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The Wire
a day ago
- Politics
- The Wire
Justice A.P Shah's Open Letter Seeking Repeal of Recent Amendments to RTI Act
This is the full and unedited open letter by Justice Ajit Prakash Shah, former chairperson of Law Commission of India and former chief justice of Delhi high court, to attorney general R. Venkataramani expressing concern over the changes in the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005, brought through the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP)Act, 2023. § Justice Ajit Prakash Shah Former Chief Justice, High Court of Delhi Former Chairman, Law Commission India 28 July 2025 OPEN LETTER To, Shri. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India Sub: Urgent Need to Roll Back Amendments to the Right to Information Act, 2005 1. I write to you with profound concern over the recent legislative changes to the Right to Information Act, 2005 ('RTI Act') through the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 ('DPDP Act'). These changes represent a seismic shift in India's transparency framework for the worse, threatening to dismantle RTI Act's core purpose of democratic accountability and citizen empowerment. It has come to my attention – through reports in The Economic Times and other sources – that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology ('MeitY') has formally sought your legal opinion on whether the DPDP Act undermines the RTI Act. As a concerned citizen, I have applied my mind to this important subject. My endeavour in submitting this opinion is to assist your office and contribute meaningfully to the public discourse on this matter of urgent constitutional importance. 2. India's RTI Act has been hailed globally as a benchmark "sunshine law" that transformed the relationship between the state and its citizens by promoting transparency and accountability in public administration. It codified the fundamental right to information, derived from Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution. It has empowered citizens to scrutinize government functions, prevent corruption, and ensure good governance. The original RTI Act, particularly Section 8(1)(j), meticulously balanced the public's right to know with the individual's right to privacy – a balance consistently affirmed by the Indian judiciary. The recent amendments, however, destroy this delicate equilibrium. 3. The DPDP Act significantly harms the RTI Act, both directly and indirectly, in the following manner: A. Section 8(1)(j) Amended: Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act replaces the narrowly tailored exemption in Section 8(1)(j) with an overbroad provision for withholding information, and removing the "public interest' override. This enables public authorities to deny information simply by classifying it as "personal," regardless of its public relevance or importance. B. Proviso to Section 8(1) Deleted: The removal of the proviso to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act - which mandated that information not deniable to Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person - is alarming for democracy. This attempt to legitimate information asymmetry between elected representatives and ordinary citizens undermines the principle of an informed citizenry vital for democratic functioning and public accountability. C. Impact on Suo Motu Disclosures (Section 4): The expansive definition of 'personal data' in the DPDP Act, coupled with the absence of a public interest override, severely curtails proactive disclosures under Section 4 of the RTI Act. Public authorities can now withhold information concerning their functions, decision-making processes, employee details, and budgets if such information can be broadly interpreted as 'personal information'. 4. As a co-author of the Report of the Group of Experts on Privacy (2012), constituted under the aegis of erstwhile Planning Commission, it was our position that any legislation on privacy should not affect or dilute the RTI Act. Our report recommended that "Privacy Act should not circumscribe the Right to Information Act.' It also unequivocally stated that "Any information that is available or accessible in public domain or furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 will not be regarded as sensitive personal data." This foundational principle, articulated in greater detail in our report, demonstrates the complementary nature of privacy and transparency - which the DPDP Act gravely disrupts. 5. These amendments are manifestly ill-thought-out, raising critical legal issues that are ripe for constitutional challenge. A. Does the amendment to Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act via Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act constitute an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to information under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution? B. Does the removal of the "larger public interest" override from Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, contradict the principles established in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017), which emphasized that privacy, while a fundamental right, is not absolute and can be subject to reasonable restrictions in the public interest? C. Does the broad and undefined scope of "personal information" in the amended Section 8(1)(j), when read in conjunction with the DPDP Act's definition of "personal data," lead to an arbitrary and excessive denial of information that is intrinsically linked to public activity and accountability, thereby undermining the public's right to know? D. Does the deletion of the proviso to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, which ensures information accessible to