Latest news with #Lashkar-e-Toiba
Hans India
3 days ago
- Hans India
11/7 acquittal: HC slams prosecution's failure to establish type of bombs used to hit Mumbai trains
Mumbai: The prosecution failed to even establish the type of bombs used in the crime, the Bombay High Court said on Monday castigating the shoddy probe that resulted in the acquittal of 12 accused in the 2006 Mumbai train blasts. "The prosecution has utterly failed to establish the offence beyond the reasonable doubt against the accused on each count, it is unsafe to reach the satisfaction that the Appellants/Accused have committed the offences for which they have been convicted and sentenced," said a bench of Justices Anil Kilor and Justice S. Chandak. On July 11, 2006, seven bomb serial blasts in packed Mumbai local trains brought the maximum city on its knees within 11 minutes. The terror attack left 189 dead and 800 injured. Out of the 12 people convicted by the trial court, five were handed death sentences and others were given life imprisonment. The High Court's acquittal order is a major blow to the investigation agencies which, according to Justices Kilor and Chandak, failed to even present evidence on the type of bombs used in the serial blasts. "The circuit boards recovered from Mohd. Faisal Shaikh and Mohammad Sajid Margub Ansari are of no help to the prosecution to establish the present offence as the prosecution failed to bring any evidence on record and to establish the type of bombs used in the present crime," the High Court said. Justices Kilor and Chandak said, "Though the prosecution brought on record the technical report of the expert about the circuit board, it failed to establish the type of bombs used in the present crime. Thus, the said recovery is not relevant." On Monday, the 12 accused -- incarcerated for 19 years -- also succeeded to establish in the High Court the fact of torture inflicted on them to extort confessional statements. As a result, the High Court held the statements inadmissible saying, "On all the tests relating to voluntariness and truthfulness of the confessional statements, the prosecution failed." The prosecution case against the accused was weakened further when it failed to share with the defence the Call Detail Record -- which were relied upon heavily to file charges. In 2015, a special court had convicted 12 accused in the case -- sentenced five of them to death and seven others to life imprisonment. Faisal Shaikh, Asif Khan, Kamal Ansari, Ehtesham Siddiqui, and Naveed Khan were sentenced to death. They had challenged this sentence in the High Court. The prosecution had argued that the attack was planned by Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, and carried out by operatives of Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba with help from the Students' Islamic Movement of India, a banned Indian group.
Hans India
3 days ago
- Politics
- Hans India
J&K: Gunfight underway in Kishtwar district
Jammu: A gunfight started on Sunday between the security forces and the terrorists in J&K's Kishtwar district. Officials said that an encounter started between the security forces and the terrorists during a CASO (Cordon & Search Operation) in the Khankoo forest area of Kishtwar district. 'The encounter started during a CASO launched by the army and police in the Khankoo forest, located between Dachhan and Nagseni, following intelligence inputs about the presence of terrorists in the area,' the official said. He said that as the security forces closed in on the hiding terrorists, the terrorists fired, triggering an encounter which lasted for a short duration. 'Additional reinforcements have been rushed to the area. The search operation is ongoing to track the terrorists,' officials said. Meanwhile, Nagrota headquartered White Knight corps of the army said on X, 'Based on specific inputs, an operation was launched by the Indian Army in the Hadal Gal area of Kishtwar Sector. Contact has been established with terrorists. The operation is currently in progress.' Security forces have been carrying on aggressive operations against the terrorists, their Over Ground Workers (OGWs) and their sympathisers to dismantle the entire ecosystem of terror in J&K. The aggressive pursuit of the terrorists started after the April 22 attack on civilians by Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorists in Baisaran meadow of Pahalgam. Twenty-six civilians, including 25 tourists and a local, were killed in that terrorist attack. The attack outraged the entire country. The Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, gave a free hand to the armed forces to avenge the Pahalgam terror attack. Operation Sindoor was launched by the armed forces in which terror infrastructure was destroyed by carrying out attacks deep inside Pakistan, including Muridke near Lahore, Bahawalpur and Kotli, and Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Nine terror infrastructures were destroyed in the attack, and in a subsequent escalation, facilities of the Pakistan army were destroyed.
