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Business Recorder
4 days ago
- Politics
- Business Recorder
India's proxy war of terrorism
EDITORIAL: The Corps Commanders' Conference on Thursday once again underscored Pakistan's growing concerns over India's role in fomenting terrorism within this country. In the wake of the Pahalgam incident, and what was described as India's 'manifest defeat in direct aggression against Pakistan', the military leadership called for 'decisive and holistic actions at all levels' against Indian-backed and -sponsored proxies. The use of proxies by India reflects a well-documented pattern of behaviour in recent years, particularly since the rise to power of ultra-Hindu nationalist Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, in 2014. Pakistan has consistently highlighted India's support for separatist and militant elements, most notably Baloch insurgent groups and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorist outfit, both of which have been involved in high-profile terrorist attacks. The urgency of the matter was underscored by events on the very day of the conference in the Sur Dukai area of Baluchistan, where armed men stopped two buses, checked passengers' identity cards, and dragged out nine of them with Punjab addresses to be shot dead in cold blood. The so-called Balochistan Liberation Front later claimed responsibility for the heinous act. Pakistan has submitted multiple dossiers to the United Nations and other international bodies, detailing Indian financial and logistical support for these terrorist groups, often operating from Afghan soil or via clandestine regional networks. The issue gained significant traction following the 2016 arrest of a serving Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav in Baluchistan. Found in possession of a passport under a fictitious Muslim name, Jadhav later confessed on video to orchestrating subversive activities in that restive province on behalf of India's intelligence agency, RAW. A striking element of the top brass' assertions is the pointed reference to India's National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval. Just a day before the Corps Commanders' meeting, Director General of ISPR, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, had also named Doval as the 'chief architect of terrorism in Pakistan.' This, of course, did not come as a surprise. Doval has, on multiple public platforms and in think-tank discussions, outlined his 'offensive defence' doctrine – a Pakistan-centric strategy that advocates taking the fight to adversary through covert means. This doctrine has come to symbolize India's use of violent proxies to destabilise this country. The military's call for 'holistic' action reflects the evolving nature of modern security challenges, which requires a multi-dimensional approach. In addition to military readiness it demands greater political alignment and economic resilience—especially at a time when Pakistan is grappling with political uncertainty and grim economic challenges. Meanwhile, India's attempts to offset its military setbacks through proxy warfare leave limited space for diplomatic engagement in an already fragile regional environment. Common sense suggests that both nuclear-armed neighbours work to de-escalate tensions. Unfortunately, however, India's interference via proxies continues, adding to the tensions between two nuclear-armed countries. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Scroll.in
15-06-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
‘The idea that KB Hedgewar was an ultra-Hindu is patently false': Biographer Sachin Nandha
Hedgewar: A Definitive Biography by Sachin Nandha delves into the life and philosophy of the elusive Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) founder Keshav Baliram Hedgewar. The biography sheds light on Hedgewar's philosophy of cultural nationalism, his contributions to the socio-political cultural landscape of his times, and highlights his radical vision to fight the caste barriers within the RSS framework. Hedgewar's early critique of the increasing ritualism among Brahmins during British rule, including his distrust of the militant philosophy of Subhas Chandra Bose and private disagreements with Gandhi over his strict adherence to non-violence, is also covered. The biography charts Hedgewar's journey from an orphaned child in colonial India to becoming the mastermind behind RSS, one of the world's most secretive and largest voluntary organisations that completed its 100 years of existence. In an interview with Scroll, author Sachin Nanda talked about how the biography locates Hedgewar within the political and cultural ferment of his time, his key influences while growing up in poverty leading up to the creation of the RSS, his role in creating Shakhas to build social capital, and why he believes Hedgewar should not be labeled as an 'ultra-Hindu' or someone who 'hated' minorities. This biography claims to be a definitive biography of Hedgewar. How is this biography different from other biographies published earlier on Hedgewar and what are some unique insights and new archival information you were able to bring forth about his role and contribution within and outside the RSS? This is the first biography of Hedgewar in the true sense of the word. Previous works have largely been hagiographies – reverential, one-sided portrayals. This book took over seven years to research and write. It's grounded in