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AllAfrica
5 days ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
US banking on cheap missiles to narrow China war gap
The US is betting on a new wave of cheap cruise missiles to win a high-tech war of attrition against China. This month, US defense contractor L3Harris Technologies revealed the 'Red Wolf' and 'Green Wolf' missiles, offering affordable, long-range strike capabilities for the US military amid rising tensions with China in the Pacific, Reuters reported. The systems support the US Department of Defense's (DoD) 'affordable mass' strategy, shaped by recent conflicts in Ukraine and Israel that underscored the need for large stockpiles of deployable munitions. Both multi-role missiles exceed a 200-nautical-mile range and can engage moving naval targets. Red Wolf focuses on precision strikes, whereas Green Wolf is designed for electronic warfare and intelligence collection. Production is underway in Ashburn, Virginia, with initial low-rate manufacturing progressing toward full-scale output. L3Harris anticipates pricing around US$300,000 per unit and aims to produce roughly 1,000 annually. Having completed over 40 successful test flights, the systems mark a strategic pivot as Lockheed Martin and RTX currently dominate the long-range missile market. The Red and Green Wolf systems join a growing list of weapons marketed under the affordable mass concept, including Anduril's Barracuda and Lockheed Martin's Common Multi-Mission Truck (CMMT), which embody competing visions of low-cost, mass-producible cruise missiles designed to saturate peer adversaries. Anduril's Barracuda—available in three scalable configurations—emphasizes rapid production using commercial components, modular payloads and autonomous teaming enabled by its Lattice software. Designed for flexibility across air, sea and land launches, it has entered a US Air Force/Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) prototype effort. In contrast, Lockheed's CMMT, or 'Comet,' is a modular, non-stealthy missile priced at $150,000 and optimized for global assembly and palletized mass launch from cargo aircraft. Barracuda emphasizes software-defined autonomy and flexible mission roles, while CMMT focuses on industrial-scale modularity and global assembly for cost-effective mass deployment. As the US military turns to low-cost cruise missiles like Barracuda, CMMT and the Red and Green Wolf to achieve affordable mass, a critical question looms: can these cheaper weapons deliver sufficient firepower, scale and survivability to offset industrial shortfalls and support sustained combat in a high-intensity war with China? According to the US DoD's 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR), China possesses the world's largest navy by battle force, exceeding 370 ships and submarines, including over 140 major surface combatants. Mark Gunzinger argues in a November 2021 article for Air & Space Forces Magazine that the US suffers from a shortage of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), rooted in outdated assumptions favoring short wars, which he argues limits its ability to sustain combat against China. Seth Jones writes in a January 2023 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US defense industrial base remains optimized for peacetime and lacks resilient supply chains. Jones warns that this situation leaves the US unprepared for a protracted conflict, such as a Taiwan contingency against China, where early depletion of high-end munitions could prove disastrous. He stresses that in a potential US-China war over Taiwan, the US could expend up to 5,000 high-end, multi-million-dollar long-range missiles—including the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Harpoon anti-ship missile and Tomahawk cruise missile—within the first three weeks of conflict. While ramping up production of lower-end PGMs could, to some extent, alleviate shortages, Evan Montgomery and others argue in a June 2024 article for War on the Rocks that cheap, mass-produced PGMs often lack the performance—stealth, speed, range and penetrating power—needed to generate lasting strategic effects. Drawing on recent case studies, they point out that Israel's neutralization of Iran's April 2024 drone swarm using $20,000-$50,000 Shahed loitering munitions contrasts sharply with Ukraine's selective use of advanced, multi-million-dollar munitions such as Storm Shadow and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). They note the latter precision strikes forced costly Russian Black Sea Fleet redeployments and disrupted operations. Montgomery and others conclude that low-cost swarms may struggle to inflict meaningful attrition, particularly if autonomy and swarming technologies remain immature or economically unscalable. Given the capability gap between high-end PGMs like the $3.2 million per unit LRASM and more affordable systems such as the Red Wolf, Stacey Pettyjohn and others argue in a January 2025 article for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that