Latest news with #KRaveendran
Arabian Post
20-07-2025
- Business
- Arabian Post
Wall Street Journal's Ahmedabad Crash Report May Well Be A Plant
By K Raveendran The Wall Street Journal's report on the Ahmedabad Air India crash has triggered a storm of controversy not only for what it suggests but also for what it deliberately avoids. The claim that the crash, which took 260 lives, may have been caused by the senior pilot unintentionally or mistakenly putting the fuel control switch in the cut-off position is presented as a finding from preliminary investigations. Yet the entire report is predicated on anonymous sources, vague phrasing, and an overall speculative tone that raises more questions than it answers. In a case of such magnitude and human tragedy, a claim of this nature carries heavy implications—not least because it seems to absolve the aircraft manufacturer, Boeing, of any blame. And that is precisely where the unease lies. At face value, the report offers no hard evidence, no black box transcript, and no direct statements from investigating authorities to support its most consequential insinuation. It is speculative by admission and selectively sourced, quoting individuals purportedly 'familiar with the probe.' In the world of aviation reporting, particularly in the context of post-crash assessments, this kind of journalistic hedging can often be more strategic than informative. The timing, anonymity, and framing of the article all suggest that it may serve a public relations purpose more than it serves public interest. The possibility that the story is a planted narrative cannot be dismissed lightly, especially given the track record of how Boeing and other aviation corporations have navigated crises in the past. Media placement is a subtle but potent weapon in the realm of crisis management, and Boeing is no stranger to this strategy. Following the two catastrophic crashes involving the 737 MAX aircraft in 2018 and 2019, the company was initially quick to point to pilot training and operational errors. Only under mounting international pressure and meticulous investigative scrutiny did Boeing concede to software flaws and systemic safety issues in the MCAS system, which were ultimately found to be central to the crashes. Given that history, the suggestion that the Ahmedabad crash report may be part of a broader attempt to refocus blame is not a wild conspiracy theory, but a plausible continuation of an established pattern. In this case, the framing of the WSJ article effectively shifts the lens away from mechanical, software, or design faults that could potentially point back to Boeing, and instead plants the seed of human error, specifically that of the pilot. The pilot, of course, is not here to defend himself. Nor are the 259 other lives lost in the tragedy able to provide context or counterpoint. The tactic of blaming pilot error is particularly insidious because it operates on multiple psychological levels. For one, it exploits the public's general lack of technical understanding about aircraft systems. To the layperson, the idea that a pilot 'mistakenly flipped a switch' seems like a tragic but understandable human slip. It plays into a narrative of fallibility and distraction, steering the emotional focus away from mechanical flaws, production shortcuts, or system design oversights. At the same time, it serves the institutional interest of the aircraft manufacturer, which has billions of dollars at stake in current and future contracts, not to mention shareholder confidence. There is a grim irony in how the narrative around pilot error is often deployed. Pilots are among the most highly trained professionals in any field. Their every move is subjected to simulation, testing, review, and regulation. While human error is never out of the question, it is seldom the sole or primary cause of major aviation disasters—especially when it comes to systemic failures or design flaws that lie hidden beneath layers of operational complexity. The attempt to scapegoat a pilot in the immediate aftermath of a crash—before full data from black boxes is made public, before the investigation is complete—should always raise red flags. Moreover, the involvement of a US media outlet, particularly one with the stature of The Wall Street Journal, adds a significant dimension of corporate intrigue. Boeing, as one of America's flagship manufacturing giants, has deep roots not just in commerce but in politics and international diplomacy. It is a major defence contractor and a symbol of American industrial power. That reality brings with it a strong motivation—if not outright pressure—to protect the company's reputation in global markets. Favourable media coverage, carefully curated leaks, and selectively attributed information are all part of the playbook when a company of Boeing's stature is under scrutiny. This is not to argue that media organizations are complicit in misinformation, but it does highlight how strategic narratives can be embedded in seemingly routine reporting. Especially in crisis situations, the distinction between a leak and a plant is often only a matter of motive and timing. For a company under the shadow of past failures, a well-placed article can serve as a preemptive shield, setting the stage for public perception before the official facts are fully established. It is crucial that the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) release their findings in a manner that is not only scientifically robust but also publicly transparent. Leaks through foreign media should not be allowed to shape the early narrative of a tragedy that occurred on Indian soil and involved Indian carriers and passengers. The families of the victims deserve nothing less than an unambiguous and fact-based explanation for what went wrong. (IPA Service)