the legislature is open to the public, violate the principles of democratic accountability and an informed citizenry? E. Does the DPDP Act, through its broad definitions and lack of public interest override, undermine the spirit and effectiveness of suo motu disclosures under Section 4 of the RTI Act? The Original Framework of Section 8(1)(j): A Balanced Approach 6. The RTI Act was designed with a clear intent to enable 'maximum disclosure with minimum exemptions' in order to promote transparency and accountability in public authorities. Within this framework, Section 8(1)(j) served as a crucial provision for balancing the right to information with the right to privacy. Narrow Scope of "Personal Information" 7. The original Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act was carefully worded to exempt "information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual." This restrictive phrasing ensured that the exemption was not a blanket one but applied only to specific categories of personal data. It primarily concerned information that genuinely lacked public relevance or constituted an "unwarranted invasion" of privacy. This approach ensured that the provision was not intended to be a broad shield against disclosure. The Indispensable Public Interest Balancing Test 8. A critical component of the original Section 8(1)(j) is that it allows disclosure "unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information." This "public interest override" is the cornerstone of the RTI Act's balance. It permits Public Information Officers (PIOs) to weigh the public's right to know against individual privacy concerns on a case-by-case basis. Judicial Affirmation of the RTI Act's Balance 9. The judiciary consistently affirmed the delicate balance struck by the original Section 8(1)(j). The nine-judge bench decision in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017) unequivocally declared the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy, like other fundamental rights, is not absolute and can be limited. Any invasion of privacy must meet a three-pronged proportionality test: (i) legality (existence of a law), (ii) legitimate state aim, and (iii) proportionality stricto sensu. 10. The original Section 8(1)(j) with its public interest override is inherently aligned with the principles of proportionality. It ensures a calibrated approach to privacy invasion when a legitimate state aim, such as public interest in transparency, justifies disclosure. This position has been reinforced by the five-judge Constitution Bench in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019). The Court reiterated that decisions on public disclosure must be made on a "case-by-case basis' by weighing competing public interest claims. In particular, the Court upheld the disclosure of judges' assets by affirming the public interest override in Section 8(1)(j). 11. Courts and Information Commissions consistently accepted the existing Section 8(1)(j) as a fair and workable balance between the right to information and the right to privacy. The framework allowed for nuanced decision-making, ensuring that personal information was protected from unwarranted invasion while permitting disclosure where public accountability was paramount. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and the Dilution of Section 8(1)(j) 12. The DPDP Act's Section 44(3) drastically amends Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act to simply read: "(j) information which relates to personal information." This seemingly minor textual change fundamentally alters its original character and purpose. The Undefined and Overbroad Scope of "Personal Information" 13. It removes the crucial qualifying phrases: "the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual." 14. While the RTI Act itself does not define "personal information," the DPDP Act defines "personal data" broadly as "any data about an individual who is identifiable by or in relation to such data." This broad and vague definition, when implicitly applied to RTI, enables public authorities to classify virtually any data related to an individual as "personal information," thereby exempting it from disclosure. This could include public officials' salaries, educational qualifications, disciplinary actions, and property records, which were previously accessible. 15. The vagueness of 'personal information', coupled with the removal of qualifiers in the original 8(1)(j), is a significant legal loophole. It shifts the burden of proof on the public authority to justify non-disclosure based on specific criteria, to the RTI applicant, who now has to prove the information is not 'personal'. Thus, it fundamentally alters the RTI Act's openness principle and creates a ripe environment for PIOs to shield information. Exclusion of the Public Interest Test 16. The most significant change is the complete removal of the public interest override from Section 8(1)(j). This means that even if the disclosure of certain personal information is overwhelmingly in the public interest - for example, exposing corruption or ensuring the accountability of public officials - it can now be denied outright simply because it relates to 'personal information'. This blanket ban on the disclosure of personal information, regardless of its public relevance, eliminates the nuanced balancing act that is central to the original RTI framework. The removal of this crucial safeguard transforms an exception into a broad rule, severely curtailing the public's right to access information. 