Localisation beyond the Grand Bargain: Structural contradictions in the Global South
Rajeev Kumar Jha is a development professional with over 18 years of extensive experience in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) across the South Asia region. He currently serves as the Director of DRR and CCA at the esteemed Humanitarian Aid International (HAI). LESS ... MORE
On March 10, Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, issued a high-profile call for a 'humanitarian-reset' to consolidate efforts, re-evaluate strategies, eliminate redundancies, and enhance accountability across clusters and at the country level. A central part of his message was the need to accelerate the shift toward cash-based programming, aligning with long-standing commitments under the Grand Bargain.
Yet, the timing and tone of this appeal raise important questions. Many observers argue that this reset was less a bold reformist initiative and more a reaction to the recent wave of development aid cuts by the US administration and other major donors. While Mr. Fletcher referenced the grand-bargain, his statement notably sidestepped the issue of localisation, failing to outline concrete mechanisms for transferring power, resources, or leadership to local actors. This omission is particularly striking as the current iteration of the Grand Bargain is set to expire in 2026, and localisation remains one of its most contested and unfulfilled goals. As the sector approaches this critical juncture, fundamental questions emerge: Will there be a genuine reset that centres local leadership and accountability, or will it dissolve into another cycle of rhetorical commitments and fragmented reform?
The Grand Bargain Annual Meeting, held in Geneva on 16–17 October 2024, reflected these tensions. While members reaffirmed their interest in advancing quality funding, gender-transformative approaches, and strengthening national reference groups to serve as feedback loops between local and global levels, the outcomes were, by most accounts, muted and incremental. Without decisive action and structural reform, the localisation agenda risks becoming another diluted ambition, overshadowed by geopolitical shifts and institutional inertia.
The Grand Bargain (GB) was introduced in 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit to transform the humanitarian system, with localisation as one of its core pillars. A predominant argument for localisation critiques the historical dominance of Northern development agencies and donor governments in shaping humanitarian responses. Another classical question that always generates interest is issues of resource sharing through the local actors, which generally flows from the coffers of Northern Hemisphere countries and their institutions. It has been perceived that most of the Southern Hemisphere-based actors are net receivers of the resources. Grand Bargain was embraced with optimism, viewing it as a potential game-changer.
However, the reality has proven more complex. As per the Passing the Buck report 2022, 1.2% of humanitarian funding only going directly to local and national actors till 2022. Based on the evidence, one can argue that it has fallen short of shifting power and resources to local actors in any substantive way. Questions about its legacy and next phase persist. If it ends without achieving substantial progress, the humanitarian system risks retaining the same colonial-era dynamics it sought to redress. Along the way, another question arises: Will countries and institutions in the Southern hemisphere take on new leadership roles, develop innovative funding mechanisms, and demonstrate the political will necessary to advance localisation? Alternatively, will they continue to rely on financial support from Western nations? There is a concern that existing imbalances may simply re-emerge in different forms.
One significant challenge is that many Southern countries lack national-level funding systems that can sustain local actors without depending on international aid. This creates a disconnect between the expressed support for localisation and the actual structural policies, which are often centralised, top-down, and counterproductive to the aims of localisation. This inconsistency highlights a fundamental contradiction that must be addressed for effective advancement in localisation efforts.
Let us examine a few large Southern countries that hold influence in the global humanitarian order and can change the course of localisation if they act collectively:
India
India's development space is increasingly shaped by corporate-led social responsibility under the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) mandate of the Companies Act, 2013. While CSR has mobilised significant funds (over INR 25,000 crore in 2021-22), it operates under strict government guidelines, which restrict innovation and prioritise state-aligned objectives. Local community agency is often subsumed under state-corporate frameworks. Direct humanitarian funding mechanisms for local NGOs are virtually non-existent. Further, the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) amendments in 2020 have significantly curtailed foreign funding to local NGOs, reducing their operational independence.