Arabian Post
13-07-2025
- Politics
- Arabian Post
Election Commission's Constitutional Mandate Is Not All-Pervasive
By K Raveendran The most important takeaway from the Supreme Court's stand on the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Bihar's electoral rolls is a reminder that while the Election Commission of India (ECI) has the constitutional authority to take all necessary steps to ensure free and fair elections, it does not have the license to act with unrestrained discretion. The court's refusal to stay the revision process might appear at first glance to be an endorsement of the Commission's initiative, but the underlying tone and substance of the judgment are anything but a blank cheque. On the contrary, the court has issued what can only be described as a firm warning against arbitrariness, reminding the Commission that constitutional autonomy does not mean constitutional impunity. This development is particularly significant in light of the growing perception that the ECI has, in recent years, veered into territories beyond its constitutional remit. In the Bihar case, the Commission's attempt to link the revision of electoral rolls with questions of citizenship invited the court's sharp rebuke. The bench made it unequivocally clear that the determination of citizenship falls outside the jurisdiction of the ECI. By making this assertion, the court not only placed a legal check on the Bihar exercise but also raised a larger, more pressing question about the creeping overreach of electoral authorities in India's democratic machinery. The decision assumes added significance given the broader political and institutional context in which it has emerged. The Election Commission has been facing mounting scrutiny from multiple quarters—notably from the Opposition—for what is seen as its increasing alignment with the executive's agenda. Central to this criticism is the ongoing controversy surrounding electronic voting machines (EVMs), with senior opposition leader Rahul Gandhi becoming the most persistent voice questioning both their credibility and the Commission's impartiality. His allegations have consistently touched on the larger theme of erosion of trust in democratic institutions, where the ECI occupies a crucial place. By raising these concerns, Gandhi is not merely waging a political campaign but calling attention to a crisis of confidence in one of India's key constitutional bodies. What makes the Bihar episode more than just a state-level controversy is the nature of the power being exercised and questioned. The ECI's power to conduct electoral roll revisions is well-established. However, the issue arises when the basis for such revision seems to originate not from administrative necessity but from opaque criteria or questionable motivations. In Bihar, the SIR process raised eyebrows because of its timing, the manner of implementation, and the demographic implications it was likely to have. The fact that the Commission attempted to conflate electoral roll management with citizenship verification hinted at an intention that extended beyond the scope of its constitutional mandate. That the Supreme Court has had to step in and draw a line illustrates how easily institutional overreach can become normalized if left unchecked. These concerns take on added urgency in the context of the central government's push for the 'One Nation, One Election' proposal, a sweeping reform that seeks to synchronize elections for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies. On the face of it, this idea promises efficiency and cost-effectiveness. However, critics have argued that it threatens to tilt the already delicate balance of power in favour of the central government. The principal mechanism for conducting these elections would, of course, be the ECI. Hence, any doubts about the Commission's neutrality become magnified when seen through the lens of a synchronized electoral calendar. What the former CJI essentially flagged is that the One Nation, One Election model could, under the wrong circumstances, convert the Election Commission into a quasi-sovereign entity with minimal accountability. The Bihar case is therefore not just about one state or one exercise. It is symptomatic of a larger trend—an institutional drift towards over-centralisation, cloaked in the garb of administrative streamlining. It is precisely this trend that the judiciary's intervention seeks to arrest. By making it clear that the ECI must confine itself to its constitutionally defined lane, the Supreme Court is also trying to reset the equilibrium between autonomy and accountability. The Commission may be autonomous, but that does not place it above scrutiny. If anything, its autonomy is meant to insulate it from political interference, not to free it from constitutional discipline. At another level, this judicial moment could also be read as a quiet vote of confidence in India's democratic resilience. Even as political actors clash and institutions are tested, the court's ability to function as a constitutional watchdog remains intact. That said, the very fact that such a warning had to be issued to the ECI suggests that the red lines of institutional propriety are being approached with dangerous regularity. The recurrence of such confrontations between the court and the Commission also hints at a growing lack of trust between various arms of the democratic state. In a democracy as large and diverse as India's, the legitimacy of the electoral process rests not just on technical soundness but on public perception of fairness. If large sections of the electorate begin to suspect that voter lists are being revised selectively, or that machines are being tampered with, or that one institution is acquiring undue control over the electoral calendar, then democracy itself stands weakened. What Rahul Gandhi and others are articulating in their critiques is a sense of that democratic fragility. Their warnings might be politically motivated, but they are not devoid of substance. (IPA Service)
