Latest news with #ICBMs
Politico
2 days ago
- Business
- Politico
Don't forget about Iran's space program
With help from Daniel Lippman Subscribe here | Email Robbie | Email Eric Left out of Israel and the United States's bombardment of Iran was one potentially key piece of infrastructure: Iran's growing space program, which U.S. officials have warned could one day help power an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking far beyond the Middle East. The program may have suffered indirectly in the strikes though — and could well be a target in the future. Iran currently has no known program for building ICBMs, per NICHOLAS CARL, an Iran analyst at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. Such missiles, first developed in the 1950s, shoot into space and then reenter the atmosphere to strike targets as much as 11,000 miles away. Indeed, Iran has taken pains to say it has limited its missiles' range to under 1250 miles, Carl said. However, Iran does have an increasingly robust space program — which could allow it to develop the rocketry and associated tech necessary to build an ICBM. In 2023, Iran launched a rocket with a capsule capable of life support as part of plans to send a human to space. In 2024 it launched three satellite-carrying rockets. Meanwhile, ties between Iran and top space power Russia have grown increasingly close amid Iran's support for Russia's war on Ukraine. Russia launched one Iranian satellite from its Vostochny Cosmodrome in February 2023, then launched a further two Iranian satellites in November 2024. Such collaboration could be particularly appealing to Russia after its space partners in Europe cut ties with Moscow following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 'Iran is a willing and paying customer right when others have backed out,' said KARI BINGEN, who leads the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington. All of this is alarming to the U.S., which has sanctioned Iran's space program and may have launched a covert campaign to undermine it under the first Trump administration. Strategic Command head Gen. ANTHONY COTTON, in written testimony given this year, stated that Iran's space program 'likely shortens the timeline to produce an ICBM due to the similarities in technology.' 'Why do they have a space program? Is Iran going to go to the moon? No, they're trying to build an ICBM so they can one day put a warhead on it,' Secretary of State MARCO RUBIO warned in a CBS interview this month. So far, Israel isn't directly targeting Iran's space infrastructure, such as its launch pads. However, the space program may be indirectly squeezed by the strikes. On June 13, Israel killed Brig. Gen. AMIR ALI HAJIZADEH, who led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force, which controls Iran's military space program. Meanwhile, Israeli strikes on Iranian missile production facilities may have an impact on Iran's space program, said Bingen, given that the subcomponents for space and missile programs have a broad overlap. Of course, just because Iran has a space program, it doesn't necessarily mean it's using it solely as part of research toward an ICBM. Space programs are often as much about national prestige as national security, as they were when the U.S. and Soviet Union vied to be the first to place astronauts in space and later the moon. Indeed, in an echo of past space races, Iran's launch of a capsule capable of supporting life reportedly carried animals into space — just as the Soviet Union did when it blasted a dog into orbit back in 1957. The Inbox ELUSIVE IRAN TALKS: Iran and the United States have not yet penciled a date for talks, and Iran's making it clear it has one big demand before any negotiations resume: that President DONALD TRUMP stop threatening future strikes. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister MAJID TAKHT-RAVANCHI told the BBC today that 'right now, we are seeking an answer to this question: Are we going to see a repetition of an act of aggression while we are engaging in dialogue?' Takht-Ravanchi added that Iran is not backing down in its desire to retain enrichment capabilities. The administration isn't relaxing its positions either. White House spokesperson KAROLINE LEAVITT today confirmed that special envoy STEVE WITKOFF is still 'in communication directly and indirectly' with Iranian counterparts. But it's unclear if those efforts are bringing both sides any closer to an agreement about next steps for negotiations. TRUMP'S SYRIA EXECUTIVE ORDER: Trump will sign an executive order today eliminating most of the remaining U.S. sanctions against Syria, State Department and White House spokespeople said today. The removal of the sanctions was expected after