China
China's development cooperation is entirely state-led. China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), formed in 2018, coordinates China Aid, which focuses on government-to-government projects, infrastructure, and technical assistance. China's engagement in humanitarianism has grown—e.g., through contributions to WFP, WHO, IFRC—but this rarely involves local civil society partners. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further emphasizes large-scale corporate participation over grassroots empowerment. Domestic restrictions on NGO activity further limit the growth of an independent humanitarian civil society.
Mexico
Mexico lacks a formal humanitarian funding mechanism accessible to CSOs. The previous disaster response mechanism, FONDEN, was dissolved in 2020. Disaster and emergency responses are now managed through federal systems with minimal CSO engagement. Regulatory constraints also inhibit foreign funding to local NGOs. Despite efforts to integrate DRR into public policy, most CSOs operate in precarious environments.
Brazil
The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) coordinates South-South development cooperation but mainly offers technical support through state-to-state partnerships. Despite a vibrant NGO landscape, access to both national and international funding is bureaucratically arduous. The government does not maintain a grant-making mechanism for local humanitarian actors. Moreover, recent political shifts have led to reduced civic space for CSOs and public budget cuts for social development initiatives.
Nigeria
Nigeria heavily depends on foreign humanitarian aid. Currently, between 4 and 5 per cent of the operation is delivered directly through local partners, compared to 1.2 per cent globally. Most funding passes through UN agencies and INGOs. Although the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD) was established in 2019, its focus remains on poverty alleviation (e.g., through the National Social Investment Programme) rather than on empowering local humanitarian actors. Despite hosting many humanitarian operations in Northeast Nigeria, local NGOs are often subcontractors rather than equal partners.
Indonesia
Indonesia has a well-established disaster management framework through the BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency), but local NGOs struggle to access core funding or influence national decision-making processes. Civil society contributions are seen as complementary rather than central. International funding flows still dominate in humanitarian response efforts such as tsunamis, floods, or volcanic eruptions.
Suggestions to Improve Localisation:
Establish international humanitarian funds with Southern leadership-Governments, particularly in the Global South, should lead in establishing transparent, accessible international humanitarian funding pools that include mandatory quotas for local and national NGOs. These could be disbursed through competitive grant mechanisms, matching fund models, or simplified direct financing channels. A strategic starting point would be for a coalition of countries in the Global South—for example, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Nigeria—to launch a $10 billion Southern Humanitarian Solidarity Fund, focused on regional crises, protracted emergencies, and anticipatory action. Currently, less than 2% of international humanitarian funding directly reaches local actors as per the Global Humanitarian Report, 2023. A South-led pooled fund could set a precedent for reversing this imbalance.
Institutionalise local representation in national and international coordination platforms-National governments should mandate the inclusion of local NGOs, women-led groups, and community-based organizations into disaster coordination bodies such as NEMA (Nigeria), BNPB (Indonesia), and NDMA(India). Representation should be formalised in national disaster policies and linked to decision-making rights. International forums (e.g., the Grand Bargain, IASC) must also include local actors through elected representatives. Without institutional support, local actors often remain peripheral: for instance, only 3% of attendees at the 2023 Global Humanitarian Summit represented local organisations.
Transition from capacity building to capacity sharing-Rather than treating capacity building as a unidirectional process, a shift toward mutual capacity sharing is needed. This means creating South-South peer learning platforms, where local actors co-develop tools, exchange lessons from disaster response, and contribute their deep contextual knowledge. Initiatives like the Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL) or peer-review networks across Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies offer replicable models. Studies show that 'peer-to-peer learning between local responders in similar risk environments has higher retention and contextual adaptation than traditional training models' (ODI, 2022).
Promote South-South localisation alliances-Regional alliances among Global South countries—such as the African Union, ASEAN, or CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States )—should mainstream localisation within their humanitarian frameworks. These alliances can launch regional localisation funds, create civil society working groups, and host annual South-South Humanitarian Localisation Forums. The Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) provides a powerful precedent in pooling sovereign funds for disaster risk reduction and response. A 2023 FAO-WFP review highlighted that regional cooperation on humanitarian action in the Global South has doubled in the past decade but remains underfunded and donor-dependent.
