Latest news with #MiddleEastConflict
Asharq Al-Awsat
10 hours ago
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Israel Killed 30 Iranian Security Chiefs and 11 Nuclear Scientists, Israeli Official Says
Israel killed more than 30 senior security officials and 11 senior nuclear scientists to deliver a major blow to Iran's nuclear ambitions, a senior Israeli military official said on Friday in summarizing Israel's 12-day air war with Iran. In the United States, an independent expert said a review of commercial satellite imagery showed only a small number of the approximately 30 Iranian missiles that penetrated Israel's air defenses managed to hit any militarily significant targets. "Iran has yet to produce missiles that demonstrate great accuracy," Decker Eveleth, an associate research analyst at the CNA Corporation specializing in satellite imagery, told Reuters. In Israel, the senior military official said Israel's June 13 opening strike on Iran severely damaged its aerial defenses and destabilized its ability to respond in the critical early hours of the conflict. Israel's air force struck over 900 targets and the military deeply damaged Iran's missile production during the war that ended with a US-brokered ceasefire, the official said. "The Iranian nuclear project suffered a major blow: The regime's ability to enrich uranium to 90% was neutralized for a prolonged period. Its current ability to produce a nuclear weapon core has been neutralized," the official said. Iran, which denies trying to build nuclear weapons, retaliated against the strikes with barrages of missiles on Israeli military sites and cities. Iran said it forced the end of the war by penetrating Israeli defenses. Iranian authorities said 627 people were killed in Iran, where the extent of the damage could not be independently confirmed because of tight restrictions on the media. Israeli authorities said 28 people were killed in Israel. Eveleth, the independent US expert, said Iran's missile forces were not accurate enough to destroy small military targets like US-made F-35 jet fighters in their shelters. "Because of this the only targets they can hit with regularity are large cities or industrial targets like the refinery at Haifa," he told Reuters. Iranian missile salvos, which were limited by Israeli airstrikes in Iran, did not have the density to achieve high rates of destruction, he wrote on X. "At the current level of performance, there is effectively nothing stopping Israel from conducting the same operation in the future with similar results," he wrote. In a statement on Friday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said he had directed the military to draft plans to safeguard air superiority over Iran, prevent nuclear development and missile production, and address Iran's support for militant operations against Israel. Israel's military Chief of Staff Lieutenant General, Eyal Zamir, said on Friday the outcome in Iran could help advance Israeli objectives against the Iranian-backed Palestinian Hamas group in the Gaza Strip. Zamir told troops in Gaza an Israeli ground operation, known as "Gideon's Chariots," would in the near future achieve its goal of greater control of the Palestinian enclave and present options to Israel's government for further action.
Yahoo
10 hours ago
- Business
- Yahoo
The oil market avoided worst-case scenario. What's next?
Macquarie Group global energy strategist Vikas Dwivedi joins Brad Smith on Market Catalysts to discuss recent changes in oil prices (CL=F, BZ=F) and what's next for the energy market. To watch more expert insights and analysis on the latest market action, check out more Market Catalysts here. Oil prices are set for their steepest weekly decline since March of 2023 as the Middle East conflict failed to significantly disrupt supply in the region. What's next in terms of catalysts for crude? Joining us now to discuss is because the vote, excuse me, because the vote, who is the Macquarie group global energy strategist here. Great to have you here with us. You know, one of the things absolutely, one of the things that we're tracking, of course, week over week, at least, is perhaps the relief that things are not as bad as they could have become within the Middle East conflict, and thus the impacts on the oil markets as well. What what's your read through here? Yeah, uh, agree with your comment that it didn't turn out nearly as bad as it could have. Now, what we think is it should have come out the way it did, so it's not surprising that we we ended up here. But there were really credible scenarios where it could have ended up in very bad shape with a much longer military engagement between Iran and Israel, and a, um, either destruction or disruption of oil facilities in Iran, and then the potential reprisal from Iran to other regional oil producers, or of course, the straight of war moves, you know. So there were a lot of things that could have easily gone extremely badly for oil price and oil supply. And so with