the US must urgently implement a high-low PGM mix to deter China. They argue that China's People's Liberation Army's (PLA) rapid expansion and increasingly coercive maneuvers have outpaced the US's Indo-Pacific posture, exposing a strategic mismatch in both capability and scale. They point out that while high-end weapons are critical for penetrating advanced defenses and executing high-value missions, they are constrained by cost, availability and replenishment lag. Conversely, they state low-cost autonomous systems can be produced more rapidly and in greater numbers to bolster mass and sustain combat effectiveness over time, though they lack the capability of high-end systems. However, Pettyjohn and others caution that the US DoD's risk-averse acquisition culture and absence of a clear operational concept integrating both tiers exacerbate these challenges. Explaining the roots of this problem, Shands Pickett and Zach Beecher write in a June 2025 article for War on the Rocks that a widening rift between traditional prime contractors and non-traditional tech entrants is fracturing the US defense-industrial base. Pickett and Beecher note that primes, known for delivering large-scale, complex systems, are criticized for being slow, risk-averse and too focused on legacy programs. In contrast, they state that non-traditionalists bring agility and innovation, rapidly developing capabilities using commercial best practices. Yet Pickett and Beecher note that these firms often struggle with integration into mission systems and scaling for full-rate production. They liken this incompatibility to clashing software languages, resulting in technical debt, mission gaps and an industrial ecosystem fragmented and ill-suited to modern threats. While low-cost missiles can help close the gap in munitions volume, their strategic value hinges on effective integration, operational clarity and industrial readiness. Without structural reforms to US acquisition practices and production infrastructure, affordable mass may fall short of delivering meaningful deterrence in a high-end conflict with China.


AllAfrica
02-05-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
US betting big on robo-fighters to win a Taiwan war
The US is a step closer to being able to deploy stealthy, semi-autonomous drone swarms to saturate the Taiwan Strait in a high-tech push to shift the military balance vis-à-vis China. This month, multiple media sources reported that the US Air Force had initiated ground tests for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program, marking a significant milestone before the anticipated maiden flights of Anduril's YFQ-44A and General Atomics' YFQ-42A drones this summer. The tests, focusing on propulsion, avionics, autonomy integration and ground control interfaces, aim to validate performance and prepare both unmanned fighters, designated under the 'fighter drone' FQ series, for operational use. Anduril's YFQ-44A, known as Fury, features advanced design elements, including stealth-optimized intake shapes and potential infrared sensors for enhanced situational awareness. General Atomics leverages its experience with unmanned platforms such as the XQ-67A to advance the YFQ-42A, aimed at expanding the operational role of unmanned systems. Beale Air Force Base in California was selected to host the new Aircraft Readiness Unit, tasked with maintaining drones ready for global deployment at reduced personnel requirements due to their semi-autonomous nature. The US Air Force expects a competitive production decision in fiscal 2026, aiming for affordability at approximately US$25-30 million per drone. The initiative represents an essential component of the US Air Force's broader strategy to integrate unmanned systems alongside manned fighters like the F-35, enhancing combat effectiveness and operational readiness in contested environments. Mark Gunzinger mentions in a January 2024 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that CCAs can be decoys, jammers and strike platforms—stimulating adversary defenses, complicating targeting and absorbing fire to reduce crewed aircraft attrition. He notes that some variants will be launched from dispersed sites, avoiding reliance on fixed airfields and enhancing flexibility while complementing, not replacing, fifth-generation fighters. Considering possible adversary advantages, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) mentions that China has a robust and redundant Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) covering land areas and extending up to 300 nautical miles from its coastline. The report notes this system integrates a vast early-warning radar network, advanced fighter aircraft and diverse Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) platforms, including the indigenous CSA-9 (HQ-9) and its enhanced version HQ-9B. These operate alongside the Russia-supplied SA-10 (S-300PMU), SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2) and the advanced SA-21 (S-400) Triumf, noted for their longer range and superior radar