Localise monitoring and accountability mechanisms-Localisation benchmarks (e.g., the 25% direct funding target from the Grand Bargain) should be monitored not just by international bodies like the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) or OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), but by national civil society coalitions and independent watchdogs. Public scorecards, community-level audits, and data disaggregation by local/national/international status can foster greater accountability and transparency.
Conclusion:
The call for a 'Humanitarian Reset' invites a thoughtful reckoning with the enduring tensions within the aid system. Efforts to advance localisation cannot rely solely on international platforms, particularly when national frameworks in many parts of the Global South continue to exhibit centralising tendencies and offer limited avenues for civil society engagement. As the Grand Bargain draws to a close, the challenge lies less in formulating new pledges and more in fostering the quiet but essential shifts within donor approaches and domestic governance alike that enable a more balanced distribution of power and resources.
Real progress will depend on sustained collaboration between actors across both the Global South and traditional donor landscapes. It is through such partnerships, grounded in mutual respect and a commitment to shared responsibility, that localisation can move from aspiration to practice. Governments, donors, and civil society must work together to cultivate an environment in which the humanitarian system becomes more inclusive, responsive, and accountable to those it seeks to serve.
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Time of India
4 days ago
- Time of India
Localisation beyond the Grand Bargain: Structural contradictions in the Global South
Rajeev Kumar Jha is a development professional with over 18 years of extensive experience in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) across the South Asia region. He currently serves as the Director of DRR and CCA at the esteemed Humanitarian Aid International (HAI). LESS ... MORE On March 10, Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, issued a high-profile call for a 'humanitarian-reset' to consolidate efforts, re-evaluate strategies, eliminate redundancies, and enhance accountability across clusters and at the country level. A central part of his message was the need to accelerate the shift toward cash-based programming, aligning with long-standing commitments under the Grand Bargain. Yet, the timing and tone of this appeal raise important questions. Many observers argue that this reset was less a bold reformist initiative and more a reaction to the recent wave of development aid cuts by the US administration and other major donors. While Mr. Fletcher referenced the grand-bargain, his statement notably sidestepped the issue of localisation, failing to outline concrete mechanisms for transferring power, resources, or leadership to local actors. This omission is particularly striking as the current iteration of the Grand Bargain is set to expire in 2026, and localisation remains one of its most contested and unfulfilled goals. As the sector approaches this critical juncture, fundamental questions emerge: Will there be a genuine reset that centres local leadership and accountability, or will it dissolve into another cycle of rhetorical commitments and fragmented reform? The Grand Bargain Annual Meeting, held in Geneva on 16–17 October 2024, reflected these tensions. While members reaffirmed their interest in advancing quality funding, gender-transformative approaches, and strengthening national reference groups to serve as feedback loops between local and global levels, the outcomes were, by most accounts, muted and incremental. Without decisive action and structural reform, the localisation agenda risks becoming another diluted ambition, overshadowed by geopolitical shifts and institutional inertia. The Grand Bargain (GB) was introduced in 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit to transform the humanitarian system, with localisation as one of its core pillars. A predominant argument for localisation critiques the historical dominance of Northern development agencies and donor governments in shaping humanitarian responses. Another classical question that always generates interest is issues of resource sharing through the local actors, which generally flows from the coffers of Northern Hemisphere countries and their institutions. It has been perceived that most of the Southern Hemisphere-based actors are net receivers of the resources. Grand Bargain was embraced with optimism, viewing it as a potential game-changer. However, the reality has proven more complex. As per the Passing the Buck report 2022, 1.2% of humanitarian funding only going directly to local and national actors till 2022. Based on the evidence, one can argue that it has fallen short of shifting power and resources to local actors in any substantive way. Questions about its legacy and next phase persist. If it ends without achieving substantial progress, the humanitarian system risks retaining the same colonial-era dynamics it sought to redress. Along the way, another question arises: Will countries and institutions in the Southern hemisphere take on new leadership roles, develop innovative funding mechanisms, and demonstrate