Trump met with Syrian leader AHMED AL-SHARAA last month in Saudi Arabia and vowed to give the fledgling government in Damascus a lifeline. The reprieves are being offered as a way to help al-Sharaa stabilize the country, which is still plagued by turmoil after the collapse of the regime of Syrian dictator BASHAR ASSAD. Leavitt insisted at a briefing today that sanctions against Assad and his allies, as well as 'human rights abusers, drug traffickers, persons linked to chemical weapons activities, Islamic State and their affiliates, and Iranian proxies,' will remain in place. It's also worth noting that some sanctions will remain on Syria, including those mandated through the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019. The U.S. will also continue to consider Syria a state sponsor of terrorism. ISRAEL'S NEW GAZA STRIKES: As the White House signals it wants to return its focus to securing a new deal to end fighting in the Gaza Strip, Israel has launched several military operations in the territory, Reuters' Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Maayan Lubell report. The Israel Defense Forces issued evacuation orders today for a number of areas in the northern Gaza Strip, forcing a new wave of displacement. Meanwhile, airstrikes and tank attacks killed 60 people in the enclave today in the suburbs of Gaza City. Israel claims it took efforts to lessen/reduce/avoid civilian casualties and targeted the Hamas militant group's command and control centers. All these military efforts presaged the visit of Israeli strategic affairs minister RON DERMER to Washington for meetings with U.S. officials. He'll be meeting with U.S. counterparts Tuesday. IT'S MONDAY: Thanks for tuning in to NatSec Daily! This space is reserved for the top U.S. and foreign officials, the lawmakers, the lobbyists, the experts and the people like you who care about how the natsec sausage gets made. Aim your tips and comments at ebazail@ and follow Eric on X @ebazaileimil. While you're at it, follow the rest of POLITICO's global security team on X and Bluesky at: @dave_brown24, @HeidiVogt, @jessicameyers, @RosiePerper, @ @PhelimKine, @ak_mack, @felschwartz, @connorobrienNH, @paulmcleary, @reporterjoe, @JackDetsch, @samuelskove, @magmill95, @johnnysaks130 and @delizanickel Keystrokes ALL CLEAR (FOR NOW): The nation's top cybersecurity agencies are saying there's no sign yet of a coordinated Iranian cyber campaign against the U.S. following the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites. The statement was jointly issued today by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center and the National Security Agency. Still, the agencies warned critical infrastructure facilities, such as power grids or dams, to keep on guard. U.S. utilities have been bracing for Iranian cyberattacks since even before the U.S. struck Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan this month, Iran has spent years building up their cyber forces, which the U.S. has accused of being behind campaigns against U.S. companies and government agencies. Iran's apparent decision to not target the U.S. with cyberstrikes follows its relatively limited military response to the U.S. strike, in which Iran gave advance notice that it would fire missiles at a U.S. base in Qatar. The Complex ITALY BRIDGES THE GAP: Italy is eyeing an inventive solution to its struggles to reach the NATO alliance's lofty defense spending targets: building a multibillion-dollar bridge between its mainland peninsula and Sicily. Our colleagues Tommaso Lecca, Ben Munster and Martina Sapio report that Italian officials are looking to build a long-desired suspension bridge between the Italian peninsula and the Sicilian city of Messina, the construction of which eluded Italy's leaders dating back to the Roman Empire. The expensive bridge — valued at nearly $16 billion — has never been constructed since the process of constructing the large bridge in an active seismic region was long seen as too difficult. But the argument goes that now with the impetus to spend money on defense, the bridge would be a useful investment that would improve the ability of allies to deploy resources and troops to Sicily, and constructing the bridge for military purposes would clear some of the technical roadblocks associated with the project. It has been expected that European partners would use some creative accounting to reach the 5 percent defense spending target, especially after the alliance allowed allies to count spending on cybersecurity and infrastructure to support military installations to count as 1.5 percent of that. But this effort could prove to test the limits of the alliance's definition of supportive infrastructure, since the bridge's dual use