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IOL News
21-07-2025
- Business
- IOL News
BRICS+ Series: Vietnam Joins BRICS
Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh (L) signs on a box of Navico (also known as Nam Viet Corporation, a major Vietnamese seafood producer and exporter) next to Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva as they celebrate the completion of the first export of Brazilian beef to Vietnam and the first export of Vietnamese tilapia to Brazil after a bilateral meeting ahead of the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 5, 2025. BRICS leaders meeting in Rio de Janeiro from Sunday are expected to decry Donald Trump's hardline trade policies, but are struggling to bridge divides over crises roiling the Middle East. Image: AFP Vietnam was officially recognised as a partner country of BRICS in June 2025, joining the ranks of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. This development highlights Hanoi's ongoing effort to strengthen its global integration strategy by pursuing a broader range of diplomatic and economic alliances. It also underscores the country's commitment to multilateralism. As Vietnam strengthens ties with emerging economies worldwide, its association with BRICS reflects its multilateral priorities and growing international presence. For international investors and businesses, this moment marks a critical phase in Vietnam's deepening global engagement and rising role in South-South cooperation. Why Vietnam's Partnership Matters There are nine official partner nations: Vietnam, Belarus, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Vietnam's inclusion as a BRICS partner aligns with its aim to elevate its standing in international platforms and enhance cooperation with the Global South. With a population nearing 100 million and a robust export-led economy, Vietnam provides BRICS with a dependable Southeast Asian ally well integrated into global production networks. The partnership supports shared goals such as inclusive growth, sustainable development, and diversified cooperation. Brazil, currently chairing BRICS, has recognised Vietnam's valuable contribution to South-South collaboration and its strategic importance in Asia. Crucially, Vietnam's ties with BRICS do not come at the expense of existing partnerships. As Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh reaffirmed at the Kazan Summit, Vietnam remains committed to its independent, multilateral, and constructive foreign policy, maintaining strong links with the US, EU, and ASEAN. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Vietnam's Economic Value to BRICS and Beyond Vietnam is a compelling prospect for both BRICS members and global investors, offering consistent economic growth, supportive investment policies, and integration into global trade systems. Over the last ten years, the nation has demonstrated economic resilience, with steady GDP growth, low inflation, and sound fiscal discipline, boosting investor confidence. As a key manufacturing hub, Vietnam serves a wide range of sectors including electronics, textiles, renewable energy, and semiconductors. It has become an attractive option for firms seeking more resilient supply chains and efficient regional production. Infrastructure upgrades and trade agreement participation further strengthen its competitive edge. The government continues to foster diverse partnerships while advancing governance reforms, enhancing transparency, and accelerating digital transformation. These priorities resonate with BRICS's long-term development agenda and appeal to investors looking for sustainable returns. Vietnam represents a dynamic model of development through strategic diplomacy and market-led policies. Participation in BRICS also opens access to multilateral funding sources, such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which could support critical infrastructure, energy, and digital transformation projects. There are also substantial opportunities for cross-border private ventures in sectors like advanced manufacturing, agri-tech, digital services, and logistics. BRICS member states offer complementary strengths, including industrial know-how, access to natural resources, and expanded markets that match Vietnam's economic objectives. On the policy front, Vietnam's involvement allows it to influence investment norms that favour transparency, sustainability, and shared prosperity—positioning itself as both a recipient and a contributor to future cooperation models. A Balanced Approach to Global Diplomacy Vietnam's engagement with BRICS is part of its wider foreign policy approach, which emphasises diversification, non-alignment, and constructive multilateralism. Rather than aligning too closely with any one bloc, Hanoi adopts a flexible and adaptive strategy—often dubbed 'bamboo diplomacy'—that safeguards national interests while advancing economic goals. This partnership enhances, rather than undermines, Vietnam's ties with Western partners. The country remains actively involved in several international agreements, including the