this in mind, you are bearish on crude, and you know, your answer there starts to spell out why, but take us deeper into why other investors out there might also be singing to a similar tune. Sure. The big thing right now is we're in a big over supply. Yeah, the way we're counting the barrels, it looks like we're one and a half to 2 million barrels a day over supply right now. And if we look forward over the next few months, what were some of the things that were supposed to happen? Iran was supposed to go down on production. They're probably going to stay flat or even go up a little bit, especially based on the recent announcements from the Trump administration of Iranian oil to China being okay. And uh, the US probably is firming up its own production growth, which was at risk, you know, not but a few weeks ago when we were nearing 55 WTI. The US may have fallen, and now it looks like with the amount of hedging that was done recently at higher prices, the US should deliver pretty good production growth. How how good? You know, to the tune of half a million and even up to 600,000 barrels a day on an exit basis this year. Brazil is ahead of schedule, far ahead of, I think where the market was. Everybody knows Guyana is in good shape. So, you know, not to list them all out, but there are a lot of good production growth stories. OPEC will still be coming back, right, with another four or 500,000 barrels a day over the next few weeks. Once you start piling that on, we start heading into extremely big surpluses in the global market. So what is the market focused on right now? The biggest headwind in this climate from your own assessment. And on the other side, is there is there a tailwind that we should be anticipating to the upside? Because I mean, it's hard to imagine that there would be a tailwind to the upside if there was more of the kind of drill baby drill that President Trump has talked about, because that would actually just further impact some of the very oil companies that are looking to securitize margins and have to fight fiduciary duty as well to their investors that kind of heat hit some of their own expectations on that front too. Great points. What we think is that maybe there's not a good tailwind, but there are things that will limit the downside. What we've analyzed in our supply demand balance, the surplus is so big that you could have an unmitigated down move. I could go down to, you know, some really, uh, unbelievably low price versus what expectations have been. But what I think will stop that is the fixes, right? The low price fixing low price. The Chinese will start buying a lot more strategic petroleum reserve barrels on their part. They can buy. We've seen them buy a million barrels a day. So that's a huge, um, sort of a safety net for the price of oil. You'll get a better demand. You'll get some diesel getting in front of natural gas, maybe 200,000 barrels a day globally there. And the US will slow down on growth, and OPEC can tap the brakes on how much it's returning to the market. You start adding those up and you get a you get a fix to the over supply that will be compelled by low prices. Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
ABC News
12 hours ago
- ABC News
Does travel insurance cover cancellations due to war or natural disasters?
Do you really know what your travel insurance covers? This week, passengers faced cancellations and lengthy delays on flights due to the Middle East conflict, with routes to major cities cut off across the globe. While operations in Dubai and Qatar have resumed and airspaces reopened, it's times like these that it pays to know exactly what your travel insurance covers We spoke to the experts to find out what you're entitled to when a conflict breaks out or a natural disaster unfolds. In short, no. That's what Wendy discovered after buying travel insurance for her adult son weeks before the conflict in the Middle East. Stranded at Doha airport after winning a European holiday, and despite getting a full refund for the cancelled flight, Christopher was told he would have to pay the difference for an alternative ticket with another airline. "We were really shocked. I can understand war and unrest is a very top-tier issue, but it's still interesting how they can get around it because it falls under something that's outside of your control," Wendy said. It's a situation insurance expert Jodi Bird from consumer advocacy group CHOICE said was far more common than many people realised. "Pretty much across all policies there's a blanket ban," he said. "There's no policies that CHOICE are aware of that will cover claims resulting from war." It's pretty straightforward, according to Mr Bird. It's all about the bottom line. "Travel insurance generally doesn't like to cover things like war because it costs too much money," he said. "For some reason, they've decided that war is kind of a blanket ban across pretty much all policies." Put simply, it doesn't make a difference. You won't be