systems. It also states that China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) deploys Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, extending radar coverage beyond ground radar limitations. In addition to layered air defenses, the report says the PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation operate the world's third-largest aviation force with 3,150 aircraft, including 1,900 fighters. China currently produces jets at a 1.2:1 ratio over the US. Despite the 'affordable mass' promised by CCAs, Rohith Stambamkadi mentions in a February 2025 article for the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) that as drones rely on data from sensors and predefined algorithms, they have limited flexibility as they lack real-time adaptability for air superiority. Stambamkadi argues that drones suffer from range, speed and payload limitations, undermining the notion that they can achieve air superiority independently. He argues that combat experience in Ukraine and Israel has shown that drones alone cannot replace manned aircraft, with the former's air defenses effectively thwarting mass drone attacks from Russia and Hamas enemies. He adds that stealthy systems that can survive in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment, such as the B-21 bomber, will remain critical, as a force vulnerable to attrition may not retain sufficient mass to remain effective. Regarding how the US would deploy CCAs in a Taiwan Strait crisis, Admiral Samuel Paparo mentions in a June 2024 article in the Washington Post that he intends to turn the place into an 'unmanned hellscape' to buy time for US forces to get ready for an intervention. While Paparo did not discuss the details of the strategy, Bob Work mentions in a July 2024 USNI article that it involves thousands of pre-positioned sea, air and ground drones in the Taiwan Strait operating in tandem to eliminate the 'tyranny of distance' that characterizes operations in the Pacific theater. Aside from the hellscape strategy, Work mentions that the US Replicator initiative's reveal in August 2023, which aims to surge the production of attritable autonomous systems, has forced PLA planners to rethink how they will operate against Taiwan and pursue force projection in the South China Sea. However, the US strategy may backfire in unintended ways. In a July 2024 article for Stars and Stripes, Demri Greggo contends that the strategy may be a weak deterrent and potentially accelerate Chinese action while undercutting strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, long seen as a stabilizing factor in cross-Strait tensions. Greggo also points out that it does not address China's 'other warfares' – psychological, economic or legal – and that the strategy could force China to double down on those fronts. Greggo argues that the strategy risks indirectly signaling US intervention while undermining the US's long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. In his view, ambiguity deters China by keeping its leaders guessing about US intentions and tempers Taiwan's confidence by linking its security to self-reliant deterrence, not guaranteed US support. As the US bets on drone fighters to deter China, it must weigh the promise of unmanned mass against the perils of strategic overreach, miscalculation and, perhaps most dangerously, eroding strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait.

Wall Street Journal
26-03-2025
- Business
- Wall Street Journal
Bring on the F-47 Fighter Jet
President Trump was in the Oval Office on Friday next to a poster of a mist-shrouded new U.S. fighter jet, which he says will be called the F-47 and built by Boeing. The U.S. Air Force desperately needs modern equipment, and credit the President for his support. Now comes the hard part: putting up the money to field airframes in numbers that match the world's threats. 'The F-47 will be the most advanced, most capable, most lethal aircraft ever built,' Mr. Trump said, with his usual understatement. The Air Force has been working on the concept under the Next Generation Air Dominance program, and the details are classified. But Mr. Trump said an experimental aircraft has been flying secretly for almost five years and exploits advances in stealth technology. 'America's enemies will never see it coming,' he said. The Air Force calls the aircraft 'a family of systems,' and in plain English that means piloted planes working with drones. The service has been developing such Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) that could, say, scoot out ahead of manned planes and conduct jamming or launch weapons, among many other potential missions. Why not go fully unmanned with the F-47? The 'technology is not there yet,' as Mark Gunzinger of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies puts it. But CCAs can join the fleet at scale in short order and work with existing aircraft like the F-35. Mitchell wargaming has found the drone wingmen are valuable in helping the Air Force disrupt and strike Chinese air defenses in a fight for Taiwan.