Latest news with #Sykes-PicotAgreement
Memri
21-07-2025
- Politics
- Memri
Druze Revolts, Then And Now
Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash in exile in Saudi Arabia Exactly a century ago, what began as a dispute about local power in the Druze majority region of Southern Syria erupted into a long-lasting anti-imperialist revolt, one that would have a lasting regional impact. In July 2025, a different Druze revolt threatened to change the trajectory of political change in Syria and is already havening regional implications. The Druze, a relatively small and compact ethnic and religious minority found mostly in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, are once again in the spotlight. On July 21, 1925, Druze feudal leader Sultan Al-Atrash announced a revolt against the French Mandate in the Levant. French rule in Syria, part of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between Britain and France, had already been rocky from the start. French efforts at modernizing and controlling Syria had also been characterized by a considerable amount of meddling and heavy-handed micromanaging. The powerful Al-Atrash family (the Turshan, plural of Atrash) had sent representatives to iron out differences with the French only to have them jailed as hostages in order to secure good behavior from the Druze. The French did not quite know who they were dealing with. Sultan Al-Atrash had lost a father to the Ottomans, been drafted into the Turkish Army and later had fought the French in past battles.[1] This was a warrior chief from among a warrior people. Jealous of his personal power and feudal privileges, the Great Syrian Revolt Al-Atrash ignited was not a parochial one but framed in the potent language of Syrian Arab Nationalism, anti-imperialism and freedom. His revolutionary manifesto (drafted by Damascus intellectuals) even called for the "application of the principles of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man." The humble Arab masses, what Al-Atrash dubbed "the patchers of cloaks" were especially inspired by this cause.[2] Despite many small victories and undoubted bravery, Al-Atrash would eventually lose the war to the French but become a legendary figure, even in the West (he was portrayed heroically in the December 1925 issue of The Atlantic, in an article written by a Revisionist Zionist).[3] While he may have lost on the battlefield, Al-Atrash's cause won politically, giving a tremendous boost to both Syrian patriotism and Arab Nationalism, a feat that would later earn him the praise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hafiz Al-Assad. And yet in 1946, 20 years after that nationalist revolt, the Al-Atrash clan fought fiercely against the newly independent Arab government in Damascus (under Presidents Shukri Al-Quwatli and Adib Shishakli) to maintain Druze rights and autonomy. The Druze, like the Alawites, and like the Christians of neighboring Lebanon, seemed to have had two quarreling factions within their ranks: those seeking unity with the greater whole – either with the state and/or the Arab nation – and those leaning towards greater autonomy, federalism, or separation.[4] Clipping of PLO Chief Yasser Arafat with an ailing Sultan Al-Atrash The Turshan still exist but they are not the leading political figures of the Syrian Druze today. As with other polities and individuals in Syria over the past 15 years, the Druze have had to maneuver and scheme in their relations with the state, with each other, with the Assad regime, during the brutal Syrian Civil War, and now with the new Syrian government headed by Islamist President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. There were Syrian Druze who fought against Assad and there were Syrian Druze who collaborated with and indeed held high military rank in the Assad regime army. A (pro-Al-Hijri) Druze fighter desecrating the tomb of Wahid Al-Balous (July 2025) Syria's most prominent Druze figures today represent the two sides of that historic Druze duality and ambivalence. 30-year-old Laith Al-Balous represents the more Syrian Arab nationalist Druze tendency, looking towards today's Damascus government. The Al-Balous (through Laith's father, Wahid Al-Balous, who was assassinated by the Assad regime in 2015) raised their own militia which fought against Jihadists and against aggressive Bedouin (Sunni Arab) neighbors but which also mostly leaned against the Assad regime.[5] Druze fighter posing with dead Syrian government troops (July 2025) The traditional Druze religious leadership, especially in the person of Venezuela-born 60-year-old Hikmat Al-Hijri (many Druze have ties with South America, especially Venezuela), leaned much more decisively towards the Assad regime through the years. Al-Hijri broke with the Assad regime only at the very end, and much more clearly represents the autonomy-seeking tendency among the Druze.