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Yahoo
14-07-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Israel's midnight strategist: How IDF chief Eyal Zamir rewired the doctrine on Iran
The Magazine delves into the life and character of Eyal Zamir – featuring conversations with peers from his years in military positions, people close to his family, officers who served alongside him. When the 14-year-old Eyal Zamir entered the Military Command Boarding School in 1980, he knew that he wanted to have a military career. But as opposed to his peers, he wasn't aiming for the more elite commando units but rather to join the Armored Corps. Why? 'I was a young boy from Eilat who used to read a lot of books, and when I read about the Yom Kippur War I would always see that the Armored Corps – the tanks and whatnot – were saving the day,' Zamir likes telling those who ask him. 'I was the only one who wanted to go in that direction,' he laughs when he repeats this story in various occasions. Forty-five years later, and after he had already retired from IDF service as a major-general, he became the 24th chief of staff, receiving the military's highest rank, lieutenant-general. He was the man who was able to maneuver what seemed impossible: attack Israel's most vicious enemy, Iran, in the most ingenious way, which will be taught in military academies for decades to come. Few officers rise through the ranks of the Armored Corps to the very top, but Zamir did just that. A few factoids: He's the first Yemenite-descended citizen to hold the post, and the first tanker to lead the army in more than 40 years. Colleagues call him a 'soldier's soldier,' a nickname earned during four decades that took him from the resort city of Eilat to the general staff's 14th-floor war room in Tel Aviv. His appointment capped a career spent juggling front-line commands, deep strategic planning, and day-to-day political liaison work at the highest level. He's not your average IDF chief of staff. He didn't serve in elite combat units like the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal) like Ehud Barak or Shaul Mofaz did. But this may be one of the reasons that even though his predecessors spoke incessantly of the Iranian threat, just months after he entered his prestigious role he was able to convince the political administration, including the prime minister, to attack and that 'we're ready to do so in the best most possible way.' A month after Israel's impressive opening attack on Iranian military targets, the Magazine delves into the life and character of Eyal Zamir – featuring conversations with peers from his years in military positions, people close to his family, and officers who have served alongside him. One way to define Zamir's character is that he isn't arrogant. 'We are a nation that cherishes life, and to secure our future and our freedom, we know how to make hard decisions,' he said on the third day of the attack in Iran. But one statement differentiated him from all of his predecessors: 'The campaign is underway. Let us meet it with humility, unity, steadiness, and faith in the justice of our cause.' The hubris that once defined Israel's mostly elitist political and defense establishments in their entirety isn't something that Zamir adopted. On the contrary, he speaks of humility. Something deeply lacking in those responsible for Oct. 7 – those who, like him, have been part of the old-school military tactic in Gaza. He understands the failure. He's not looking for people to blame but has taken the responsibility on his shoulders. Zamir was born in January 1966 to Shlomo, whose family had immigrated from Yemen and fought in the pre-state Irgun, and Yaffa (née Abadi), whose parents were from Aleppo, Syria. The eldest of three children, Zamir grew up on Eilat's dusty outskirts, an upbringing friends say shaped his understated manner and desert-tough resilience. As a teenager, he won a coveted place at the IDF's Command Preparatory Boarding School in Tel Aviv, a program that grooms future field commanders. He later completed a BA in political science at Tel Aviv University, an MA in national security at the University of Haifa, and an executive management course at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. This résumé balances tank grease with ivory-tower theory. Drafted in 1984, Zamir chose tanks over the glamour of the air force, which many of his peers sought. He commanded a platoon in the 500th Armored Brigade, a company in the 460th Training Brigade, and by 1994, the 75th Battalion of the vaunted 7th Brigade. His rise continued as operations officer of the 162nd Division and later commander of the 7th Brigade itself – the IDF's historical spearhead on the Golan Heights. Two years leading the Gaash Division on the northern frontier followed, exposing him to the Hezbollah threat, which would preoccupy him later. Fellow officers describe a commander who 'listens more than he talks,' renowned for after-action reviews that run until every private understands yesterday's mistakes. An interesting and less discussed anecdote from his biography was that he went on to study for a year at the École militaire in Paris. He didn't speak a word of French but was expected to study with officers from around the world in this European language. 