17. The following tables illustrate the stark differences between the original and amended Section 8(1)(j): Original 8(1)(j) Amended 8(1)(j) What is Protected Personal information unrelated to public activity or interest, or causing unwarranted invasion of privacy. Disclosure Condition Can be denied only if it causes unwarranted invasion of privacy and has no relationship to public activity or public interest. Public Interest Override Disclosure allowed if larger public interest justifies it. Definition of "Personal Info" Undefined but applied narrowly with a public interest test. Grave Knock-on Effects on Democratic Governance 18. The amendments to Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act carry profound and detrimental consequences for the functioning of India's democratic governance. Chilling Impact on Journalists and Free Speech 19. The amendments, coupled with the broad definitions in the DPDP Act, pose a severe threat to independent journalism and the freedom of the press. Journalists fear that the Act will criminalise routine reporting and require consent for news coverage, which is impractical for investigative journalism, especially in situations like riots, custodial deaths, or corruption scandals. The DPDP Act's definitions of "Data Principal" (a person mentioned in a news article) and "Data Fiduciary" (the journalist handling that information) mean that even quoting a name or taking a photo could be considered processing personal data, potentially leading to heavy penalties up to ₹250 crore or ₹500 crore. Undermining Public Accountability and Anti-Corruption Efforts 20. The removal of the public interest override and the vague definition of "personal information" under the DPDP Act will significantly hamper efforts to ensure public accountability and combat corruption. Information about public servants' qualifications, disciplinary actions, property records, and even minutes of public meetings could now be withheld under the guise of privacy. Even a document that would otherwise be disclosed may be withheld simply because a small part of it pertains to 'personal information' of an individual. The RTI Act's original intent was to prevent corruption and ensure accountability. This was achieved by allowing access to information about public officials' conduct and assets. If this information is subject to blanket exemption, then the mechanism for accountability is broken, leading to increased opacity and potential for corruption. 21. The RTI Act was a potent weapon against corruption, making government officials wary of misconduct. This amendment weakens that deterrent effect. The amendment creates an information asymmetry that favors public authorities and potentially corrupt officials. By restricting access to personal information that is intrinsically linked to public activity, it shifts the balance of power away from citizens and oversight bodies, making it harder to hold the government accountable. This directly undermines the foundational purpose of the RTI Act. Crippling Social Audits 22. Social audits, a crucial mechanism for ensuring transparency and accountability in the implementation of public welfare schemes, rely heavily on the ability to access information about beneficiaries, expenditures, and service delivery. Social audits require detailed information about individuals, such as beneficiaries and officials, to verify scheme implementation. If this "personal information" is now exempt, then the very data needed for audits is inaccessible, making them impossible or ineffective. 23. By creating a blanket ban on disclosure of personal information, the amendments will cripple social audits and the verification of public service delivery. Examples include exposing ration distribution fraud or identifying "ghost beneficiaries" in public distribution systems, which were previously achieved through RTI requests. These vital oversight mechanisms will become impossible if access to relevant personal data of beneficiaries or officials involved is denied. The impact on social audits highlights how the amendment's broad sweep affects grassroots accountability. Susceptibility to Legal Challenge: Violation of Constitutional Principles 24. The amendments introduced by the DPDP Act to Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act are not merely problematic from a policy perspective; they are susceptible to legal challenge on fundamental constitutional grounds. Failure to Satisfy the Proportionality Test 25. As established in Puttaswamy, any invasion of privacy, or restriction on fundamental rights, must satisfy the three-pronged proportionality test: legality, legitimate state aim, and proportionality. While the DPDP Act provides legality, the blanket ban on personal information disclosure, without a public interest override, fails the proportionality limb. (a) Rational Nexus: A blanket exemption from disclosure for all "personal information" is not rationally connected to the legitimate state aim of merely protecting an individual from unwarranted infringement of privacy. As explained earlier, the original Section 8(1)(j) was meticulously crafted to exempt only such personal information that had "no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy." This inherent qualifier ensured that the scope of privacy protection was tailored to the actual harm. The current broad exemption encompasses vast swathes of information that are intrinsically linked to public functions and accountability, where the privacy interest is negligible or outweighed by public interest. (b) Least Restrictive Means (Necessity Test): The Puttaswamy judgment mandates that any restriction on a fundamental right must employ the least intrusive means possible to achieve its legitimate aim. The original Section 8(1)(j), with its in-built public interest override and the requirement to demonstrate "unwarranted invasion," served as a less restrictive, yet effective, mechanism for privacy protection. It allowed for a