The Print
4 days ago
- Politics
- The Print
SubscriberWrites: Operation Sindoor & the rise of ‘Made in India' defence
During the recent conflict, Pakistan had literally no answer to India's missiles, drones, unmanned air vehicles which ended up with not only decimation of some of the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist bases but also with serious damages to their frontline runways and vital military bases. When Pakistan tried to retaliate with drones, missiles and aircrafts, our air power, air defence systems and anti-drone systems proved to be superior and successfully repelled their attempts again and again. What shocked Pakistan, surprised rest of the world and brought joy to own citizens was the fact that most of the weapon platfoems and the air defence systems and anti drone systems used were 'Made in India'. Your Turn is a unique section from ThePrint featuring points of view from its subscribers. If you are a subscriber, have a point of view, please send it to us. If not, do subscribe here: This changes the equation between India and our immediate adversaries and also with other countries as far as defence equipment and their production is concerned. Our successes in Operation Sindoor where we outrightly dominated the Pakistanis in weapon systems and equipment has made the world sit up and notice the scientific and technological advances we have made in defence production. It is a well known fact that outcome of wars and ability of the armed forces is heavily dependent on the availability of superior quality defence equipment. They can range from basic requirement like boots and helmets worn by the soldiers to small weapons, ammunition, vehicles etc and extend to complex war platforms like modern armoured fighting vehicles, fighter aircrafts, aircraft carrier warships, submarines and many more. Modern warfare is very much technology and equipment dependent which include effective surveillance, air defence systems and anti-drone systems as demonstrated in the recent conflicts across the world. The Indian ordinance factories were set up by the British to provide ammunition, equipment and military stores to their armed forces and to the allied forces during World War 2. Until recently, the Indian Ordinance Factories controlled by the Ordinance Factory Board produced small arms like pistols and rifles, vehicles like military jeeps and trucks, armoured vehicles like tanks, artillery guns, various grades of ammunition and explosives and a wide variety of military equipment and stores. During the initial years, critical equipment, arms and ammunition were imported from countries which were ahead in technology primarily because of their power, stability and economy. One of the major concern in importing arms, ammunition and equipment is that we also need the transfer of technology so that India can produce them along with their spares (for replacement and maintenance) within the country and thus preference was given to countries like Russia (erstwhile USSR), France, Sweden and few others who were willing to transfer their technology, train our people and help in setting up the production infrastructure. It is definitely wise not to depend too much on imported equipment, arms, ammunition and war machinery. The failures and shortcomings of Chinese equipment especially their radars, missiles. anti-aircraft and other air defence systems used by Pakistan is a good reason why we should continue in our endeavour for self reliance in defence production. By developing our own weapon sysytems and war equipment we can ensure catering to the exact requirement of our defence forces as per the threat perceptions and our strategic objectives, which may not always be achieved by going for off-the-shelf products of foreign origin. Continuous supply of ammunition, spare parts and maintenance especially during conflicts and operations is another major concern which can get affected by changes in global stability, international relations, economic and political conditions in the countries of import and any such eventualities. We have been successful in producing missiles like Nag, Akash, Prithvi and Agni, primarily because of the effort of our ex-President Dr APJ Abdul Kalam who also spearheaded the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and have acquired reasonably competent expertise in this field. We have had limited success in our efforts for other war equipment because of political, economic and administrative reasons. National politics played its part in prioritising our effort of upgrading the vintage ordinance factories, setting up of a strong R&D base and revamping the production of war equipment as per the requirement of the military. The past decade has seen India planning, designing, developing and manufacturing state of the art war equipment and the results have been more than satisfactory. We have developed our own assault rifle, artillery guns, combat helicopters, fighter aircrafts, warships, aircraft carrier warships, nuclear submarines, radars, anti-drone systems and many other. The involvement of private sector is a welcome change and has given a much needed boost to defence production. The defence verticals of the private industry will attract and retain some of our best engineering brains and scientific minds which will help in R&D and production. But, this is just the beginning of our new phase in self reliance in defence production and it must remain a work in progress at a larger scale and faster pace. The government's policy of involving and encouraging the private industry has been a gamechanger in our mission to become self reliant. The combination of established defence public sector undertakings and capable frontline private sector companies and startups will help us achieve the much needed self reliance in defence production and also bring handsome revenue from export to foreign countries as decided by the government.
