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Boston Globe
3 days ago
- Business
- Boston Globe
That seafood on your plate? It might have been produced by forced labor.
The event was part of a vast labor-transfer program run by the Chinese state, which The goal of the program is partially to address labor needs in Chinese industries. But another goal is to subjugate a historically restive people. Uyghur separatists revolted throughout the 1990s and bombed police stations in 2008 and 2014. China began the labor transfers in the early 2000s as part of a broad camps, where Uyghurs have been subjected to torture, beatings, and forced sterilization. Researchers described China's actions against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims Many of the transferred workers are involved in processing seafood that is then exported to more than 20 countries, including the United States, Canada, and several in the European Union, according to an investigation published as episode 8 of The Outlaw Ocean Podcast's second season. The podcast is available on all major streaming platforms. For transcripts, background reporting, and bonus content, visit These disclosures of China's use of state-sponsored forced labor in seafood production come as the trade war between the US and China has heightened tensions between the countries and directed new attention to the This is an American law that prohibits the import of goods produced in Xinjiang and a cudgel that the Trump administration is likely to apply more aggressively as it ramps up pressure on Beijing. 'We worked yesterday. Worked last night. We are still working,' a Uyghur man says in a voice clip uploaded to Douyin in 2021 over snapshots of exhausted workers on pallets of flounder packed for export. Douyin/The Outlaw Ocean Project On November 19, 2024, the European Union approved its own A review by Outlaw Ocean Project of internal company newsletters, local news reports, trade data, and satellite imagery revealed that 10 large seafood companies in the eastern province of Shandong, China's most important fishing and seafood processing hub, have received at least a thousand Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities from forced labor-transfer programs out of Xinjiang since 2018. Sometimes transfers are motivated by labor demands. In March 2020, for example, the Chishan Group, one of China's largest seafood catching and processing companies, published an internal newsletter describing what it called the 'huge production pressure' caused by the pandemic. That October, party officials from the local antiterrorist detachment of China's public security bureau and the country's human resources and social security bureau, which handles work transfers, met twice with executives to discuss how to find the company additional labor, according to company newsletters. Soon after, Chishan agreed to accelerate transfers to their plants. Wang Shanqiang, the deputy general manager at Chishan, said in a corporate newsletter, 'The company looks forward to the migrant workers from Xinjiang arriving soon.' The Chishan Group did not respond to requests for comment. Workers in 2023 at a seafood plant called Yantai Sanko Fisheries in Shandong Province, China, which relies on Uyghur and other labor from Xinjiang and exports to the U.S., Canada, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Douyin/The Outlaw Ocean Project To detect forced labor, companies tend to rely on private firms that conduct 'social audits,' in which inspectors visit factories to make sure they comply with international work standards. But social audits are typically announced in advance, which allows managers to hide minority workers during inspections. Even when workers are interviewed, they are often reluctant to be candid, for fear of retribution. In May 2022, social auditors from SGS, a major international auditing firms, toured the Haibo seafood processing factory in Shandong and found no evidence of forced labor. But a team of investigative reporters from Outlaw Ocean Project discovered that more than 170 people from Xinjiang worked at Haibo in 2021, and a half-dozen Uyghur workers posted regularly to social media from Haibo throughout 2022. On the same day the auditors toured, a young Uyghur worker posted pictures of herself near the plant's dormitories and loading bays. This was not an isolated incident. During the investigation, reporters found other examples of Uyghurs who had posted pictures of themselves at factories within days of those plants being cleared by social audits. They also found that half of the Chinese exporters they had identified as being tied to Uyghur labor had passed audits by leading global inspection firms. Two Uyghur researchers who independently reviewed hundreds social media videos archived by Outlaw Ocean Project concluded that Uyghurs working at Shandong seafood facilities were using coded content to convey critical perspectives on their experiences through humor, poetry and song. Posts alluded to strong sentiments of loss and separation, and offered direct and indirect references to coercion and involuntary transfer, as well as commentary on poor working conditions. The bigger point, however, is that the Chishan Group or Haibo are not unique cases. What we found in our investigation tracking and documenting Xinjiang minorities who had been deployed to seafood processing plants in Shandong was that many seafood companies are tied to a wide variety of similar problems with forced labor. The presence of Uyghur workers in these major seafood processing plants should not be viewed as incidental. It is a glaring red flag. The pervasiveness of these problems is why the global seafood industry likely will have to assess how it monitors its supply chains, especially when these supply chains route through China.
