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Economic Times
3 days ago
- General
- Economic Times
Black box data tells all about deadly flight Air India 171: Full sequence of events that ended in a tragic crash
Flight AI423 crashed shortly after takeoff due to a dual engine failure triggered by the fuel cutoff switches being inexplicably moved to the CUTOFF position. Despite attempts to relight the engines, the aircraft lost altitude and crashed outside the airport perimeter after a MAYDAY call went unanswered. Initial checks showed no issues with fuel, weight, or pilot fitness. Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Flight AI423 had a Pilot Defect Report (PDR) entry for a status message: 'STAB POS XDCR' in the tech log. Troubleshooting was carried out, and the aircraft was released for flight. The pilots had adequate rest, underwent pre-flight breath analyser tests, and were found fit to operate the flight. Fuel on board was 54,200 kg, and the takeoff weight was 213,401 kg, which was within the maximum allowed limit of 218,183 kg. No dangerous goods were onboard the aircraft. The aircraft began its takeoff roll at 08:07:37. The air/ground sensors transitioned to 'air mode,' consistent with liftoff at 08:08:39. The aircraft achieved a maximum recorded airspeed of 180 knots IAS at approximately 08:08:42. Immediately after, Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches were moved from RUN to CUTOFF positions, one after another, with a one-second gap. As fuel supply to the engines was cut off, both N1 and N2 values began to decrease from their takeoff values. In the cockpit voice recording, one pilot is heard asking the other, 'Why did you cut off?' The other pilot responded that he did not. CCTV footage from the airport showed the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) deploying during the initial climb, immediately after liftoff. No significant bird activity was observed near the flight path. The aircraft began to lose altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall. According to EAFR data, both engines' N2 values dropped below the minimum idle speed, and the RAT hydraulic pump began supplying power at around 08:08:47. At approximately 08:08:52, Engine 1's fuel cutoff switch transitioned back from CUTOFF to RUN. At 08:08:56, Engine 2's fuel cutoff switch also transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to RUN during flight, the Full Authority Dual Engine Control (FADEC) system automatically initiates a relight and thrust recovery sequence, including ignition and fuel reintroduction. Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) began rising for both engines, indicating relight. Engine 1's core deceleration stopped, reversed, and began recovering. Engine 2 managed to relight but could not stop the core speed deceleration. It kept reintroducing fuel in attempts to increase acceleration and achieve recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11. At around 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted: 'MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY.' Air Traffic Control (ATCO) asked for the call sign but received no response. ATCO then observed the aircraft crash outside the airport boundary and immediately activated the emergency response. On June 12, tragedy struck as Air India Flight 171 crashed just moments after takeoff, despite no signs of mechanical issues or external threats like bird strikes. In a shocking chain of events, both engines shut down mid-air, cockpit confusion unfolded, and a desperate Mayday call went unanswered.A detailed sequence reconstructed from technical logs, cockpit voice recordings, and CCTV footage now reveals the terrifying final moments of the flight, offering a chilling look into what caused the deadly is the minute-by-minute breakdown of what exactly happened from takeoff to is the sequence of events leading to the deadly crash on June 12:
Time of India
3 days ago
- General
- Time of India
Black box data tells all about deadly flight Air India 171: Full sequence of events that ended in a tragic crash
Synopsis Flight AI423 crashed shortly after takeoff due to a dual engine failure triggered by the fuel cutoff switches being inexplicably moved to the CUTOFF position. Despite attempts to relight the engines, the aircraft lost altitude and crashed outside the airport perimeter after a MAYDAY call went unanswered. Initial checks showed no issues with fuel, weight, or pilot fitness.