CPTPP, RCEP, and the IPEF, signalling its desire to help shape a fairer, multipolar global order that reflects the priorities of developing nations. At the same time, Vietnam navigates a complex regional landscape with a commitment to stability and pragmatic engagement. Its BRICS involvement is a forward-looking step aimed at diversifying its alliances and increasing resilience in a fast-changing international environment. Written by: Dr Iqbal Survé Past chairman of the BRICS Business Council and co-chairman of the BRICS Media Forum and the BRNN *Cole Jackson Lead Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group Chinese & South American Specialist ** MORE ARTICLES ON OUR WEBSITE ** Follow @brics_daily on X/Twitter & @brics_daily on Instagram for daily BRICS+ updates
Express Tribune
15-07-2025
- Business
- Express Tribune
BRICS 2025 and the Indian dilemma
The writer is a PhD scholar of Semiotics and Philosophy of Communication at Charles University Prague. She can be reached at shaziaanwer@ Listen to article The 2025 BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro concluded without the presence of the presidents of China, Russia and Iran. Russia and Iran were represented by their foreign ministers, and China by their premier. The theme of this year's summit emphasised multilateralism and the upholding of international law, based on the Purposes and Principles enshrined in the UN Charter. It reaffirmed the central role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and encouraging cooperation grounded in solidarity, mutual respect, justice and equality. BRICS is increasingly positioning itself as an alliance of the historically oppressed. The list of members and partners continues to expand each year. In 2025, Colombia and Bolivia expressed interest in joining. Colombia pivoting away from longstanding American influence toward a more sovereign foreign policy in the past three years is particularly noteworthy. Current full members include Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran. Partner countries include Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan. Over 30 countries expressed interest in joining BRICS in 2024, either as full members or partners. A relatively low-profile summit was expected this year, especially when compared with the 2024 Kazan Summit, partly because Brazil is also hosting COP30 and its attention appears divided. Nevertheless, BRICS 2025 generated more media attention than expected. Notably, US President Donald Trump has become increasingly vocal, recently threatening a 10% tariff on any country that joins BRICS or attempts to bypass the US dollar. Bilateral trade in sovereign currencies, along with growing mistrust of US economic policies, especially Trump's proposed 100% tariffs, have already begun shaking global markets. According to the US Dollar Index, the dollar fell approximately 8.8% from June 2024. In 2023, several UN investment banks raised concerns that the dollar could be dethroned as the world's primary reserve currency, citing possible replacements such as the Chinese yuan, Japanese yen or a potential BRICS-issued shared currency. The summit also addressed major geopolitical flashpoints. It strongly condemned US and Israeli bombardments on Iran in June and reaffirmed commitment to the two-state solution in Palestine. India's participation in endorsing such resolutions highlights a strategic tightrope: while aligning with BRICS' broader anti-imperialist stance, India's longstanding ties with Israel and its own illegal occupation of Kashmir may draw future scrutiny within BRICS circles if consistency in international law is demanded. The 2024 Kazan Summit had set a high benchmark, marked by Russia's comprehensive efforts to institutionalise BRICS mechanisms. Initiatives included the BRICS Finance Track and Central Bank Working Group, Payments Cooperation Council, BRICS Rapid Information Security Channel, Anti-Corruption Working Group and the BRICS Space Council. Additionally, a BRICS Healthcare and Nuclear Medicine Working Group was launched. Brazil followed suit this year by initiating five new working groups on employment, SMEs, counterterrorism, disaster management and anti-monopoly/competition policy. In this light, BRICS 2025 can be viewed as a step toward deeper cooperation among the Global South, aimed at inclusive and sustainable global governance. While the 2024 Kazan Summit was more focused on reinforcing multilateralism for equitable global development and security, the Rio Summit leaned more towards amplifying the Global South's voice in the evolving world order. Looking ahead to the 2026 BRICS Summit, which India will host, questions loom large. As a swing state straddling the Global North and South, India faces growing skepticism from within the alliance. Experts remain uncertain about India's long-term commitment to BRICS' transformative agenda. The 2026 summit will thus serve as a test case — whether India is genuinely aligned with BRICS' vision of multilateralism, inclusive governance and South-South cooperation, or it prefers to maintain strategic ambiguity.