[6] And although Al-Hijri's powerbase was initially religious, he is now very much a political player, with his own militia base and international ties (to the Israeli Druze).[7] Critics also accuse Al-Hijri of having recruited former Assad regime officers among the Syrian Druze and to be deeply involved in the Syrian drug trade across the border into Jordan. Both Al-Balous and Al-Hijri are connected, in different ways, in the recent violence in Syria's Druze majority Suwayda Governorate. One of the challenges the new government in Damascus faces is how to incorporate breakaway provinces back into a centrally-ruled Syria. This is a major problem with the Kurdish ruled Syrian Northeast and with Druze Suwayda.[8] Earlier this month, the Damascus government saw what seemed a golden opportunity to reincorporate Suwayda into Syria. The 1925 war was triggered by a dead cat belonging to a French officer. The ostensible trigger for the 2025 war was the stealing of a Druze vegetable truck at a pro-government Bedouin-run checkpoint. Both local events were, of course, intimately connected to larger questions of power and authority in Syria, a century ago under French military, today, under Syria's new Islamist rulers. Anti "Al-Hijri Gangs" propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) With the vegetable truck incident, tensions between Bedouin and Druze (which are nothing new) then exploded into outright conflict, with kidnappings and murders on both sides. Al-Hijri's men – already regarded suspiciously by Damascus because of the international ties, the Assad officer connection and the smuggling question – were prominent in fighting (and killing) their Bedouin rivals. Damascus saw the sending of troops as a way to solve several problems – restore order, extend state power, curtail (or maybe eliminate) a troublesome local potentate, perhaps also build up a more amenable local figure in Laith Al-Balous.[9] Infamous image of Druze cleric having his mustache clipped by government soldier (July 2025) But disaster struck. The Damascus units initially sent in had two major problems. They seem to have been made up of raw recruits and they were contaminated by open religious animus. Videos of government soldiers mocking the Druze including several showing government fighters forcibly shaving the mustaches of Druze elders peppered social media. Islamists called for "no Druze mustaches (shawarib) or baggy pants (the traditional Druze sherwal)." And if insults were not bad enough, government troops and the pro-government Bedouin militias committed many human rights abuses against Druze civilians (not just against Al-Hijri's fighters) while Al-Hijri's forces seem to not just ambushed government troops but also slaughtered civilian prisoners and taken hostages. All of this, the rhetoric, the videos, calls for revenge, calls to slaughter the Druze (not just "the criminal Al-Hijri") fed into larger regional and international narratives.[10] Enemies of the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government in Damascus, including Iran and its allies, Assad regime types, and the Syrian Kurds, wasted no time in highlighting the abuses, and there was plenty of real material to work with. Pro-Syrian government forces stand on image of Druze flag and Sultan Al-Atrash With its own Druze population, a valued part of the state of Israel's history and armed forces, rhetoric (and real violence) against the Syrian Druze and deeply ambivalent about Islamist rule in Damascus, the IDF intervened directly on the side of the Druze (meaning on the side of Al-Hijri).[11] Israel has long considered Southern Syria an area of deep strategic concern. Israel not only hit local government units and militias confronting Druze forces but spectacularly bombing the Syrian Defense Ministry in Damascus on live television. With the help of American mediation, Damascus tried to forge a de-escalation agreement with the Druze which may or may not last. Government troops pulled back which led to even worse violence which then seems to be leading to government forces returning to the region.[12] There are simultaneously community-generated efforts at vendetta and at peacebuilding happening between Druze and non-Druze. Anti-Druze, pro-government propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) Much blood has been spilt and hearts hardened, especially among the Syrian Sunni majority against the Druze. There is deep rage and fury on both sides. While pro-government voices seek to place all the blame on the mercurial Druze warlord Al-Hijri, the fact remains that many Druze (and some Christians) were slaughtered, raped or kidnapped by pro-government forces (whether Bedouin or uniformed government units) with no regard to political affiliation.