India Today
4 days ago
- General
- India Today
From takeoff to crash: The 98-second life of doomed Air India flight
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau's 15-page preliminary investigation report details the fateful 98 seconds of AI171, the London-bound flight from Ahmedabad — from the takeoff roll to the moment the Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner crashed outside the airport boundary wall — in which 241 people on board were killed, with only one flight took off at 1:38 pm after receiving take-off clearance. The AI 171 Dreamliner was just 32 seconds in the air, before it eventually crashed. By 1:38 pm, one of the engines had reached a speed of 284 km/h during the takeoff roll. Within the next two seconds, the aircraft achieved Vr speed — the rotation speed — at 287 km/h, according to the preliminary investigation report. Following that, the aircraft lifted off, meaning the wheels left the ground four seconds the next three seconds, the aircraft recorded a maximum airspeed of 334 km/h. Immediately afterward, both engines shut down, prompting the deployment of the RAT (Ram Air Turbine) as the aircraft began losing altitude. RATs are deployed in the event of a dual engine failure or a loss of electrical or hydraulic aviation experts noted that RAT deployment is often ineffective at lower altitudes, particularly during takeoff, due to insufficient airflow required to power the turbine at low Time Stamps05:47 UTC – Aircraft arrived in Ahmedabad (from Delhi, flight AI423)06:40 UTC – Aircraft released for flight after tech check06:25 UTC – Crew underwent preflight Breath Analyser test — found fit07:05 UTC (12:35 IST) – Crew seen arriving at the boarding gate via CCTV07:48:38 UTC – Aircraft departed from Bay 3407:55:15 UTC – Received taxi clearance07:56:08 UTC – Began taxi08:07:33 UTC – Take-off clearance issued08:07:37 UTC – Aircraft began take-off roll08:08:33 UTC – V1 speed (153 Kts IAS) achieved08:08:35 UTC – Vr speed (155 Kts) achieved08:08:39 UTC – Aircraft lifted off (air/ground sensors show air mode)08:08:42 UTC – Max recorded airspeed: 180 Kts IASImmediately after: Engine 1 & 2 fuel cutoff switches moved to CUTOFF08:08:47 UTC – RAT (Ram Air Turbine) deployed; aircraft losing altitude08:08:52 UTC – Engine 1 fuel cutoff moved back to RUN08:08:54 UTC – APU Inlet Door began opening (Auto Start logic)08:08:56 UTC – Engine 2 fuel cutoff moved back to RUN08:09:05 UTC – MAYDAY call made08:09:11 UTC – EAFR recording stops, flight crashesFive seconds later, Engine 1's fuel cutoff switch was moved back to the RUN position, indicating signs of recovery, the report stated, citing data from the Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR).The APU inlet door began to open two seconds later, triggered by the auto-start logic. Engine 2 also began to stabilise within the following two report stated that while Engine 1 began to recover after its core speed deceleration stopped, Engine 2, although able to relight, could not arrest its core speed MAYDAY call was made at 1:39 pm (08:09:05 UTC). Six seconds later, at 08:09:11 UTC, the EAFR stopped recording, according to the the Air Traffic Control officer enquired about the MAYDAY call, there was no response, as the aircraft was observed crashing outside the airport boundary at that moment, the report noted.- EndsMust Watch
India Today
13-06-2025
- India Today
Air India crash videos suggest errors in cockpit take-off drills
On June 12, 2025, Air India Flight AI171, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner (VT-ANB), crashed in Ahmedabad's Meghaninagar at 1:38 PM IST, shortly after takeoff from Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport. The aircraft, bound for London Gatwick, reached only 600–650 feet before issuing a MAYDAY call and crashing into a residential analysis explores the probable causes of the catastrophic crash, focusing on the aircraft's low altitude, low speed, and landing gear configuration, based on preliminary evidence and crash videos. The aircraft reached only 600–650 feet before issuing a MAYDAY call and crashing into a residential area advertisementCrash ContextAircraft: Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner, a modern twin-engine jet with advanced fly-by-wire systems and GE Aerospace GEnx engines, heavily fueled for a 4,200-mile flight. Conditions: Clear weather, 43C, near-sea-level airport (180 feet elevation), high-density altitude reducing lift and Captain Sumeet Sabharwal and First Officer Clive Indicators: Low altitude (600–650 feet), low speed, and landing gear down, suggesting failure to climb Causes1. Configuration ErrorA configuration error during takeoff involves incorrect settings or actions