Yahoo
13-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Explainer-What is the history of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
By Felix Light TBILISI (Reuters) - Armenia and Azerbaijan were locked in conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh for nearly four decades after the Soviet Union they were both members of collapsed. Here is a look at the history of the conflict and the latest developments as Armenian and Azerbaijani officials said on Thursday that they had agreed the text of a peace agreement. WHAT IS NAGORNO-KARABAKH? Nagorno-Karabakh, known as Artsakh by Armenians, is a mountainous region at the southern end of the Karabakh mountain range, within Azerbaijan. It is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but until 2023 its 100,000 inhabitants were predominantly ethnic Armenians. See for yourself — The Yodel is the go-to source for daily news, entertainment and feel-good stories. By signing up, you agree to our Terms and Privacy Policy. Armenians, who are Christian, claim a long presence in the area, dating back to several centuries before Christ. Azerbaijan, whose inhabitants are mostly Turkic Muslims, also claims deep historical ties to the region, which over the centuries has come under the sway of Persians, Turks and Russians. Bloody conflict between the two peoples goes back more than a century. Under the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh became an autonomous region within the republic of Azerbaijan. FIRST KARABAKH WAR As the Soviet Union crumbled, the First Karabakh War (1988-1994) erupted between Armenians and their Azeri neighbours. About 30,000 people were killed and more than a million displaced. Most of those were Azeris driven from their homes when the Armenian side ended up in control of Nagorno-Karabakh itself and swathes of seven surrounding districts. 44-DAY WAR IN 2020 In 2020, after decades of intermittent skirmishes, Azerbaijan began a military operation that became the Second Karabakh War, swiftly breaking through Armenian defences. It won a resounding victory in 44 days, taking back the seven districts and about a third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The deal provided for 1,960 Russian peacekeepers to guard the territory's lifeline to Armenia: the road through the "Lachin corridor", which Armenian forces no longer controlled. BLOCKADE AND EXODUS In 2022, Azerbaijani personnel blocked the one remaining road into Karabakh, causing acute shortages of food and fuel in the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces launched an offensive against what remained of Karabakh, which quickly agreed a ceasefire and capitulated to Baku. Almost all of the remaining 100,000 or so Armenians in the region fled to Armenia as refugees. PEACE TALKS After the exodus from Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan both said that they wanted to sign a treaty to end the conflict between them. Though Armenia in 2024 handed back some disputed territory, progress towards a final deal was slow and fitful, with both sides blaming each other for the stalled talks. Azerbaijan demanded that Armenia rewrite its constitution, which Baku says makes implicit claims to Azerbaijani territory. Armenia denied that it made any such claim, but has recently signalled openness to changing its constitution. Azerbaijan also asked for a transport corridor through Armenia, linking the bulk of its territory to Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani enclave that borders Baku's ally Turkey.
Reuters
13-03-2025
- Politics
- Reuters
What is the history of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
TBILISI, March 13 (Reuters) - Armenia and Azerbaijan were locked in conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh for nearly four decades after the Soviet Union they were both members of collapsed. Here is a look at the history of the conflict and the latest developments as Armenian and Azerbaijani officials said on Thursday that they had agreed the text of a peace agreement. WHAT IS NAGORNO-KARABAKH? Nagorno-Karabakh, known as Artsakh by Armenians, is a mountainous region at the southern end of the Karabakh mountain range, within Azerbaijan. It is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but until 2023 its 100,000 inhabitants were predominantly ethnic Armenians. Armenians, who are Christian, claim a long presence in the area, dating back to several centuries before Christ. Azerbaijan, whose inhabitants are mostly Turkic Muslims, also claims deep historical ties to the region, which over the centuries has come under the sway of Persians, Turks and Russians. Bloody conflict between the two peoples goes back more than a century. Under the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh became an autonomous region within the republic of Azerbaijan. FIRST KARABAKH WAR As the Soviet Union crumbled, the First Karabakh War (1988-1994) erupted between Armenians and their Azeri neighbours. About 30,000 people were killed and more than a million displaced. Most of those were Azeris driven from their homes when the Armenian side ended up in control of Nagorno-Karabakh itself and swathes of seven surrounding districts. 44-DAY WAR IN 2020 In 2020, after decades of intermittent skirmishes, Azerbaijan began a military operation that became the Second Karabakh War, swiftly breaking through Armenian defences. It won a resounding victory in 44 days, taking back the seven districts and about a third of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The deal provided for 1,960 Russian peacekeepers to guard the territory's lifeline to Armenia: the road through the "Lachin corridor", which Armenian forces no longer controlled. BLOCKADE AND EXODUS In 2022, Azerbaijani personnel blocked the one remaining road into Karabakh, causing acute shortages of food and fuel in the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijani forces launched an offensive against what remained of Karabakh, which quickly agreed a ceasefire and capitulated to Baku. Almost all of the remaining 100,000 or so Armenians in the region fled to Armenia as refugees. PEACE TALKS After the exodus from Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan both said that they wanted to sign a treaty to end the conflict between them. Though Armenia in 2024 handed back some disputed territory, progress towards a final deal was slow and fitful, with both sides blaming each other for the stalled talks. Azerbaijan demanded that Armenia rewrite its constitution, which Baku says makes implicit claims to Azerbaijani territory. Armenia denied that it made any such claim, but has recently signalled openness to changing its constitution. Azerbaijan also asked for a transport corridor through Armenia, linking the bulk of its territory to Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani enclave that borders Baku's ally Turkey.