[13] Syrian Bedouin Tribes Meet to Demand Disarming of Al-Hijri's militia (January 2025) Both sides are being portrayed as either victims or villains and both are portrayed too often, falsely, as uniform fronts.[14] There has been so much rhetoric and so much twisting, for political or ideological reasons, of the facts or exaggeration that it is important to make some general statements about the situation: 1) Tension and violence between Syrian Bedouin and Druze are not new. In addition, elements of both groups have connections with and are competitors in the lucrative smuggling (drugs and guns) business. They are not just in conflict because of religion or ethnicity. 2) There has been heightened anti-Druze tension for months in Syria.[15] In April 2025, there were bloodcurdling threats against Druze as a result of a suspicious video of a Druze man insulting the Prophet Muhammad which led to Syrian Sunni Muslim calls for violence against the Druze community as a whole.[16] 3) The March 2025 slaughter of Alawites by government forces on the Syrian Coast and the seeming subsequent impunity of those forces has heightened tensions with all ethnic and religious communities in the country across the board. The Druze, like the Kurds, and unlike the Christians, are armed and everyone is more leery of domination by Damascus after the March events. 4) Hikmat Al-Hijri is indeed a scheming, volatile figure who seeks to gain ultimate power within his community and is involved in all sorts of suspicious enterprises. But the indiscriminate slaughter of Druze by Bedouin/government forces seems to have boosted his popularity among Druze while Al-Balous's influence is greatly diminished in comparison. 5) The Syrian government has real ties with Syrian Bedouin which it has used and is using as a tool to project power. In this conflict, the Bedouin are not completely free actors but rather enthusiastic sub-contractors, pursuing their own vendettas and crimes (such as rape and looting) while broadly serving the political interests of the Damascus government, in a sense serving as the "bad cop" to the Syrian government's relative "good cop."[17] 6) The Damascus government – whatever President Al-Sharaa's real feelings on the matter – is itself not a free actor in this conflict either. Al-Sharaa is exquisitely aware of Qatari, and especially Turkish interests, in everything involving Syria, including the South. In a way, what happened with the Druze can be seen as a dry-run for a similar campaign to be directed against the Kurdish-led SDF in the country's Northeast, an issue of tremendous interest to the Erdogan regime. But Al-Sharaa seems to also be hampered by his own cadres, blunt and chaotic instruments who seem to be cruder and less disciplined than he would prefer.[18] Pro-Al-Hijri Propaganda on social media comparing him to Sultan Al-Atrash (July 2025) A century after Sultan Al-Atrash's heroism, the situation in Syria seems dire indeed, balancing on the edge of a knife. Any celebration marking the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and the great Druze warrior would ring extremely hollow today. A shaky ceasefire seems to be holding in Suwayda but what comes next?[19] The war-wrecked country's already frayed social fabric is again, deeply and severely wounded. *Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.
Al-Ahram Weekly
17-07-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Fluid borders - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
When American officials invoke the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement — whether it is contextually justified or not — they are doing two things. First, they are recalling a traumatic historical episode marked by the arbitrary partitioning of the region's lands and peoples to serve the imperial designs of early 20th-century France and Britain. Secondly, they are issuing a veiled warning, framed as historical reflection. No state in the region has called for dismantling the Sykes-Picot framework. Yet when US officials speak of the 'injustice' it inflicted, their rhetoric hints at disruption. Then as now, a familiar pattern emerges: a dominant power seeks to reshape the region according to its own strategic and ideological aims. Though increasingly criticised by US diplomats, the Sykes-Picot order shaped the modern Middle East — a region still burdened by structural crises. But undoing this legacy, however flawed, risks exacerbating instability rather than resolving it. Since May 2025, Tom Barrack, the billionaire real estate developer and longtime ally of Donald Trump, has served concurrently as US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Lebanon. In this dual role, Barrack