that prevent the aircraft from achieving the necessary performance (lift, thrust, or climb rate). Common errors include wrong flap settings, insufficient thrust, premature rotation (lifting off too early), or failure to retract landing gear, all of which can reduce climb capability and lead to a stall or loss of control, especially at low altitudes. A configuration error during takeoff means incorrect settings that hinder performance advertisementWhy Configuration Errors Matter?Takeoff is a critical phase with tight performance margins. The 787 requires precise settings for flaps, thrust, and rotation speed (Vr) to achieve lift-off and climb, especially in hot conditions. Errors in these settings, combined with low altitude and speed, leave little time for recovery, as seen in the rapid descent after the MAYDAY Happens: Flaps increase lift and drag during takeoff, allowing the aircraft to fly at lower speeds. The 787 typically uses Flaps 5 or 15 for takeoff, depending on weight, runway length, and flaps too low (eg, Flaps 0) reduces lift, requiring higher speeds to take off, while excessive flaps (eg, Flaps 20) increase drag, hindering climb. Flaps increase lift and drag during takeoff, allowing the aircraft to fly at lower speeds Ahmedabad Context: At 43C, the reduced air density lowered lift, requiring precise flap settings. If the pilots selected insufficient flaps (eg, Flaps 0 instead of 5), the aircraft may have struggled to generate lift, leading to the observed low Factors: Distraction (eg, responding to ATC or a cockpit alert, like engine failure) or miscommunication during pre-takeoff checks could lead to incorrect flap 787's electronic checklist should flag this, but manual override or rushed procedures could bypass Spanair Flight 5022 (2008, MD-82) crashed in Madrid due to zero flaps during takeoff, causing insufficient lift and a stall, despite clear weather. If pilots selected reduced thrust or miscalculated required power, the aircraft could fail to climb 2. Insufficient ThrustThe 787's GEnx engines require specific thrust settings based on weight, runway length, and temperature. At 43C, high-density altitude reduced engine efficiency, necessitating higher thrust. If pilots used reduced thrust (derated takeoff) or miscalculated power via the flight management system (FMS), the heavily fuelled aircraft (near 227 tons) could fail to climb, explaining the low altitude and speed. Pilots typically retract gear after a positive climb rate advertisement3. Failure to Retract Landing GearCrash videos show the landing gear down, increasing drag and reducing climb performance. Pilots typically retract gear after a positive climb rate. Leaving it down suggests:Oversight: Distraction from a stall warning or engine Choice: Anticipating an emergency landing, though the MAYDAY call and rapid descent suggest insufficient time to return.4. Engine Failure (Including Bird Strike)The lack of engine noise in videos and the MAYDAY call suggest possible thrust loss. Potential causes include:Bird Strike: Ahmedabad's known risk could affect one or both engines, though dual-engine failure is rare (<1 in 1 million flights).Fuel Contamination or Mechanical Failure: Less likely given the GEnx engines' reliability, but Engine failure alone doesn't explain the landing gear configuration, making it a secondary factor compared to configuration errors.5. High-Temperature Performance Issues Distraction or miscommunication during pre-takeoff checks could lead to incorrect flap settings At 43C, reduced air density lowered lift and thrust, requiring precise configuration. While the 787's FMS accounts for temperature, a miscalculation of rotation speed (Vr) or thrust, or an intersection takeoff, could exacerbate issues. This is likely a contributing factor rather than the primary Structural Failure The 787's GEnx engines require specific thrust settings based on weight, runway length, and temperature A failure in flight controls or structure is unlikely given the 787's redundant systems and perfect safety record. The gear-down and low-speed evidence points to pilot error over a sudden mechanical issue.7. Sabotage or TerrorismNo evidence supports sabotage, and the MAYDAY call indicates crew awareness of an issue, not a sudden explosion. Security measures further reduce this low altitude, low speed, and landing gear down strongly suggest a configuration error—likely incorrect flap settings, insufficient thrust, premature rotation, or failure to retract gear—as the primary cause of the Air India Flight AI171 crash. Engine failure (possibly from a bird strike or fuel issue) and high-temperature performance challenges are secondary contributors. The 787's advanced systems should mitigate such errors, but human factors, such as a cockpit emergency, distraction or miscommunication, likely played a critical role in this tragedy.(Images by Vani Gupta and Ayushi Srivastava) Must Watch