Arabian Post
29-06-2025
- Politics
- Arabian Post
CJI's Weighty Contribution To Constitution Versus Parliament Debate
By K Raveendran When Chief Justice B R Gavai stated the other day that the Constitution is supreme and all arms of governance come under it, it may have seemed like a routine assertion at a felicitation event in his hometown, but in India's current political atmosphere, it was anything but routine. It was a subtle yet firm reminder that in a functioning democracy, the foundational text remains the final arbiter. That such a pronouncement had to be made at all speaks volumes about the ongoing tension between constitutional principles and legislative ambition in the country today. At a time when the government appears to view the Constitution with a degree of suspicion, the increasing frequency of confrontations between legislative actions and constitutional boundaries has elevated these tensions into a full-blown national concern. This assertion by the Chief Justice does not arise in a vacuum. It comes in the wake of an unmistakable pattern where the legislature seems to test the elasticity of the Constitution, pushing to see how far the law can be bent or bypassed in the name of political expediency, majoritarian impulses, or administrative convenience. Judicial review, once regarded as a healthy institutional checkpoint, is increasingly seen by some political actors as an unwelcome hurdle. The executive's overt irritation with judicial scrutiny, especially in matters like electoral bonds, appointments, civil liberties, and legislative processes, makes Justice Gavai's message more timely than ever. His reassertion of the Constitution's supremacy reminds the country—and its lawmakers—that power, no matter how democratically conferred, is still subject to constitutional restraint. That the Chief Justice also invoked the doctrine of the basic structure of the Constitution—established by the landmark Keshavananda Bharati judgment—is particularly telling. This doctrine has been the single greatest check on untrammelled parliamentary power since it was articulated in 1973. It says, quite simply, that while Parliament may amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its basic structure. This includes principles like the separation of powers, the rule of law, judicial independence, federalism, and secularism. In recent times, this principle has come under increasing strain as amendments and legislative changes raise questions about whether the government is acting within its limits or seeking to undermine these foundational tenets. The Keshavananda Bharati judgment itself was born in an era not entirely dissimilar to today's: a period marked by growing centralisation of power and executive assertion. Then too, the judiciary had to assert its authority and underline that constitutional supremacy cannot be ceded to electoral majorities, however large. Today's context mirrors that history with unsettling clarity. Whether it is the dilution of Article 370, the passage of laws without adequate parliamentary debate, or attempts to control or influence independent institutions, the sense is growing that the legislative arm is not merely functioning within the Constitution but trying to bend it to its will. In this environment, the judiciary's role as the guardian of the Constitution becomes both more critical and more perilous. That danger is compounded by the way in which judicial pronouncements themselves are increasingly politicised. Rulings are no longer just legal interpretations; they are treated as ideological statements, drawing praise or censure depending on who perceives themselves to be advantaged or threatened by the outcome. This adds further pressure on the judiciary to walk a narrow line—delivering justice, maintaining institutional independence, and yet somehow surviving in a politically charged arena. Chief Justice Gavai's remarks are thus not only a reminder to the legislature but a quiet reassurance to the judiciary itself, a reaffirmation of its constitutional mandate in the face of unrelenting scrutiny and political targeting. More broadly, the tension between legislature and Constitution is a symptom of a deeper issue: the shrinking space for constitutional morality in political discourse. Laws are passed not because they reflect constitutional ideals but because they serve short-term political goals. The Constitution is often reduced to a procedural tool—something to be followed only in form, not in spirit. Institutions are reshaped, rules are tweaked, and legal language is weaponised not to protect citizens but to control them. This erosion of constitutional fidelity is not a legal problem alone—it is a democratic crisis. In such times, it is not only judges and lawyers who must defend the Constitution, but the citizenry itself. The challenge is compounded by the fact that the Constitution, for all its majesty, cannot enforce itself. It relies on the integrity of those in office, the strength of institutions, and the vigilance of the people. When a government begins to view the Constitution as a set of negotiable guidelines rather than binding principles, every institutional safeguard becomes essential. That is why the CJI's emphasis