Yahoo
08-02-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
The Chancellor courting China signals a craven betrayal of British interests and human rights
You may or may not remember the time Rachel Reeves voiced fears about the UK being too dependent on China. 'I think we are still too over-reliant on China,' she said back in early 2023. 'National security has always got to come first.' However, fast forward to early 2025 and the Chancellor appears to be taking a very different approach. Reeves may have often voted in support of laws that advance human rights, but this failed to deter her from visiting the ruthless authoritarian state last month. In her much hyped speech laying out her plans to turn Britain's struggling economy around, she bragged that her visit to Beijing had secured agreements worth £600 million to the UK. But the question remains: At what cost? The list of human rights abuses perpetrated by the People's Party is both lengthy and indefensible. From the grave persecution and reprisals faced by government critics and those who fight for human rights to the stringent censorship of Chinese citizens and quashing of freedom of expression and association, repression in China is only intensifying. State-sanctioned abuse against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang persists – as does the continued repression of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. Forced organ harvesting perpetrated against religious minorities remains one of the most barbaric and sickening examples of abuse there is the espionage committed by agents of the Chinese state around the world. The Chinese embassy in London recently urged the UK to 'stop creating trouble' after Yang Tengbo – a businessman accused of spying on us on their behalf was barred from the country. The controversy unsurprisingly revived demands for the UK to classify China as a national security threat. However, with Reeves apparently cosying up to them, it feels like we are moving in the opposite Reeves is right to point out that China is both our fourth-largest single trading partner and the world's second-largest economy. But this neither negates nor alleviates the grave threat to national security that China presents. Reeves has promised to challenge China, saying she raised during her recent trip 'issues around human rights, forced labour, Hong Kong and Jimmy Lai, and around the sanctioning of parliamentarians'. But one cannot help but wonder what truly goes on behind doors in such negotiations - and whether the chancellor or the wider UK government takes China's track record of human rights violations as seriously as they should. UK leaders have long excelled at paying homage to democratic principles and human rights but this so often amounts to lip service and empty taking office last July, Labour has made no secret of its eagerness to improve our relationship with China. But such efforts have also been marked by an apparent dearth of consternation and anger at the regime's grisly catalogue of human rights abuses. Take the weaponisation of Interpol red notices. Red Notices are designed to be alerts to track down serious criminals but the mechanisms have been weaponised by Beijing as a tool of transnational repression. In turn, they have been wielded to target individuals who have escaped the regime's repression - with human rights defenders and political dissidents among persecution is at times deeply rooted in ideology and those Chinese who have become successful in business and subsequently 'westernised' have found themselves punished. Being targeted by a Red Notice is life-changing - your assets can be frozen, you can face travel bans, and most irrevocably of all, your reputation can be profoundly damaged. Such harm can outlive the notice being withdrawn because it is found to be unwarranted. To sum up, China's sophisticated manipulation of Interpol's system of red notices is unparalleled - and its misuse poses a far-reaching danger to international law enforcement. Its successful infiltration of a global institution like Interpol is a tell-tale sign of the authoritarian regime's swelling power and control. The UK government – which gives substantial funding to Interpol – must demand reform of the is also the issue of cyberattacks. In 2020, the US Department of Justice announced criminal charges against Chinese nationals after a campaign of attacks aimed at governments and businesses. If the UK government remains intent on pursuing economic ties with China, it will have to keep its eyes wide open. Unsurprisingly, concerns have been raised about the security risk posed by China's plans to build a new 600,000-square-foot embassy in London – both Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Home Secretary Yvette Cooper have signalled their support for the mega-embassy. But the threat which China presents does not just exist in cyberspace, with Chinese nationals even assaulted here in the UK. Take the case of Consul General Zheng Xiyuan assaulting a Hong Kong protester inside the grounds of the Chinese consulate in Manchester back in 2022. Reeves's opening to China signals a craven betrayal of human rights and of British interests. Ben Keith is a lawyer with extensive background in international criminal and human rights law Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