has repeatedly invoked the legacy of Sykes-Picot as the deepest root of the region's upheavals. He made his first explicit reference to this on May 25, shortly after his appointment, in a post on X: 'A century ago, the West imposed maps, mandates, penciled borders, and foreign rule. Sykes-Picot divided Syria and the broader region for imperial gain—not peace. That mistake cost generations. We will not make it again.' He added: 'The era of Western interference is over. The future belongs to regional solutions.' In a June 2025 interview with Turkish media outlet NTV, Barrack again referenced the historical roots of regional instability, commenting on the stalled negotiations between Syria's interim government and Kurdish representatives over integration into state institutions: 'I think all these borders go back to Sykes-Picot, to the Sèvres Agreement, to all the failed lines. It's time to redraw and reach a new agreement.' On July 11, in an interview with The National, the official media outlet of the Abu Dhabi government, Barrack returned to the same theme — this time more implicitly. He invoked the term Bilad Al-Sham, a historical designation for Greater Syria prior to the 20th-century colonial partitions, warning that Lebanon could lose its autonomy if it failed to act decisively regarding Hizbullah's military arsenal: 'If Lebanon doesn't move, it's going to be Bilad Al-Sham again… Syrians say Lebanon is our beach resort,' Barrack said. He stressed that Lebanon faces an 'existential threat' if it does not disarm Hizbullah and reassert state sovereignty. Bilad Al-Sham historically refers to a vast area in the Arab Levant encompassing modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan — territory that was fractured by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Barrack's remarks provoked a sharp backlash across Lebanon's political spectrum. Many factions denounced his comments as an unacceptable intrusion into Lebanon's internal affairs and a direct challenge to its sovereignty. Ibrahim Al-Moussawi, a Hizbullah MP and member of Lebanon's Foreign Affairs Committee, called Barrack's remarks 'deeply troubling,' framing them as evidence of a broader US geopolitical agenda. In response to the growing controversy, Barrack attempted to clarify his comments in a follow-up post on X, claiming his remarks were meant to praise Syrian reforms, not threaten Lebanon. He reiterated Washington's commitment to fostering balanced and respectful ties between Beirut and Damascus. Notably, Barrack was not alone in challenging the permanence of the Sykes-Picot borders. On 3 July, Israeli outlet i24 News cited a source close to Syrian interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, who spoke in a startling manner about security and political arrangements between Israel and Syria that embrace a land swap including even Lebanon, within the framework of a vision that can be summarised as 'fluid borders,' where borders can be modified and lands exchanged in order to achieve 'peace,' 'stability,' and 'cooperation.' 'There is no such thing as peace for free,' the Syrian source told i24, outlining two main scenarios reportedly under discussion. In the first, Israel would retain a third of the Golan Heights, return another third to Syria, and lease the remaining third for 25 years. The second scenario would see Israel keeping two-thirds of the Golan while handing back the final third, potentially under a lease agreement as well. Intriguingly, this plan might also involve transferring the Lebanese city of Tripoli, along with areas in the north and the Beqaa Valley, to Syria. According to the source, Syria views Tripoli as a lost part of Greater Syria, one of five regions detached during the French Mandate to form modern Lebanon. The ambitions don't stop at redrawn borders. The vision includes a sweeping regional agreement involving Israel, Syria and Turkey, centred on water sharing, possibly even a pipeline connecting the Euphrates to Israel. And, in a similar way to the wave of anger Barrack's statements about Bilad Al-Sham prompted in Lebanon, these statements sparked outrage, but Damascus distanced itself from them. It's difficult to determine the seriousness of these proposals. Many consider them 'trial balloons.' An Arab diplomat based in London told Al-Ahram Weekly that Barrack's persistent references to the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Bilad Al-Sham are causing increasing alarm in the region. 'The frequency and consistency of these remarks,' the diplomat noted, 'are far from coincidental; they appear as calculated signals. The US, Israel, several Gulf states, and political factions in Lebanon appear to be exerting intense pressure for the swift disarmament of Hizbullah. They have elevated this objective above all else,' he added, 'even concerns about rekindling internal strife or provoking another civil war in Lebanon. 