on the basic structure doctrine is so crucial: it is one of the few judicial tools that has historically withstood executive overreach. It is not a political doctrine—it is a democratic one, rooted in the idea that certain principles cannot be altered even by overwhelming majorities. In an age where popular mandates are used to justify sweeping changes, the basic structure doctrine insists that some things must remain untouched, no matter how persuasive the majority. This is the essence of constitutionalism: the idea that a democracy is not merely the rule of the majority, but the rule of law. It is a system where rights exist even when they are inconvenient to those in power, and where institutions are meant to withstand the whims of temporary governments. That is why the legislature's ambitions must always be tethered to constitutional limits. All governments are temporary; Constitution is permanent. To be clear, this does not imply that Parliament has no authority or that judicial review should obstruct governance. But in any democratic setup, there is a balance to be maintained. The legislature must legislate, the executive must implement, and the judiciary must interpret. When one branch begins to assume supremacy, the balance breaks down. The Constitution was designed precisely to prevent such a breakdown. That is why the Indian judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, has historically played an activist role—not out of hubris, but out of necessity. Whether it was striking down the emergency-era amendments or upholding individual freedoms against state excess, the Court has repeatedly acted as the final line of defence. This line is now being tested again. The increasing pressure on institutions, the blurring of lines between party and government, and the aggressive majoritarianism of contemporary politics have all combined to make the judiciary's task harder. It is no longer just about interpreting the law; it is about preserving the democratic ethos of the Constitution itself. CJI Gavai's statement, therefore, should not be seen as mere legalism. It is a signal—a quiet but firm assertion that even in these fraught times, the Constitution endures, and so does the duty to uphold it. (IPA Service)
Arabian Post
19-06-2025
- Business
- Arabian Post
Economic Fallout Of Israel-Iran Conflict Could Extend Way Beyond Region
By K Raveendran With the likelihood of a diplomatic solution appearing increasingly distant, West Asia is now clearly veering toward a longer and more intense confrontation, one that may significantly reshape economic, geopolitical, and energy dynamics not only in the Middle East but globally. What was initially perceived as a retaliatory exchange following months of simmering tensions and occasional flare-ups has morphed into something far more strategic and entrenched. The operational tempo, the choice of targets, and the statements emanating from both capitals suggest that the two sides are not simply signalling strength, but engaging in sustained military campaigns with long-term goals. Israel's stated aim of destroying Iran's nuclear capability is no longer being couched in terms of surgical strikes or symbolic action. Officials have openly indicated that such an operation could span at least two weeks, possibly longer, which already places it well beyond the scale of previous escalations, including the direct exchanges in April and October of 2024. The implication is that Israel has committed itself to a campaign with significant military depth—one that targets infrastructure critical to Iran's nuclear ambitions but also disrupts its broader strategic and economic posture. The scope of Israel's recent operations makes this point explicit. The strikes have not been confined to nuclear facilities or military installations, but have also encompassed a broader swath of targets, including missile storage depots, airports, air defence systems, gas fields, and even regime-linked individuals. This reflects an evolving doctrine—one that seeks to degrade Iran's retaliatory capacity, political command structure, and economic backbone simultaneously. Of particular note are the attacks on Iran's energy sector, including a refinery in Abadan and facilities at the South Pars gas field—the world's largest. These moves mark a clear shift from traditional containment strategies toward an approach that aims to kneecap Iran's economic and technological lifelines in the medium term. The targeting of the energy sector introduces a potent economic dimension to the conflict. Iran currently contributes around 3 percent of global oil production and approximately 7 percent of global gas output. While these figures might seem marginal at first glance, they are anything but negligible in an already tight global energy market. Any prolonged disruption of Iranian oil and gas flows—especially from critical nodes like South Pars—would likely inject new volatility into global energy prices. The geopolitical risk premium on oil has already edged upwards since the early stages of the conflict, and with each additional strike on infrastructure, traders and policymakers are recalibrating their forecasts. More worrying still is the risk of cascading impacts: tanker rerouting, shipping insurance hikes, and logistical bottlenecks could all conspire to push prices higher, not just in oil but in related commodities and manufacturing inputs. The most immediate victims of this unfolding crisis are, unsurprisingly, the economies in the region. Tourism has already declined precipitously in countries like Jordan and Lebanon, and even Gulf states, which had enjoyed a post-COVID resurgence in travel and entertainment, are starting to see