Latest news with #PMF


Iraqi News
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Iraqi News
Iraqi parliament to advance PMF structure law after first reading, official says
Baghdad ( – The Iraqi Parliament is set to advance a new law defining the structure of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in its upcoming sessions, having already completed a first reading of the bill, a member of the parliamentary Legal Committee, Mohammed Anouz, stated on Tuesday (July 1, 2025). Anouz confirmed the 'PMF Structure Law' is now a priority for parliament, with a second reading and a final vote expected in the near future. The bill had its first reading on March 24, 2025. He also clarified that a separate 'Service and Retirement Law' for the PMF, which the government had withdrawn in March for amendments due to 'political disagreements' and reported 'US pressure' for the force to be under government control, will be re-submitted to parliament after the structure law is passed. This legislative process is a crucial step in formalizing the role and hierarchy of the powerful organization within the Iraqi state framework.


Rudaw Net
13 hours ago
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
US renews call Baghdad to ‘rein in' pro-Iran militia groups
Also in World 7 Kurds held in Libya after failed attempt to reach Europe US presses urgent restart of Kurdish oil exports, slams stalemate as 'unacceptable' Trump moves to lift broad sanctions on Syria: White House spox. Three Gorges Dam powers China's growth amid displacement, environmental concerns A+ A- WASHINGTON DC - The United States continues to call on the Iraqi government to bring pro-Iran militia groups, designated as terrorist organizations by Washington, under its control, a senior American official said on Wednesday. The US has 'expressed deep concerns on terrorist-designated Iran-backed militia groups who threaten Americans and Iraqi stability. We continue to urge the Iraqi government to rein in these groups and hold them accountable for breaking Iraqi law,' Andy Halus, Public Diplomacy Counselor at the US embassy in Baghdad, told Rudaw in response to a question about reports suggesting that the US is pressuring Iraq to withhold the salaries of the pro-Iran groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi). Several Iraqi pro-Iran militia groups warned last month that should the US support Israel in its then-escalating conflict with Iran or assassinate the Iranian supreme leader, American interests in the region would be targeted. While the US supported Israel, the groups did not openly carry out any attacks on American interests. The US brokered a ceasefire between Iran and Israel after 12 days of a deadly war. Despite the truce, several drone attacks have been reported in Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region in the last week. No party has claimed responsibility for the attacks which have targeted civilian and military locations. The PMF was established in 2014 during the Islamic State group (ISIS) blitz, which saw the group seize control of large parts of Iraq's north and west. Created in response to a fatwa, a religious edict, by Iraq's highest Shiite authority Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the PMF was initially an umbrella organization of roughly 70 predominantly Shiite armed groups, with approximately 250,000 members.