'Why this urgency? Maybe because negotiations between Israel and Syria's transitional government have reportedly reached advanced stages. Washington seeks to normalise relations with both Syria and Lebanon in tandem. Hizbullah's political and military influence renders that impossible. Hence, the push to neutralise it,' he argues. The paradox lies in the fact that while the US claims to oppose colonial-style interventions like the Sykes-Picot Agreement, its support for Israeli territorial ambitions in Palestine, Southern Lebanon, and parts of southwestern and southern Syria undermines this stance. Critics argue that the US message — promoting non-interference and respect for self-determination — is contradicted by its actions. Moreover, many interpret Barrack's criticism of the Sykes-Picot Agreement as part of a broader realignment in US Middle East policy. Rather than rejecting the logic of the 1916 agreement outright, Washington may instead be seeking to replace it with a framework more closely aligned with its contemporary strategic goals—and those of Israel. In this context, Barrack's remarks on Sykes-Picot, Bilad Al-Sham, and the 'New Syria' as a regional model may point to a deeper ambition: the gradual unravelling of the century-old state system in the Middle East. Undoing Sykes-Picot, when deemed necessary, would involve more than just redrawing borders; it would signify the dismantling of the centralised, nationalist state structures that have shaped the region for generations. It is precisely this state-based order that remains the final obstacle to realising the vision of Greater Israel. Furthermore, the concept of 'fluid borders' in the Middle East — promoted subtly through US and Israeli strategic thinking — has become an increasingly evident tool for territorial manipulation under the guise of security. Rather than respecting the internationally recognised borders drawn during the Sykes-Picot era, which, though colonial in origin, still serve as a framework for sovereignty, the new strategy exploits Israel's security anxieties to justify de facto annexations and military buffer zones. This shift towards 'security geography' enables Israel, with US backing, to establish temporary or permanent military control beyond its recognised borders, particularly in areas like Gaza, where the ongoing genocidal war on the Palestinians has resulted not just in military incursions but in the destruction of civilian infrastructure and the depopulation of large parts of northern Gaza. These actions raise credible concerns about long-term demographic engineering and the creation of a strategic 'security belt' similar to the one previously attempted in Southern Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s. In Syria, Israel has increased its military footprint in the Quneitra Governorate near the Golan Heights — an area long coveted for its strategic depth and water access. Since early 2025, Israeli strikes and covert operations have extended deep into Syrian territory, capturing Mount Hermon and parts of Daraa, reinforcing the notion of a shifting border under military logic. In doing so, Israel has positioned itself as a permanent security actor in southern Syria, creating facts on the ground that undermine Syrian sovereignty and suggest the transformation of temporary military actions into long-term territorial control — an echo of the occupation of the Golan Heights, which was similarly justified as a security necessity before its de facto annexation. Meanwhile, the Israeli military's increasing activity along the Lebanese border, especially in Southern Lebanon around Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil, reflects a renewed interest in buffer zones reminiscent of the pre-2000 occupation. Following heightened clashes with Hizbullah since late 2023, Israeli shelling and displacement of border villages have prompted fears that Israel is once again attempting to push the frontier northwards. In this context, the rhetoric of 'defensive measures' cloaks a strategy that erodes state borders to secure territorial depth against asymmetric threats. This undermines Lebanon's sovereignty and supports the broader theory that the principle of 'fluid borders' is being implemented as part of a US-Israeli effort to reorder the region. Thus, by challenging the validity of the Sykes-Picot framework, the United States is not promoting justice or local autonomy, but rather redrawing lines of influence to serve hegemonic and expansionist interests. * A version of this article appears in print in the 17 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
NDTV
20-06-2025
- Politics
- NDTV
How Did The Muslim World Go So Wrong?