covered regardless of the premium you're paying, Mr Bird said. Even the most expensive policies don't offer protection when conflict breaks out overseas. "You might find some variation in things like a pandemic — there were a lot more insurers that covered for pandemic before we had one," he said. Unfortunately, timing doesn't help. Wendy's family had no inkling there was a risk when they booked. "In what way, in our wildest dreams … a transit flight through Qatar, which thousands and thousands of passengers are doing around the world every day, would you ever consider that there's going to be a war there?" she said. The Insurance Council of Australia's deputy CEO, Kylie McFarlane, said it doesn't matter when the policy is taken out. If there is no conflict or war at the time of purchase, the fine print still excludes any claims arising from those events. It depends on your level of cover, but in many cases you may be protected. Natural disasters like floods, cyclones or bushfires are treated differently to war or a conflict. "Extreme weather events may be an inclusion," Ms McFarlane said. "It all comes down to the insurance policy and the provider, so if you're concerned, speak to your insurer." Absolutely — and don't give up if your claim is knocked back. "You should not accept that as the last port of call, unless you absolutely agree with them," Mr Bird said. "The first thing you need to do is raise a complaint to the insurer themselves and ask them to revisit your claim. And if they don't give you a satisfactory answer, you can escalate the complaint to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority." Wendy reached out to the insurance company, but they simply directed her to the clause on her policy showing that war or unrest made any claims null and void. "It's not one of those things that they even raise for you in the beginning, and even if you'd looked at the exclusions at the back, it still wouldn't occur to us," she said. Start by looking beyond the top-line benefits on the website and dig into the exclusions. "Every product disclosure statement has a section called 'general exclusions' — that's a bit that is good to read," he said. "That will give you an understanding of what they may or may not cover — big events like war, pandemic, terrorism, civil unrest. That will give you a good idea of what it is that you're actually buying." Yep. "Travel insurance is definitely worth it — especially just for the medical cost line," Mr Bird says. "It's worth it basically all the time for overseas travel. You will need travel insurance to cover the medical and repatriation costs if you have a problem overseas. Those are the kinds of things where you can really get into a lot of trouble financially if you're not covered." While Wendy's son was able to get a refund for the cancelled flight, they weren't able to pay out the difference of a more expensive flight for him to get to Europe. Or the extra costs associated with travelling from a different city to his intended destination. Wendy has a message for other travellers . "Beware, and understand that you can fully pay for your trip and be prepared, and you can buy your travel insurance, and then still you have to be prepared to cover all the costs yourself if something goes wrong," she said.
Reuters
15 hours ago
- Politics
- Reuters
Israel killed 30 Iranian security chiefs and 11 nuclear scientists, Israeli official says
June 27 (Reuters) - Israel killed more than 30 senior security officials and 11 senior nuclear scientists to deliver a major blow to Iran's nuclear ambitions, a senior Israeli military official said on Friday in summarizing Israel's 12-day air war with Iran. The June 13 opening strike on Iran, 1,500 km (930 miles) away, severely damaged its aerial defences and destabilised its ability to respond in the critical early hours of the conflict, the official said. Israel's air force struck over 900 targets and the military deeply damaged Iran's missile production during the war that ended with a U.S.-brokered ceasefire, the official said. "The Iranian nuclear project suffered a major blow: The regime's ability to enrich uranium to 90% was neutralized for a prolonged period. Its current ability to produce a nuclear weapon core has been neutralized," the official said. Iran, which denies trying to build nuclear weapons, retaliated against the strikes with barrages of missiles on Israeli military sites and cities. Iran said it forced the end of the war by penetrating Israeli defences. Iranian authorities said 627 people were killed in Iran, where the extent of the damage could not be independently confirmed because of tight restrictions on the media. Israeli authorities said 28 people were killed in Israel. In a statement, Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Friday he had directed the military to draft a plan to safeguard air superiority over Iran, prevent nuclear development and missile production, and address Iran's support for militant operations against Israel.