Time of India
13-06-2025
- General
- Time of India
Air India plane crash: Bird hit, engine failure, or flap issue? Exact reason for AI-171 crash in Ahmedabad may take a year to confirm
Shortly after take-off from Ahmedabad airport, Air India flight AI-171 crashed, killing all 241 on board. Two videos of the aircraft moments before the crash have surfaced on social media, raising key questions about what went wrong. Aviation experts and former airline officials are analysing the clips and suspect a possible dual engine failure as one of the main causes. Experts question unretracted landing gear The aircraft's landing gear remained extended even as it climbed past 400 feet, something pilots say is unusual. "Within 5 secs of lift off, pilots normally put the landing gear up," said Capt Amit Singh, an air safety expert told TOI. Capt Manoj Hathi, a former Air India official, added, "As soon as a positive rate of climb is reached, the landing gear is retracted." Landing gear left down during climb increases drag and slows down the aircraft, making it harder to gain altitude. In normal conditions, retracting the landing gear is one of the first actions pilots take after ensuring a stable climb. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Moose Approaches Girl At Bus Stop In Phnom Penh - Watch What Happens Happy in Shape Undo Possible engine failure, fuel issues or bird hit A major concern raised is why the gear stayed down. Capt Singh explained, "In case there is a distraction the pilots could forget to put the gear up. The distraction could be dual engine failure, bird hit or combination of both. The plume of dust as the aircraft crosses the runway end shows it was low on power and possibly a dual engine problem." Capt Hathi echoed the possibility: "It's possible that a dual engine flame-out was the reason the landing gear could not be retracted. Dual engine failure could occur due to bird ingestion or fuel contamination. Looking at the trajectory and body angle of the aircraft, it appears as if the aircraft has stalled because of loss of speed." Live Events You Might Also Like: Plane crash a result of human karma, not just fate, says ex-Puducherry L-G Kiran Bedi quoting 'Autobiography of a Yogi' Other pilots, who spoke off record, also pointed to a rare dual engine failure — a situation with only seven recorded cases in the past 70 years. Did Air India flight suffered a bird hit? Gujarat has seen 462 bird strike cases in five years, with Ahmedabad airport reporting the highest number, according to Civil Aviation Ministry data shared in Parliament in December 2023. A TOI report from September 2023 also noted a 35% increase in such incidents in Ahmedabad, with 38 bird strikes recorded in 2022–23. In a 2009 case, a bird hit occurred at 2,700 feet when a flock of seagulls was sucked into the engines. In contrast, the recent Air India flight was flying much lower, leaving the pilots with little time or height to react. MAYDAY call and aircraft behaviour hint at emergency The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) confirmed that a MAYDAY call was issued just seconds after take-off. Experts say this reinforces the engine failure theory. The aircraft is seen in videos flying low over a densely populated area. Moments before the crash, it appears the pilots raised the aircraft's nose, possibly to avoid hitting buildings — a move that may have caused further loss of airspeed. "Even if the pilots had not pulled up the nose it would have continued to glide, descend and eventually crash," Capt Singh said. Questions over flap settings during take-off Flaps, which are critical for lift during take-off, have also come under scrutiny. While some pilots believe the flaps were not deployed, others argue the video footage shows otherwise. The exact status will be confirmed only after detailed analysis. Investigation underway, final report due in one year India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is leading the investigation, following international norms under Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). A preliminary report is expected within 30 days, but it is up to the Indian authorities to decide whether to make it public. The final report, which includes a complete analysis of causes and contributory factors, will be released by June 12 next year. Annex 13 makes clear that the main goal of such investigations is not to assign blame, but to prevent similar accidents in the future. (The article originally published in TOI)
