Latest news with #TheConversationUK
Yahoo
7 hours ago
- Science
- Yahoo
Can you spot a ‘fake' accent? It will depend on where you're from
We all need to learn how to place trust in others. It's easy to be misled. Someone who doesn't deserve trust can appear a lot like someone who does – and part of growing up in a society is developing the ability to tell the difference. An important part of this is learning about the signals people give about themselves. These might be a smile, a style of dressing or a way of speaking. In particular, we use accents to make decisions about others – especially in the UK. But what if people adapt or change their accents to fit into a certain social group or geographical area? Our past research has shown that native speakers are pretty good at spotting such speech. We've now published a follow-up study that supports and further strengthens our original results. Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK's latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. We associate accents with places, classes and groups. Research shows that even infants use accents to determine whether they think someone is considered trustworthy. This can be a problem – studies have demonstrated that accents can affect someone's odds of getting a job – and potentially the likelihood of being found guilty of a crime. As with most topics in the social sciences, evolutionary theory has a lot to say about this process. Scientists are interested in understanding how people send and receive signals like accents, how those signals affect relationships between people and how, in turn, those relationships affect us. But because accents can affect how we treat each other, we'd expect some people to try to change them for personal gain. A social chameleon who can pretend to be a member of any social class or group is likely to win trust within each – assuming they are not caught. If that's true, though, then we'd expect people to also be good at detecting when someone is 'faking' it – what we call mimicry – setting up a kind of arms race between those who want to deceive us into trusting them and those who try to catch deceivers out. Over the last few years, we've looked into how well people detect accent mimicry. Last year we found that generally speaking, people in the UK and Ireland are strong at this, detecting mimicked accents in the UK and Ireland better than we'd expect by chance alone. What was more interesting, though, was that native listeners from the specific places of the imitated accent – Belfast, Glasgow and Dublin – were a lot better at this task than were non-natives or native listeners from further away in the UK, like Essex. Our new findings went further, though. Of the roughly 2,000 people that participated, more than 1,500 were this time based in English-speaking countries outside the UK, including the US, Canada and Australia. And on average, this group did a lot worse at detecting mimicked accents from seven different regions in the UK and Ireland than did people from the UK. In fact, people from places other than the UK barely did better than we'd expect by chance, while people who were native listeners were right between about two-thirds and three-quarters of the time. As we argued in our original article, we believe it's local cultural tensions — tribalism, classism or even warfare — that explain the differences. For example, as someone commented to me some time ago, people living in Belfast in the 1970s and 80s – a time of huge political tension – needed to be attuned to the accents of those around them. Hearing something off, like an out-group member's accent, could signal an imminent threat. This wouldn't have put the same pressures on people living in a more peaceful regions. In fact, we found that people living in large, multicultural and largely peaceful areas, such as London, didn't need to pay much attention to the accents of those around them and were worse at detecting mimicked accents. The further you move out from the native accent, too, the less likely a listener is to place emphasis on or notice anything wrong with a local accent. Someone living in the US is likely to pay even less attention to an imitation Belfast accent than is someone living in London, and accordingly will be worse at detecting mimicry. Likewise, someone growing up in Australia would be better at spotting a mimicked Australian accent than a Brit. So while accents, and our ability to detect differences in accents, probably evolved to help us place trust more effectively at a broad level, it's the cultural environment that shapes that process at the local level. Together, this has the unfortunate effect that we sometimes place a lot more emphasis on accents than we should. How someone speaks should be a lot less important than what is said. Still, accents drive how people treat each other at every level of society, just as other signals, be they tattoos, smiles or clothes, that tell us something about another person's background or heritage. Learning how these processes work and why they evolved is critical for overcoming them – and helping us to override the biases that so often prevent us from placing trust in people who deserve it. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Jonathan R. Goodman receives funding from the Wellcome Trust (grant no. 220540/Z/20/A).
Yahoo
24-06-2025
- Health
- Yahoo
Dementia: are younger generations really less likely to develop the disorder, as a recent study has claimed?