function to boost military installations in Sicily could be cast into some doubt. On the Hill NAVY'S MEGABILL MISSION: The funding bill currently making its way through Congress would fund more Navy ships than the Defense Department has asked for — that is if Republicans can move past other issues they have with Trump's 'big, beautiful bill.' As our friends at Morning Defense wrote this morning (for Pros!), the GOP-backed reconciliation bill would add 16 new ships to the Navy's fleet. By contrast, the Defense Department asked in its budget request to only add three more. While analysts aren't sure it'll do much to boost the fleet — since the Navy will have to decommission older ships in the longer term to account for maintenance costs — it's a boost to shipyards in the short term. Yet Republicans are antsy about the Trump administration's efforts to Medicaid costs and the bill's future looks uncertain. Sen. THOM TILLIS (R-N.C.), who announced he would retire at the end of this Congress over the weekend, and colleagues JIM JUSTICE ( and LISA MURKOWSKI (R-Alaska), have voiced their concerns about the bill and have not yet committed to voting for it. The bill faces what's expected to be a long 'vote-a-rama' today and potentially tomorrow as Republican leadership looks to appease holdouts while also conforming to strict guidelines for reconciliation set by the Senate parliamentarian. Broadsides VYLAN'S VISA REVOCATION: The State Department revoked the visas of British punk duo Bob Vylan after they chanted 'death to the IDF' and 'from the river to the sea, Palestine must be, will be — inshallah — it will be free' at the Glastonbury music festival this past weekend. As our colleague Cheyanne Daniels reports, Deputy Secretary of State CHRIS LANDAU confirmed the revocation in a social media post, writing on X that the decision was made 'in light of their hateful tirade at Glastonbury, including leading the crowd in death chants. Foreigners who glorify violence and hatred are not welcome visitors to our country.' Bob Vylan — whose members use pseudonyms in protest of what they argue is a surveillance state — was due to tour in the United States. It's the latest example of the Trump administration using all the procedural levers at its disposal against supporters of the Palestinian cause and institutions it deems have not done enough to combat antisemitism from pro-Palestinian activists and organizers. Visa revocations have become an integral component of those efforts. The duo did not comment on the revocations. Lead singer BOBBY VYLAN, whose real name is PASCAL ROBINSON-FOSTER, has defended his performance on social media, calling for more protests and saying 'I said what I said.' Transitions — Global strategy firm McLarty Associates announced a series of new roles and promotions. JÉRÉMIE GALLON, previously head of McLarty Europe in Brussels, will lead the firm's entire Europe practice. Head of strategy CLAIRE KAISER will co-lead the Eurasia practice. Prior to McLarty, Gallon led AmCham France after years posted to Washington by the EU's foreign service arm, serving as senior political adviser to the EU ambassador to the U.S.. He'll succeed former Ambassador RICK BURT, who built the practice and will remain at the firm as a senior counselor. Managing Director FRAN BURWELL will also be head of research, in addition to her current responsibilities. — JERRY HENDRIX is now deputy to the associate director for defense at the Office of Management and Budget. He most recently was senior counselor at the Office of Shipbuilding on the National Security Council and served in the Navy for 26 years. — MEGAN ECHTENKAMP is now briefing book coordinator for the deputy secretary at the Department of Homeland Security. She most recently was director of external affairs at Florida Young Republicans. What to Read — Maggie Michael, Reuters: Syrian forces massacred 1,500 Alawites. The chain of command led to Damascus. — Maria Abi-Habib, Paulina Villegas and Alan Feuer, The New York TImes: Cartel Fighters Make a Desperate Alliance That Could Transform Underworld — Sarah El Deeb, Associated Press: Survivor of Israel's attack on Iran's Evin prison describes a 'slow death' after 12-day war — Carl Bildt, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Sanna Marin and Kajsa Ollongren, European Pravda: The cost of saving Europe: what the EU must do now to stop Putin Tomorrow Today — Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11 a.m.: Explosive Triangle: The U.S., Iran and Israel — Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2 p.m.: Schriever Spacepower Series with Col. ROBERT W. DAVIS Thanks to our editors, Heidi Vogt and Emily Lussier, who should never be allowed to develop their own space programs.
