US betting big on robo-fighters to win a Taiwan war
This month, multiple media sources reported that the US Air Force had initiated ground tests for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program, marking a significant milestone before the anticipated maiden flights of Anduril's YFQ-44A and General Atomics' YFQ-42A drones this summer.
The tests, focusing on propulsion, avionics, autonomy integration and ground control interfaces, aim to validate performance and prepare both unmanned fighters, designated under the 'fighter drone' FQ series, for operational use.
Anduril's YFQ-44A, known as Fury, features advanced design elements, including stealth-optimized intake shapes and potential infrared sensors for enhanced situational awareness. General Atomics leverages its experience with unmanned platforms such as the XQ-67A to advance the YFQ-42A, aimed at expanding the operational role of unmanned systems.
Beale Air Force Base in California was selected to host the new Aircraft Readiness Unit, tasked with maintaining drones ready for global deployment at reduced personnel requirements due to their semi-autonomous nature.
The US Air Force expects a competitive production decision in fiscal 2026, aiming for affordability at approximately US$25-30 million per drone.
The initiative represents an essential component of the US Air Force's broader strategy to integrate unmanned systems alongside manned fighters like the F-35, enhancing combat effectiveness and operational readiness in contested environments.
Mark Gunzinger mentions in a January 2024 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that CCAs can be decoys, jammers and strike platforms—stimulating adversary defenses, complicating targeting and absorbing fire to reduce crewed aircraft attrition.
He notes that some variants will be launched from dispersed sites, avoiding reliance on fixed airfields and enhancing flexibility while complementing, not replacing, fifth-generation fighters.
Considering possible adversary advantages, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) mentions that China has a robust and redundant Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) covering land areas and extending up to 300 nautical miles from its coastline.
The report notes this system integrates a vast early-warning radar network, advanced fighter aircraft and diverse Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) platforms, including the indigenous CSA-9 (HQ-9) and its enhanced version HQ-9B. These operate alongside the Russia-supplied SA-10 (S-300PMU), SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2) and the advanced SA-21 (S-400) Triumf, noted for their longer range and superior radar systems.
It also states that China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) deploys Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, extending radar coverage beyond ground radar limitations.
In addition to layered air defenses, the report says the PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation operate the world's third-largest aviation force with 3,150 aircraft, including 1,900 fighters. China currently produces jets at a 1.2:1 ratio over the US.
Despite the 'affordable mass' promised by CCAs, Rohith Stambamkadi mentions in a February 2025 article for the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) that as drones rely on data from sensors and predefined algorithms, they have limited flexibility as they lack real-time adaptability for air superiority.
Stambamkadi argues that drones suffer from range, speed and payload limitations, undermining the notion that they can achieve air superiority independently.
He argues that combat experience in Ukraine and Israel has shown that drones alone cannot replace manned aircraft, with the former's air defenses effectively thwarting mass drone attacks from Russia and Hamas enemies.
He adds that stealthy systems that can survive in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment, such as the B-21 bomber, will remain critical, as a force vulnerable to attrition may not retain sufficient mass to remain effective.
Regarding how the US would deploy CCAs in a Taiwan Strait crisis, Admiral Samuel Paparo mentions in a June 2024 article in the Washington Post that he intends to turn the place into an 'unmanned hellscape' to buy time for US forces to get ready for an intervention.
While Paparo did not discuss the details of the strategy, Bob Work mentions in a July 2024 USNI article that it involves thousands of pre-positioned sea, air and ground drones in the Taiwan Strait operating in tandem to eliminate the 'tyranny of distance' that characterizes operations in the Pacific theater.
Aside from the hellscape strategy, Work mentions that the US Replicator initiative's reveal in August 2023, which aims to surge the production of attritable autonomous systems, has forced PLA planners to rethink how they will operate against Taiwan and pursue force projection in the South China Sea.
However, the US strategy may backfire in unintended ways. In a July 2024 article for Stars and Stripes, Demri Greggo contends that the strategy may be a weak deterrent and potentially accelerate Chinese action while undercutting strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, long seen as a stabilizing factor in cross-Strait tensions.
Greggo also points out that it does not address China's 'other warfares' – psychological, economic or legal – and that the strategy could force China to double down on those fronts.
Greggo argues that the strategy risks indirectly signaling US intervention while undermining the US's long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity.
In his view, ambiguity deters China by keeping its leaders guessing about US intentions and tempers Taiwan's confidence by linking its security to self-reliant deterrence, not guaranteed US support.
As the US bets on drone fighters to deter China, it must weigh the promise of unmanned mass against the perils of strategic overreach, miscalculation and, perhaps most dangerously, eroding strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait.
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