'For three to four months, he was just mumbling some gibberish version of what he thought was French,' a friend who went to school with him recounted. 'But he was somehow able to deliver a speech to his class at the end of the year about theories in combat,' the friend said. Zamir's blend of field grit and strategic polish propelled him in 2012 to the position of military secretary to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. For three years, he briefed the premier daily, translating battlefield jargon into political options during the tense run-up to Operation Protective Edge. Working with Netanyahu back then turned out to be quite significant: The prime minister doesn't trust most officials, and it is rare for him to have long-lasting relationships with defense officials. Zamir, however, being a humble, classic soldier who gets the job done, now has access to and the trust of the prime minister. After Oct. 7 was blamed on both Netanyahu and the defense establishment, previous chief of staff Herzi Halevi and Netanyahu disagreed profoundly on several major issues, and thus had a deep mistrust. Just recently, at the General Staff Forum at Tel Aviv's Kirya base, Zamir thanked Netanyahu and offered praise: 'Prime Minister, I thank you and the defense minister [Israel Katz] for our joint management and for understanding the magnitude of this moment,' he said. But here's where it becomes interesting: 'The way the political echelon and the military echelon rose together, in full synchronization, cooperation, and unity of purpose, from the lengthy preparation stage, through the decision-making processes, and on to the guidance you provided, represents, in my view, a masterpiece of strategic political leadership fused with military action. Much will be written about it, and it is, in this sense, an example of leadership,' Zamir said. Zamir knows how to speak 'Netanyahu lingo,' just like those who work with US President Donald Trump need to know 'Trump lingo.' Zamir praises Netanyahu and their work, also promoting what he thinks is important, with the understanding that the prime minister is the one calling the shots. In 2015, Zamir assumed control of the Southern Command, overseeing Gaza border defenses during the early tunnel wars and weekly fence riots. In December 2018, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff, where he co-authored the multi-year 'Momentum' plan, aimed at preparing the IDF for simultaneous wars in the North and the South. In 2022, when Zamir was a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he wrote a comprehensive pamphlet dealing with various threats to Israeli and American security. In his chapter on the Houthis, he foresaw that despite their nearly 2,000 km. distance from Israel, Iran could exploit them as an additional proxy to attack the Jewish state, as well as to interfere with international shipping. Zamir had several recommendations for neutralizing or reducing the Houthi threat, such as disrupting Iranian weapons resupply to the Houthis by air and sea. He wrote that the impact of such a sustained campaign would take time but would eventually impact the Houthis' ability to project power and threaten parties beyond their borders, given that they have no land border with the Islamic Republic. In addition, Zamir dispensed with the unrealistic idea of regime change and ousting the Houthis completely from controlling Yemen, opting instead for splitting the country between the Shi'ite-Houthis in northern Yemen, including Sanaa, and the Sunni-internationally backed council in southern Yemen, including Aden. Through these moves, he suggested that the Houthis could eventually be removed from Iran's active list of destabilizing proxies. 'When Zamir wrote this paper on Iran and its proxies, the Houthis weren't on anyone's radar yet,' a senior military officer said. 