Express Tribune
4 days ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
The day after doctrine: Russia's nuclear dilemma & the South Asian precedent
On 3 June, the Daily Mail ran a headline that many dismissed as melodramatic, but few could ignore: 'Putin knows a nuclear revenge attack will force Ukraine's surrender. These are the four ways he'd strike... and we're powerless to stop this holocaust.' Quoting Col Richard Kemp, a former British commander in Afghanistan, the piece imagined multiple escalation scenarios where Russia, cornered by battlefield setbacks and deep strategic losses, might resort to tactical nuclear use. The framing may have sounded like tabloid frenzy but it struck a chord with the evolving anxiety in the West: that nuclear deterrence, as traditionally conceived, is disintegrating. That tactical nuclear use, long treated as a taboo, is now entering the realm of possibility — not by miscalculation or accident, but as a calculated tool of escalation management. That the post-Hiroshima threshold is not merely at risk but already structurally breached. Ukraine's deep-strike campaign against the air leg of Russia's nuclear triad marks more than a tactical success; it is a doctrinal rupture. A claimed 20 per cent degradation of Russia's strategic long-range fleet, achieved using low-cost drones and remote-inserted assets, pierced directly into the Soviet legacy posture. This wasn't a battlefield blow, it was strategic. It signalled that a top-tier nuclear state has failed to protect its second-strike assets from sub-strategic encroachment. The world has sleepwalked into a new nuclear reality. Technically, Russia's 2020 declared deterrence doctrine has been breached. If 'critical military infrastructure' includes nuclear-capable bombers and their launch sites, then the threshold for retaliation was crossed. But enforcement isn't automatic, it's political. The absence of response so far can only be attributed to structural hesitation or political calibration. Strategic restraint remains a possibility, if Moscow still calculates long-term positional gain rooted in the attritional phase of its war doctrine. More likely, however, is operational unreadiness. Few of Russia's tactical nuclear platforms are both survivable and deployable under current battlefield conditions. Doctrinal hesitation seems less convincing. Had the strikes carried a NATO signature, escalation might already have occurred. But the "Ukrainian" label, even if nominal, offers Moscow political cover to absorb, for now. But the SBU's operation revealed more than Ukrainian capability; it exposed the fragility of the triad's symmetry. The air leg now appears a soft, centralised, and non-survivable underbelly. If the calculus for escalation is grounded in survivability, then Russia and other nuclear nations face a strategic imbalance. Submarines and ICBMs must now carry the entire burden of escalation credibility. That shift has consequences far beyond Ukraine. It fractures the predictability of nuclear thresholds. It dissolves the assumptions underpinning INF and New START. It redefines the sub-strategic space under a nuclear horizon. Yet, deterrence doesn't survive on ambiguity. It must survive impact. A tactical Russian nuclear strike — even a single sub-kiloton yield, battlefield-contained use — would not be about battlefield outcomes, but reestablishing doctrinal red lines. But the fallout would not remain in theatre. It would globalise. For China, this would be doctrinally liberating. The American Indo-Pacific Command's persistent theatre-posturing — especially its simulated decapitation 'left-of-launch' scenarios against mainland targets — already pressures Beijing to shorten its response timeline. A Russian precedent would remove the final moral hesitations. It would rationalise tactical nuclear signalling as legitimate escalation management, not taboo. Expect China to invest in regionalised, non-strategic nuclear options designed to deny US naval or ISR dominance around Taiwan — and to validate 'first countervalue, then counterforce' as a pre-emptive logic, not a reactive one. But the deeper detonation, however, may occur in South Asia. India's doctrinal drift away from 'No First Use' — through both ambiguity and posture — is already incentivising Chinese and Pakistani 'use-it-or-lose-it' anxieties. India's alignment with Israeli precision warfare and American surgical decapitation has fostered a belief that strategic risk can be managed through deniable, calibrated strikes. But unlike Tel Aviv or Washington, New Delhi operates within a regional theatre defined by compressed warning timelines, low tolerance for ambiguity, and adversaries conditioned for reflex. This borrowed strategic grammar, when applied to a nuclear dyad like Pakistan, risks translating Western hubris into subcontinental catastrophe. If Russia demonstrates that tactical nuclear use can be decoupled from strategic Armageddon, then Pakistan will finally possess a template to formalise the battlefield nuclear doctrine it has long reserved but never operationalised. The full logic of NASR — once a deterrent symbol, now a potential tripwire — will become active: no more a signal but a standing battlefield option. The danger is that Pakistan's ROEs will evolve past Riposte and into deterrence-by-interdiction. Any visible IBG buildup near the border, or persistent scavenging for sub-strategic manoeuvre space under the nuclear ceiling, may trigger a counter-concentration strike before hostilities formally begin. Unlike Russia or China, Pakistan doesn't operate behind oceans or with redundancy. It operates with existential immediacy. It cannot afford to absorb. Its threshold is not calibrated in megatons, but in minutes. The United States, meanwhile, will face a strategic reversal. For decades, it managed nuclear escalation through centralised alliance structures and deterrence hierarchies. But a likely Russian breach, especially if absorbed