the signs of consumer hesitation. Major airlines are reconsidering routes, and insurance rates for regional air travel and maritime shipping have surged. Investors, both foreign and domestic, are pulling capital from Middle Eastern equity markets in favour of safer havens, leading to sell-offs in sectors ranging from real estate to technology. The psychological impact of a prolonged conflict, specially one involving missile exchanges and potential attacks on critical infrastructure, hard to quantify but undeniably corrosive. Consumer confidence has taken a hit, and businesses are postponing or scrapping investment plans across multiple sectors. Israel, despite its sophisticated Iron Dome and layered defence architecture, is not immune to these pressures. Iran's response has been far more expansive and effective than its strikes in October 2024. It has managed to hit sensitive targets within Israel, reportedly overwhelming some defence systems through sheer volume and timing coordination. This level of effectiveness complicates Israel's security calculus and introduces new variables into its decision-making. The domestic impact is already visible: air raid sirens, disruptions to schools and workplaces, and heightened public anxiety. In the longer term, the economic consequences could be significant, especially if investor sentiment sours and foreign tech companies, a backbone of Israel's export economy, begin to reassess their risk exposure. Yet what is perhaps most striking about this conflict so far is the calibrated restraint shown by third countries. Both sides have so far kept their military actions bilateral—pointed but not yet spiralling into a regional conflagration. The United States, though vocally supportive of Israel and deeply suspicious of Iran, has thus far avoided direct military engagement. Gulf nations, many of whom harbour strategic anxieties about both Israeli expansionism and Iranian destabilization, have been walking a diplomatic tightrope—issuing statements of concern, boosting local security readiness, but stopping short of involvement. This containment, however, is precarious. Should Iran escalate further and target American assets in the region or oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, a much broader conflict becomes likely. U.S. retaliation would almost certainly follow, and with that, the spectre of a major Middle East war with implications far beyond the region. Indeed, the interconnected nature of global trade and finance means the economic fallout from such a widening would be swift and far-reaching. Oil prices, already volatile, could soar well past $100 per barrel, reigniting inflation concerns in Europe and North America and undermining efforts by central banks to stabilize post-pandemic recoveries. Emerging markets, particularly those dependent on energy imports, would face sharp balance-of-payments challenges. Even the global shipping industry could be disrupted if the Strait of Hormuz—through which nearly a third of the world's seaborne oil passes—becomes contested or risky. That alone would prompt emergency responses from global powers, whether through naval deployments or strategic reserve releases, but these would do little to allay market fears in the short term. The risk to global supply chains extends beyond energy. With the Red Sea already having witnessed Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in recent months, a broader Israeli-Iranian war could embolden proxy groups across the region—from Yemen to Iraq to Lebanon. Any attacks on ports, pipelines, or fibre optic cables could have knock-on effects on data flows and container shipping, both critical to global commerce. The psychological impact on global markets would likely be profound, with equity markets dipping on fears of sustained conflict, while gold and other safe-haven assets spike in value. Domestically, Iran faces a complex balancing act. While hardliners may be emboldened by a sense of national victimhood and the perceived righteousness of retaliatory strikes, the economic cost of continued conflict is considerable. The country is still grappling with the effects of years of sanctions, high inflation, and a restive population increasingly disillusioned with the regime's priorities. A prolonged war, particularly one that inflicts damage on civilian infrastructure and energy exports, could deepen domestic discontent and amplify internal dissent. This in turn may make the regime more aggressive internationally as a way to consolidate control at home—a dangerous feedback loop that reduces the likelihood of de-escalation. (IPA Service)
Arabian Post
15-06-2025
- Business
- Arabian Post
All Eyes On What Iran Does To Oil Traffic Through Strait Of Hormuz
By K Raveendran Israel's strike against Iran has reignited a familiar tension in global energy markets, sending oil prices climbing into the mid-$70 per barrel range. The impact is not just visible in the numbers, but in the broader nervousness sweeping across energy trading floors and geopolitical circles alike. At the heart of this movement lies the so-called 'geopolitical risk premium'—the extra cost per barrel that markets price in when a key oil-producing region teeters on the brink of conflict. That premium has now risen to about $8 a barrel, a level surpassing even the acute flashpoints of April and October 2024, when Israel and Iran directly exchanged strikes for the first time in decades. This escalation has naturally drawn intense scrutiny, not only for the possibility of a broader military conflict but also for its potential to derail the delicate logistics of global oil supply. Among the many scenarios being modelled by analysts and strategists, one