'He met with heads of the intelligence units, who were shocked about what was then a revelation.' Zamir wrote that Tehran's support for its Houthi proxy could enable Iran to 'seize influence in yet another territory, expand its regional influence, open another front against its rivals, and threaten and deter them,' labeling Yemen 'an active front in the struggle' against Saudi Arabia – and, by extension, Israel. After hanging up his uniform temporarily in 2023, Zamir crossed Kaplan Street to serve as director-general of the Defense Ministry, signing multi-billion-shekel US-funded contracts for Iron Dome and long-range munitions. He headed the ministry, met with officials in the Biden White House every few months in Washington, headed the purchase of armor and military equipment, and created dialogue with defense officials worldwide. In this role, Zamir promoted his agenda of encouraging more and more production of ammunition and military technology in Israel, after a non-official arms embargo on Israel, other than the US and a few small Eastern European countries. He also facilitated the export of arms to Morocco and the United Arab Emirates. With many of these countries, and even their leaders, he had deep personal connections from his three-year period in the Prime Minister's Office the previous decade. Several individuals with close ties to Zamir noted that he has expertise regarding a number of Middle Eastern countries, where he has established deep personal relationships and a profound understanding of local culture. He has frequently visited those countries, which cannot be published due to their sensitivity. Strategically, Zamir argues that Israel can no longer afford 'small and smart' boutique forces. The Oct. 7 massacre convinced him that the country needs mass, mobility, and manufacturing independence. As chief of staff, he ordered the Manpower Directorate to issue enlistment notices to every 16.5-year-old haredi male, calling equal service 'a national imperative.' At the same time, he champions hi-tech warfare, artificial-intelligence targeting, autonomous drones, and rapid-fire precision artillery, believing that a larger IDF need not be a slower one. His 2007 essay in the IDF's journal Maarachot, which urged commanders to prefer arrests over airstrikes when civilians might be hit, still guides his thinking, but critics on the Right have muttered that it signals excessive restraint. Zamir's reply is that morality is not a handicap but 'a force multiplier that preserves Israel's legitimacy.' Unlike some of his predecessors, Zamir maintains an easy rapport with US counterparts. A 2022 Washington Institute for Near East Policy fellowship introduced him to Pentagon planners and Capitol Hill aides. Since taking command, he has relied on those contacts for expedited ammunition deliveries and coordinated strikes on Iranian targets. However, he also tells cadets that Israel must be able 'to fight a multi-front war alone if dawn breaks with no allies awake.' Off duty, Zamir is happiest on a Negev hiking trail with his wife and their German shepherd, or replaying historic tank battles on a battered chessboard in the family living room. Zamir lives in the Ramot Hashavim moshav, north of Hod Hasharon, with his wife, Orna, a former spokesperson and deputy director of the Hod Hasharon Municipality. The couple have three children, all of whom followed their father into service. Ori is a major and company commander in the Armored Corps, who earned a Chief of Staff Commendation; Roni is a reserve officer in the Golani Brigade's Operations Division, who has also been cited for excellence; and Itai, the youngest, is in high school. While studying at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and as a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Zamir moved to the US with his family. Sources close to the Zamir family say that period was very significant for him. 'He learned about American Jewry, something he wasn't aware of beforehand,' one source said. 'He was also very disturbed by the state of Jewish education.' Ironically, it was then-IDF chief Benny Gantz who paved the way for Zamir to become the IDF chief by sending him to serve as Netanyahu's military secretary in 2022. Zamir had never been involved in politics and was not drawn to the post; but Gantz pushed, so he accepted it. It is ironic because Gantz would later choose Herzi Halevi over Zamir as IDF chief, which left Halevi with the baggage of being the military chief on Oct. 7, and eventually meant that Zamir ascended to the post in time to lead the historic war against Iran. Despite not wanting the role initially, sources close to Zamir say it was an incredible position that gave him the opportunity to work with top officials, such as US secretary of state John Kerry, foreign minister Tzipi Livni, German chancellor Angela Merkel, Russian President Vladimir Putin, US President Donald Trump, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. During that time, Zamir tried to help Israeli efforts to torpedo US Gen. John Allen's plans for Israel to withdraw from the Jordan Valley, replacing troops on the ground with new technological sensors and protection. Following the Oct. 7 era, sources close to Zamir say Israel was very lucky that it succeeded in blocking the initiative to withdraw from the Jordan Valley. Operation Rising Lion, led by Zamir, was a huge success. About 200 Israeli aircraft dropped 330 precision munitions on more than 100 high-value sites, nuclear plants at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan; IRGC command bunkers in Tehran; and missile factories at Yazd and Mashhad. In the course of 12 days, the