New Indian Express
6 days ago
- Politics
- New Indian Express
India welcomes US move to designate LeT proxy TRF as global terrorist outfit
NEW DELHI: India on Friday welcomed the US designating Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) proxy TRF, which claimed responsibility for the Pahalgam terror attack, as a global terrorist outfit. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar described Washington's decision on The Resistance Front (TRF) as a "strong affirmation" of India-US counter-terrorism cooperation. In a social media post, he specially complimented US Secretary of State Marco Rubio for designating the proxy of Pakistan-based LeT. "Appreciate @SecRubio and @StateDept for designating TRF - a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) proxy - as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). It claimed responsibility for the April 22 Pahalgam attack," the external affairs minister said.
News18
6 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Book By Paul Kapur, Trump's South Asia Pick, Captures Pakistan's Jihad Strategy & India's Response
Kapur's 2017 book 'Jihad as Grand Strategy' is more than an analysis of Pakistan's use of jihad as state policy. It anticipates much of what is unfolding today In and around the Indian subcontinent, S Paul Kapur is going to become an important figure, working carefully behind the headlines. He will be the eyes, ears, and at times the hand of the world's most powerful nation in this region. Kapur has been nominated as America's representative in India's neighbourhood. He will be the new Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs in the US State Department. The extent of the power vested in him can be gauged from the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Lu. Lu is credited (or discredited) with engineering regime changes in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Kyrgyzstan; fomenting violent protests against the nationalist government in India; mishandling Afghanistan; keeping the Maldives and Nepal on the boil against India; and interfering in Central Asia's Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. So, who is Paul Kapur? What are his core geopolitical convictions? How closely do these align with India's vision and strategic approach? Kapur is an academic born in New Delhi to an Indian father and an American mother. He rose through the ranks of the foreign service and enjoys enough of the Trump administration's trust to be entrusted with one of the most sensitive regions in the world. His appointment becomes even more significant in light of the recent Pahalgam massacre of tourists by Pakistan-backed jihadis and India's response via Operation Sindoor. Jihad as Grand Strategy. It is not just an analytical study of how Pakistan has used jihad as a central lever of its state policy— in many ways, the book anticipates what is unfolding today. Kapur opens with a blunt statement of truth: 'Terrorism's ascendance as one of the world's leading strategic dangers has been a central development of the post–Cold War security environment… Scholars and analysts have generated a voluminous literature attempting to identify the demographic, economic, psychological, ideological, strategic and other patterns in terrorist violence. Although the nature and prevalence of such patterns are a matter of vigorous debate, one recurring theme concerning terrorism is strikingly clear: A disproportionate amount of it has been linked to Islamist terrorists based in Pakistan." He backs this up with examples—how Al Qaeda operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed trained 9/11 terrorists in Karachi and later wired funds for their mission; how Osama bin Laden was found hiding in Pakistan's garrison town of Abbottabad; how the leader of the group that bombed London in 2005 received paramilitary training in Pakistan and got bomb-making instructions from a caller in Rawalpindi; and how the Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Toiba carried out the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. The book primarily deals with the impact that Pakistan's support for terrorism has had on its strategic interests. Kapur rightly argues that the Islamisation of Pakistan did not begin with General Zia-ul-Haq, as is widely believed. The so-called 'liberal' Zulfikar Ali Bhutto used Islamism for political ends and was ultimately consumed by it. He was the one who declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims and banned alcohol in Pakistan. 'A number of other factors underlay Pakistan's use of Islamist militants, such as the lack of a coherent national founding narrative and material weakness relative to India," Kapur explains. 'Finally, Pakistan did not adopt its militant strategy during the Zia era; the Pakistanis had been using Islamist militants as strategic tools since achieving independence, long before Zia's emergence. It is a deliberate, long-running policy as old as the Pakistani state. Indeed, supporting jihad has constituted nothing less than a central pillar of Pakistani grand strategy." Pakistan's use of jihad as central state policy did not simply begin after independence; it was a driving force in the violent separation from India and the formation of the Pakistani state—on both its eastern and western fronts. Grand strategy, Kapur explains, is a state's theory of shaping national security. Pakistan has three main grand strategic tools: nuclear weapons, conventional forces, and militant proxies. Before 1971, Kapur notes, Pakistan believed it could defeat India