The National
a day ago
- Politics
- The National
Israel's war may have weakened the hold of Iran-aligned groups on Iraqi politics
The Middle East has been in turmoil since October 2023. Missiles have flown in just about every direction, and there is significant concern about what the future might hold. One of the surprises, however, is that Iraq has managed to stay out of the conflict. For years, many analysts have argued that Iraq has fallen completely under Iran's shadow partially through control that proxy groups exercise in the country. And yet, these groups have been almost entirely inactive since October 2023, leading to questions as to where exactly the balance of powers lies in Iraq. The Popular Mobilisation Forces were established following ISIS's 2014 invasion and occupation of Iraq's north-west. After the terror group's defeat, the PMF and affiliated groups sought and obtained direct representation in Parliament and in government. Like all other parties, they used those positions to extract rents and to exercise influence over policy and financial matters. The difference, however, is that the PMF used its status as a paramilitary organisation to impose outcomes in ways that many other groups could not. Many factions within the PMF were also plainly anti-western in their rhetoric. On occasion, their leaders could be seen directing marches of (relatively small numbers of) followers and openly declaring that their ultimate source of authority was the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, since 2003, Iraq has lost its monolithic status and has become a more complicated society. The PMF may have been pushing a specific political line, but much of the state and society have had little to no interest in being involved in regional struggles of any kind. Formally, the Iraqi government's position has been to seek to de-escalate tensions in the region and internally. Politically, however, the government is made up of myriad forces, including groups affiliated to the PMF, each of which has its own set of interests and the means to act upon it. The quietist groups have long been at a disadvantage, however, given that they favour a moderate and dialogue-based approach that shies away from confrontation no matter the circumstances, which more aggressive groups have consistently used to push the limits on a range of issues. The contrast can most obviously be seen after arriving at Baghdad International Airport, the road to which has been co-opted by the PMF's efforts to construct a narrative of struggle and resistance. But visitors to Baghdad who drive along that road can look immediately to the left and see the enormous campus of the newly established American University of Baghdad and the thousands of students who now visit every day. English business schools and language academies can be found almost everywhere in the capital, including on streets that sometimes bear the names and faces of Iranian officers and their Iraqi allies who were killed in action by the American military. Recent developments will probably have an impact on that delicate balance. Iraqis and outside observers will all have noticed that the PMF did not get involved at all during the recent fighting between Iran and Israel. Analysts have offered different explanations for what was happening in the background. Some have said that Iran was opposed to any involvement by the PMF for fear that this could lead to greater escalation. Others have argued that Iran's main priority in Iraq is not to seek military support from the PMF but rather to keep the flow of dollars from Baghdad open. According to that narrative, any direct military involvement by the PMF could threaten that financial lifeline. Others still have noted that the Iraqi government – mainly Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani and the security forces – worked tirelessly behind the scenes to keep the country out of the conflict, which has been bearing fruit. Now that the conflict is over, however, a number of consequences will probably flow. Regardless of which narrative is the most accurate, the fact that the PMF did not take any action whatsoever will be interpreted by many as a sign of weakness and vulnerability. Political forces that have always been antagonistic to the PMF will seek at least partial realignment on a number of fronts, much of which the PMF will find hard to resist given that it will all be coming at the same time. Within the Iraqi government itself, and within governing coalitions – including but not limited to the Co-ordination Framework (of which the PMF is a part) – the quietist camp will necessarily feel emboldened. It could be that Iraqi politics will be entering a non-confrontation stage, in which armed skirmishes of any kind will be eschewed in favour of business as usual (including the continued and uninterrupted extraction of rents). Clearly, however, Iraq's relationship with Iran will not break entirely. All that is likely to happen is that Iraqi groups will feel less compelled to consult or to defer to Tehran in as many matters as before. Iraqi political groups' relentless rent-seeking for the past 20 years has always meant that they are economically independent, and many now will feel less politically tethered to Iran as well. If that does happen, it is altogether unclear whether this will translate into any concrete improvements for ordinary Iraqis. It will probably only mean that political power will gradually slip away from the confrontation camp – not with a bang, but with a whimper – with nothing much to replace it other than Iraq's decrepit political system. Iraqi politics is too fractious to coalesce around a concrete strategy, particularly in relation to foreign policy, given the country's limited regional influence. Thus, it is not that a new strategy is being developed. It is that the previous status quo will probably fray without collapsing altogether.


Shafaq News
a day ago
- Politics
- Shafaq News
PMF restructuring law advances in Iraqi Parliament
Shafaq News - Baghdad Iraq's Parliament is advancing legislation to formalize the structure and responsibilities of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a senior lawmaker confirmed on Tuesday. Mohammad Anouz of the Parliamentary Legal Committee said the first reading of the draft PMF Administrative Structure Law was completed during the holy month of Ramadan and will be prioritized in upcoming sessions for a second reading and vote. Passed in 2016, Law No. 40 incorporated the PMF into Iraq's security framework but left structural and administrative gaps. The new bill, comprising 17 articles, outlines leadership roles, directorate organization, and institutional affiliations. The draft replaces a previous version known as the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which the government withdrew in March due to political contention and US pressure to reinforce state oversight of the PMF. Anouz also noted that the amended PMF's Service and Retirement Law will be reintroduced once the current legislation is approved.