Dementia affects over 57 million people worldwide – and this number is only projected to grow. By 2030, 78 million people are estimated to have dementia. By 2050, it's projected that number will reach 139 million people. Despite this, a surprising new study has suggested that dementia risk has actually declined with each generation. However, there are good reasons to be sceptical of this finding. The researchers analysed data from 62,437 people aged 70 and over. Data was collected from three longitudinal cohort studies on ageing, including one conducted in the US, one in Europe and one from England. To conduct their analysis, the researchers compared probable dementia diagnoses from people born in eight different generation cohorts. The people in the first cohort were born in 1890-1913, while those in the most recent cohort were born in 1944-48. Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK's latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. The researchers employed an algorithm that suggested probable dementia diagnosis. This was based on participants' demographic characteristics, as well as their cognitive performance and everyday functioning skills (including how well they were able to perform daily functions, such as washing and feeding, and how well they could remember things). These are standard assessment tools used in clinical practice to diagnose dementia. To then validate the algorithm's projections on probable dementia cases, the predictions were compared against a sub-sample of participants from the US Aging, Demographics and Memory study who had a clinical diagnosis of dementia. The participants in this study had undergone a rigorous three- to four-hour cognitive assessment. The algorithm used to create dementia projections showed an over 85% agreement with clinical diagnosis data from that sub-sample data. Once dementia status was calculated, the authors computed two models to ascertain the relationship between age, cohort and dementia onset. They also included gross domestic product (GDP) in their analyses, as there's a correlation between GDP and health – with research showing that people in higher-income nations tend to be healthier than those living in lower-income nations. Their findings revealed that dementia cases decreased for each subsequent generation. For instance, in the US, the algorithm indicated that 25% of people born between 1890-1912 developed dementia, while only 15% of those born in the most recent cohort (1939-1943) developed dementia. In England, almost 16% of people born between 1924-28 were indicated to have developed dementia, compared with around 15% in those born between 1934-38. This effect was also apparently more pronounced for women than for men. It remains unclear why dementia cases fell across the generations, with more recent cohorts having reduced dementia cases. What does this mean? And how does this compare against existing projections? While the authors used a large sample from three established ageing research cohorts, the findings are based on data from high-income countries only. It's well known that dementia can be better diagnosed and cared for in high-income countries, where there are more and better healthcare services and professionals. Dementia is hugely stigmatised in low- and middle-income countries as well. As a result, many people are not as aware of dementia as people living in high-income societies. This means people in lower-income countries may know less about the associated risk factors for dementia and are less likely to receive a diagnosis and support. This is particularly relevant given the fact that most people with dementia reside in low- and middle-income countries. With a lack of cohort data on older adults and dementia cases in low- and middle-income countries, the findings from this study do not provide representative projections on dementia diagnoses globally. It's also important to consider the methods the authors used in their study. The authors used a prediction model. Although this model had high agreement with clinical diagnosis, there are still cases of dementia that will have been missed out as a result. Similarly, the authors did not distinguish between dementia subtypes in their modelling. Dementia is just an umbrella term. About 60-70% of dementia cases are actually Alzheimer's disease. But there are also many rarer subtypes – such as Lewy Body dementia or semantic dementia. Each subtype brings with it different symptoms. A generic model is unlikely to pick up each subtype dementia case correctly. All these factors may possibly explain how the study came to their conclusions. Dementia cases worldwide are actually predicted to increase. As such, the findings from this study should be considered with caution. It may not be the case that dementia prevalence continues to fall for more recently born generations. Part of the reason for these projections is due to the fact that people are living longer and growing older. Dementia primarily affects people aged over 65, so with more people living to be over 65 this means that more people will be at risk of developing the disorder. The world population is growing, too. So naturally we're going to see more people living with dementia – particularly in low- and middle-income countries, where people may have less knowledge of dementia symptoms and may be less able to address the modifiable risk factors linked to greater risk, due to poor healthcare infrastructure. We know that overall, people from more socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds experience greater health inequalities – and these health inequalities may contribute to increased risk of dementia. But as this factor was not taken into account in the study, it's difficult to know whether there really will be any differences in the projected number of dementia cases in younger generations. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Clarissa Giebel receives funding from the ESRC and the NIHR. She sits on the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Lewy Body Society.