You often run into people who look down upon the Muslim world, pointing at the chaos, armed terror groups, militia rule and dictatorship to conclude that there is something fundamentally wrong with Muslims and their religion. Others take the opposite view, arguing that the Muslim world's present-day turmoil owes much to the West's repeated interventions and historical injustices. Both arguments offer partial truths, but they miss the broader reality: much of the Muslim world, especially in West Asia, lies in ruins. The causes are complex and layered, but the evidence is undeniable. From the shattered boulevards of Tripoli to the bombed-out alleys of Aleppo, from Baghdad's sectarian heartlands to Gaza's crumbled skyline, a common image emerges - of nations torn apart, societies hollowed and futures stolen. This devastation is neither natural nor inevitable. It is the cumulative result of decades of war, opportunistic foreign interventions, proxy conflicts, repressive regimes and colonial legacies. And in all of this, ordinary people, displaced, disillusioned and discarded, are the ones who suffer the most. Aftershocks Of Empire This is not about defending despots or absolving extremists. It is a plea for consistency, justice and memory. It is a call to understand how historical interference, political hypocrisy and selective moral outrage have turned one of the world's richest cultural regions into a perpetual battleground. The story of the Muslim world's chaos is not just about religion or governance. It is about the aftershocks of empire, the exploitation of oil and ideology, and a world order that has failed millions. In the 1920s, Winston Churchill famously quipped that he was not in favour of allowing 'the Arab tribes' to control their own affairs in Palestine. This imperial disdain wasn't just personal opinion; it was policy. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France carved up West Asia through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, drawing arbitrary borders and installing loyalist rulers. These new 'nation-states' were not crafted with local realities in mind but were designed to serve European interests - strategic positioning, oil pipelines and control of trade routes. This era of manufactured states and manipulated societies set the stage for future instability. Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, each is a product of imperial drawing boards rather than organic nation-building. As regimes collapsed and identities clashed, these fissures widened. The West may have formally exited the region in the mid-20th century, but its legacy never left. Instead, West Asia continued to be haunted by postcolonial trauma, Cold War alignments and economic dependency. Sea Of Ruin Take Libya. Muammar Gaddafi ruled it for over four decades with an iron grip. He was a tyrant, but he also provided free education, healthcare and relative stability. NATO's intervention in 2011, under the guise of humanitarian protection, toppled him but offered no plan for what came next. Libya descended into chaos, with rival militias carving up the country. Weapons looted from Libyan arsenals flooded Mali and Syria, fueling other wars. Gaddafi's fall wasn't the birth of democracy; it was the opening act of a long, bloody disintegration. Iraq offers an even starker example. The 2003 US-led invasion, based on false claims of weapons of mass destruction, dismantled not only Saddam Hussein's regime but also the entire Ba'athist (party) state structure. The de-Ba'athification programme purged thousands of civil servants and military officers, creating a vacuum that was quickly filled by sectarian militias and, eventually, the dreaded and bloodthirsty Islamic State. Iraq went from dictatorship to a failed democracy haunted by car bombs and assassinations. Once a cradle of civilisation, it now struggles to keep the lights on. Syria, too, became a battlefield of global ambition. What began as peaceful protests in 2011 soon morphed into a full-scale civil war, drawing in Russia, the United States, Iran, Turkey, Israel and countless non-state actors. While Assad's brutality is undeniable, so too is the damage inflicted by competing foreign agendas. More than half of Syria's population has been displaced. Cities like Aleppo and Raqqa have become modern ruins. Afghanistan was a theatre of invasion and war, resulting in total collapse of the existing system. First it was the Communist USSR that invaded the country in the late '70s. It was ultimately ousted with the American money, muscle and machine guns after a decade of misrule. Then, the US-led allied forces invaded it in 2001, claiming to install stability and democracy. The experiment failed miserably. The ousted Taliban made a dramatic comeback in 2021, with Western forces making an inglorious retreat. They have left the local population, women and children, at the mercy of the extremist Taliban. Iran's Turn Now? And now it is Iran, dangerously poised to be on the road to ruin. It has been subjected to cycles of isolation, sanctions sabotage, and now, open threats of regime change. Its current hardline government owes its survival not just to repression but also to an embattled nationalism born from decades of foreign pressure. From the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed 1953 coup that ousted Prime Minister Mossadegh to present-day nuclear tensions, Iran's story is as much of external meddling as of internal strife. Meanwhile, regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar continue to enjoy Western patronage. These nations are no less autocratic, no more democratic. Yet, their wealth and alignment with Western strategic interests insulate them from criticism. Human rights violations, censorship and state-sponsored religious extremism are quietly tolerated. The West does not oppose dictatorship, it opposes defiant dictators. This selective morality has real consequences. When Western powers punish some regimes while shielding others, they lose credibility. Worse, they stoke cynicism and anger across the Muslim