by the West without proportional response, would flatten that structure. It would reveal that nuclear use can be absorbed, normalised, and locally managed. That is not deterrence resilience; it is signalling failure. The Cold War built nuclear norms through symmetry, transparency, and globalised fear. The new reality is asymmetrical, obscured, and psychologically decoupled. Escalation thresholds are being reinterpreted in regional dialects. Deterrence is being broken not in theory, but in precedent. For the first time in history, if a nuclear strike occurs outside superpower initiation, in a contested theatre, by a major power struggling to retain parity, then Washington's entire nuclear architecture — based on managed escalation, centralised decision nodes, and predictability — would fracture. The gatekeeping function of American deterrence would be voided. Allies would begin to hedge. Adversaries would begin to test. But if Russia absorbs these Ukrainian sabotage and continues the war conventionally, the implications may be deeper still. That would confirm a precedent even more subversive than retaliation: that a nuclear power can suffer strategic degradation without escalation. That the air leg of its deterrent can be degraded, mocked, and exploited without cost. That the bluff can be called — and nothing happens. That would rewrite the global deterrence script in real time. In such a scenario, for China, the lesson would not be symmetrical. It would be inverse. The Taiwan scenario would evolve past porcupine defences and passive deterrence. Taipei's planners may assume they can strike Chinese missile bases or early-warning nodes in a prolonged attritional campaign without triggering a nuclear response. Whether true or not, that assumption itself would be destabilising. If a top-tier nuclear state can't protect its second-strike assets, then deterrence must be made more reflexive, more automated, more decoupled from politics. China's command-and-control systems — already shifting toward dual-use ambiguity — may become hair-trigger by necessity. Meanwhile, the PLA's own deterrence posture will face renewed pressure. If Russia cannot secure its bombers, can China secure its rail-mobile launchers? Expect a doctrinal pivot: from posture-by-denial to posture-by-pre-emption. Thresholds will tighten, not widen. Response timelines will compress. And the pressure to demonstrate readiness, before a shot is fired, will grow exponentially. For Pakistan, Russia's restraint would be a warning, not reassurance. It would reveal the limits of deterrence signalling in the face of deniable strikes. If restraint buys degradation, then restraint must be shortened. Deterrence posture would move from 'second-strike assuredness' to 'first-strike necessity.' Tactical nuclear use may become essential to restore credibility. For the United States, Russia's non-response would appear as strategic victory — but only briefly. It would signal that nuclear impunity is now negotiable. It would not matter that NATO ISR assisted the Ukrainian operation. That detail would be strategically irrelevant. What would matter will be this: Ukraine has demonstrated that nuclear deterrence is no longer the exclusive domain of superpowers. Escalatory logic is being localised. Sub-strategic space is being democratised. That is the real rupture. The West no longer gatekeeps the escalatory script — it only reacts to it. So, the choice is stark. Strike and trigger the world's first precedent for tactical nuclear signalling in a modern battlefield, with ripple effects across every nuclear flashpoint from Kaliningrad to Kashmir. Or absorb and allow the world to infer that nuclear doctrine can be breached without consequence. That deterrence is a decaying art, not a governing science. This choice is starker still because India and Pakistan are sleepwalking through a transformation in nuclear logic without corresponding public debate, institutional preparedness, or political mechanisms. Parliamentary oversight is absent; military wargaming remains siloed; and civilian elites continue to treat doctrine as a legacy relic, not a living architecture. As thresholds dissolve and deterrence becomes theatre-specific, the region's opacity is no longer stabilising — it is actively dangerous. Without transparent review of red lines, retaliation postures, or escalation ladders, South Asia may become the world's first nuclear region where deterrence fails not due to intention — but inertia. A few days ago, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio remarked: 'If it weren't for the US-Russia ties in 1961, the world could have collapsed during the Cuban Missile Crisis.' The world learnt many lessons from those 13 days. Doctrines were developed, safeguards installed, hotlines opened. India seems to have learned nothing from that even after 63 years. It, perhaps, cannot. This is the country that 'accidentally' fired a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile into Pakistan in March 2022. A Russian-engineered P-800 Oniks, rebranded as BrahMos, went off-course and landed deep inside a nuclear-armed neighbour. No heads rolled. No systems reviewed. Just a sorry scapegoating at IAF. What other nuclear power in the world could have done this without consequences? In 2010, a Delhi university lab disposed of radioactive cobalt-60 into a scrap market. One person died. Several were injured. In 2017, a GPS malfunction sent an Agni-II nuclear-capable missile near a populated area. In 2014, a valve failure at Kakrapar threatened radiation leaks. In 1995, a coolant pipe burst at Rajasthan's reactor. In 2002, fuel rod mishandling at Kalpakkam spiked radiation dangerously close to local communities. Between 1994 and 2021, there have been 18 reported cases of nuclear material theft or loss in India. Uranium on the black market. Californium in private hands. The Bhopal disaster remains the world's worst industrial catastrophe — and still, no