Irish Times
19 hours ago
- Politics
- Irish Times
Two tribes: How Israel and Iran became enemies
Any understanding of the conflict that has shaken the Middle East for the past two weeks must take into account the shifting relationship between Israel and Iran and the complex politics of nuclear technology in the region, which have seen Israel consistently project its military and intelligence strengths to resist any attempt of the part of regional states to pose a nuclear threat to its existence. Although it seems unimaginable today, the relationship between Iran and Israel has not always been antagonistic. From the pre-revolutionary period under the Shah to the early years of the Islamic Republic, relations between Israel and Iran, while never friendly, were pragmatic and based on shared geopolitical interests. In the 1950s the Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion developed the so-called 'periphery' doctrine based on the view that Israel should develop close relations with non-Arab neighbours, such as Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, to protect itself from hostile Arab states. The alliance was informal and consisted for the most part of secret and clandestine contacts. According to historian Avi Shlaim, Iran was 'the jewel in the crown of the alliance of the periphery'. The non-Arab states shared, with Israel, a fear of the expanding influence of Egypt's charismatic president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leading figure in the pan-Arabist movement promoting Arab unity, and a supporter of the Palestinian cause. Iran and Israel also saw Iraq as a common threat and, by 1960, Israel was supporting Iraqi Kurds who were fighting the revolutionary regime in Baghdad. READ MORE Israel's Mossad created an intelligence alliance with Iran and Turkey in 1958, while Tehran and Tel Aviv developed a close military relationship that lasted until the 1979 revolution in Iran. Unlikely as it might seem, the relationship between the two countries did not end in 1979. Initially, the foreign policy of revolutionary Iran was hostile to Israel but soon the Islamic Republic saw the benefit of an Israeli counterweight to its Arab neighbours, especially Iraq. The Israelis shared the Iranian view of Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, as a threat to security and a low-level relationship between the two developed. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, in early 1980, the then Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin, approved the shipment of weapons and materials for the Iranian army. By the 1990s, co-operation between Israel and Iran had diminished significantly. Nonetheless, relations were not entirely hostile. The reformist Iranian president, Mohammed Khatami, made conciliatory moves towards Israel as part of his policy of greater engagement with the United States, including the suggestion that Iran would support a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. But matters changed in the next decade. Ironically, the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq led to the defeat of long-standing Iranian rivals and resulted in growing Iranian influence in the region, while Israel began to see Iran as the source of every regional conflict. The 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency, with his virulent anti-Israel rhetoric and Holocaust denials, deepened Israeli fears of Iran, as relations between the two assumed the hostile nature that has largely characterised them ever since. Israel's perception of its isolation in the region led to an early interest in the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Ben Gurion launched Israel's nuclear project in the 1950s with the construction of a large complex at Dimona, a city in the Negev desert. The project was developed with particular assistance from France, which at this time was intent on holding on to its colonial possessions in North Africa and saw Israel as a potentially powerful ally in the region. [ Nuclear weapons have been in the Middle East for decades – not in Iran, but in Israel Opens in new window ] In 1960, Israel and France signed a series of agreements that saw the French provide Israel with a large reactor. In addition to this, they supplied Israel with enriched uranium and a plant for the extraction of plutonium. Israel undertook formally to use these only for civilian purposes, but both sides understood their true intent. Co-operation between the two states was kept secret and the US was initially unaware of these developments. Declassified documents reveal that the US repeatedly questioned what Israel was doing at Dimona. It is estimated that the first nuclear weapons were produced at Dimona in 1966-67. By the end of the 1960s, the US finally became aware of its true purpose and a deal was struck whereby the US would remain silent if Israel also kept quiet. In 1986 a former nuclear technician, Mordechai Vanunu, revealed the extent of the nuclear weapons programme by offering details and pictures of the Dimona reactor to the Sunday Times newspaper. Before the article was published, Vanunu was kidnapped in Rome by Mossad and returned to Israel, where he was convicted of treason and sentenced to 18 years in prison, 11 of which were spent in solitary confinement. Today it is estimated that Israel has about 90 nuclear warheads and has produced enough plutonium for 100-200 weapons. However, Israel neither acknowledges nor denies the existence of its nuclear weapons, is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is not subject to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Israel's nuclear ambitions extend beyond possessing weapons to a