Daily News Egypt
23-06-2025
- Business
- Daily News Egypt
Iran is considering closing the strait of Hormuz – why this would be a major escalation
Faced with the prospect of continuing Israeli airstrikes and further American involvement, Iran's parliament has reportedly approved plans to close the strait of Hormuz. This is potentially a very dangerous moment. The strait of Hormuz is an important shipping lane through which 20% of the world's oil transits – about 20 million barrels each day. The waterway connects the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Iran can either disrupt maritime traffic or attempt to 'close' the strait altogether. These are distinctly different approaches with different risks and outcomes. Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK's latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. The first option is to try and disrupt maritime traffic like Yemen's Houthi rebels have been doing in the Red Sea since winter 2024. This can be done by attacking passing ships with rockets and drones. There are already reports that Iran has started to jam GPS signals in the strait, which has the potential to severely interfere with passing ships, according to US-based maritime analyst Windward. Disruption of this kind is likely to deter shipping companies from using this route for fear of casualties and loss of cargo. Shipping companies that want to avoid the Red Sea can always use alternative shipping lanes, such as the Cape of Good Hope route. As inconvenient as that is, there is no such option in the case of the Gulf. As we've seen with Houthis' attacks, such disruptions have impacts on oil price, but also ripple effects on stock markets and inflation. Although the US and its western allies can absorb these economic effects – certainly for a while – disrupting the strait would still demonstrate that Tehran has some leverage. The credibility factor The second option – 'closing' the strait would involve interdicting all maritime traffic. This is akin to a blockade. And for it to work, as we have seen in the Black Sea with Russia's failed attempt at blockading Ukraine, a blockade must be credible enough to deter all traffic. Iran has a number of ways to block the strait. It could deploy mines in the waters around the choke point and sink vessels to create obstacles. Iran would also likely use its navy, including submarines, to engage those attempting to break the blockade; use electronic and cyber attacks to disrupt navigation; and threaten civilian traffic and regional ports and oil infrastructure with drones and rockets. It's worth noting that Iran still has plenty of short-range rockets. Israel claims to have destroyed much of its longer range ballistic-missile capability, but it is understood that the country still has a stockpile of short-range missiles that could be effective in targeting ships and infrastructure in the Gulf as well as US bases in the region. Recent events have shown up Iran as a bit of a paper tiger. It has made bold claims about its plan to retaliate and the military strength it has to do so. Yet with almost no air power capabilities (apart from drones and missiles) and limited naval power – and with its proxies either defeated or on the back foot – Iran is no longer in a position to project power in the region. Iran's response to the current Israeli attacks have not managed to inflict any major damage or achieve any strategic or political objectives. It's hard to see a change on the battlefield as things stand. For this reason, Tehran's best option is to target the strait of Hormuz, which has the potential to cause a significant spike in oil prices, leading to a major disruption of the global economy. Short of being able to rival the US or Israel on the battlefield, Iran might decide to use asymmetrical means of disruption (in particular missile and drone attacks on civilian shipping) to affect the global economy. Closing or disrupting the strait would be an effective way of doing that. A blockade, even a partial one, would offer Tehran some options on the diplomatic scene. For instance, it has been reported that the US asked China to convince Iran not to close the strait. This demonstrates that Tehran can use the threat of a blockade to its advantage on the diplomatic front. But for this to work, the blockade needs to be effective and thus sustained. What would be the effect of a blocking the Strait? Disrupting traffic in the strait could drag Gulf states – Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar – into the conflict, since their interests will be directly affected. It's important to consider how they might respond and whether this will drive them closer to the US – and even Israel, as was already happening with the Abraham Accords and the tentative, but shaky, rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. These are all things Iran would have factored into its calculations a year ago when Israel was targeting its proxies, including Hezollah, Hamas and the various Shia militias it funds in Iraq and elsewhere. But now, given that it has suffered an enormous military setback, which has hurt the regime's prestige and credibility – including, importantly, at home – Tehran is more likely to downplay these risks. I would expect it to proceed with its blockade plans. Even if China voices concerns, like it did regarding the Houthis' attacks, this is unlikely to change the decision. The regime is cornered. If the leaders believe they could be toppled, they are likely to consider the risks worth taking, particularly if they feel it could give them diplomatic leverage. The US has enough naval and air power to disrupt such a blockade. It can preemptively destroy Iran's mine-laying forces. It can also target missile launch sites inland and respond to threats as and when they arise. This is likely to prevent Iran from completely closing the strait. But it won't prevent the Islamic republic from disrupting maritime trade enough to have serious effects on the world economy. This might well be one of the last cards the regime has to play, both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena. Basil Germond, Professor of International Security, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Yahoo