full-scope IAEA oversight. No accountability. Not even regulatory autonomy. India's own Comptroller and Auditor General has called out the AERB's lack of independence. Indian leaders routinely issue conventional threats to nuclear neighbours. It's a uniquely juvenile understanding of deterrence — only possible in Delhi. With immature, nuclear-sabre-rattling leadership threatening a region of 2 billion people, India's belligerence is no longer an internal risk. It is a regional liability — and a global one. This is the country that the West chose to proliferate nuclear technology with. Through BECA and other agreements, the US has effectively endorsed recklessness. This is not just hypocrisy. It is strategic malpractice. One lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the visible posturing of No First Use policies to reduce escalation risks. Instead, India has embarked on a visible First Use threat, with aggressive and strategic attack platforms. Crisis stability theory, shaped by the 1962 near-catastrophe, warns that such posturing creates a preemptive incentive for Pakistan or China, heightening the risk of miscalculation in a tense region. Pakistan and China, by contrast, continue to be recognised for nuclear responsibility. IAEA and US officials have acknowledged their command systems as stable and disciplined. No major nuclear accidents or incidents have been publicly reported at Pakistani facilities. Pakistan maintains its nuclear assets under tight security with a robust command and control structure through the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the National Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan has improved its regulatory framework, including joining several international treaties like the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The world was lucky in 1962. It may not be again. This is not a game of nerves. These are doctrines in freefall. And to the empire-builders in Taipei, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi — and their borrowed faith in absolute escalatory control — this may be a final warning: Are you prepared to be the first ideologues in history who confuse tactical advantage with thermonuclear immunity — and stake your grand civilisational myths on the hope that the other side blinks first? Abdul Munim is a freelance contributor and electrical engineer. He posts on X using the handle @Munimusing and can be reached via email at munimusing@ All facts and information are the sole responsibility of the author
India.com
5 days ago
- Business
- India.com
After Israel-Iran war, another major conflict simmering in THIS volatile region; not India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, the conflict is between...
File/Representational US-North Korea tensions The recent Israel-Iran war brought the world to the brink of World War 3, especially after the United States used B-2 stealth bombers to drop 13,000 pound bunker busting GBU-57 bombs on Iranian nuclear sites of Isfahan, Fordow, and Natanz. The conflict ended after 12 days the US mediated a ceasefire, which came into effect on Tuesday. North Korea-US tensions and threat of World War 3 There are other major conflicts raging across the world, including the Russia-Ukraine war, and the forever tensions between India and Pakistan, which present a real threat of spilling over into a global war. But, one volatile conflict which has been simmering for decades but often overlooked are the tensions between North Korea and the United States. After its recent attack on Iran, many geopolitical experts believe that US might be considering a similar operation against North Korea, which is a strong ally of its main rivals, China, Russia, and Iran. However, there is a major catch, North Korea, unlike Iran, is a nuclear-armed state with an estimated stockpile of at least 40 to 50 nuclear warheads, and nuclear-capable ICBMs with enough range to strike the US' West Coast. North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un realized that the only way to protect his regime from being toppled by a super power like the US, was to develop nuclear weapons, which he did, in addition to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) reportedly capable of reaching the US. Putin, Kim Jong Un may build stronger ties Experts believe that North Korea and Russia may build stronger strategic ties after the US attack on Iran, considering that Pyongyang has already sent arms and North Korean soldiers to fight for Moscow in the Russia-Ukraine war, and in exchange, received advanced military technology and oil from Russia. This strategic military and economic partnership between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un is expected to grow rapidly in the coming months in wake of how the US brazenly attacked Iran without any provocation on the pretext of developing nuclear weapons, a claim refuted by UN nuclear watchdog IAEA. Russia ties with North Korea are not limited to trade, but has transformed into a strategic military partnership that includes joint development of weapons, military exercises and technology transfer. Can North Korea-US tensions trigger a global nuclear war? Its highly-difficult for the US to attack North Korea in the same way it did Iran because unlike the Islamic Republic, Pyongyang is believed to have at least 40 to 50 nuclear weapons, and ultra long-range ICBMS to carry them all the way to the US, experts say, adding that it also a strong strategic partner like Russia. However, if the unthinkable happens and the US, particularly under Trump, launches an attack on a nuclear-armed North Korea, it will likely be met with a nuclear response from Pyongyang as Kim Jong Un has often threatened. This would trigger a catastrophic nuclear war, which might spill over in to World War 3, as every major nation gets involved and fires its nuclear weapons at their adversaries, threatening an extinction-level even never before seen on the planet.