in any conventional conflict—drawing from the centuries-old triumphant lore of Muslim invaders. India disabused it of that notion by vivisecting it and creating Bangladesh. A bloodied and humiliated Pakistan then ramped up its use of terror proxies. Other nations have also used non-state actors: Iran backs Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; the Soviet Union supported the Red Brigades and Black September; the US trained the Afghan mujahideen and ironically propped up Al Qaeda and the Taliban, who later turned on their mentor; China is believed to support Maoist insurgency in India and radical movements across western democracies. But for no other nation is terrorism as central to state policy as it is in Pakistan, Kapur argues. And Kapur believes jihad has, in some ways, worked for Pakistan. It has delivered a number of significant domestic and international outcomes. The strategy has promoted internal political cohesion, offering Pakistan a raison d'être in the absence of a coherent founding narrative. By steadily attriting Indian military and financial resources, it has also helped address Pakistan's material weakness vis-à-vis India. Additionally, the strategy has enabled Pakistan to continue challenging Indian control over Kashmir and to ensure the region remains on the international agenda. It has also allowed Pakistan to shape the strategic environment in Afghanistan and install a favourable government on its western frontier. However, these 'successes" are now backfiring. The terror organisations Pakistan nurtured are increasingly spinning out of control and severely undermining its interests. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) is no longer content with simply bleeding India—it harbours ambitions of conquering the entire country and spreading globally. The Tehreek-e-Taliban has seized large swathes of South Waziristan, launching attacks on Pakistani politicians and military personnel. The Baloch Liberation Army leads a fierce armed freedom movement to liberate Balochistan from Pakistani control. Groups like LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed often exceed the brief of their sponsors, conducting operations that drag Pakistan into dangerous confrontations. Kapur also notes that Pakistan's military strategy has diverted crucial resources away from development, impeding its internal progress. Perhaps the greatest blowback, Kapur writes, has been India's sweeping military modernisation in response. Operation Sindoor has highlighted India's growing defence preparedness under PM Narendra Modi, if emerging expert accounts are anything to go by. India reportedly executed remarkable acts of deception—most notably with the Rafale's X-Guard, an AI-powered towed decoy system that successfully fooled Pakistan's Chinese-made PL-15E missiles and J-10C fighters. 'It's the best spoofing and deception we've ever seen," former US Air Force F-15E and F-16 pilot Ryan Bodenheimer is quoted as saying by He added that the technology may have redefined the rules of electronic warfare. 'Driven by AI, the X-Guard constantly adjusts its signals to replicate Doppler shifts, creating the illusion of a jet roaring through the sky at Mach 1. For enemy radars and missile seekers, the decoy becomes indistinguishable from the real aircraft. Its fibre-optic tether ensures real-time communication with the cockpit, keeping pilots informed of missile locks and decoy status while staying immune to electronic jamming," the report said. John Spencer, executive director of the Urban Warfare Institute, affirms Kapur's thesis on India's rapidly strengthening conventional bulwark against Pakistan's militant strategy. Spencer writes: 'The operation demonstrated India's shift from a reactive posture to a proactive, precision-oriented doctrine. Seven of the nine terrorist targets were struck using long-range fires from the Army rather than airstrikes, including loitering munitions and rocket artillery. Counter-drone technology played a key role, with integrated use of radar, jammers, and both kinetic and soft-kill systems to neutralise incoming threats. Real-time battle damage assessments were enabled by persistent ISR from satellites and human intelligence. I was briefed on how even legacy systems, like L-70 guns, were effectively combined with modern platforms to create layered defences. The integration of kinetic force with narrative control was deliberate. What stood out was the clarity and firmness of India's red lines. Every terrorist attack will receive a military response. There will be no distinction between the attacker and those who support or harbour them." S Paul Kapur's views in his book may occasionally collide with the murky realpolitik that shapes America's foreign policy. But one thing is certain: Kapur is no natural sympathiser of jihad, particularly the industrial-scale terrorism emanating from Pakistan. top videos View all He sums up Pakistan's double-edged sword perfectly: 'Pakistan suffers from a jihad paradox. Political and material weakness originally made Pakistan's militant policy attractive and useful. Now, however, the same weakness makes Pakistan's support for militancy extremely dangerous." Abhijit Majumder is a senior journalist. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : Islamic Jihad Operation Sindoor Osama bin Laden view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 11, 2025, 08:22 IST News opinion Book By Paul Kapur, Trump's South Asia Pick, Captures Pakistan's Jihad Strategy & India's Response Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