air force struck 900 separate targets, killed at least 30 senior security officials and 11 nuclear scientists, and destroyed more than half of Iran's 400 ballistic-missile launchers, according to senior IDF briefings. By day three, Israeli jets had achieved 'full operational freedom' in Tehran's airspace after suppressing local air defenses, a milestone that spokesperson Brig. Gen. Effie Defrin called a 'political and military game-changer.' Iran answered with about 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 explosive drones; IDF figures showed that its multilayer Arrow, David's Sling, Iron Dome, and US-deployed THAAD batteries intercepted 80% to 90% of missiles and 99.9% of drones. Six missiles slipped through, striking five IDF bases and, overall, killed 28 Israelis and wounded more than 3,000, the Health Ministry reported. Iranian sources cited 610 of their citizens dead and 4,800 wounded. Israeli planners hailed the campaign for resetting Iran's nuclear and missile timelines 'by years,' demonstrating the ability to project sustained air power 2,000 km. from home and to defend the civilian rear under unprecedented missile fire. Despite the IDF's game-changing war against Iran, there are still many critical questions about how Zamir will handle Israeli security concerns regarding Iran going forward. Sources close to him said that he hopes Trump will succeed in getting Tehran to sign on to a new nuclear deal that will limit its nuclear program much more strongly and longer than the 2015 deal. In the meantime, Israel, via the Mossad and the IDF, is still keeping a watchful eye over new Iranian nuclear developments; but other than Netanyahu's trip to Washington this week, it is unclear if Jerusalem has a defined policy on when it would use force again if Iran starts to rebuild its nuclear program. There are Israeli statements about using a similar mechanism of consulting with the US about Hezbollah rearmament violations and then striking and preventing those rearmaments, but Israel finished the war with Hezbollah in a much more powerful position than it was relative to the ceasefire with Iran, even as it struck the Islamic Republic very hard. Likewise, sources close to Zamir indicated that there is not yet a set number of new ballistic missiles, which, if Iran produced in the future, would definitely lead Israel to act again against that separate threat. Rather, Zamir again hopes that Trump will convince Iran to agree to a broader deal that places limits not only on the nuclear program but also on the volume and range of future ballistic missile production by Iran. For example, if Iran continued to produce a large number of ballistic missiles with a range below 1,300 km., given that Israel is at closest 1,500 km. away, such missiles might not be viewed as threatening to the same degree. But what if the Islamic Republic does not agree to a new deal, or the deal includes only nuclear issues and not ballistic missile issues? This is an equally likely scenario, given that Trump's statements have almost all focused on the nuclear threat. In that case, Zamir is not necessarily ready to commit that Israel would definitely attack if Iran 'merely' rebuilt its old ballistic missile arsenal back from its current 500-1,000 level to its pre-war 2,500 level. That does not mean that Israel might not attack the arsenal again even earlier than the 2,500 missile inventory point if Iran tries to rebuild its arsenal. But it means that, unlike with Hezbollah, where the air force has a free hand to strike any rearmament attempts, with Iran the evaluation and process of deciding if and when to attack will be more complex and dynamic, and it might require deeper consultation with Washington. As of the start of July, sources close to Zamir said that the three- to four-month primary operations he has pushed forward in Gaza are nearing a tipping point. Zamir's operation has led to the IDF taking over 75% of the territory, boxing in Hamas to a few contained areas in Gaza City, central Gaza, and the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone. This had broken Hamas's political control over sizable amounts of the population in the southern Gaza areas of Khan Yunis, Rafah, and parts north of Gaza City. It has also broken Hamas's monopoly and control over food distribution, at least in those areas. And yet, Zamir recognizes that Hamas, while on life support, is still far from completely defeated or disarmed. At the start of July, his view was that in the next two to three weeks there would be a new deal with Hamas returning additional hostages in exchange for a ceasefire or possibly even an end to the war, or the government would need to give the order to widen the operation for the military to take over the remaining 25% of Gaza. But these areas are exactly where the hostages are being held, such that Zamir believes that taking them over could elevate the risk to their lives, which is why