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Time of India
4 days ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Localisation beyond the Grand Bargain: Structural contradictions in the Global South
Rajeev Kumar Jha is a development professional with over 18 years of extensive experience in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) across the South Asia region. He currently serves as the Director of DRR and CCA at the esteemed Humanitarian Aid International (HAI). LESS ... MORE On March 10, Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, issued a high-profile call for a 'humanitarian-reset' to consolidate efforts, re-evaluate strategies, eliminate redundancies, and enhance accountability across clusters and at the country level. A central part of his message was the need to accelerate the shift toward cash-based programming, aligning with long-standing commitments under the Grand Bargain. Yet, the timing and tone of this appeal raise important questions. Many observers argue that this reset was less a bold reformist initiative and more a reaction to the recent wave of development aid cuts by the US administration and other major donors. While Mr. Fletcher referenced the grand-bargain, his statement notably sidestepped the issue of localisation, failing to outline concrete mechanisms for transferring power, resources, or leadership to local actors. This omission is particularly striking as the current iteration of the Grand Bargain is set to expire in 2026, and localisation remains one of its most contested and unfulfilled goals. As the sector approaches this critical juncture, fundamental questions emerge: Will there be a genuine reset that centres local leadership and accountability, or will it dissolve into another cycle of rhetorical commitments and fragmented reform? The Grand Bargain Annual Meeting, held in Geneva on 16–17 October 2024, reflected these tensions. While members reaffirmed their interest in advancing quality funding, gender-transformative approaches, and strengthening national reference groups to serve as feedback loops between local and global levels, the outcomes were, by most accounts, muted and incremental. Without decisive action and structural reform, the localisation agenda risks becoming another diluted ambition, overshadowed by geopolitical shifts and institutional inertia. The Grand Bargain (GB) was introduced in 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit to transform the humanitarian system, with localisation as one of its core pillars. A predominant argument for localisation critiques the historical dominance of Northern development agencies and donor governments in shaping humanitarian responses. Another classical question that always generates interest is issues of resource sharing through the local actors, which generally flows from the coffers of Northern Hemisphere countries and their institutions. It has been perceived that most of the Southern Hemisphere-based actors are net receivers of the resources. Grand Bargain was embraced with optimism, viewing it as a potential game-changer. However, the reality has proven more complex. As per the Passing the Buck report 2022, 1.2% of humanitarian funding only going directly to local and national actors till 2022. Based on the evidence, one can argue that it has fallen short of shifting power and resources to local actors in any substantive way. Questions about its legacy and next phase persist. If it ends without achieving substantial progress, the humanitarian system risks retaining the same colonial-era dynamics it sought to redress. Along the way, another question arises: Will countries and institutions in the Southern hemisphere take on new leadership roles, develop innovative funding mechanisms, and demonstrate the political will necessary to advance localisation? Alternatively, will they continue to rely on financial support from Western nations? There is a concern that existing imbalances may simply re-emerge in different forms. One significant challenge is that many Southern countries lack national-level funding systems that can sustain local actors without depending on international aid. This creates a disconnect between the expressed support for localisation and the actual structural policies, which are often centralised, top-down, and counterproductive to the aims of localisation. This inconsistency highlights a fundamental contradiction that must be addressed for effective advancement in localisation efforts. Let us examine a few large Southern countries that hold influence in the global humanitarian order and can change the course of localisation if they act collectively: India India's development space is increasingly shaped by corporate-led social responsibility under the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) mandate of the Companies Act, 2013. While CSR has mobilised significant funds (over INR 25,000 crore in 2021-22), it operates under strict government guidelines, which restrict innovation and prioritise state-aligned objectives. Local community agency is often subsumed under state-corporate frameworks. Direct humanitarian funding mechanisms for local NGOs are virtually non-existent. Further, the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) amendments in 2020 have significantly curtailed foreign funding to local NGOs, reducing their operational independence. China China's development cooperation is entirely state-led. China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), formed in 2018, coordinates China Aid, which focuses on government-to-government projects, infrastructure, and technical assistance. China's engagement in humanitarianism has grown—e.g., through contributions to WFP, WHO, IFRC—but this rarely involves local civil society partners. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further emphasizes large-scale corporate participation over grassroots empowerment. Domestic restrictions on NGO activity further limit the growth of an independent humanitarian civil society. Mexico Mexico lacks a formal humanitarian funding mechanism accessible to CSOs. The previous disaster response mechanism, FONDEN, was dissolved in 2020. Disaster and emergency responses are now managed through federal systems with minimal CSO engagement. Regulatory constraints also inhibit foreign funding to local NGOs. Despite efforts to integrate DRR into public policy, most CSOs operate in precarious environments. Brazil The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) coordinates South-South development cooperation but mainly offers technical support through state-to-state partnerships. Despite a vibrant NGO landscape, access to both national and international funding is bureaucratically arduous. The government does not maintain a grant-making mechanism for local humanitarian actors. Moreover, recent political shifts have led to reduced civic space for CSOs and public budget cuts for social development initiatives. Nigeria Nigeria heavily depends on foreign humanitarian aid. Currently, between 4 and 5 per cent of the operation is delivered directly through local partners, compared to 1.2 per cent globally. Most funding passes through UN agencies and INGOs. Although the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD) was established in 2019, its focus remains on poverty alleviation (e.g., through the National Social Investment Programme) rather than on empowering local humanitarian actors. Despite hosting many humanitarian operations in Northeast Nigeria, local NGOs are often subcontractors rather than equal partners. Indonesia Indonesia has a well-established disaster management framework through the BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency), but local NGOs struggle to access core funding or influence national decision-making processes. Civil society contributions are seen as complementary rather than central. International funding flows still dominate in humanitarian response efforts such as tsunamis, floods, or volcanic eruptions. Suggestions to Improve Localisation: Establish international humanitarian funds with Southern leadership-Governments, particularly in the Global South, should lead in establishing transparent, accessible international humanitarian funding pools that include mandatory quotas for local and national NGOs. These could be disbursed through competitive grant mechanisms, matching fund models, or simplified direct financing channels. A strategic starting point would be for a coalition of countries in the Global South—for example, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Nigeria—to launch a $10 billion Southern Humanitarian Solidarity Fund, focused on regional crises, protracted emergencies, and anticipatory action. Currently, less than 2% of international humanitarian funding directly reaches local actors as per the Global Humanitarian Report, 2023. A South-led pooled fund could set a precedent for reversing this imbalance. Institutionalise local representation in national and international coordination platforms-National governments should mandate the inclusion of local NGOs, women-led groups, and community-based organizations into disaster coordination bodies such as NEMA (Nigeria), BNPB (Indonesia), and NDMA(India). Representation should be formalised in national disaster policies and linked to decision-making rights. International forums (e.g., the Grand Bargain, IASC) must also include local actors through elected representatives. Without institutional support, local actors often remain peripheral: for instance, only 3% of attendees at the 2023 Global Humanitarian Summit represented local organisations. Transition from capacity building to capacity sharing-Rather than treating capacity building as a unidirectional process, a shift toward mutual capacity sharing is needed. This means creating South-South peer learning platforms, where local actors co-develop tools, exchange lessons from disaster response, and contribute their deep contextual knowledge. Initiatives like the Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL) or peer-review networks across Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies offer replicable models. Studies show that 'peer-to-peer learning between local responders in similar risk environments has higher retention and contextual adaptation than traditional training models' (ODI, 2022). Promote South-South localisation alliances-Regional alliances among Global South countries—such as the African Union, ASEAN, or CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States )—should mainstream localisation within their humanitarian frameworks. These alliances can launch regional localisation funds, create civil society working groups, and host annual South-South Humanitarian Localisation Forums. The Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) provides a powerful precedent in pooling sovereign funds for disaster risk reduction and response. A 2023 FAO-WFP review highlighted that regional cooperation on humanitarian action in the Global South has doubled in the past decade but remains underfunded and donor-dependent. Localise monitoring and accountability mechanisms-Localisation benchmarks (e.g., the 25% direct funding target from the Grand Bargain) should be monitored not just by international bodies like the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) or OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), but by national civil society coalitions and independent watchdogs. Public scorecards, community-level audits, and data