archival material, over 700 references, and includes both focused and unstructured interviews with individuals connected to the RSS since the 1930s. What makes it unique is the attempt to locate Hedgewar within the political and cultural ferment of his time – inside and outside the RSS – while resisting both vilification and blind admiration. What were some key influences on Hedgewar while growing up that shaped his worldview and ideology of cultural nationalism that led to the founding of RSS? How did his exposure to Western education shape his understanding of political systems and nationalism? The early death of Hedgewar's parents left a deep emotional imprint – he was raised in poverty but later adopted by Dr BS Moonjay, one of Nagpur's wealthiest and most influential nationalists. This gave him access to both hardship and privilege, grounding him in India's social realities. He was deeply disturbed by the backwards condition of women and the fragmented state of Hindu society. He saw how the 'tyranny of custom' meant that women had almost no access to healthcare and medication that could have saved many thousands of lives during cholera outbreaks. Though rooted in tradition, Hedgewar had a curious and open mind. His time in Calcutta exposed him to revolutionary politics, and Western thinkers (from the age of 14) – Mazzini's nationalism, Marx's class analysis, Nietzsche's will to power, and even Greek political philosophy. He read widely and saw value in ideas that could help rebuild Indian society with discipline, unity, and pride. His vision for the RSS was neither orthodox revivalism nor blind Westernisation – but a fusion of Indian cultural rootedness with the organisational and philosophical insights he absorbed from across the world. He realised that the answer to India's problems was not political but cultural – and that Indian society was trapped by caste, class and creed, which had to be overcome if India was to reclaim its position as a great civilisation again. What was the motivation and thought behind the creation of RSS Shakhas which Hedgewar was instrumental in establishing? What kind of social and cultural capital was he hoping to reap through these Shakhas for the growth of RSS? Hedgewar's creation of the Shakha was, in many ways, a response to the deep deficit of social capital within Hindu society. India lacked the civic glue – networks of trust, norms, and cooperation – needed to build strong, inclusive institutions. Hindu society, fragmented by caste, region, and sect, had never developed the habits of collective action beyond its rigid hierarchies. Hedgewar's critique was not aimed outward – it was directed inward, at Hindu society itself. The Shakha was designed as a daily ritual of reform: a caste-blind, community-centric space where young men could forge bonds across social divisions, learn discipline, and cultivate a sense of shared civilisational responsibility. His vision was to rebuild Hindu society from the bottom up, laying the cultural foundations for a future India that was cohesive, self-confident, and capable of collective action. You write in the biography that in order to understand modern India, it should be viewed through the legacy of RSS founder Hedgewar. Why do you think Hedgewar shouldn't be looked at with a preconditional mindset formed by academics who, as you write in the biography, 'label him as an ultra-Hindu and hater of minorities'? To reframe the assertion in your question, I believe there are many ways to understand modern India. But no understanding can be complete without engaging seriously with the RSS – and that journey must begin with Hedgewar. He may well be more influential today than any of his contemporaries, precisely because of how deeply the institution he founded has shaped Indian society and politics. The idea that Hedgewar was an 'ultra-Hindu' or a hater of minorities is not just reductive – it's patently false. In seven years of research, I found no evidence, no data, no statements by him that support that claim. On the contrary, while at university, Hedgewar was deeply influenced by a Maulvi named Liaqat Hussain. His framework was not one of religious exclusion – it was about psychological unity with the nation. The red line for him was desh bhakt i – a profound emotional connection to the land and its civilisation. This inevitably came into tension with orthodox Islamist clerics of the time, who saw desh bhakti as a form of idolatry. So, the conflict wasn't about faith per se, but about whether loyalty to the nation could transcend religious dogma. The 1920s were a period of rupture – between Hindus and Muslims, between castes, between linguistic and regional identities. The RSS's early reputation as anti-minority must be understood in that turbulent context. Hedgewar was not a bigot. He was a complex and subtle thinker who recognised that to build a nation, one needed to bridge capital – something to unify diverse groups. For him, desh bhakti was that bridge: a shared emotional and cultural bond that could transcend sectarian lines and forge a common civilisational purpose. Can you elaborate on the idea of cultural nationalism that Hedgewar and RSS came to espouse? And where did he situate the minorities and their religious and cultural identities in this nationalism? Cultural nationalism, as Hedgewar conceived it, is distinct from political nationalism. Political nationalism is often tied to statehood, electoral power, or constitutional identity – a