he would advise cutting a deal at this point. Given the additional leverage he has seized for the government, which has already gotten Hamas to be somewhat more flexible in aspects of hostage negotiations and regarding terms for governing Gaza post-war, he believes it is time for the government to cut a deal, even if it is imperfect. Three out of five Hamas brigades that had started to try to reconstitute themselves during the January-March ceasefire were taken apart again by Zamir's operation, and the remaining two are still shadows of what they were pre-war. Given how much weaker Hamas is now not only militarily but also politically following its loss of control of land and food distribution in large portions of Gaza, sources close to Zamir stated that he believes that ending the war now to get hostages back sufficiently achieves the war's twin goals of retrieving the hostages and degrading Hamas's capability to pose a future threat to Israel. Regarding the West Bank, Zamir is plagued by several recent events, where gangs of up to 70 Jewish extremists have attacked Palestinians and soldiers alike. He wants to give Col. (res.) Avichai Tenami (the special project manager to handle the issue of 'hilltop youth') time, resources, and personnel to try to improve the situation with some of these Jewish extremists by using dialogue and a more social welfare approach toward bringing them back onto more normal and nonviolent tracks, said sources close to him. However, he, like every other senior official in the IDF, is extremely frustrated with the small number of police arrests and convictions of those extremists who have perpetrated violence against Palestinians and against the IDF, as opposed to those who have just protested government policies that they deem are not right-wing enough. However, given his surrender to the idea that Defense Minister Israel Katz will not reverse himself on the issue and that Zamir is not willing to wage a public fight over it, he is at least hopeful that Tenami can make some progress through dialogue. Historians would surely debate the operational fine points, but one verdict already seemed secure: Zamir had restored deterrence by pairing humility with audacity. He left Iran's nuclear timetable in tatters and demonstrated that Armored Corps discipline could thrive alongside 21st-century precision. Future chiefs poring over his campaign would, no doubt, pause over the maxims he drilled into every graduating class of cadets: 'We acted before it was too late because security delayed becomes insecurity multiplied.' Just as often, he reminded field commanders: 'Protect the civilians, and you protect the country; that is the heart of every operation.' When asked how Israel should prepare for tomorrow's threats, his answer was always the same: 'When dawn breaks, Israel must be ready to fight alone and still prevail.'
Business Recorder
12-07-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
They're still flying high
EDITORIAL: The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has always drawn praise from everyone – not through grandstanding, but by delivering whenever it is tested. The latest nod came from the Chief of Staff of China's People's Liberation Army Air Force, Lieutenant General Wang Gang, who called the PAF's performance in the recent war with India 'a textbook example of precision, discipline, and courage' in the face of unprovoked aggression. The remark came during a high-level visit to Air Headquarters in Islamabad, where General Wang also noted China's keen interest in learning from the PAF's battle-tested integration of Multi-Domain Operations, which says a lot. That's not a compliment Beijing hands out lightly – especially given its own airpower ambitions. But for those who've watched the PAF over the decades, this shouldn't come as a surprise. The Pakistan Air Force has always punched well above its weight. It captured international attention during the 1965 war, when a much smaller fleet held its own against a numerically superior Indian Air Force. Some of its wartime manoeuvres became case studies in combat aviation. The legend only grew over time – with stories of PAF pilots flying for Arab states and downing Israeli jets during the Yom Kippur War becoming part of regional military lore. Even in peacetime, the service maintained its edge, consistently training to a standard that attracted foreign observers, joint drills, and deep bilateral engagements – not least with China, which co-developed the JF-17 Thunder with Pakistan. That same platform has since matured into a credible deterrent force, operated by highly trained PAF squadrons who've adapted to modern hybrid warfare challenges without bloating the budget. What's more, the PAF's operational discipline and strategic clarity often stand in contrast to the disarray that marks other parts of the country's institutional machinery. Whether it's political paralysis, economic stasis, or