nuanced, case-by-case balancing that prevented arbitrary denials. The amendment, by removing this balance and creating a blanket ban, adopts the most restrictive means possible. It presupposes that all "personal information," irrespective of context or public relevance, carries an equal and overriding privacy sensitivity, which is clearly fallacious in a transparent governance framework. (c) Proportionality Stricto Senso (Balancing Test): This final component requires a balancing of the adverse impact on the affected rights against the benefit derived from the restriction. The benefit of a blanket privacy protection, achieved at the cost of a complete erosion of the public's right to information on matters of public concern, is disproportionate. The adverse impact on public accountability, anti-corruption efforts, social audits, and journalistic freedom (as detailed previously) far outweighs the marginal, if any, additional privacy protection gained beyond what the original Section 8(1)(j) already afforded. It undermines the very essence of public oversight and creates an information asymmetry that tilts heavily in favour of public authorities. 26. This failure to satisfy the stringent proportionality test, particularly on the aspects of rational connection, necessity, and balancing, renders the amendment to Section 8(1)(j) constitutionally vulnerable and susceptible to legal challenge. Deprivation of Fundamental Rights 27. The amendment deprives citizens of their fundamental right to information, which is an intrinsic part of the right to freedom of speech and expression [Article 19(1)(a)] and the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21). By creating a broad exemption for "personal information" without a public interest override, it unduly restricts the flow of information necessary for informed public discourse and democratic participation. The right to information is a fundamental right, and any restriction on it must be reasonable. A blanket ban on "personal information" regardless of public interest is an unreasonable restriction, directly depriving citizens of their fundamental right. This suggests that the amendment is not merely a policy choice but a constitutional infringement. 28. Furthermore, while purporting to protect privacy, the amendment paradoxically undermines the broader constitutional scheme where transparency and accountability are complementary to, not in contradiction with, privacy. The amendment creates a false dichotomy between privacy and transparency, implying they are inherently conflicting, whereas judicial pronouncements have emphasized their complementary nature in a democratic society. Deletion of the Proviso to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act: Erosion of Democratic Oversight 29. The original proviso to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act stated: "Provided further, that the information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person." This proviso embodies the principle that what is accessible to the legislature, representing the people, must also be accessible to the people directly. The deletion of this proviso is not merely a procedural change but a symbolic and substantive attack on the principle of popular sovereignty. It suggests that the government's primary accountability is to the legislature, rather than directly to the citizenry, creating a hierarchical information flow that is antithetical to a vibrant participatory democracy. The Mandate of Suo Motu Disclosures under Section 4 of the RTI Act 30. The RTI Act not only mandates disclosure upon request but also imposes a duty on public authorities to actively disclose, disseminate, and publish information of general public interest suo motu. Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act sets out 17 categories of information that public authorities must proactively disclose, including details about their functions, decision-making norms, documents held, employee contacts, and budgets. The positive effects of proactive disclosure include minimizing time, money, and effort for the public to access routine information, helping citizens understand what information is available, and reducing the administrative burden of individual RTI requests. 31. The DPDP Act defines "personal data" broadly as "any data about an individual who is identifiable by or in relation to such data." It mandates that personal data processing generally requires "free, specific, informed, unconditional, and unambiguous" consent, obtained through "clear affirmative action.' While the DPDP Act is ostensibly focused on protection of digital personal data, it has lost sight of the profound and unintended consequence of dismantling proactive transparency mechanisms that have been built over years under the RTI Act. The stringent consent requirements for processing "personal data" create a fundamental conflict with the suo motu disclosure mandate of Section 4 of the RTI Act. Many categories of information proactively disclosed under Section 4, such as beneficiary lists for welfare schemes, employee details, or property records, inherently contain "personal data". Conclusion 32. In light of the profound implications for democratic governance and fundamental rights, the following recommendations for legislative action are respectfully submitted: A. Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act, which amends Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, should be immediately repealed. B. It must be explicitly clarified within the DPDP Act that the RTI Act applies with full force. This clarity is essential to prevent any future misinterpretation that might undermine the RTI Act's effectiveness. I urge your good offices to give this matter their urgent attention and initiate steps to rectify this critical legislative flaw, thereby upholding the constitutional values of transparency, accountability, and the fundamental rights of every citizen. Best regards, Ajit Prakash Shah