disaggregation by local/national/international status can foster greater accountability and transparency. Conclusion: The call for a 'Humanitarian Reset' invites a thoughtful reckoning with the enduring tensions within the aid system. Efforts to advance localisation cannot rely solely on international platforms, particularly when national frameworks in many parts of the Global South continue to exhibit centralising tendencies and offer limited avenues for civil society engagement. As the Grand Bargain draws to a close, the challenge lies less in formulating new pledges and more in fostering the quiet but essential shifts within donor approaches and domestic governance alike that enable a more balanced distribution of power and resources. Real progress will depend on sustained collaboration between actors across both the Global South and traditional donor landscapes. It is through such partnerships, grounded in mutual respect and a commitment to shared responsibility, that localisation can move from aspiration to practice. Governments, donors, and civil society must work together to cultivate an environment in which the humanitarian system becomes more inclusive, responsive, and accountable to those it seeks to serve. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
Time of India
23-05-2025
- General
- Time of India
In the wake of Operation Sindoor
Rajeev Kumar Jha is a development professional with over 18 years of extensive experience in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) across the South Asia region. He currently serves as the Director of DRR and CCA at the esteemed Humanitarian Aid International (HAI). As the Director, Rajeev is entrusted with the important responsibility of overseeing a wide range of initiatives aimed at reducing disaster risks and enhancing climate change adaptation capacities. He plays a pivotal role in designing and implementing innovative projects that integrate risk-informed approaches into development planning and humanitarian action, thereby contributing significantly to the betterment of society. Over the years he majorly invested in Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change, and Humanitarian Response work. Mr Jha's latest work includes working with UNDP India as a DRR consultant and as national lead for Practical Action on its DRR and Flood Resilience work supported by the ZURICH Foundation. His contribution after the Nepal Earthquake for Islamic Relief Worldwide as Senior Programme Manager cum Country Representative was noteworthy when he worked for the rehabilitation of disaster-affected communities. He works as a consultant for the World Bank India team in its Disaster Management program. He played an active role in shaping plans and policies during natural disasters such as cyclone Hudhud and the Jammu-Kashmir flood in India. He is also skilled in dealing with issues related to Urban and Rural Affairs, Civil Society partnerships, DRR and Climate Change issues, mainstreaming in development planning and policy, training and capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and program management at the national and international level. LESS ... MORE On the 22nd day of April 2025, in the quiet valley of Pahalgam, where streams murmur and meadows bloom, terror once again intruded upon the sanctity of peace. In a moment heavy with cruelty, 26 souls were lost—among them a newlywed couple, torn from joy into the grip of horror, conscripted by fate to bear a chilling message to the Prime Minister of this great Republic. What words suffice for such sorrow? What balm for a nation wounded again? The perpetrators—The Resistance Front (TRF), a name shadowed by the spectre of Lashkar-e-Taiba—did not delay in boasting of their cruelty. And as the blood of innocents still cried from the earth, a voice from across the border sought not solidarity, but proof. Proof, in the face of agony; proof, in defiance of truth laid bare. But we have seen this play before. The theatre of denial, the pantomime of diplomacy, the habitual shrug in the face of pain not theirs. Let our grief not be idle. The pyres now burn, the nation bows not in defeat, but rises in remembrance. For every child orphaned, for every life cut short, for every silence where once there was laughter—India remembers. And India will answer. In response, the Prime Minister addresses a rally in Madhubani, Bihar, on 24th April 2025, with a powerful message: 'We will seek justice.' On May 7, 2025, Operation Sindoor was launched in response to the ongoing challenge of terrorism, a situation that affects us all deeply. The ensuing four days of intense fighting revealed the toll of conflict, showcasing a level of fighting that many hoped would never be witnessed again. The conflict has also seen the advanced use of drones, air defence systems, and precision strikes on the enemy territory by the Indian Air Force, It became evident that we cannot let fear dictate our actions. After extensive diplomatic discussions, both countries announced a ceasefire, which we hope brings some relief. However, the Indian government has reiterated that this is just a temporary pause; we remain vigilant in the face of potential threats across the border. This situation is a reminder of the strength we find in our unity, crossing political divides to stand together for peace and security. One important question that arises is how a country with a population of 1.4 billion people, which has historically advocated for peace and nonviolence, has shifted its stance and is now prepared to retaliate against its enemies, demanding retribution without seeking assistance from the UN or other international agencies. Notably, India has requested the UN Security Council to mediate the issue of Kashmir (Security Council passed