diplomatic drift, Pakistan struggles to project stability in most arenas – except when its military, particularly its air wing, is in frame. So when China singles out the PAF for praise – and explicitly expresses a desire to learn from it – the statement carries weight beyond flattery. It confirms what military analysts have long argued: that the Pakistan Air Force remains one of the region's most competent and coherent fighting forces. It also reinforces the reality that Pakistan's strategic partnerships are not just alive – they're evolving. China is not lavishing praise as a favour; it is acknowledging value. A battle-tested, professionally run air force with multi-domain integration capabilities is an asset, especially as China gears up for its own next-generation military transformation. And for Pakistan, deeper integration with China's airpower doctrines and technologies could be the edge it needs to maintain parity with a larger neighbour constantly updating its arsenal. Yet there's a larger implication here, one worth noting. Pakistan's military, and the PAF in particular, has remained committed to hard capability even as fiscal realities have shrunk civilian development space. One might argue whether this allocation of resources is sustainable – that's a different debate – but there is little doubt that it has paid operational dividends. For a country still fighting an internal insurgency, struggling with fiscal meltdown, and burdened by political disarray, having one institution consistently deliver competence and reliability on the global stage is more than just optics – it's leverage. That's not to say the country can fly on the wings of the PAF alone. But when the civilian leadership is largely absent from diplomatic or economic strategy, and parliament rarely debates serious national security matters, such moments of international recognition carry weight far beyond military circles. They serve as reminders of what disciplined focus can achieve, even under systemic stress. So yes, the PAF deserves the recognition. Not just for what it did this summer, but for the decades of consistency, evolution, and excellence that led up to it. If anything still commands quiet respect for Pakistan abroad, it's not its economy, its democracy, or its diplomacy. It's the precision of its pilots. And they're still flying high. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Indian Express
07-07-2025
- Business
- Indian Express
With every fragile ‘peace' in Middle East, the West sows seeds of a conflict
I have followed the recent '12-day war' in the Middle East through a 50-year-old personal prism. My interest in petroleum and a postgraduate thesis on oil for goods barter trade by Iran was sparked by the Yom Kippur War between Egypt /Syria and Israel in 1973. The war triggered a four-fold increase in the international price of oil and global stagflation. My first job in the Petroleum sector with Phillips Petroleum in London (after a short stint in the IAS ) was in 1980, a year after the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini and months before Iran and Iraq commenced a bloody and inconclusive eight-year war. The Iranian revolution had doubled the price of oil and set off another global stagflation and the Iran-Iraq war embroiled the US when in April 1988, it sank the Iranian frigate 'Sahand' after a US frigate had hit an Iranian mine in the Straits of Hormuz. I am reminded of 'Operation Praying Mantis' every time there is talk of choking the straits through which pass nearly 20 per cent of internationally traded crude oil and one-third of Liquefied Natural gas (LNG). In 1990 when President Saddam Hussein moved his tanks into Kuwait and aimed SCUD missiles at the Shell-Saudi Refinery and Petrochemical complex in Al Jubail on the East coast of Saudi Arabia, I was in the Middle East Region of Shell International based in London. Shell Management decided that the head office must support the evacuation of Shell expatriates from the complex and as the lowest rank executive on the ME Regions totem pole, I was dispatched into the war zone. I could write much about the three days I spent surrounded by agitated rednecks desperate to get out of the region but that would take too many lines. Suffice it to say, I gained first-hand insight into the mental and emotional turmoil caused by rumours, misinformation and fear. More than a decade later in 2003, when President George W Bush ordered a US-led coalition to overthrow the Baathist Government of Saddam Hussein on grounds that Iraq had 'weapons of mass destruction' and was an accomplice of the al Qaeda terrorist group — allegations dismissed by the 9/11 Commission in 2004 — I was with the Shell Group in India. Although no longer in the thick of events, I was impacted. The international price of crude oil crossed into triple digits and the newly elected UPA government of PM Manmohan Singh reintroduced administered pricing of petroleum