The Hindu
19-07-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
It is my responsibility to strengthen judiciary the way it serves people better, says Karnataka High Court Chief Justice Vibhu Bakhru
Vibhu Bakhru, the new Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka, on Saturday, said it was his responsibility to strengthen the judiciary the way it serves the people better, along with protecting independence of the institution. 'As Chief Justice, I view it as my responsibility not only to protect the independence of the judiciary but also to strengthen the institution the way it serves the people better, to reduce delay, and to enhance access to embrace technology without losing the human touch, to ensure that our courts are safe, includes spaces for all, specially marginalised...,' he said in his response to the customary welcome offered to him by the Full Court of the Karnataka High Court and the Karnataka State Bar Council. Earlier, Governor Thaawarchand Gehlot administered the oath of office to Chief Justice Bakhru at a ceremony held at the Glass House of the Raj Bhavan, which was attended by Chief Minister Siddaramaiah, Deputy Chief Minister D.K. Shivakumar, and Chairman of the Karnataka Legislative Council Basavaraj Horatti. Allegiance to Constitution Stating that the judges' sworn allegiance is to the Constitution of India, Chief Justice Bakhru said that the Constitution and the freedom that it guarantees would not be sustainable if the institutions, on which it rests, are weak. 'It is your faith in this institution that sustains it. It's our job to ensure that this faith is not misplaced,' he said. Ideals of visionary Basvananna remind us that justice must transcend privilege and reach every corner of society, the Chief Justice said while pointing out that Basavanna taught about a just society grounded in dignity, equity, and moral courage. 'While we take inspiration from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, whose commitment to social justice and constitutional values remains our guiding light, in Sir M. Visvesvaraiah, we were reminded that public service, whether in engineering, governance, and law, demands discipline, excellence, and integrity,' Chief Justice Bakhru said. Born in Nagpur in 1966, Chief Justice Bakhru had his education in Delhi where he secured BCom, Chartered Accountancy, and LL.B degrees and enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of Delhi in 1990. After extensive practice in law, he was elevated as an additional judge of the High Court of Delhi on April 17, 2013, and as a permanent judge on March 18, 2015. He had served as acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi between December 5, 2024 and January 21, 2025. Transferred judges Meanwhile, Justice Jayant Banerji, who was serving as a judge of the Allahabad High Court since September 22, 2017, took oath as a judge of the High Court of Karnataka on his transfer from Allahabad. Also, Justice D.K. Singh took oath as a judge of the High Court of Karnataka, on his transfer from Kerala. After the oath-taking and welcoming ceremonies, the High Court of Karnataka on Saturday bid a farewell to Justice V. Kameswar Rao, who has been repatriated to the High Court of Delhi. He had served as acting Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka from May 30 to July 18.
Indian Express
24-05-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
Let district courts hear civil cases involving disputes up to Rs 20 crore: Bar Association to Meghwal
The district courts in Delhi should be allowed to hear civil suits involving disputes up to Rs 20 crore, the coordination committee of the District Court Bar Association urged Union Law Minister Arjun Ram Meghwal in a letter on Friday. The body has urged for an 'enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction of district courts of Delhi from Rs 2 crore to Rs 20 crore' in relation to hearing civil suits. Currently, the jurisdiction of civil suits involving disputes of more than Rs 2 crore is vested with the Delhi High Court. '…Delhi has got only 11 district courts located in six complexes having civil jurisdiction, and the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has only very few courts (Presently 4) vested with original civil jurisdiction. It is further noteworthy that the Honourable High Court of Delhi has very limited capacity,' read the letter to Meghwal. 'With every passing day,' the letter further pointed out, 'the inflation and other contributory factors result in an increase in the valuation of every transaction, which finally gives rise to an increasing number of cases going to the High Court of Delhi, and the cases in district courts keep decreasing'. 'On the other hand, the capacity of district courts keep increasing from time to time whereas the capacity High Court of Delhi is almost stagnant for many decades,' it read. '…We, the coordination committee of All District Courts Bar Associations of Delhi take the privilege to draw your kind attention about the urgency for enhancement of pecuniary limits of all District Courts in Delhi from existing Rs 2 crore, which is very minuscule considering the cost of living or volume of business in Delhi to Rs 20 crore at least,' the letter urged, adding the rate of disposal in Delhi's district courts was higher than the disposal in the High Court. Earlier, this monetary limit for district courts was Rs 20 lakh and was enhanced to Rs 2 crore in October 2015 after the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, was amended by the Parliament.