Resolution 39 on January 20, 1948, which established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to mediate the dispute. The reasons are many: Repeated incidents This is not the first time that terrorists from across the border have ruthlessly taken the lives of innocent Indians. Tragic incidents are etched in our collective memory, from the fierce battles of Kargil to the chilling assault on the Parliament (13th Dec 2001), and the horrifying events of November 26, 2008, in Mumbai. On that fateful day, 166 lives were brutally snuffed out by the gunfire of Pakistani terrorists, leaving behind a wave of grief and devastation that still echoes in the hearts of many. Remember when Bill Clinton, former US president of US visited India in 2000 AD. 35 people in Anantnag district were killed by gunshot, a similar story when Vice President JD Evans visited in 2025. So, what changes then and now? One of the plausible reasons is that personality factors in Indian politics have shaped the major strategic decisions in India. To some extent, this is true, but even at this level, decisions are based on the socioeconomic and cultural inputs and the ability to deliver the message. Another reason could be the role of the middle class, as in the growing India voice of the middle class matters more than before, and governments may not ignore them now. Change in the country's strategic posture from defence to 'offensive defence' could be another one since 2014. There is also a clear political mandate since 2014 to respond decisively to aggression. But the real reason can be attributed to the economic growth of the country since 2000, as well as its ability to reform and modernise its systems and processes, making it more resilient. It is widely understood that effectively attacking an enemy depends on a society's ability to first withstand the shock, neutralise the threat, and then retaliate. In my opinion, a resilient economy plays a crucial role in the decision to strike back, as it provides better choices that simplify the strategic decision-making process. Now let's examine the economic growth of both countries, since 2000 AD, which may tell the real story of growing confidence of the Indian system to strike, and strike hard. According to the World Bank, India's average annual GDP growth rate from 2000 to 2023-24 is approximately 6.2%. This average reflects periods of significant expansion, such as the mid-2000s, as well as downturns, including the contraction during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. During the same period, the central government's revenue has increased dramatically from Rs 2.23 lakh crore (26 billion USD@83) to Rs 24.56 lakh crore (294 billion USD@83). This impressive revenue collection enables the government to allocate resources to various sectors, including defence. Let's also take a closer look at India's defence expenditure over recent years. India's defence spending has increased dramatically, rising from Rs 58,587 crore in 2000 AD (13 billion@45) to Rs 593,538 crore (71 billion@83), which amounts to about 2% of its GDP. Within this budget, capital expenditure typically constitutes around 28% to 32% of the total defence budget. While these figures may seem significant in absolute terms, the overall defence budget continues to hover around 2% of GDP. Given the fragile security situation, there is a growing call for India to increase its defence budget from 2% to 4% of GDP. At the same time, since 2000, Pakistan's average growth rate has been approximately 4.1%, starting from 1.9% of GDP growth in 2000, peaking at 7.5% in 2003-04, and then averaging around 4%. Notably, Pakistan experienced a contraction of up to 0.9% during the COVID-19 pandemic. When examining defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Pakistan allocates over 3%, which exceeds India's allocation of 2%. However, in absolute terms, and when factoring in the depreciation of the Pakistani Rupee against the Dollar, Pakistan's actual purchasing power is significantly lower. It can be concluded that despite Pakistan's defence spending, India's overall defence-related expenditure is considerably higher. This provides India with substantial capacity, knowledge, and skill to effectively respond to any incursions into its territory. What is evident is- a thriving economy, effective tax collection, and resource redistribution can be transformative forces that strengthen our ability to respond, enhance resilience against shocks, and accelerate India's thriving economy, which now exceeds USD 3.7 trillion, providing a solid foundation for national security. This economic scale allows for substantial and sustained investment in defence capabilities, including indigenous manufacturing (such as Tejas, BrahMos, and INS Vikrant) and the modernisation of the armed forces. Additionally, a vibrant economy enables India to maintain strong foreign exchange reserves (over USD 620 billion) and to fund strategic reserves and emergency responses. This context is further illustrated in the table provided below. IND & PAK defence budget and GDP growth comparison (2000–2024) Data Source-Several -SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Ministry of Finance – Budget in Brief & Economic Survey – Historical defence budget allocations. However, just because the country is witnessing better economic growth doesn't mean that problems are resolved. One should combine all his social, economic, and cultural power in one direction to achieve its goal that s powerful, peaceful, and prosperous India. A few of the suggestions are- Promote economic asymmetry- It is crucial to achieve a consistent annual growth rate of 6-7 percent in comparison to your neighbouring economies. This strategic focus on sustained growth can transform the