India.com
6 days ago
- Business
- India.com
Not Iran, The Real Threat Is Pakistan… Tensions Rise After US Report, How India's Warning Is Proving True
New Delhi: The maps in Washington have shifted focus. The chatter inside intelligence rooms is not about Tehran anymore. It is Rawalpindi. A fresh report from U.S. intelligence agencies has triggered serious alarm. Hidden under radar, Pakistan is reportedly building an intercontinental ballistic missile. It is said to be nuke-tipped that could reach mainland America. Until now, Iran had held the spotlight. But this new revelation has brought Pakistan's nuclear ambitions straight into global crosshairs. For India, it is vindication. For the United States, a potential crisis. For the region, a ticking clock. A report quoting U.S. sources claims that Pakistan's new missile has crossed theory stage. It is being developed quietly – away from public eyes. It is capable of traveling over 5,500 kilometers. That is ICBM territory. A range wide enough to strike far beyond Delhi. All the way to Washington. The report was published in Foreign Affairs – an American magazine. It says the missile project picked up speed after India's Operation Sindoor rattled Pakistan's military brass. With Chinese help, Pakistan is now said to be acquiring the components and know-how needed to leapfrog its existing arsenal. What This Means for America Washington is watching closely. Senior officials say that if Pakistan achieves the ICBM capability, it will be reclassified as a nuclear threat like North Korea, China and Russia. There will be no middle ground. The United States has already imposed sanctions. Last year, it froze assets and blocked trade with Pakistan's National Development Complex and its key missile contractors. That was not random. It came after evidence emerged of Islamabad sourcing sensitive tech from foreign markets. For years, Pakistan insisted its nuclear weapons were for deterrence against India. Nothing more. No ICBMs. No aggression. Just defense. But this new intelligence contradicts that script. With Shahin-III already reaching over 2,700 km, experts believe Pakistan is preparing to extend its reach far beyond South Asia. And there is a motive. If Pakistan owns a missile that can hit the United States, it will change the rules. It will act as a shield. It will limit U.S. involvement in any future India-Pakistan conflict. That is the strategy. Quietly but clearly. Why India Is Saying 'We Told You So' New Delhi has long raised concerns. That Pakistan cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons. That its command chain is fragile. That terror groups work hand in glove with rogue military elements. After recent air strikes inside Pakistan, India also neutralised nine terror camps and targeted 11 airbases. Pakistan reportedly fired a Fateh-II hypersonic missile. India shot it down. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and other top Indian leaders have called on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor Pakistan's nuclear stockpiles. The concern is not hypothetical. It is urgent. One weapon in the wrong hands could mean catastrophe. While the world debated strikes on Iran, Pakistan was quietly reshaping its arsenal. The fear is not merely the missile. It is what surrounds it – terror cells, sleeper agents and political instability. If these missiles fall into the wrong hands, no country is out of reach. No continent immune. According to global estimates, Pakistan currently has around 170 nuclear warheads. It is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It also has a history of proliferation. That is what makes the new report even more chilling. The ICBM threat from Pakistan is no longer whispers. It is a documented risk. A weapon in the making. America now faces a choice. Ignore and risk a future crisis. Or act. India, meanwhile, continues to say the same thing - Pakistan's nukes are not only a South Asia's problem. It could soon become the world's.
