs and guns) business. They are not just in conflict because of religion or ethnicity. 2) There has been heightened anti-Druze tension for months in Syria.[15] In April 2025, there were bloodcurdling threats against Druze as a result of a suspicious video of a Druze man insulting the Prophet Muhammad which led to Syrian Sunni Muslim calls for violence against the Druze community as a whole.[16] 3) The March 2025 slaughter of Alawites by government forces on the Syrian Coast and the seeming subsequent impunity of those forces has heightened tensions with all ethnic and religious communities in the country across the board. The Druze, like the Kurds, and unlike the Christians, are armed and everyone is more leery of domination by Damascus after the March events. 4) Hikmat Al-Hijri is indeed a scheming, volatile figure who seeks to gain ultimate power within his community and is involved in all sorts of suspicious enterprises. But the indiscriminate slaughter of Druze by Bedouin/government forces seems to have boosted his popularity among Druze while Al-Balous's influence is greatly diminished in comparison. 5) The Syrian government has real ties with Syrian Bedouin which it has used and is using as a tool to project power. In this conflict, the Bedouin are not completely free actors but rather enthusiastic sub-contractors, pursuing their own vendettas and crimes (such as rape and looting) while broadly serving the political interests of the Damascus government, in a sense serving as the "bad cop" to the Syrian government's relative "good cop."[17] 6) The Damascus government – whatever President Al-Sharaa's real feelings on the matter – is itself not a free actor in this conflict either. Al-Sharaa is exquisitely aware of Qatari, and especially Turkish interests, in everything involving Syria, including the South. In a way, what happened with the Druze can be seen as a dry-run for a similar campaign to be directed against the Kurdish-led SDF in the country's Northeast, an issue of tremendous interest to the Erdogan regime. But Al-Sharaa seems to also be hampered by his own cadres, blunt and chaotic instruments who seem to be cruder and less disciplined than he would prefer.[18] Pro-Al-Hijri Propaganda on social media comparing him to Sultan Al-Atrash (July 2025) A century after Sultan Al-Atrash's heroism, the situation in Syria seems dire indeed, balancing on the edge of a knife. Any celebration marking the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and the great Druze warrior would ring extremely hollow today. A shaky ceasefire seems to be holding in Suwayda but what comes next?[19] The war-wrecked country's already frayed social fabric is again, deeply and severely wounded. *Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.
Arab News
31-03-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
‘Israeli peace' not a silver bullet for the Levant
In Jeddah last week, Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qusra and his Lebanese counterpart Michel Menassa signed a promising agreement to end lingering border issues between their two countries. In truth, neither the new Syrian government nor the current Lebanese authorities contributed to these issues, which were inherited from the birth of the existing Syrian and Lebanese territories during the French Mandate period and on the ruins of former Ottoman provinces and states. The decades that followed brought tensions and understandings between the rulers of Damascus and Beirut, until Hafez Assad succeeded — with regional and international approval — in imposing Damascus' 'hegemony' over Lebanese decision-making. Indeed, the Syrian security apparatus controlled Lebanon from the late 1970s until the departure of Syrian forces in 2005, following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Hariri's assassination created new facts on the ground, including Bashar Assad accepting that Damascus would exchange ambassadors with Beirut and recognize Lebanon's independence. However, the border issue remained complex and thorny in the north, center and south. Keeping the issue as such became even more important as Iran, through Hezbollah, inherited Syria's hegemony over Lebanon. In the south, the identity of the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shuba hills became a pretext to justify Hezbollah's 'resistance' and ensured it could retain its weapons. In the north, some border villages inside the Syrian province of Homs became the initial justification for Hezbollah's participation in suppressing the Syrian uprising in 2011. Today, the Syrian and Lebanese entities, which in the past shared similar existential challenges, are now sharing (and will continue to share) similar existential dangers. In an era where Israel plays a hegemonic role in international decision-making