the political will necessary to advance localisation? Alternatively, will they continue to rely on financial support from Western nations? There is a concern that existing imbalances may simply re-emerge in different forms. One significant challenge is that many Southern countries lack national-level funding systems that can sustain local actors without depending on international aid. This creates a disconnect between the expressed support for localisation and the actual structural policies, which are often centralised, top-down, and counterproductive to the aims of localisation. This inconsistency highlights a fundamental contradiction that must be addressed for effective advancement in localisation efforts. Let us examine a few large Southern countries that hold influence in the global humanitarian order and can change the course of localisation if they act collectively: India India's development space is increasingly shaped by corporate-led social responsibility under the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) mandate of the Companies Act, 2013. While CSR has mobilised significant funds (over INR 25,000 crore in 2021-22), it operates under strict government guidelines, which restrict innovation and prioritise state-aligned objectives. Local community agency is often subsumed under state-corporate frameworks. Direct humanitarian funding mechanisms for local NGOs are virtually non-existent. Further, the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) amendments in 2020 have significantly curtailed foreign funding to local NGOs, reducing their operational independence. China China's development cooperation is entirely state-led. China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), formed in 2018, coordinates China Aid, which focuses on government-to-government projects, infrastructure, and technical assistance. China's engagement in humanitarianism has grown—e.g., through contributions to WFP, WHO, IFRC—but this rarely involves local civil society partners. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further emphasizes large-scale corporate participation over grassroots empowerment. Domestic restrictions on NGO activity further limit the growth of an independent humanitarian civil society. Mexico Mexico lacks a formal humanitarian funding mechanism accessible to CSOs. The previous disaster response mechanism, FONDEN, was dissolved in 2020. Disaster and emergency responses are now managed through federal systems with minimal CSO engagement. Regulatory constraints also inhibit foreign funding to local NGOs. Despite efforts to integrate DRR into public policy, most CSOs operate in precarious environments. Brazil The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) coordinates South-South development cooperation but mainly offers technical support through state-to-state partnerships. Despite a vibrant NGO landscape, access to both national and international funding is bureaucratically arduous. The government does not maintain a grant-making mechanism for local humanitarian actors. Moreover, recent political shifts have led to reduced civic space for CSOs and public budget cuts for social development initiatives. Nigeria Nigeria heavily depends on foreign humanitarian aid. Currently, between 4 and 5 per cent of the operation is delivered directly through local partners, compared to 1.2 per cent globally. Most funding passes through UN agencies and INGOs. Although the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD) was established in 2019, its focus remains on poverty alleviation (e.g., through the National Social Investment Programme) rather than on empowering local humanitarian actors. Despite hosting many humanitarian operations in Northeast Nigeria, local NGOs are often subcontractors rather than equal partners. Indonesia Indonesia has a well-established disaster management framework through the BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency), but local NGOs struggle to access core funding or influence national decision-making processes. Civil society contributions are seen as complementary rather than central. International funding flows still dominate in humanitarian response efforts such as tsunamis, floods, or volcanic eruptions. Suggestions to Improve Localisation: Establish international humanitarian funds with Southern leadership-Governments, particularly in the Global South, should lead in establishing transparent, accessible international humanitarian funding pools that include mandatory quotas for local and national NGOs. These could be disbursed through competitive grant mechanisms, matching fund models, or simplified direct financing channels. A strategic starting point would be for a coalition of countries in the Global South—for example, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Nigeria—to launch a $10 billion Southern Humanitarian Solidarity Fund, focused on regional crises, protracted emergencies, and anticipatory action. Currently, less than 2% of international humanitarian funding directly reaches local actors as per the Global Humanitarian Report, 2023. A South-led pooled fund could set a precedent for reversing this imbalance. Institutionalise local representation in national and international coordination platforms-National governments should mandate the inclusion of local NGOs, women-led groups, and community-based organizations into disaster