Shafaq News
2 days ago
- Business
- Shafaq News
No end in sight: Iraq's Parliament drowns in delays and disagreements
Shafaq News With fewer than a week remaining until the scheduled end of Iraq's parliamentary recess, mounting political tensions and strategic stalling tactics are drawing renewed scrutiny. Multiple lawmakers have confirmed the existence of internal pressures by party leaders and bloc heads to delay parliamentary sessions and obstruct legislative progress. The motivations, they warn, are deeply political—ranging from efforts to avoid passing controversial laws to shielding the government and certain factions from public embarrassment ahead of national elections. This institutional stagnation comes at a critical moment. Iraq's legislature, formally in recess until July 9, has already missed a series of opportunities to address pending legislation, including laws with direct implications for security, governance, and electoral integrity. According to observers, the political inertia reflects a broader dysfunction rooted in partisan interests and a long-standing system of consensus politics that many believe has paralyzed representative governance. Laws Blocked, Accountability Avoided Parliamentary sources, including members of the Finance Committee and independent MPs, have confirmed that both contentious and non-contentious laws remain frozen. Among the most prominent examples is the draft law on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). According to MP Mohammed Qutayba al-Bayati, secretary-general of the National Braves Party, the PMF law faces deep intra-Shiite disagreements over core provisions related to leadership and retirement regulations. Al-Bayati told Shafaq News that the legislature is unlikely to convene before the scheduled end of its recess, despite growing calls from lawmakers to resume parliamentary work. Even if the Council of Representatives reconvenes promptly, the fate of the PMF law—as well as other key legislation—will hinge on political consensus. 'These laws will not be passed without a clear political agreement among faction leaders,' he emphasized. Beyond the PMF file, other proposals affecting broad sectors of the population have also stalled. Al-Bayati pointed out that even laws with no direct political controversy remain suspended. Among them is the federal general budget for 2025, which the parliament has yet to receive from the government. The delay is particularly striking given that more than half the fiscal year has already passed. Finance Committee member Moeen al-Kadhimi anticipated that the budget draft would be submitted by early July following Cabinet approval. Yet another committee member, Jamal Kocher, expressed doubt over whether the government will forward the budget to parliament at all. Kocher raised concerns about the potential use of the budget process as a platform for electoral promotion, implying that political calculations could again override institutional obligations. Coordinated Absences, Factional Maneuvering For Independent MP Haitham al-Fahd, the paralysis is not coincidental. He attributed the legislative deadlock to deliberate pressure from political leaders seeking to prevent sensitive laws from surfacing before the elections. Speaking to Shafaq News, he confirmed that numerous MPs have recently called for parliament to interrupt its recess and resume sessions to vote on urgent laws, including the PMF statute, electoral commission restructuring, and other regulatory matters. However, political leadership appears to be withholding support. 'Some of these laws could put the government or specific parties in a difficult position,' al-Fahd explained, 'which is why there is visible hesitation, if not outright avoidance.' He added that there are real and varied motives behind the obstruction of sessions. Among them is the decision by some Kurdish MPs to boycott proceedings in response to the federal government's failure to release salaries to the Kurdistan Region. Others, he noted, are avoiding parliament to block potential amendments to the election law—seen by some as a threat to their electoral prospects. A third group reportedly fears that pushing through legislation like the PMF law could increase pressure on the prime minister, who is already navigating a dense political minefield. 'We remain firmly committed to passing priority laws, especially those on the PMF,' al-Fahd said. 'But internal bloc dynamics and political maneuvering continue to prevent the Council from doing its job.' Parliament's Diminished Role According to political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi, the dysfunction runs far deeper than the current recession. In his view, Iraq's parliament has increasingly taken on the form of a 'silent institution'—a body that exists in name but has lost much of its legislative and oversight capacity. Al-Tamimi attributes this decline to the entrenchment of ethno-sectarian power-sharing arrangements, or "muhasasa," which have institutionalized elite pacts at the expense of genuine deliberative governance. He told Shafaq News that the State Administration Coalition—the post-October 2021 political framework composed of major Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish factions—has prioritized political balance over state-building. 'Decision-making has been reduced to behind-the-scenes agreements based on partisan interest…effectively neutralizing parliament's role in passing strategic laws that impact citizens' daily lives.' Al-Tamimi also recalled the alternative proposed by the head of the Patriotic Shiite Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, who in 2021 called for abandoning the consensus model in favor of a 'national majority government.' Al-Sadr's vision aimed to empower parliament to hold the executive accountable and legislate independently of elite bargaining. However, the collapse of that project—and the reassertion of consensus politics—has returned the legislature to a state of inertia. Ongoing divisions among political blocs, coupled with the absence of genuine reform willpower, have, in al-Tamimi's words, 'reduced the parliament to a procedural entity without real influence.' The consequence, he warned, is a sharp decline in public trust and a hollowing of Iraq's democratic institutions. Missed Sessions, Electoral Risks The evidence of legislative underperformance is quantifiable. Shafaq News conducted a review in April 2025 showing that Iraq's fifth parliamentary session had completed only 51 percent of its scheduled sittings, as mandated by the Council's internal bylaws. Since January 2022, the Council has convened only 132 sessions—far below the required standard of 256 annual sittings, or eight sessions per month across two four-month legislative terms. This legislative absenteeism has real implications. The delay in passing the federal budget, electoral law amendments, and public sector reforms is stalling governance across all levels. The lack of parliamentary action is also threatening the timeline for the next general election. Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission has scheduled the upcoming vote for November 2025, following a prior postponement linked to legal and procedural delays. Failure to resolve the legal framework and pass key laws—especially concerning the electoral commission and voting procedures—could jeopardize the election's credibility or even delay it further. Political observers caution that absent a fundamental change in institutional behavior, the upcoming polls may replicate past patterns of low turnout, fragmented participation, and disputed outcomes.