capitals regarding the politics of the Middle East, the prospect of a disastrous 'Israeli peace' looms large for the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. This Israeli peace appears to many as a powerful storm — too overwhelming to confront — especially given the current US administration's total alignment with Benjamin Netanyahu's government and the hard-line Israeli right. This right-wing faction has succeeded in dragging Iran into a war larger than it can handle and is now reaping the benefits of its 'response' to the Oct. 7, 2023, operation. Having managed, through unprecedented American support, to diminish Iran's regional stature, it is now accelerating the imposition of its dominance — whether direct or indirect — over the Eastern Mediterranean region and its four Arab entities. The major headlines here include the forced transfer of Palestinians and the implementation of an old plan to divide and fragment the region's remaining entities along religious, sectarian and ethnic lines. Israeli penetration of the region has been underway for some time across various components, but it is now nearly overt. The blow dealt to Hezbollah has liberated voices that were previously concealed or had dual allegiances (particularly within Syria and Lebanon) who are now openly calling for an 'Israeli solution' to the issues of coexistence between majorities and minorities. In Syria, one can recall Rami Makhlouf's warning to Israel — at the onset of the uprising — that the fall of the Syrian regime would not be in its interest. Some of the violent incidents involving the killing of civilians on Syria's coast during the new government's pursuit of remnants of the former regime ended up serving those who sought to add fuel to the fire. There is also the matter of reckless statements made by certain separatist Kurdish leaders, which they quickly backed away from, especially after the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, proceeded to sign an understanding with the new Syrian leadership. In southern Syria, Israeli penetration is now taking on dangerous dimensions, particularly through its deliberate investment in the Druze community via arming, funding and courting certain figures within the religious establishment. Simultaneously, a fierce media and social media campaign is currently underway targeting any Druze voices that oppose the 'replication' of the Israeli model and its attempt to reengineer the national and religious identity of Druze communities. The situation in Lebanon is not much different. Much of the alluring rhetoric that was once cloaked in the language of 'change,' at times in 'federalism' and even 'fighting corruption,' has since shed its cautious facade, revealing its true agenda of division and suspicious foreign alignment. The Eastern Mediterranean has long been part of what was known as the 'Eastern question' — a landscape marked by seismic fault lines between religions, sects, ethnicities and fragile statelets. This is a historical reality. However, the only consistent and constructive way to deal with it has always rested on alleviating the fears of minorities and addressing the sense of injustice felt by majorities. As long as fear and resentment persist within fragmented, diminished entities whose decision-making lies elsewhere, the region will find no rest. It will continue to swing from one episode of exploitation to another, from one conflict to the next. As long as fear and resentment persist within fragmented, diminished entities, the region will find no rest. Eyad Abu Shakra In more advanced parts of the world, political actors have managed to arrive at tailored arrangements that reflect the needs of each context, ranging from federalism to administrative decentralization. Some in our region reject federalism, arguing that it will lead to partition. Perhaps so. That may be true in certain tribal societies. But federalism has succeeded in most countries where it has been implemented — from Switzerland and Belgium to India and Brazil. But what about administrative decentralization? In the case of the Eastern Mediterranean, administrative decentralization is precisely the model outlined in the 1989 Taif Agreement in Lebanon. Yet the Damascus regime resisted its implementation — perhaps out of fear that it might actually work. In my view, there can be no political solution to the crises facing any of the Eastern Mediterranean states unless it is based on administrative decentralization within a unified, sovereign and independent state — one in which all citizens enjoy the same rights, responsibilities and foundations of citizenship. When people feel justice and safety, their sense of belonging will grow. The cycle of oppression and counteroppression will never be broken through reliance on foreign powers.