23-06-2025
- Health
- Yahoo
Mounjaro becomes available on the NHS: what to know and what to do if you're not eligible
Obesity remains one of the most pressing, and preventable, health challenges of our time. The UK is one of a number of countries undoubtedly struggling with it. It affects nearly every organ system in the body, contributing to cardiovascular conditions like coronary heart disease; musculoskeletal issues such as osteoarthritis and gout; and even the development of certain cancers, including of the breast, uterus and colon. Its impact on mental health is also significant. A few years ago, injectable weight-loss drugs entered clinical use and quickly captured public attention for their ability to promote rapid fat loss. Ozempic is available on the NHS, but only for managing type 2 diabetes. Wegovy is authorised for weight loss and cardiovascular risk reduction and is also available on the NHS, though access is currently limited to specialist weight management services. Now, a new option has emerged: Mounjaro, which is approved for both type 2 diabetes and weight loss. This dual-purpose drug is now available on the NHS, offering another potential tool in the fight against obesity. Demand is expected to be high. However, access will be limited at first, with strict eligibility criteria for NHS prescriptions. Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK's latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. Mounjaro (tirzepatide) is a once weekly injectable medication designed to help control blood-sugar levels. It works by boosting the secretion and effects of insulin, improving glycaemic control in people with Type 2 diabetes. It also slows gastric emptying — the process by which food leaves the stomach — and enhances feelings of fullness by acting on the brain. This combined effect reduces appetite and helps support weight loss. Compared to similar medications like Ozempic and Wegovy (both brand names for semaglutide), clinical trials found Mounjaro more effective, with some participants losing up to 20% of their body weight over a 72-week period. Read more: The NHS has introduced specific criteria to prioritise patients most in need. First, patients need a BMI of 40 or more (classified as morbid obesity). People from certain ethnic backgrounds, such as South Asian communities, may be eligible at a lower BMI due to higher clinical risk of health conditions. Second, at least four obesity-related health conditions must be diagnosed, including type 2 diabetes, hypertension (high blood pressure), dyslipidaemia (abnormal cholesterol or triglyceride levels), cardiovascular disease and obstructive sleep apnoea. (Some of these conditions often occur together; for example, high blood pressure and cholesterol.) Patients are encouraged to check their BMI and confirm their diagnoses before contacting a GP. This helps ensure appointments are used effectively and discussions remain focused. While the current criteria are strict, there is optimism that eligibility will broaden in the coming years to include people with lower BMIs and fewer co-morbidities. The NHS continues to offer a comprehensive weight-loss programme, tiered according to BMI and previous attempts at weight loss. Don't underestimate the value of group-based programmes or community referrals – when a healthcare professional refers a patient to a community-based health service for further care or support – many of which can be accessed via your GP. These services, such as the NHS digital weight management programme, support both individuals and families and can be highly effective for sustainable fat loss. GPs may also refer patients to online courses and structured exercise programmes. Lifestyle interventions, including increased physical activity and healthier eating, remain cornerstones of obesity treatment and are critical for long-term success, even when medications are used. Read more: Higher tier interventions may be considered if lifestyle changes fail or if the patient has significant co-morbidities. This is where medications like Mounjaro, or private prescriptions, may become relevant – albeit that the cost of the latter may be a limiting factor for some. Other treatments include Orlistat, a medication that reduces fat absorption in the gut. This can be effective for some but often causes unpleasant side effects, such as oily stools and gastrointestinal upset Gastric banding or surgery may also result in significant, sustained weight loss, but they come with risks, can lead to surgical complications, and recovery can be demanding It's also important to recognise that drugs like Mounjaro aren't suitable for everyone. They can cause side effects significant enough for people to stop using them, and in some cases, they may not work at all. In this new era of faster, medication-assisted weight loss, we must remember that long-term change is about more than quick fixes. Sustainable success comes from consistent effort, willingness to change and methods that are both practical and lasting. Medications can help, sometimes dramatically, but they're not the only answer. A return to basics, with tailored support and realistic goals, remains as relevant as ever. So whether you qualify for Mounjaro, are trying lifestyle changes, or are exploring other options, remember this: the journey to better health is personal, gradual and worth it. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Dan Baumgardt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Canada Standard
18-06-2025
- Politics
- Canada Standard
Trump breaks from western allies at G7 summit as US weighs joining Iran strikes