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First Post
08-07-2025
- Business
- First Post
Brics Rio summit: A double espresso shot for big effort ahead
Brazil, as the current chair, and India, as the next chair of Brics, should collaborate to devise a way to bring the US and European Union closer to the Rio formulations read more The 17th summit of Brics was held in Rio de Janeiro from 6 to 7 July under trying circumstances, with Israeli and US military strikes against Iran—a new Brics member—dominating the immediate backdrop. Furthermore, the failure of the Brics foreign ministers to produce a joint statement at their April meeting had raised doubts about whether Rio would succeed in crafting a joint declaration at all. In this light, Brazil, as the chair and host, scored a notable success, delivering an impressive summit. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, therefore, commended President Lula for the summit's excellent organisation, which gave Brics cooperation 'fresh momentum and vitality.' Modi added, 'And let me say—the energy we have received isn't just an espresso; it is a double espresso shot.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Besides the Rio Declaration, the summit produced three other important documents: on climate finance, the global governance of artificial intelligence, and the partnership for the elimination of socially determined diseases. To appreciate the value and importance of what was achieved at Rio, it is necessary to analyse the summit declaration and then assess the potential for its implementation in the future. Declaration – Key Elements With its 126 paragraphs, the Rio Declaration is longer than the declaration of the Johannesburg Summit (2023) but shorter than the declaration of the Kazan Summit (2024), which had 134 paragraphs. Right at the outset, the latest declaration reiterates the commitment to 'the Brics spirit', encompassing 'mutual respect and understanding, sovereign equality, solidarity, democracy, openness, inclusiveness, collaboration, and consensus.' It refers to the grouping's three pillars of cooperation: political and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people connect. Brics aims to enhance strategic partnership through the promotion of peace, a fairer international order, a reinvigorated and reformed multilateral system, and sustainable development. The declaration is divided into five sections. The first section on strengthening multilateralism and reforming global governance highlights the need for comprehensive reform of global governance institutions, particularly the UN, the World Bank, the WTO, and the WHO. Para 6 deals with the reform of the UN Security Council. It represents some improvement from India's perspective. Deviating from the Kazan Declaration, it stresses the support of China and Russia as permanent members of the Security Council for 'the aspiration of Brazil and India to play a greater role in the United Nations, including its Security Council'. In contrast, the Kazan formulation referred to 'Brics countries', not Brazil and India specifically, in this context. The underlying spirit of the Rio Summit was to strengthen cooperation among the Global South countries. Para 8 emphasised the importance of the Global South 'as a driver for positive change', especially in light of geopolitical tensions, rapid economic downturns, and technological changes. The summit participants were fully cognisant of the need for a 'collective global effort' to establish suitable AI governance. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In the second section on promoting peace, security, and international stability, the grouping articulated its consensus view on several global and regional issues, including the conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia. It condemned the military strikes against Iran, without naming the authors. Para 34 contains a 'strong condemnation of any act of terrorism'. Bearing India's imprint, the Rio Declaration condemned 'in the strongest terms the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir.' It renewed the call for the finalisation and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which remains elusive. The third section relating to deepening international economic trade and financial cooperation welcomed the results of the 'Strategy for Brics Economic Policy 2025'. It encouraged the ongoing expansion of the New Development Bank's (NDB) membership and the strengthening of its governance framework. Para 50 makes it clear that the work on the 'Brics Cross-Border Payments Initiatives' will continue. The plan is to realise the potential for 'greater interoperability of Brics payment systems'. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The last two sections, which pertain to combating climate change and promoting sustainable, fair, and inclusive development, as well as partnership for the promotion of human, social, and cultural development, contain a wealth of ideas for ongoing and new projects based on cooperation within the expanded Brics family and beyond. Focus on the Founders The thoughts of the Bricsleadership were also reflected in the statements of their key leaders. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's opening remarks at the first session, devoted to peace, security, and reform of global governance, drew international attention. He called Brics 'an heir of the Non-Aligned Movement'. Pointing out that in 2025 Brazil hosted the fourth Brics summit, he added, 'Of all of them, this one is taking place amid the most adverse scenario,' marked by 'an unprecedented collapse of multilateralism.' He made a strong plea for investment in reform and peace. Regretting that it was always easier to invest in war than in peace, he noted, 'It is easier to designate 5 per cent of the GDP to military spending than to allocate the 0.7 per cent that has been provided for Official Development Assistance.' He believed that the world still has the opportunity to lay the groundwork for 'a reinvigorated governance model'. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Remarks at the same session by Prime Minister Narendra Modi were brief but crisp. From West Asia to Europe, he said, the world is surrounded by disputes and tensions. 'The path to peace is the only option for the good of humanity,' he stated. On reform, he said that global institutions without adequate representation for the Global South are 'like a mobile phone with a SIM card but no network'. He devoted utmost attention to the scourge of international terrorism, asserting, 'Condemning terrorism must be a matter of principle and not just of convenience.' The media made an unnecessary play of the absence of President Xi Jinping. Premier Li Qiang represented China well. He expressed his nation's readiness to work with fellow Brics members to make global governance 'more just, equitable, efficient, and well-ordered'. Delivering an online address, President Vladimir Putin argued that it was important for Brics to continue expanding the use of national currencies in mutual payments as well as to create 'an independent payment and monetary system within Brics'. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Critical Assessment Evaluation of the summit needs to address several facets of the present and future of Brics. First, the expanded grouping (with 11 members, 10 partners, and other attendees) has indeed become more influential than before. It reflects the collegiate leadership of the Global South, although not all nations may accept China and Russia as integral parts of the Global South. Second, while the Brics does have a wise agenda, backed by considerable unity, it is not in a strong position to garner the world's support for it. The fissures within the G7, the tensions between the US and Europe, and the unilateralism of Washington combine to leave little room for Brics to develop an international consensus on the issues agreed at Rio. Finally, even if a reasonable consensus were to emerge on the issues of peace and security, reform of global institutions, economic cooperation, and climate change, the real challenge would be to mobilize the political will of the G7 economies and others to translate their commitments into action. That is a tall order! STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Therefore, it is suggested that Brazil, as the current chair, and India, as the next chair of Brics, should collaborate to devise a way to bring the US and EU closer to the Rio formulations. Should there be some success in this endeavour, these two nations could then work together with South Africa, the current president of the G20. The Rio Declaration has emphasised the G20's key role as the premier global forum for international economic cooperation. This larger forum has the best chance of devising a consensus on the vital issues of our time. However, first, there is the daunting challenge of persuading the US President and his advisers, who continue to view Brics in rather negative terms. Clearly, more coffee and hard work may be required. Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House, a former Indian Ambassador with extensive diplomatic experience in regional and global groupings, and the author of three books on Indian foreign expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
The Diplomat
02-07-2025
- Business
- The Diplomat
Decoding ASEAN's Measured Engagement with BRICS
Following Thailand and Malaysia, Vietnam last month became the third Southeast Asian 'partner country' of BRICS. BRICS partnership, an extended cooperation mechanism established at the grouping's Kazan Summit in October 2024, allows countries to engage with the grouping in a flexible manner. In addition to these three nations, Indonesia in January became the first nation in Southeast Asia to attain full membership in BRICS. Why did Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi only join BRICS as 'partner countries' while Indonesia was determined to seek full BRICS membership? By pursuing partner status, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam are walking a fine line between BRICS and the West, which remain at odds on many important issues. With 10 full members and 10 partner countries across three continents, BRICS now accounts for 40 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), positioning it as a powerful platform for countries seeking to reduce their dependence on the West. Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam –all of which pursue foreign policies aimed at strategic balance – fit this profile. Thailand pursues 'proactive diplomacy,' opening to collaboration with 'all sides.' Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra recently underlined the importance of engaging with global economic institutions, including BRICS, to boost the country's economy. Malaysia considers its economy as 'highly open' and maintains a 'neutral' foreign policy. Hence, joining BRICS is a vital step towards diversifying the country's economic relations. Meanwhile, Vietnam remains committed to 'bamboo diplomacy' – an overarching foreign policy strategy rooted in multi-alignment, multilateralism, and strategic autonomy. Hanoi's partnership with BRICS allows it to lay low geopolitically while enhancing its ability to 'influence international affairs' through the bloc, via 'forums and meetings that facilitate dialogue, cultural exchange, and cooperation' in security and economic matters. However, BRICS partnership is not a risk-free endeavor. Heavily influenced by Russia and China, the bloc is advancing a de-dollarization agenda aimed at challenging U.S. financial dominance. In the wake of the Ukraine war and Russia's SWIFT exclusion in 2022, Moscow has pushed BRICS members to advance this agenda by building an alternative international payments platform, thereby strengthening BRICS' role in the global financial and monetary system. In 2024, Russia announced a series of initiatives – including the BRICS Pay e-payment