Asharq Al-Awsat
30-03-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
‘Israeli peace' is Not a Silver Bullet for The Levant
Yesterday, in Jeddah, Syrian and Lebanese defense ministers Murhaf Abu Qusra and Michel Menassa signed a promising agreement to end lingering border issues between Lebanon and Syria. In truth, neither the new Syrian government nor the current Lebanese authorities contributed to these issues, which were inherited from the birth of the current Syrian and Lebanese territories during the French Mandate period and on the ruins of former Ottoman provinces and states. The decades that followed brought tensions and understandings between the rulers of Damascus and Beirut, until Assad succeeded - with regional and international approval - in imposing Damascus' 'hegemony' over Lebanese decision-making. Indeed, the Syrian security apparatus controlled Lebanon from the late 1970s until the departure of Syrian forces in 2005, following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Hariri's assassination created new facts on the ground, including Bashar al-Assad accepting that Damascus would exchange ambassadors with Beirut and recognize Lebanon's independence. However, the border issue remained complex and thorny in the north, center, and south. Keeping the issue 'complex and thorny' became even more important as Iran, through Hezbollah, inherited Syria's hegemony over Lebanon. In the south, the identity of the Shebaa Farms and Kfarshuba hills became a 'pretext' to justify Hezbollah's 'resistance' and ensure it could retain its weapons. In the north, some border villages inside the Syrian province of Homs became the initial justification for Hezbollah's participation in suppressing the Syrian uprising in 2011. Today, the Syrian and Lebanese entities, which in the past shared similar existential challenges, are now sharing (and will continue to share) similar existential dangers. In an era where Israel plays a hegemonic role in international decision-making capitals regarding the politics of the Middle East, the prospect of a disastrous 'Israeli peace' looms large for the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. 'Israeli peace' appears to many as a powerful storm - too overwhelming to confront - especially given the current US administration's total alignment with Benjamin Netanyahu's government and the hardline Israeli right. This right-wing faction has succeeded in dragging Iran into a war larger than it can handle and is now reaping the benefits of its 'response' to the October 7, 2023 operation. Having managed, through unprecedented American support, to diminish Iran's regional stature, it is now accelerating the imposition of its dominance - whether direct or indirect - over the Eastern Mediterranean region and its four Arab entities. The major headlines here include the forced 'transfer' of Palestinians and the implementation of an old plan to divide and fragment the region's remaining entities along religious, sectarian, and ethnic lines. Israeli penetration of the region has been underway for some time across various components, but it is now nearly overt. The blow dealt to Hezbollah has 'liberated' voices that were previously concealed or had dual allegiances (particularly within Syria and Lebanon) who are now openly calling for an 'Israeli solution' to the issues of coexistence between majorities and minorities. In Syria, one can recall Rami Makhlouf's warning to Israel - at the onset of the uprising - that the fall of the Syrian regime would not be in its interest. Some of the violent incidents involving the killing of civilians on Syria's coast during the new government's pursuit of remnants of the former regime ended up serving those who sought to add fuel to the fire. There's also the matter of reckless statements made by certain separatist Kurdish leaders, which they quickly backed away from, especially after the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, proceeded to sign an understanding with the new Syrian leadership. In southern Syria, Israeli penetration is now taking on dangerous dimensions, particularly through Israel's deliberate investment in the Druze community via arming, funding, and courting certain figures within the religious establishment. Simultaneously, a fierce media and social media campaign is currently underway targeting any Druze voices that oppose the 'replication' of the Israeli model and its attempt to re-engineer the national and religious identity of Druze communities. The situation in Lebanon is not much different. Much of the alluring rhetoric that was once cloaked in the language of 'change,' at times in 'federalism,' and even 'fighting corruption', has since shed its cautious facade, revealing its true agenda of division and suspicious foreign alignment. The Eastern Mediterranean has long been part of what was known as the "Eastern Question" - a landscape marked by seismic fault lines between religions, sects, ethnicities, and fragile statelets. This is a historical reality. However, the only consistent and constructive way to deal with it has always rested on alleviating the fears of minorities and addressing the sense of injustice felt by majorities. As long as fear and resentment persist within fragmented, diminished entities whose decision-making lies elsewhere, the region will find no rest. It will continue to swing from one episode of exploitation to another, from one conflict to the next. In more advanced parts of the world, political actors have managed to arrive at tailored arrangements that reflect the needs of each context, ranging from 'federalism' to 'administrative decentralization.' Some in our region reject federalism, arguing that it will lead to partition. Perhaps so! That may be true in certain tribal societies. But federalism has succeeded in most countries where it has been implemented—from Switzerland and Belgium to India and Brazil. But what about administrative decentralization? In the case of the Eastern Mediterranean, administrative decentralization is precisely the model outlined in the 1989 Taif Agreement in Lebanon. Yet the Damascus regime resisted its implementation—perhaps out of fear that it might actually work. In my view, there can be no political solution to the crises facing any of the Eastern Mediterranean states unless it is based on administrative decentralization within a unified, sovereign, and independent state—one in which all citizens enjoy the same rights, responsibilities, and foundations of citizenship. When people feel justice and safety, their sense of belonging will grow. The cycle of oppression and counter-oppression will never be broken through reliance on foreign powers.