coordination bodies such as NEMA (Nigeria), BNPB (Indonesia), and NDMA(India). Representation should be formalised in national disaster policies and linked to decision-making rights. International forums (e.g., the Grand Bargain, IASC) must also include local actors through elected representatives. Without institutional support, local actors often remain peripheral: for instance, only 3% of attendees at the 2023 Global Humanitarian Summit represented local organisations. Transition from capacity building to capacity sharing-Rather than treating capacity building as a unidirectional process, a shift toward mutual capacity sharing is needed. This means creating South-South peer learning platforms, where local actors co-develop tools, exchange lessons from disaster response, and contribute their deep contextual knowledge. Initiatives like the Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL) or peer-review networks across Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies offer replicable models. Studies show that 'peer-to-peer learning between local responders in similar risk environments has higher retention and contextual adaptation than traditional training models' (ODI, 2022). Promote South-South localisation alliances-Regional alliances among Global South countries—such as the African Union, ASEAN, or CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States )—should mainstream localisation within their humanitarian frameworks. These alliances can launch regional localisation funds, create civil society working groups, and host annual South-South Humanitarian Localisation Forums. The Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) provides a powerful precedent in pooling sovereign funds for disaster risk reduction and response. A 2023 FAO-WFP review highlighted that regional cooperation on humanitarian action in the Global South has doubled in the past decade but remains underfunded and donor-dependent. Localise monitoring and accountability mechanisms-Localisation benchmarks (e.g., the 25% direct funding target from the Grand Bargain) should be monitored not just by international bodies like the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) or OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), but by national civil society coalitions and independent watchdogs. Public scorecards, community-level audits, and data disaggregation by local/national/international status can foster greater accountability and transparency. Conclusion: The call for a 'Humanitarian Reset' invites a thoughtful reckoning with the enduring tensions within the aid system. Efforts to advance localisation cannot rely solely on international platforms, particularly when national frameworks in many parts of the Global South continue to exhibit centralising tendencies and offer limited avenues for civil society engagement. As the Grand Bargain draws to a close, the challenge lies less in formulating new pledges and more in fostering the quiet but essential shifts within donor approaches and domestic governance alike that enable a more balanced distribution of power and resources. Real progress will depend on sustained collaboration between actors across both the Global South and traditional donor landscapes. It is through such partnerships, grounded in mutual respect and a commitment to shared responsibility, that localisation can move from aspiration to practice. Governments, donors, and civil society must work together to cultivate an environment in which the humanitarian system becomes more inclusive, responsive, and accountable to those it seeks to serve. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
The Wire
19-06-2025
- The Wire
A University That Punishes Dissent
The following is an open letter to JNU vice chancellor Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit (and if he cares to read it, ex-vice chancellor M. Jagadesh Kumar). § Dear Professor Pandit, After an agonising wait of five years for my gratuity illegally withheld by the JNU administration, the Hon'ble Delhi high court has ordered JNU to pay the amount with interest of 6%. Previous to this, I had approached the same court for the recovery of my leave encashment dues, which were also illegally withheld by JNU. The court then (2022) awarded 9% interest. It is more than evident that JNU has acted illegally in withholding my dues (and those of other retired faculty). At the time of my retirement in January 2020, I received no written explanation for the same, despite many written and oral requests to the then-registrar Pramod Kumar. Finally, I was sent a letter on March 17, 2020, saying that I was refused leave encashment and gratuity pending an enquiry into misconduct (which incidentally had been stayed by the Hon'ble Delhi high court). The previous communication I received was on July 24, 2019, when I was informed that under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) (CCS/CCA) Rules, 1965, I would be subjected to an enquiry for 'misconduct'. The charge was violating Rule 7 of the CCS/CCA rules. The enquiry was purportedly about a silent and peaceful march on July 31, 2018 taken out by about 200 JNU faculty around the campus, for about half an hour, without disrupting any academic or administrative duties. Less than 50 of us were singled out for the show cause, and later, chargesheet. I referred to the service contract which I had signed when I joined