concern to ensure that no other state in the region should do so. The attacks on Iran over the past two weeks are the most severe in pursuit of this objective but certainly not the first. [ Israel-Iran conflict: Does Israel have a secret nuclear programme? Opens in new window ] Over the past five decades, Israel has undertaken a variety of actions to stymie the nuclear ambitions of others in the region. From the 1970s onwards, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, pursued the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear capabilities in the belief that this would make his regime secure. The French were involved in this once more. In 1976 Iraq bought a nuclear reactor from France together with a limited supply of enriched uranium and technical training. The Osiraq reactor, as it became known, was purchased under an agreement that it would be used for peaceful purposes and was also subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. However, the Israeli leadership thought otherwise. On June 7th, 1981, Israel attacked and partially destroyed Iraq's nuclear research reactor, killing 10 Iraqi soldiers and one French engineer in the air strike. Before this, they had sabotaged equipment intended for delivery to the facility and in 1980 assassinated a leading scientist working on Iraq's nuclear programme. Afterwards, Israel claimed that the attack represented a big setback to Iraq's ambitions. Other observers argued that they simply convinced Saddam of the need to move faster and in greater secrecy to pursue nuclear weapons capability. Twenty-six years after the attack on Iraq, the Israeli air force destroyed a nuclear facility that was being developed in Syria with the assistance of North Korea. In the early 1980s, the Syrian regime began to develop weapons of mass destruction in response to its recognition that its conventional military capacity was no match for Israel's forces. To begin with, the focus was on developing chemical weapons such as Sarin nerve gas and a reliable 'delivery' system, in the form of Soviet-built Scud missiles. However, before his death in 2000, Hafez al-Assad entered into negotiations with North Korea to build a secret nuclear reactor in western Syria. Co-operation between the two regimes began in the late 1990s. The Israelis identified the reactor for what it was in 2006, Mossad having gained access to the laptop computer of a senior Syrian government official while he was visiting London. However, US intelligence on the extent of Syria's nuclear capabilities was less than definitive and the then US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, adopted the view that to bomb the reactor in the face of uncertain intelligence was reckless, favouring a diplomatic route instead. The then Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, told US president George W Bush that a Syrian nuclear weapons program represented an existential issue for Israel, and, on September 6th, 2007, Israel launched a military strike that destroyed the reactor and maintained Israel's own nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Although it is strongly associated with the Islamic Republic, Iran's nuclear programme began under the Shah. In 1972 he announced that Iran would build a nuclear apparatus to generate 23,000 megawatts of power. Two years later the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran was established with a commitment to build 40 reactors. Iran's nuclear programme drew on assistance from the US, West Germany, France and South Africa. From the outset, there was speculation that the ambition was to build a nuclear bomb in addition to the overt aim of civil power generation, given the Shah's broader objective of establishing Iran as a regional power. Following the 1979 revolution, the nuclear programme was initially cancelled by the Ayatollah Khomeini who regarded it as another ploy to make Iran dependent on the West. But it was revived during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq when it became clear that Saddam Hussein was moving forward with a nuclear weapons programme. An Iranian woman holds a poster with portraits of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and late supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as people celebrate a ceasefire between Iran and Israel in the capital Tehran. Photograph: Atta Kenare/AFP via Getty Iran has been a signatory of the NPT since 1968 and has repeatedly declared its adherence to the provisions of the treaty, as well as its commitment solely to the civil application of nuclear power, and its position that nuclear weapons are contrary to Islam. While doubts about its intentions persisted, its religious stance against weapons of mass destruction has been consistently asserted since Khomeini's time. There were negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, but these were undermined by the hostile stance of the Bush administration and the subsequent election in 2005 of the hardline, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to the Iranian presidency. Twelve years later, Iran concluded a deal negotiated with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – under which Iran committed to enrich no uranium beyond 3.67 per cent and to limit its stockpile of uranium enriched to that level to a maximum of 300kg. In return Iran secured an easing of sanctions to the value of several billion dollars. The agreement was immediately attacked by Israel, Saudi Arabia and US Republicans in Congress. In July 2018, during Trump's first presidency, the US withdrew from the deal. [ Israel's ambition: Destroy the heart of Iran's nuclear programme Opens in new window ] The Israeli attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities that began two weeks ago represent the culmination of a series of efforts at disruption that go back decades and have taken a number of forms. In 2009, Israel and the US combined to mount a cyber attack by installing a computer virus, known as Stuxnet, on computers at the Iranian nuclear plant at Natanz. The virus caused about 1,000 of the roughly 7,000 centrifuges at the facility to fail, significantly impacting Iran's nuclear ambitions. Between 2010 and 2012, a series of targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists were carried out, responsibility for which is generally attributed to Mossad. In November 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a scientist believed to be the key figure in Iran's nuclear programme, was killed outside Tehran . However, the bombing campaign that began on June 13th is by far the most significant attempt yet to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Netanyahu's ostensible motivation for the launch of hostilities was the release of an International Atomic Energy Agency report that found that Iran was in violation of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations for the first time in 20 years, prompting the Israeli leader to declare that Iran was taking steps to weaponise enriched uranium such that it represented an existential danger to Israel. A satellite image of damage at the Fordo enrichment facility in Iran after the US strikes, June 22nd. Photograph: Maxar Technologies via The New York Times The decision on the part of Donald Trump to join the Israeli assault is less straightforward to explain. In part it may have stemmed from divisions within his own administration over the merits of attacking Iran. It may also be a reflection of frustration with Iran's approach to the negotiations that the US had restarted on the nuclear issue and Trump's concluding that a show of force would push Tehran towards more far-reaching concessions in the event of a return to the negotiating table. All of this raises the question of what exactly Israel and the US have, in fact, achieved. Netanyahu described Israel's objectives in terms of eliminating the two concrete threats to its existence: the nuclear threat and the ballistic missile threat. Trump, on the other hand, characteristically set out a number of possible outcomes of the US intervention from a limited operation to destroy Iran's nuclear enrichment capacity and an end to its nuclear threat, to the 'unconditional surrender' of Iran and regime change . [ If Netanyahu wants regime change in Iran, it is unlikely to end well Opens in new window ] Netanyahu has declared success on his terms, while Trump has spoken of the 'obliteration' of Iran's nuclear capabilities. However, all the early indicators are that the attacks may have accomplished no more than setting back Iran's nuclear programme by a matter of months. A widely leaked report by the US Defence Intelligence Agency (the intelligence arm of the Pentagon) concludes that key elements of that programme could be restarted within months, and, as has been widely speculated, that much of Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium had been moved before the attacks, most likely to other secret sites. This is not to say that the Iranian regime has not been severely weakened by the attacks. Its effective inability to protect its own airspace and the loss of senior military and scientific personnel at Israeli hands represent both substantial losses and a blow to the already eroded legitimacy of the Islamic Republic for many Iranians. Nor did its erstwhile external allies offer any meaningful support. [ Did Iran move its uranium? Opinions split on fate of 400kg stockpile Opens in new window ] However, despite Netanyahu's calls on Iranians to rise up against the regime, there is no sign of this. Iranians are only too well aware of the regime's capacity for repression. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in protest after the death in custody in 2022 of Mahsa Amini, whose offence was the incorrect wearing of her hijab. In response, the regime deployed the full force of its repressive apparatus. Women were blinded with acid and beaten by members of the Basij militia that is part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Hundreds of protesters were shot . In November 2022 there were reports of poison gas attacks on girls' schools where the students had supported the protest movement. There is some organised opposition to the regime. However, it is highly fractured, ranging from Kurdish groups to monarchists, from small nationalist and leftist groups to reformists within ruling structures. But there is little co-ordination between them and no real prospect of a coalition of opposition forces capable of acting on a national level. The likeliest eventuality in the immediate aftermath of the attacks is of regime attempts at consolidation and control. Since June 13th there have been daily announcements of the arrest of those charged with 'spreading rumours' on social media. Iran has already executed a number of prisoners convicted of spying for Israel. A near total internet blackout is in place. With the Islamic regime still in place in Tehran and the likelihood that much of its nuclear capabilities remain intact, it appears that, at great cost in terms of human lives and increased regional instability, the war which began on June 13th may have done little more than bring all the key actors back to positions similar to those in which they found themselves at its outset. Dr Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the UCD school of politics and international relations
