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The Guardian
6 days ago
- Business
- The Guardian
Scott Morrison tells US Australia risks going to sleep on China threat after diplomatic ‘charm and flattery'
The Chinese Communist party hopes Western democracies 'go to sleep on the threat' it poses to the international order, former prime minister Scott Morrison has told a congressional committee in the US. In a forthright appearance before the hawkish US House of Representatives select committee on the strategic competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist party, Morrison said China had changed diplomatic tack after he lost the 2022 election to Anthony Albanese. 'This included abandoning their economic and diplomatic bullying and coercion for more inductive engagement, laced with charm and flattery,' Morrison said. 'That said, the PRC still continues to engage in intimidatory behaviour by their military against Australia when it suits them without remorse.' Morrison said while China's diplomatic tactics had changed, its objectives were unaltered: to isolate US influence in the Indo-Pacific and weaken efforts at countering Beijing's 'potential security threat'. He said Australia should boost its defence spending to the 3.5% of GDP demanded of it by the US, arguing 'the world has changed' and that Chinese leaders sought to 'recast the world order to accommodate their illiberal objectives'. Morrison accused the current Labor government of scrimping on defence spending in order to pay for the Aukus submarine deal, which will cost $358bn to the 2050s. Morrison later told reporters Australian defence spending parsimony – in particular the 'displacement' of funds to prioritise Aukus – had been raised by the US in its review of the agreement. Sign up: AU Breaking News email 'It wasn't [meant to be] 'Aukus instead', it was 'Aukus as well',' he said. 'And 'Aukus as well' was at least going to add another half a percent of GDP, at least.' Morrison said Australia should raise its defence spending to 3% of GDP by 2030 and 3.5% by 2035. The government spends a little over 2% of GDP on defence currently, with forecasts to lift that to 2.3% by 2033. To prioritise Aukus, significant cuts have reportedly been made to defence programs, training budgets and to senior defence ranks. Australia has already paid $1.6bn to the US as part of the Aukus agreement. However, the future of the massive nuclear submarine deal remains uncertain as the Pentagon undertakes a review to ensure it does not weaken US naval capacity or diminish America's force posture to contain China. Morrison, whose leadership between 2018 and 2022 endured a low in relations with Beijing, told the committee it was vital for western nations to resist Chinese attempts to interfere in politics and curb free speech. Citing polling of Australians by the Lowy Institute, the former prime minister told US lawmakers that 'for the first time in quite a number of years there is a greater value on the economic partnership with China than concerns about the security threat'. 'That is an objective of the CCP [Chinese communist party], that western democracies go to sleep on the threat,' Morrison said. 'You need to build the internal resilience, and that means an appreciation of the potential threat. And that is somewhat in jeopardy in Australia.' Morrison said the liberal world order faced a 'rising threat from authoritarian states who, not content with absolute control over their own populations to preserve their regimes, also seek hegemonic control over their own regions and to recast the world order to accommodate their illiberal objectives'. Sign up to Breaking News Australia Get the most important news as it breaks after newsletter promotion 'The Chinese Communist party government of the People's Republic of China is such a regime.' And Morrison said Western countries were 'kidding themselves' if they thought dialogue would change Beijing's pursuit of their objectives. 'A free and open Indo-Pacific – that is a threat and a challenge to regime security in China,' he said. 'Discussion is fine, engagement is good – it's better than the alternative. But if we think that is going to produce change in the mindset of Beijing then we're frankly kidding ourselves.' Appearing alongside Morrison before the committee hearing was Rahm Emanuel, formerly president Barack Obama's chief of staff, mayor of Chicago and US ambassador to Japan. Emanuel is widely considered to be a leading Democratic contender contemplating a run for the White House in 2028. He argued the US – in a significant shift from the Trump administration's 'America First' doctrine – should lead a strong 'anti-coercion coalition' along with allies like Australia to counter Beijing's growing influence. He cited China's trade sanctions on beef, wine and barley, imposed after Australia led calls for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, as examples of economic coercion, China's most 'pernicious and persistent tool'. 'Australia is the best kind of blueprint of what you want to replicate worldwide. They did it on their own,' Emanuel said. 'And China realised they couldn't isolate Australia.'