world. Young people see the hypocrisy. They see the bombs dropped in the name of freedom and the silence that follows when friendly monarchs crush dissent. In that silence, extremist narratives take root; terror groups do not emerge from cultural voids, they are born in environments of injustice, humiliation and betrayal. Even Sudan, often omitted from this conversation, has a familiar story. Its colonial past, where the British pitted ethnic groups against each other, laid the groundwork for later divisions. Post-independence governments, often backed or sanctioned by foreign powers, struggled to hold a fractured society together. The current infighting isn't just a power struggle, it is the delayed detonation of a colonial time bomb, exacerbated by modern meddling from Gulf rivals, the West, and even Russia. Gift Of Nostalgia Amid all this, it is the ordinary people who pay the highest price. Families displaced across generations. Children growing up without schools or safe drinking water. Doctors operating by flashlight in makeshift clinics. Artists silenced. Intellectuals exiled. Hope becomes a rare commodity. In Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, to name just a few, the future has become just a concept. In such an environment, the past - even a past ruled by dictators - can seem strangely preferable. Say what you will about Saddam or Gaddafi, many in their countries recall the order, security and predictability of life under their rule. That nostalgia isn't about love for tyranny but about despair at what followed. What the Muslim world needs isn't more interventions, more bombs, or more regime-change fantasies. It needs principled action from the global community. It needs investment in peacebuilding, infrastructure and local civil society. It needs space to breathe, heal and rebuild. The West Learns No Lessons This is not an ode to the past. It's a warning. If history continues to repeat itself, it won't just be West Asia that suffers. Instability radiates. Refugees flee. Radical ideologies spread. And global trust erodes. The price of selective intervention is paid not just in Baghdad or Tripoli, but in Paris, London and New York, too - mostly in boats full of refugees and immigrants. It's time to move beyond the tired binaries: West vs. East, Islam vs. modernity, stability vs. chaos. The real battle is between integrity and hypocrisy, between memory and amnesia. Only when Western powers hold themselves to the same standards they demand of others can we begin to imagine a different future for the Muslim world. Let that future be written not in the language of conquest or control but in the vernacular of justice, sovereignty and dignity - and hope for a better future for the Muslim world. Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
NDTV
26-05-2025
- Politics
- NDTV
"Era Of Western Interference Over. Future Belongs To...": US Envoy To Syria
Washington: Tom Barrack, US ambassador to Turkiye and special envoy to Syria, on Sunday slammed the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the Turkish empire for "imperial gain-not peace." He said the division of Syria was a historic mistake, as he stressed that the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in the country would open the door for prosperity and security. "A century ago, the West imposed maps, mandates, penciled borders, and foreign rule. Sykes-Picot divided Syria and the broader region for imperial gain-not peace. That mistake cost generations. We will not make it again," Barrack wrote on X, criticising the past Western policies. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a secret treaty between the United Kingdom and France, with assent from Russia and Italy, to define their mutually agreed spheres of influence and control in an eventual partition of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. The pact is widely seen as the foundation for the imposition of Western influence and arbitrary borders in the Arab areas of the region, particularly in oil-rich areas. Echoing US President Donald Trump's May 13 remarks in Riyadh, Barrack said the future of the Middle East depends on regional solutions and cooperation. "The era of Western interference is over. The future belongs to regional solutions, but partnerships, and a diplomacy grounded in respect. As President Trump emphasized in his May 13th address in Riyadh, "Gone are the days when Western interventionalists would fly to the Middle East to give lectures on how to live, and how to govern your own affairs," he wrote. Barrack noted that Syria's tragedy "was born from division," saying its "rebirth must come through dignity, unity, and investment in its people." "That starts with truth, accountability-and working with the region, not around it," he said. The statement follows a significant change in US policy over Syria following Trump's meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh earlier this month-- the first direct encounter between US and Syrian leaders in 25 years. Before the meeting, Trump ordered the removal of "brutal and crippling" sanctions on Syria, following which US has issued general license sanctions relief. The EU has also lifted economic sanctions on Syria on Tuesday to support reconstruction efforts. Barrack stressed that the US stands with Turkiye, the Gulf, and Europe - but "not with troops and lectures, or imaginary boundaries," but "shoulder-to-shoulder with the Syrian people themselves." "With the fall of the Assad regime, the door is open to peace - by eliminating sanctions, we are enabling the Syrian people to finally open that door and discover a path to renewed prosperity and security," he said. The US ambassador's statement came after he met Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa on May 24 in Istanbul to discuss the recent US decision to lift sanctions on Syria. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday said that Washington supports efforts to help Syria's new government succeed, warning that failure could trigger renewed conflict and regional instability.