products. That put paid to Shell India's plans to break into the petroleum main fuels markets. Today I observe the fifth major eruption in the region — I define 'major' loosely — conflict has been endemic and continuous in the region so the distinction between 'major' and the rest is subjective — from the vantage point of an armchair commentator. I am no longer directly involved with the petroleum Industry nor engaged with the ME Region but I have the luxury to reflect on this half-century of involvement. I have read countless commentaries on the current state of affairs. Many questions have been raised. What is the extent of damage caused to Iran's nuclear programme? Does it still have fissile material and the centrifuges and equipment to enrich this feedstock and build systems to deliver nuclear warheads? Does it have the capability (or indeed the inclination — their leaders cannot have forgotten Operation Mantis) to choke the Straits of Hormuz? How stable is the ceasefire given Israel's PM Netanyahu has not achieved his goal of regime change? What about President Trump? Will he green-light a second round of bombing by Israel? What is China's game plan? And many more. Experts have weighed in with the answers. I too have views but on reflection, I hesitate to proffer them. For if there is one lesson that a historical overview throws up it is that ultimately the answers will not be derived through political, economic, strategic and humanitarian logic but by the ambitions of autocratic individuals. These individuals may well craft their responses around the enlightenment ideals of freedom, democracy, social justice and human rights but that is optics. The drivers of actions are subjective predilections. Few commentators have an insight into the psychological make-up of these leaders. I certainly do not. One further thought comes to the fore on reflection. All five major wars have been brought to a close either through diplomacy or military might/stalemate. But the closures have been fragile. For, the root cause of war has never been adequately addressed. I read Henry Kissinger's book 'CRISIS: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crisis' which described the telephonic diplomacy that brought about the ceasefire in 1973. Seen through the narrow lens of the objective to end hostilities, it was a success. All combatants salvaged something out of the fighting and America kept its hegemonic foothold in the region. But the plight of the Palestinian refugees was not on the agenda. Similarly, the Iran-Iraq war ended with no effort to address the core issues that triggered the conflict. It drew to a halt because both sides were exhausted and could no longer accept the high death toll. In a comparable vein, the two Gulf wars ended because the immediate objectives were met (viz the defeat of the Iraqi army and the execution of Saddam Hussein). The geopolitical, economic, religious and ideological cleavages that triggered the wars were tackled only in passing. Today, the Western world is focused on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is a good reason for this focus. Were such weapons to fall into the 'wrong hands' it could have catastrophic consequences. But, by failing to use their heft to address humanitarian needs, the genocide in Gaza, by ignoring the cascading anger and resentment they are in fact creating the conditions for this proliferation. Commentators can speculate but those with a historical perspective know this is the consequential reality. The writer is former Chairman of Shell India. Views are personal
Shafaq News
04-07-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Syria puts disengagement deal back on table after US call
Shafaq News – Damascus/Washington Syria is willing to revive the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al‑Shibani stated on Friday. During a phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, al‑Shibani added that Damascus was ready to 'cooperate with the United States to return to the agreement,' which established a UN-patrolled buffer zone on the Golan Heights after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Rubio, meanwhile, reiterated support for sanctions on 'malign actors' while signaling openness to reviewing Syria-linked terrorism designations. The disengagement agreement has been largely voided since Israeli forces expanded operations in the buffer zone following the collapse of al-Assad's regime in Damascus. The two sides further announced the formation of a joint Syrian-American committee to follow up on the chemical weapons file, confirming broad agreement on the need to address the issue. Notably, multiple outlets have reported that transitional President Ahmad al‑Sharaa is preparing for a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, after US Envoy Thomas Barrack described potential Syria-Israel dialogue as 'meaningful' and necessary to prevent further regional escalation.