economic landscape. Such significant prosperity not only enhances competitive edge but also empowers to address pressing challenges with greater resilience. Correct the political narrative that fosters an unnecessary anti-minority atmosphere- The security situation in our country remains challenging, especially given our proximity to two large neighbours Pakistan and Bangladesh who has Islam is the state religion, Secular and modern India should avoid falling into the trap of responding based on dominant religious ideologies. We must reset our domestic political culture to improve our image by fostering an environment of maximum participation and minimal interference. Deradicalise the society- There should be an honest attempt at deradicalisation that aligns with our civilisational ethos of inclusivity and tolerance, while propelling the nation forward in modernity and development. India must invest in inclusive education, equitable development, and civic engagement rooted in constitutional values and ancient civilisation. Rise quietly – Our rise need not be loud or declarative; instead, it must be defined by quiet confidence. We must choose a different path — one of focused reform, institutional capacity building, and inclusive growth. Rather than seeking validation through headline diplomacy or reactive posturing, the emphasis should be on economic resilience, technological innovation, human capital, and social harmony. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
Time of India
29-04-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Aid interrupted: The fallout of USAID funding cuts
Rajeev Kumar Jha is a development professional with over 18 years of extensive experience in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) across the South Asia region. He currently serves as the Director of DRR and CCA at the esteemed Humanitarian Aid International (HAI). As the Director, Rajeev is entrusted with the important responsibility of overseeing a wide range of initiatives aimed at reducing disaster risks and enhancing climate change adaptation capacities. He plays a pivotal role in designing and implementing innovative projects that integrate risk-informed approaches into development planning and humanitarian action, thereby contributing significantly to the betterment of society. Over the years he majorly invested in Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change, and Humanitarian Response work. Mr Jha's latest work includes working with UNDP India as a DRR consultant and as national lead for Practical Action on its DRR and Flood Resilience work supported by the ZURICH Foundation. His contribution after the Nepal Earthquake for Islamic Relief Worldwide as Senior Programme Manager cum Country Representative was noteworthy when he worked for the rehabilitation of disaster-affected communities. He works as a consultant for the World Bank India team in its Disaster Management program. He played an active role in shaping plans and policies during natural disasters such as cyclone Hudhud and the Jammu-Kashmir flood in India. He is also skilled in dealing with issues related to Urban and Rural Affairs, Civil Society partnerships, DRR and Climate Change issues, mainstreaming in development planning and policy, training and capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and program management at the national and international level. LESS ... MORE The recent announcement by the US government to significantly reduce funding for USAID, cloaked in the rhetoric of 'Making America Great Again,' has sparked a firestorm within the international development community. Citing concerns over transparency and allegations of corruption, President Donald Trump declared that the agency's funds are mismanaged and mired in inefficiency (Trump's statement on X, formerly Twitter, February 7, 2025). Adding fuel to the controversy, it was reported that USAID expenditures were not formally submitted to the US Congress during the Biden administration—an annual exercise that has traditionally ensured legislative oversight. The implications of this decision are vast and deeply unsettling for development agencies across the globe, many of which rely heavily on US financial support. Long-standing partners such as Catholic Relief Services ($4.6 billion), FHI 360 ($3.8 billion), Save the Children Federation, Inc. ($1.5 billion), Jhpiego Corporation ($1.3 billion), and World Vision ($1.2 billion) now face serious operational uncertainty. Even large consulting firms like Deloitte and Chemonics are bracing for impact. Although USAID spending comprises a modest 0.6% of the total US federal budget, the absolute figure—close to $40 billion—dwarfs the aid contributions of other countries. To put this in perspective: in 2023, the UK, the world's fourth-largest donor, spent £15.3 billion on aid, roughly a quarter of what the US provided. USAID's scale has allowed it to lead flagship global health initiatives that command bipartisan and international respect, such as its work with the PEPFAR program, which has distributed antiretroviral drugs globally and saved an estimated 25 million lives, including 5.5 million babies born to HIV-positive mothers. The funding cut—nearly 83% from previous levels—has not only curtailed these programs but has also left dozens of small and medium-sized countries scrambling. Many rely on USAID for over 20% of their total aid budgets, and for the poorest among them, the fallout is especially dire. According to the Center for Global Development, countries like South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia—where aid comprises up to 11% of national income—stand to lose funding equivalent to over 3% of their GNI(Gross National Income). This is more than a financial setback; it's a