Arab Times
19-05-2025
- Politics
- Arab Times
Indeed, for Arabs, it is all ‘soap'
THE Sykes-Picot Agreement was the final nail in the coffin of the Ottoman Empire. The Balfour Declaration then marked the next phase in the division of influence between Britain and France, leading to a significant increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine. Even before that fateful declaration was issued, when Jewish settlements began to be established in Palestine in 1908, Palestinian landowners were wary of this development. However, they did not actively prevent the new settlements. As events accelerated after World War I, the Arabs lacked the military power needed to halt the process of Judaization. Meanwhile, Europe provided financial support to the new settlers, who succeeded in establishing a network of settlements and forming a self-defense force. After World War II, Europe and Germany, seeking to atone for the atrocities committed by Hitler against the Jews, facilitated the increased Jewish immigration to Palestine. This historical context is crucial in countering attempts to displace Palestinians from their land, particularly in light of the Israeli Finance Minister's statement about relocating Gaza's population to a third country. For nearly two decades, several Arab countries have witnessed civil wars and internal divisions. Yet, despite this, the slogan 'Free Palestine' continues to be raised, while actions often move in the opposite direction, or as we say in Kuwaiti slang, 'praying towards the east.' Since 1948, false accusations have been leveled against the late Egyptian King Farouk, claiming his involvement in the use of defective weapons during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. He was also accused of being reactionary and of collaborating with the West and the Zionist movement. These accusations were used to justify Major Jamal Abdel Nasser's coup against the king in 1952 and the secession of Sudan from Egypt. Such claims were also exploited by power-seekers in different Arab countries. This period marked the beginning of a wave of revolutions (coups) that swept through the Arab world, starting with Iraq and Syria, followed by a failed coup attempt in Lebanon, Yemen, and Libya. In 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi led a coup that ousted King Idris Al-Senussi in Libya. I still remember the chants of the demonstrators in Tripoli that day, shouting, 'The Devil is better than Idris.' It is said that when King Idris Al- Senussi heard those chants, he prayed to God that Libya be ruled by the Devil. We all know the history of Gaddafi after the success of his coup and how he adopted the liberation of Palestine as his slogan. However, Gaddafi went too far in threatening Arab rulers, intervening in the Lebanese civil war, and attempting to invade Chad, instead of directing his army to liberate Palestine. In 2011, Muammar Gaddafi's regime collapsed, and he was killed in one of the most brutal ways. Following his death, militia leaders took control of various regions in Libya. Despite being a country rich in natural resources, with beautiful coastlines and fertile land, Libya has been reduced to ruins since 1969. This is similar to what the Ba'ath Party regime did in Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, who also raised the slogan of liberating Palestine. Saddam even went so far as to declare the formation of the 'Jerusalem Army.' However, instead of marching into Palestine, he invaded Kuwait. What has recently transpired in Libya, with Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, also known as 'Ghaniwa al-Kikli,' attempting to seize control of the country's resources and loot the central bank, mirrors what gangs in Somalia and Iraq have done. It has become evident that the slogan of liberating Palestine is often nothing more than a justification or pretext for theft and the illegal assumption of power. Even Palestinian factions, who are supposed to be the most dedicated to their cause, are not exempt from this behavior. This is why the proverb 'It is all soap to the Arabs,' which has been a hallmark of Arab culture since the year 800, when Ibn Khaldun referenced it in his book 'Ibn Khaldun and the Arabs', seems especially relevant today. What is happening in the Middle East is the result of a long history of division and discord, often at the expense of peoples and nations. In the end, as the saying goes, for Arabs, it is all 'soap'.