Time of India
6 days ago
- Politics
- Time of India
After treating friend Asim Munir to a sumptuous lunch, Trump now warns Pakistan over missiles that can strike US
Why is the US worried about Pakistan's nuclear missile program? Live Events How close is Pakistan to developing an ICBM? Is China playing its long game to make Pakistan another proxy against the US? Trump's message to Pakistan: Lunch one day, warnings the next What is the broader context behind this move? Has Pakistan signed any nuclear control treaties? A global nuclear realignment may be unfolding FAQs: (You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel In a development that's raising serious concerns in Washington, Pakistan is reportedly working on a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could reach the continental United States, according to a detailed Foreign Affairs report citing US intelligence story has caught international attention, not just because of Pakistan's long-standing nuclear program, but because such a capability would mark a dramatic shift in how the United States sees Islamabad—from a key regional partner to a potential nuclear report states that US intelligence agencies believe Pakistan is not only expanding its nuclear arsenal but is also developing ICBMs with the potential to hit targets across the Atlantic.'If Pakistan acquires an ICBM, Washington will have no choice but to treat the country as a nuclear adversary,' US officials told Foreign Affairs. 'No other country with ICBMs that can target the United States is considered a friend.'While Pakistan continues to insist that its nuclear program is designed solely to deter India, US agencies are not buying that narrative anymore. Instead, they believe Pakistan's missile development may be aimed at deterring US involvement in any future India-Pakistan conflict or a preemptive strike against its exact status of Pakistan's ICBM development is classified, but intelligence officials say the program is gaining momentum, with signs that Islamabad is sourcing critical technology and materials from China—a long-time push for a long-range missile capability reportedly intensified after Operation Sindoor, a covert operation that rattled Pakistan's military establishment, though the report didn't disclose specific details about that present, Pakistan is estimated to possess about 165 nuclear warheads, according to global defense analysts. Most of its current missile systems are medium-range, designed to counter threats from India. But the development of an intercontinental missile would represent a significant strategic is the question now dominating discussions inside US strategic Foreign Affairs report suggests that Beijing's involvement in Pakistan's missile program is deeper than previously thought. Intelligence sources point to covert transfers of missile materials, nuclear assistance, and joint development and Pakistan have long maintained close military ties, often described as 'higher than the Himalayas' by both governments. But this new cooperation—if tied to ICBM development—may signal a strategic shift by China to position Pakistan as a nuclear-armed proxy capable of putting pressure on the US from the West, while China and Russia ramp up pressure from the East and China expanding its own nuclear arsenal and Russia pulling out of arms control treaties, Pakistan's ICBM program could be part of a wider global strategy—one where the US faces nuclear threats on multiple fronts.'If Pakistan joins the club of countries that can strike the US homeland, the strategic landscape will shift significantly—and not in Washington's favor,' one senior US defense official was quoted as saying in the this rising tension follows a private lunch between Donald Trump and Pakistan's Army Chief, General Asim Munir, according to sources familiar with recent events. While the gesture seemed warm at the time, the tone has shifted is now said to be alarmed by the intelligence shared with him and has reportedly warned that the United States will not tolerate any attempt by Pakistan to become a long-range nuclear new revelations come at a time when the global nuclear order is under increasing strain. The report notes that as Russia walks away from arms control agreements and China rapidly expands its nuclear stockpile, the United States now faces a multi-front nuclear challenge—from two great powers and several regional threats, including North Korea, Iran, and now possibly Pakistan.'Mounting nuclear dangers now lurk in every region of vital interest to the United States,' the report nuclear journey began in the early 1970s, shortly after India's first nuclear test in 1974. In response, Islamabad accelerated its own efforts, culminating in six nuclear tests in May 1998, which formally made it the seventh nuclear power in the then, the country has developed a range of nuclear delivery systems, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and tactical nukes designed for use on the Pakistan is not a signatory to either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It has long argued that such agreements would unfairly restrict its sovereign right to maintain national security, especially given its tense relationship with India over policy makes it harder for the international community to enforce transparency or restrictions on Pakistan's nuclear the US navigates an increasingly dangerous global security environment, Pakistan's push for an ICBM adds one more unpredictable element. Beijing's quiet support, Russia's growing defiance, and North Korea's frequent missile tests are already challenging Washington's post-Cold War with Islamabad entering the long-range missile race, the United States faces the possibility of a multi-vector nuclear threat—all happening as traditional arms control treaties is no longer just about India and becoming a part of a larger geopolitical chessboard—one that China might be orchestrating, piece by intelligence reports suggest Pakistan is developing an ICBM capable of reaching the continental Pakistan may soon join the few countries with ICBMs that can directly target the US homeland.