system, the BRICS Bridge cross-border payment platform, and the BRICS Grain Exchange – as part of its broader efforts to establish an independent economic and financial framework relatively immune from Western influence. But a vision of a single BRICS currency and the bloc's efforts to reduce Western dominance are stoking anger in Washington, with President Donald Trump threatening to impose a 150 percent tariff on products from BRICS nations should they continue attempting to undermine the U.S. dollar. Trump's warning makes full BRICS membership a highly precarious choice for the three developing countries. An economic alignment with BRICS through full membership could put Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam's efforts to deepen economic ties with the U.S. and other Western partners at risk. The stakes are even higher as all three countries are still negotiating with the Trump administration to reduce the 'reciprocal' tariffs in early April. During Trump's 'liberation day' tariff announcement, Thailand was hit with a 36 percent tariff, Malaysia 24 percent, and Vietnam 46 percent, and all three nations are under pressure to reach agreements before the new tariff rates take effect on July 8. In this context, pursuing full BRICS membership could derail their ongoing negotiations with Washington. Partner status, which entails limited voting and decision-making power within BRICS, may offer a lower-risk alternative for these countries. Moreover, full BRICS membership is unlikely to offer substantial additional economic benefits for the three countries, which already have or are negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with most major BRICS economies: with China through the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with India through the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Thailand and UAE are on the fourth round of negotiation for a bilateral FTA ), and Indonesia through the ASEAN Free Trade Area. All of this raises the question of why Indonesia decided to seek full BRICS membership, a step that former President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo was hesitant to take . At the BRICS Summit in 2023, Widodo received an invitation from BRICS leaders for Indonesia to join the bloc as a full member, but he declined the invitation. First, Indonesia has explicitly communicated its ambition to expand its influence beyond ASEAN by engaging with larger multilateral mechanisms. As Southeast Asia's leader in key geoeconomic indicators, including GDP, population, and land area, Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian member of the G-20. Since 2024, the country has also set its sights on becoming the first Southeast Asian nation to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, aiming to achieve membership within the next two or three years. Thus, it is not surprising that BRICS has been on Jakarta's radar. Indonesia's 'bebas-aktif' (free and active) foreign policy provides a strong foundation for deepening its engagement with multilateral organizations in both the Global North and South. Second, Indonesia's decision to join BRICS also reflects clear economic reasoning. Membership in BRICS serves as a stepping stone for Jakarta's efforts toward membership of the New Development Bank (NDB), the bloc's strategic lending vehicle. As the Indonesian government is seeking funding for its stalled capital relocation project, access to NDB's infrastructure loans could provide the country with much-needed fiscal relief. Moreover, BRICS membership enhances Indonesia's economic alignments with Global South states, particularly those in the Middle East – a region of growing strategic interest for President Prabowo Subianto's administration. Following Jakarta's official accession to BRICS in January, Prabowo conducted a week-long visit to the Middle East in April, securing a $10 billion investment commitment from the UAE for Indonesia's newly established sovereign wealth fund, Danantara, and establishing a strategic partnership with Egypt. In addition, despite Western sanctions on Iran, Jakarta has maintained robust trade ties with Tehran and has signed a preferential trade agreement that includes a provision for barter-style payments. At last year's BRICS Summit in Kazan, Malaysia's Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli discussed the potential for deeper ASEAN–BRICS cooperation, noting that Malaysia – as chairman of ASEAN in 2025 – saw 'tremendous synergies between ASEAN and BRICS.' This message echoes the broader strategic ambitions of ASEAN countries in strengthening their engagements with the bloc and suggests that, when engaging with external actors, ASEAN member states – regardless of their individual political and economic status – do not act in isolation, but instead seek input and coordination with their regional counterparts. Nonetheless, the four ASEAN countries must engage with BRICS in a pragmatic and cautious manner, because there is no such thing as a free lunch. While BRICS membership and partnership presents a range of strategic opportunities, it also entails costs and could 'bring pitfalls in the short term, if not carefully managed.' These countries now face heightened vulnerability amid escalating strife between BRICS and Western powers to shape the global order and global economic governance. To maintain their non-aligned stances, Jakarta, Hanoi, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur must remain cautious of political coercion, economic overdependence, and the risk of being drawn into a BRICS-or-West rivalry. The good news, however, is that the U.S and other Western countries have thus far refrained from opposing these ASEAN states' deepening engagement with BRICS, suggesting a degree of strategic tolerance. Moving forward, what matters most is how these four countries calibrate their level of participation in BRICS initiatives to make the most of the group's economic clout while carefully avoiding being perceived as taking sides.