New Indian Express
16-05-2025
- Politics
- New Indian Express
Centre appoints legal team led by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta to deal with NIA case against Tahawwur Rana
It further stated, 'This team will oversee the trial and all related proceedings concerning the NIA case before the Special Courts in Delhi, the High Court of Delhi and the Supreme Court of India.' In the notification, the MHA added that the appointed law officers' tenure 'will extend for three years from the publication date of this notification or until the completion of the trial, whichever occurs first', under the terms and conditions outlined in the Department of Legal Affairs' notification. On May 9, Tahawwur Rana, a key conspirator in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, was presented before the Patiala House Court from NIA remand a day earlier than the scheduled date due to security concerns, and the Special Court has ordered his judicial custody until June 6, 2025. Rana, a 64-year-old Canadian businessman of Pakistani origin, was extradited from the United States earlier this month in connection with his alleged role in the deadly 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks in 2008.
Mint
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Mint
Ex-CJI Sanjiv Khanna declares: No post-retirement roles for me
Former Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna has said he would not accept any post-retirement official assignments and that he would continue his innings in law. Justice Khanna was appointed as the CJI on November 11, 2024 and retired on 13 May, after a six-month tenure. Justice Khanna will be replaced by Justice BR Gavai, who takes oath as 52nd CJI today. After the conclusion of the ceremonial bench proceedings on Tuesday, the CJI met journalists in the apex court premises and said, 'I will not accept any post-retirement post ... .perhaps will do something with law.' Many former apex court judges begin their innings in arbitration post judgeship. 'I will have a third innings and will do something related to law,' the CJI said. Justice Sanjiv Khanna was elevated to the Supreme Court of India on January 18, 2019. Justice Khanna has also been the Chairman, Supreme Court Legal Services Committee (SCLSC) from 17th June, 2023 till 25th December, 2023 and Executive Chairman, NALSA from 26th December, 2023 till 10 November, 2024. After having initially practised in the District Courts of Delhi, he started practice primarily in the High Court of Delhi. As an amicus curiae, he assisted the High Court of Delhi in several criminal cases and cases involving issues of public importance. On June 24, 2005, Justice Khanna was elevated as an Additional Judge of the High Court of Delhi and was made a Permanent Judge on 20th February, 2006. Justice Sanjiv Khanna was part of 2024 Supreme Court judgement pertaining to the interim bail of former chief minister Arvind Kejriwal while the latter was embroiled in a case under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). Justice Khanna was also part of a five-judge bench that declared the controversial electoral bonds scheme unconstitutional due to concerns around transparency of donors and potential for corrupt practices. Responding to a query related to the cash discovery controversy involving high court judge Justice Yashwant Varma, he said, 'Judicial thinking has to be decisive and adjudicatory.' He added, 'We see plus and minus points and decide the issue, then rationally we weigh various factors that help us to make a right decision.' The CJI dealt with the cash row controversy following a news report, prompting him to take several steps, including a preliminary inquiry by Delhi High Court Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya, judicial work being taken away from Justice Varma in the Delhi High Court, and later his transfer to the Allahabad High Court sans judicial work. I will not accept any post-retirement post ... perhaps will do something with law. After the in-house inquiry panel indicted the judge, the CJI nudged him to resign and later wrote to President Droupadi Murmu and Prime Minister Narendra Modi after Justice Varma refused to tender resignation. On May 10, CJI-designate Justice B R Gavai also said no to any post-retirement assignments.