Russia Today
21-07-2025
- Business
- Russia Today
The quiet Asian engagement everyone should be watching
In mid-July, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited China for the first time in nearly six years, underlining a tentative yet important reset in relations between Asia's two major powers. Jaishankar met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Vice-President Han Zheng in Beijing. Although the visit did not bring about a radical breakthrough, it did mark a significant step toward restoring top-level engagement and inching toward normalization. This effort comes at a symbolic moment – the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two nations – and reflects a broader duality: a blend of gradual rapprochement alongside enduring strategic competition. Jaishankar, who since 2019 has represented the moderate and pragmatic wing within India's foreign policy establishment, continues to advocate for cooperation with China and broader engagement in multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. His presence in Beijing was emblematic of India's effort to rebalance its approach to its complex relationship with its northern neighbor. The relevance of Sino-Indian relations extends far beyond bilateral dynamics. China and India are the world's two most populous countries, belonging to fastest-growing economies. Both are ancient civilizations and increasingly influential actors in the rising Global South. As such, their ability to manage tensions and cultivate areas of cooperation carries profound implications for regional and global order. Recently, there have been meaningful achievements in the bilateral relationship. Political dialogue and high-level engagement have resumed, contributing to greater border stability through new measures. Exchanges in various sectors and regional connectivity initiatives have intensified. Economic interdependence remains strong, and coordination between the two countries in multilateral platforms such as the SCO and the United Nations has become more robust. A landmark event occurred in October 2024, when Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in Kazan. This meeting marked the beginning of a new phase of engagement. Notably, the positive trajectory of relations was not disrupted by the India-Pakistan conflict in May – a testament to the growing political will on both sides to deepen ties. Economic interaction also continues to flourish. In 2024, China reclaimed its position as India's top trading partner, surpassing the United States after a two-year hiatus. Bilateral trade reached $118.4 billion, a 4% increase from 2023. These figures underscore a deepening interdependence that provides both leverage and incentive for sustained dialogue. From Beijing's perspective, the deterioration in relations over the past few years is seen as abnormal. Chinese officials have consistently promoted the idea of improvement across multiple dimensions. India is frequently described in Chinese discourse as a fellow ancient Eastern civilization, and the bilateral relationship has been metaphorically referred to as the 'dragon-elephant tango,' a symbolic framing that seeks to capture the potential harmony between the two powers. China sees India as an indispensable actor in the Global South and advocates for a bilateral relationship that is not directed against any third party – mirroring the same language used in reference to China's strategic partnership with Russia. Both China and India promote the vision of a multipolar world, multilateralism, and economic globalization. In this context, parallels are drawn between Xi's vision of 'a community with a shared future for mankind' and Modi's concept of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' ('the world is one family'), which is rooted in ancient Indian philosophy and emphasizes harmony and interconnectedness. The Chinese-launched Global Civilization Initiative also seeks to revive pre-modern cultural frameworks and plurality of civilizations, aligning conceptually with similar trends in India. During his meetings in Beijing, Jaishankar reiterated India's principle of strategic autonomy and its independent foreign policy – an approach that resonates with China's own diplomatic posture. He described India and China as development partners rather than rivals, countering dominant Western narratives that frame China-India relations largely through the lens of competition and threat. The triangular dynamic involving the US complicates the picture. Current pressures from Washington – particularly the shared risk of a trade war and the volatility of US foreign policy – act as a common concern for both New Delhi and Beijing. India, China, and other BRICS nations are facing increased scrutiny from the White House and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who have threatened secondary sanctions over continued economic ties with Russia. These external pressures may inadvertently bring China and India closer together, as both seek to safeguard their strategic autonomy and development trajectories. Historically, the US has sought to exploit gaps between India and China in a bid to prevent closer cooperation. That strategy may be less effective in an era where both Beijing and New Delhi are increasingly conscious of the need to define their relationship on their own terms. Despite these positive trends, substantial challenges remain. Chief among them is the unresolved boundary dispute, which remains the most sensitive and complex issue in the bilateral relationship. The Galwan Valley clash in 2020, which resulted in around two dozen fatalities, caused a severe deterioration in ties. However, the June 2025 visit of Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh to China signaled a renewed willingness to seek a permanent resolution. Trade-related frictions also persist. India faces restrictions on the import of rare earth magnets from China, which are crucial for strategic and industrial sectors. Intermittent Chinese export controls disrupt Indian manufacturing and deter Chinese foreign direct investment. Conversely, India restricts Chinese investment citing national security concerns, has banned several Chinese apps, and conducted raids on Chinese companies. Geopolitically, the competition for regional influence continues to strain relations. China's growing presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean clashes with India's strategic interests, especially in countries like Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. India has consistently refused to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), largely due to its opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs through contested territory. Plans for massive infrastructure projects such as the construction of the world's largest dam on the Yarlung Zangbo river, which flows into India, remain points of tension. To move beyond these obstacles, it is essential to build a stable and effective border trust mechanism. Restoring strategic dialogue platforms and enhancing multi-level security cooperation are indispensable steps toward creating a mature and resilient bilateral relationship. What is required is long-term, sustained, and measurable interaction supported by enduring political will, pragmatic consultative frameworks, and – above all – mutual respect for each other's core interests. At a more practical level, the two countries could reconsider the potential of the China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor (CNIEC). Proposed by Beijing in 2018 and backed by Kathmandu, the CNIEC envisions greater connectivity and economic integration across the Himalayan region. Though India has so far rejected the proposal, revisiting it could offer shared economic and strategic benefits. Another concrete step would be the restoration of military exercises, which were launched in 2007 but suspended after 2019. Renewed military cooperation would enhance strategic trust and transparency. Additionally, greater coordination in hydro-political domain is vital. Seven major rivers originate in China's Xizang region and flow through India. This creates both risks and opportunities for the two nations. While a full normalization of China-India relations may still be distant, the latest developments point toward a cautious but real shift. In a global context marked by uncertainty, polarization, and geopolitical realignment, the two Asian giants have much to gain from pragmatic engagement and mutual respect. The dragon and the elephant may still step on each other's toes, but their carefully choreographed tango is once again underway.