JNU in September 2009. It speaks nowhere of CCS/CCA rules. It only says that I agree to 'Statutes, Ordinances, Regulation and rules for the time being in force in the University…' Since the matter regarding the applicability of CCS/CCA rules to JNU faculty is still pending, let me acquaint you with a brief history of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Teachers' Association (JNUTA)'s struggle which began in February 2016, when Prof Mamidala Jagadesh Kumar had just been appointed as VC of JNU. This was no coincidence. The JNUTA had decided, through a democratic and consultative process, following the turbulence on the campus, and the arrest of some of our students under Section 124a of the IPC, that it would oppose the attempts of the administration to challenge and alter the long-established traditions of debate, dialogue and discussion, including dissent, and norms and practices that recognised seniority in administrative duties. It planned to do this in a number of peaceful and constructive ways. Also read | Chargesheets, Denied Pension, Leaves: JNU's Punitive Measures Against Dissenting Faculty One of these was a month-long series of lectures on nationalism which was held at the steps of the administration in February and March 2016. The events were extremely well-attended, live- streamed and eventually became a book entitled What the Nation Really Needs to Know. Both the YouTube lectures and the book have received widespread attention and use; the book has sold well over 10,000 copies in addition to being translated into many different Indian languages. I hasten to point out that this 'Teach In' was in addition to the classroom teaching, research, administrative work, etc which all JNU teachers continued without interruption. It was, in short, well in keeping with JNU faculty's commitment to innovative teaching and learning. The JNUTA organised a series of other creative and educative events in many parts of the campus (following the Delhi high court order forbidding such actions by students within 100 metres of the administration building). These have continued over the years. None of these were disruptive, noisy or at the cost of the teaching/evaluation/administrative responsibilities of teachers. Overall, the then-new JNU administration could not challenge the JNUTA academically or on any intellectual grounds. Its preferred mode was to seek the support of the judiciary, which has also largely failed. The two cases referred to above clearly show that the JNU administration did not have a legal leg to stand on. None of its executive orders have stood legal scrutiny in case after case, whether it is related to the denial of sabbatical leave, denial of pensions or denial of NOCs to those who wished to travel abroad for fellowships. But we have all learned that in 'New India/Naya Bharat', the process is the punishment, even when there is no wrongdoing. The university soon received adverse publicity nationwide, and there was severe erosion of its carefully built-up academic reputation, which the JNU administration did nothing to rectify. Instead, teachers were maligned in multiple ways for opposing the rapid changes to long-established norms in the university. For instance, chairpersons were appointed, no longer on the basis of seniority, which was the well-established norm, but in arbitrary fashion. Centre for Historical Studies faculty attempted in 2017 to persuade the newly appointed chair, who had superseded many other senior faculty (in direct violation of long-accepted norms) against accepting the responsibility. We failed. (Later, that out-of-turn appointment was reversed by the Hon'ble high court). Instead, as punishment, 12 or 13 of us were asked to appear before an enquiry committee at the Equal Opportunity Office in JNU in 2017/2018, ostensibly for having been discriminatory towards the chair. To date, the report of this committee and its findings have not been made public or shared with all those who repeatedly appeared before the committee, and also submitted explanations in writing. Clearly, there was nothing at all to substantiate these charges. The only goal was harassment. Such mental and psychic harassment continued on many fronts even as the 'dilution' of, and assault on, JNU's original mandate and formidable reputation as an institution of higher learning continued. The academic standing of this premier institution in social sciences and humanities, international relations, languages, and life and physical sciences was undermined in multiple ways. Despite all data indicating a steep fall in enrollments in engineering studies nationwide, Prof Jagadesh Kumar began an undergraduate engineering programme with neither faculty nor buildings. Likewise, a Management Studies Centre was established, once more without teachers and buildings, and student enrolments begun. Both of these efforts basically encashed JNU's carefully built-up brand value in social sciences and the humanities, while undermining it as an institution of higher learning. Finally, on January 5, 2020, having failed to academically or legally dent the formidable spirit of the JNU teaching and learning community, a physical attack, using an unruly armed brigade of 150 storm troopers, was launched on the JNU campus, at which many students and faculty were injured. Although CCTV cameras revealed the identity of the attackers, they were allowed