stands out as the most consequential: whether Iran will target the Strait of Hormuz. This narrow waterway, separating the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman, has long been considered the most critical chokepoint in the global oil trade. Some 12 million barrels of crude pass through it daily—more than 20 percent of global consumption—with refined products pushing that number closer to 20 million barrels per day. Over 80 percent of this volume is Asia-bound, underscoring the strait's indispensable role in maintaining the energy lifelines of the region's largest economies, from India and China to Japan and South Korea. As of now, market sentiment appears to be in a state of watchful hesitation. The price jump has been meaningful but not chaotic, largely because Iran's response remains undefined. If history is any guide, Iran may opt for a calibrated retaliation targeting Israeli military sites or regional proxies, thereby avoiding a broader confrontation. Such moves, while headline-grabbing, typically result in only short-lived spikes in oil prices. The key here is the market's growing familiarity with these kinds of actions—they generate noise and some volatility, but unless they escalate further or disrupt infrastructure, their economic impact tends to be fleeting. But this time, the calculus feels different. The rhetoric on both sides has been sharper, and the regional alignments more complex. Should Iran choose to escalate further—by, for instance, targeting oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, harassing tankers, or more provocatively, attempting to close or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz—then oil prices could enter a much more volatile phase. These are not theoretical risks. Iran has a long record of threatening to shut the Strait, and although it has never fully succeeded, its past actions—from missile launches to the seizure of oil tankers—have proven that it has the capacity to cause significant disruption and uncertainty. What makes the current scenario more precarious is that the available alternatives to the Strait are limited and insufficient for maintaining full flow continuity. Saudi Arabia operates the East-West pipeline, which moves oil from the Eastern Province to the Red Sea, bypassing the Strait altogether. The UAE, similarly, utilizes the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, allowing some oil to reach global markets without passing through Hormuz. However, these routes together only handle around 6 million barrels per day—barely half of the volume typically moving through the strait. Any prolonged disruption would thus create a substantial bottleneck, forcing refiners, traders, and governments to draw down on strategic reserves or scramble for alternative sources, both of which would drive prices sharply higher. Moreover, the strategic geography of the Strait of Hormuz compounds the challenge. The narrowest point of the strait is only 21 miles wide, with shipping lanes just two miles wide in either direction. It is shared with Oman, but Iran's proximity and control over its northern shores allow it to exert considerable influence over the waters. Iran has previously used tactics like jamming GPS signals to misdirect tankers into its waters, as well as deploying fast boats to harass or seize vessels—moves that don't necessarily stop the flow of oil but make the journey riskier and more expensive. Insurance premiums on shipments rise, and so do charter rates and freight costs, all of which contribute to a rising cost base for global oil. Adding another layer of complexity is the presence of US naval forces in the region, tasked with securing free passage through the Strait. If Iran targets US military assets—either in the Persian Gulf or at bases across the Middle East—the conflict risks broadening dramatically. Such a scenario would likely see not just a spike but a sustained surge in oil prices, possibly well beyond the $100 mark, as the market prices in a protracted disruption rather than a one-off skirmish. In this sense, Iran's next move is not just a matter of military strategy—it's an economic pivot point. A restrained response could cap oil prices in the $75–$80 range, assuming no further escalation and a swift return to status quo. But any move to unsettle the energy infrastructure or shipping lanes in and around the Strait of Hormuz could catapult oil into the $90s or beyond, with reverberations across inflation, interest rates, and global growth. It's also important to consider the broader strategic environment in which this is unfolding. The global oil market has been gradually recovering from the shocks of the COVID era, with supply-demand balances tightening but still fragile. OPEC+ has been cautious with its output strategy, attempting to maintain price stability while managing spare capacity. Any geopolitical jolt that tightens supplies further could disrupt this balance, especially if it coincides with seasonal demand upticks in the northern hemisphere. China and India, the two largest consumers of Middle Eastern oil, are also watching the situation with growing unease. Both have been diversifying their oil imports and building up strategic reserves, but neither can easily replace the volumes that flow through Hormuz. The threat of prolonged disruption may prompt them to engage diplomatically behind the scenes, possibly leaning on Gulf allies or utilizing leverage with Tehran to de-escalate tensions. Meanwhile, the United States, although less dependent on Middle Eastern oil than in previous decades, remains a key player due to its security commitments and broader geopolitical interests in the region. (IPA Service)