USA Today
29-06-2025
- Politics
- USA Today
The '12-Day War,' World War III, and how we describe what's happening in Iran
USA TODAY interviewed experts about what is happening in the world, and how it should be described. Here's what they said. President Donald Trump wants to call the most recent round of fighting between Iran and Israel the "12-Day War," but he may not get his wish. That's because journalists and historians are usually the ones who put names on wars, and they often don't choose the titles that government officials put on them. It's even less likely that the conflict could be named World War III, even though Trump has been warning about it for more than a decade, and even told the leader of Ukraine this year he was risking starting it. 'There's no official naming body, international or national,' said David Sibley, a military historian for Cornell University who is based in Washington, D.C. 'It's really just kind of agreed on by historians, by countries, and sometimes not even that.' USA TODAY interviewed experts on international relations and military history to talk about what is happening in the world, and how it should be described. Here's what they said. The '12-Day War' Howard Stoffer, a professor at the University of New Haven in Connecticut, said the most recent fighting between Iran and Israel marks a "historic turning point in the Middle East,' comparable to the Six-Day War in 1967 or the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Trump's suggested title might be a way to invoke 1967, "where Israelis used a preemptive airstrike to defeat the Arab countries around them," Sibley said. Israel emerged politically stronger and with more land. 'It certainly would invoke that in Israel and in the Middle East," Sibley said. "It certainly has that sort of pithiness that is appealing, and so it would be interesting to see. I don't know. It might stick." On June 26 and June 27, the news wire Reuters used the phrase '12-day war' to describe the sparring between the two countries earlier in the month, but not as the official name of the war, which would have a capitalized the "D" and "W." USA TODAY has used the term in quotation marks. Bryon Greenwald, a professor at National Defense University in Washington, D.C., questioned whether the attacks between Iran and Israel amounted to a war at all, or just a flare-up of a long-simmering conflict the countries have engaged in for decades. He pointed to airstrikes between Iran and Israel in March, predating the most recent conflict that led the United States to drop bombs on nuclear facilities. 'Does that shift the start date to the left, so it is now longer (than) 12 Days?' he asked. Peter Singer, a political scientist and author specializing in 21st-century warfare, said if Trump wants the name to catch on, he needs "better marketing." Graphic: How 70 years of history led to the U.S. bombing in Iran Who names wars? Even if the the name a president or military leader catches on, names catches on, journalists and historians may change them over time. 'WWI was commonly called the Great War until the media needed to name its successor,' said Don Ritchie, a former Senate historian. 'Historians are usually writing long after the fact and follow the common usage.' Wayne Lee, a professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, points to the usage by President George H.W. Bush's administration of 'Operation Desert Shield" and 'Operation Desert Storm' to describe early 1990s conflicts in the Middle East. Most people refer to those conflicts as the Gulf War, the First Gulf War, or the Persian Gulf War. When President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003, his administration named it 'Operation Iraqi Freedom,' but most people call it the Iraq War. 'Sometimes even the names of wars aren't agreed on,' said Sibley, from Cornell. 'What we call the American Civil War, it depends on where you are what you call it − 'The War Between the States,' 'The War of Northern Aggression,' things like that.' Is World War III happening? When the U.S. bombed Iran on June 21, Americans grew anxious that World War III had started. Experts caution against declaring armed conflicts worldwide "world war." 'I would be really surprised if this morphed into something that looks anything like the past world wars we've had,' said Will Todman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 'But that does not mean peace is likely around the world. … I just don't think those will all be connected in the same way it was in World War I or World War II.' Russia has been at war with Ukraine for more than three years, at times threatening to use nuclear weapons but never following through. Experts said tensions between North Korea and South Korea could escalate. Or they said China, another nuclear country, could invade Taiwan. 'Forces were fighting just about everywhere around the globe,' during both world wars, Sibley said. 'So even a conflict in the Middle East between two sets of alliances, I don't know that that would rise to the level. I don't know. It retroactively could be labeled that if it gets bad enough.' Sibley said nuclear weapons act as a deterrent to attack, because countries fear having those weapons used against them. But he said, if two major powers exchanged nuclear weapons it could warrant the moniker "World War III." Sibley said countries tend to be more cautious about invading or attacking nuclear powers because they fear having those weapons used against them. But he said, if two major powers exchanged nuclear weapons it could warrant the moniker "World War III." 'Post-1945, the assumption has been that World War III is going to be a nuclear one,' Sibley said. 'And, so, short of that, it's hard to see something getting that label.' Singer pointed to the massive casualties from world wars, numbers that the world has not seen in several of the most recent conflicts combined. "As many as 22 million people died in World War I and 85 million people in World War II,' he said. 'Stop trying to make World War III happen.'