to leave unscathed. To this day, five years later, neither the JNU administration nor the Delhi police have submitted their reports on what happened on that fateful day. We were hopeful that a new vice chancellor, and especially one who has had the privilege of studying in JNU, such as yourself, would restore the intellectual ethos, ethical values and uniquely forged civility that had been systematically undermined under Prof Jagadesh Kumar. You have gone on public record several times praising the achievements of this university. But, alas, you have not lived up to these expectations, and the dismantling of the institution has continued apace, as you have remained steadfastly loyal to your political masters. Also read: Political Intolerance and Declining Academic Freedom in India Prof Pandit, let me conclude with a few personal details. When I retired in January 2020, there was no one to teach the compulsory Capitalism and Colonialism course which I had co-taught with pleasure for a decade. I agreed, in February 2020, to deliver the lectures for the first half of this course. For this, I never asked for, nor was given, any remuneration (and not even a cup of tea was forthcoming from the then-chair of the department!) Thereafter, five of my PhD students remained in my supervision and in continuous touch, and I saw them through their doctoral degrees until their vivas were held (the last was in 2023). In other words, in the best spirit of an earlier JNU ethos, I did not abandon my students even when the institution I had loyally served was abandoning me. The harassment of currently employed faculty who were issued the chargesheet continues, in the form of promotions denied, and the denial of administrative responsibility, withholding permission for leave, etc. Here, again, the JNU administration is bound to lose legally, but the long-drawn-out process is itself the punishment. I have concluded, given the steadfast adherence to illegality by your administration and the previous one, that such recklessness arises from a complete lack of accountability on your part. It is, after all, the taxpayer's money that has to compensate the JNU teachers, such as myself, who were denied their retirement rights in time. I am painfully reminded of the senseless and illiterate noise regarding JNU students and their 'exploitation' of the low fee structure that was aggressively generated after 2016, in articles, WhatsApp messages and TV channels alike. The JNU administration did nothing to counter such relentless calumny. Where are those guardians of taxpayers' money now when lakhs of rupees are being paid out by JNU/the state, for interest on dues which should have been paid a long time ago and for lawyers' fees? Why have those who so long and loudly demanded 'accountability' from students now fallen silent about lakhs of rupees spent on cases which were a tactic to delay, not win? I am suggesting, Prof Pandit, that it will set a very good example and high standard for institutional and personal ethics, if you and Prof Jagadesh Kumar put your money where your mouth is. You should jointly agree to compensate the University – and the Indian state, and the beleaguered tax payer – for the lakhs of rupees in interest that have been paid to each of us for these illegally delayed retirement dues and lawyers' fees on both sides. That will usher in the 'Naya Bharat' that we so desperately need. Janaki NairProfessor of History (retd)JNU Janaki Nair taught at the Centre for Historical Studies, JNU. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
Time of India
19-06-2025
- Time of India
Telecom department warns employees against using political influence for service related matters
New Delhi: The Department of Telecom has warned its employees against using political or external influence for service related matters, according to an office memorandum issued on Wednesday. The memorandum said that reference from Member of Parliaments or any other dignitaries will be presumed that it has been sought by the employees and the matter will be dealt as per service rules. "It has been observed that some government servants are attempting to influence service-related decisions, particularly transfers and postings , by soliciting political or external support, including through relatives or wards. This is a violation of Rule 20 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules , 1964, which expressly prohibits bringing or attempting to bring political or outside influence in such matters," the memorandum said. The memorandum reminded employees of the government's decisions under Rule 20. A first-time violation invites formal advice, a second breach results in a written warning to be placed on record and further violations call for disciplinary proceedings under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. "All ITS officers are hereby advised to refrain from any such practice and not to bring political and other outside influence directly or through their relative/ wards to further their service matters particularly in the matter of transfers/ posting," the memorandum said. DoT has advised employees to seek redressal through prescribed official channels only. "Any instance of violation of these rules/ orders would be viewed very seriously and the officers/officials responsible for such violation would attract strict disciplinary action," the memorandum said.