Working alongside western democratic allies has not been a natural fit for Donald Trump. The US president left the recently concluded G7 summit in Canada early, with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron assuming this was to work on addressing the most severe escalation between Iran and Israel in decades. But Trump offered little communication with other G7 members, which include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK, of what his plans were. He said he had to leave the summit "for obvious reasons", though failed to elaborate on what he meant. After exiting the summit, he lambasted Macron on social media. Trump wrote: "Wrong! He has no idea why I am now on my way to Washington, but it certainly has nothing to do with a Cease Fire". Trump continued by saying his exit was due to something "much bigger than that", adding: "Emmanuel always gets it wrong." This has prompted discussion over whether US forces may join Israel's strikes on Iran. Despite initially distancing the US from the Israeli attacks, Trump said on June 17: "We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran." Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK's latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. He has since demanded Tehran's "unconditional surrender", while also issuing a chilling threat to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, describing him as an "easy target". The pressure campaign employed by Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to convince Trump that the time is right for a military assault on Iran seems to be working. Exploiting Trump's impulsive nature, Netanyahu may soon be able to convince Trump to give Israel what it needs to destroy Iran's underground uranium enrichment sites: a 30,000-pound "bunker buster" bomb and a B-2 bomber to carry it. The US's western allies have been left scrambling to interpret Trump's social media posts and figure out the real reason he left the G7 summit early. This wasn't the first time that Trump has left a G7 forum early. In 2018, the last time such a meeting was held in Canada, Trump also left early after Macron and the then Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, promised to confront Trump over the imposition of tariffs on US allies. The latest G7 summit also wasn't the first time Trump has treated traditional US allies with suspicion. Trump has cast doubt on US willingness to defend Nato allies if they don't pay more for their own defence. He has repeatedly threatened to leave the alliance and has frequently denigrated it - even calling alliance members "delinquent". Trump thinks the US gains an advantage by abandoning relationships with "free riders". But experts have made clear alienating allies makes the US weaker. While the alliance system has given the US unprecedented influence over the foreign policies of US allies in the past, Trump's pressure to increase their defence spending will make them more independent from the US in the long-term. Trump seems to prefer a world guided by short-term self-interest at the expense of long-term collective security. Indeed, with an "America first" agenda, multilateral cooperation is not Trump's strong suit. With the G7, Trump is yet again making clear that he does not fit in, nor does he want to. Because the G7 is small and relatively homogenous in membership, meetings between members are supposed to promote collective and decisive decision-making. However, even the task of coming up with a joint statement on the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel proved challenging. Trump eventually joined other leaders in calling for deescalation in the Middle East, and the G7 was in agreement that Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons. But Trump's social media activity since then has left US allies in the dark over what role the US might play in the conflict. Trump also alarmed G7 members with calls for Russia to return to the forum. He claimed that the war in Ukraine would not have happened had Moscow not been ejected from the former G8 grouping in 2014. Then, on his way out of the summit, Trump bragged to reporters that Russia's leader, Vladimir Putin, "doesn't speak to anybody else" but him. Trump added that Putin was insulted when Russia was thrown out of the G8, "as I would be, as you would be, as anybody would be". Following weeks of frustration over Russia's refusal to engage in serious peace talks about ending the war in Ukraine, Trump seems to have returned to being Putin's most loyal advocate. During Trump's first term, he pushed multilateralism to the brink. But he did not completely disengage. The US withdrew from the Paris climate accords, the nuclear deal with Iran, negotiations for a trade deal with Pacific nations, and imposed sanctions against officials of the International Criminal Court. However, when multilateral initiatives served Trump's short-term objectives, he was willing to get on board. A trade deal struck with Canada and Mexico that Trump described as "the most important" ever agreed by the US. He said the deal would bring thousands of jobs back to North America. The second Trump administration has been even more hostile to multilateralism. Not only has the trade deal with Canada and Mexico been undermined by Trump's love of tariffs, his administration has been more antagonistic toward almost all of the US's traditional allies. In fact, most of Trump's ire is reserved for democracies not autocracies. In contrast to the G7, where he clearly felt out of place, Trump was in his element during his May trip to the Middle East. Trump has a more natural connection to the leaders of the Gulf who do not have to adhere to democratic norms and human rights, and where deals can get done immediately. Trump left the Middle East revelling in all of the billion dollar deals he made, which he exaggerated were worth US$2 trillion (Pound 1.5 trillion). The G7, on the other hand, doesn't offer much to Trump. He sees it as more of a nuisance. The G7 forum is supposed to reassure the public that the most powerful countries in the world are united in their commitment to stability. But Trump's antics are undermining the credibility of that message. It is these antics that risk dragging the west into a dangerous confrontation with Iran.