potential shock to fragile economies supporting 410 million people. India, too, has historically been a major recipient of USAID, receiving around $2.9 billion since 2001, over half of which targeted health-related issues, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and COVID-19. Institutions like IIT Kanpur, the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), and premier agricultural universities such as G.B. Pant University and Punjab Agricultural University have benefited from USAID partnerships. The bigger question is why foreign aid is often viewed with skepticism. Reasons are not unfounded. Developed nations often juggle delicate geopolitical balances while trying to serve local needs, with NGOs stepping in to bridge gaps left by under-resourced public systems. In such complex environments, foreign aid, though life-saving, can appear as both a blessing and a burden. It may alleviate suffering, but it can also carry subtle agendas: promoting democratic norms, advancing human rights, or aligning with donor country priorities. In India, too, Foreign aid remains a subject of intense scrutiny. From allegations of foreign interference to concerns about cultural imposition—as in the $446,000 grant reportedly aimed at promoting atheism in Nepal or funding voter mobilisation efforts in India—USAID's involvement has often walked a fine line between support and intrusion. Take, for instance, the UK's decision to merge the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in 2020. While framed as an efficiency move, the merger blurred lines between diplomacy and development, drawing criticism for potentially subordinating humanitarian goals to foreign policy interests However, legally, dismantling USAID is not as simple as an executive decree. Created through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and reinforced by Congress in 1998, the agency's closure would require a full legislative process. Still, the debate around its relevance and approach continues. This brings us to a broader reckoning with the aid system itself. Much of the aid flowing to the Global South has been criticized as extractive, defined by conditionalities, parallel delivery systems, and donor-driven priorities. The growing call to 'decolonize aid' demands a shift toward equitable partnerships that recognize and respect the agency of recipient countries. It is viewed that stepping into the void left by the United States is no easy feat. The sheer scale of global humanitarian needs—estimated at $46.3 billion by the UN for 2024 to assist 181 million people—underscores the financial enormity of the challenge. Meanwhile, the fiscal bandwidth of other major economies remains constrained. The war in Ukraine, now in its third year, combined with the intensifying humanitarian crisis in Gaza, has shifted the global focus toward defense, deterrence, and domestic resilience. The European Union, traditionally one of the largest collective donors, is undergoing a seismic budgetary recalibration. Germany, for instance, has announced a €100 billion special defense fund, the largest since World War II. Similar shifts are being observed across NATO countries, where defense spending is being scaled up to meet the alliance's 2% GDP target. This reprioritization inevitably puts pressure on overseas aid budgets, and the humanitarian sector often becomes the first casualty in such times of fiscal austerity. This diversion of resources carries far-reaching implications. According to the UN's 2023 SDG Progress Report, only 12% of the Sustainable Development Goal targets are currently on track. The cascading consequences of aid withdrawal—especially in fragile and conflict-affected states—threaten to further derail hard-won gains in areas like poverty reduction, health, education, and gender equality. Paradoxically, the reduction in USAID funding presents both a challenge and an opportunity. While some critical programs will undoubtedly suffer, this may also be the wake-up call needed to rethink development finance. Nations could explore domestic resource mobilization, tax reforms, and private sector investments to fund their priorities. Multilateral platforms like the UN and World Bank offer spaces for recalibrating collaboration, despite inherent power imbalances. Meanwhile, domestic resource mobilisation remains a critical, yet underleveraged, pillar of financing for development. The IMF estimates that developing countries could increase their tax-to-GDP ratio by 3–4% through improved compliance and policy reforms. Innovations like climate-linked sovereign bonds, diaspora remittances (which reached $669 billion globally in 2023), and social impact investments are becoming viable supplements to traditional aid flows. Emerging donors like India now have a unique opportunity to lead. India's evolution from an aid recipient to a provider of South-South cooperation, particularly in Africa and the Indo-Pacific, is noteworthy. Its emphasis on digital public goods (such as Aadhaar and CoWIN), concessional finance, and capacity building offers a pragmatic, demand-driven alternative to traditional Western aid models. In this context, the shrinking fiscal space for humanitarian action is more than a policy shift—it represents a growing moral dilemma. As donor nations turn inward, the international community must grapple with a fundamental question: can global solidarity be sustained in an era increasingly defined by national interest? In the end, the soul-searching around foreign aid is long overdue. Whether it's rethinking what solidarity means in a multipolar world or grounding development in dignity rather than dependency, the path forward must be one of humility, innovation, and mutual respect. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