capture of the State. Cultural nationalism, by contrast, is about emotional belonging – a shared sense of civilisational continuity, values, and memory that binds people across time and difference. Hedgewar's idea was rooted in the belief that India was not just a geography but a civilisation. His vision wasn't to erase differences but to find a common thread – desh bhakti – a deep psychological commitment to the nation and its culture, which could serve as a unifying principle. In this framework, minorities weren't excluded. They were invited to participate in a shared national project, provided there was alignment on that emotional bond to the land and its heritage. Hedgewar wasn't seeking uniformity; he was looking for coherence. He believed that each group could retain its unique identity, but that the nation required bridging capital – the kind of social trust and civic relationships that link people across group boundaries. Robert Putnam makes the distinction between bonded and bridging social capital. Bonded capital ties people within a group; bridging capital connects people across groups. Hedgewar recognised that Hindu society lacked both. His effort, through RSS and the Shakhas, was to create a framework where bonded capital could grow amongst Hindus in order to bring coherence and then bridging capital across castes/creeds – by building a cultural nationalism that was broad, cohesive, and rooted in desh bhakti rather than religious affiliation. The challenge that Hedgewar faced, and the RSS still face, is that desh bhakti in this sense is tantamount to idolatry for conservative Deobandi clerics who resist this path, frightened that their identity will be subsumed. India will need to solve this problem sooner or later; or face further ruptures in the future! What do you make of assessments that say Hedgewar's idea of cultural nationalism and Hindu-centric ideology was a form of exclusionary nationalism detrimental to social cohesion that further marginalised minority communities in India? Critics often conflate two very different ideas: political nationalism and cultural nationalism. Political nationalism is concerned with capturing state power – rajya – in order to shape society. Political parties, by their nature, operate in this domain. They mobilise vote banks, often by constructing an 'us' versus 'them,' and in doing so, risk falling into majoritarianism. Whether it's the BJP or the Congress, both have, at times, prioritised one group over another to consolidate political capital. Hedgewar's idea of cultural nationalism is fundamentally different. It's not about state power – it's about building a rashtra, society. For him, the nation was not a political construct but a civilisational one. The RSS, in his conception, wasn't to be a political party but a cultural force – a space where people of all castes, classes, and creeds could find common cause through desh bhakti, a deep emotional and psychological union with the land and its civilisational ethos. So to say that Hedgewar's vision was exclusionary misunderstands both his intent and the institutional architecture he laid down. His red line was never religion – it was disloyalty to the idea of India as a shared civilisational space. The test was not what God you prayed to, but whether you saw yourself as part of the rashtra – and were willing to act in service of it. Of course, any cultural movement can be distorted in later years. But if one reads Hedgewar closely, it becomes clear he was trying to transcend India's divisions – not deepen them. His idea of nationalism was not to marginalise minorities, but to invite all into a unifying project – provided they could emotionally invest in the shared destiny of the nation. One should also note that Patriotism is not akin to desh bhakti – this is also another false application which creates linguistic confusion in popular discourse. By this same account Hedgewarian thought forces Muslims in India, not as a collective, but as individuals, to reflect – and ask themselves if they wish to be part of this civilisational project, or not? Is it compatible with being Muslim? What does it mean to be a desh bhakt, and a Muslim? These are questions that I do not claim to know, nor can I answer them. But Indians of all creeds will have to face up to these difficult questions sooner or later. Hedgewarian thought might give a 'way out of the fly bottle' The biography touches on Hedgewar's radical plans to combat the caste system which he came to loathe. What was his plan to integrate all castes within the RSS at the organisational level and how successful was he in dismantling the caste barriers within the RSS? Hedgewar loathed the caste system. He believed it had fractured Hindu society and weakened its capacity for collective action. His tool for addressing this was the Shakha – a deliberately secular, egalitarian space where young Hindu men, regardless of caste or class, could play, eat, and train together. It was revolutionary for its time. He understood that social reform couldn't be forced – it needed to be lived. Through physical exercise, gamification, and shared routines, the Shakha built social capital – trust, bonding, and cooperation across caste lines. Over time, participants were introduced to a shared historical and cultural consciousness through lectures and discussions – a slow, subtle reshaping of identity. The early RSS was very much this kind of space – as Gandhi himself acknowledged during his visit in 1934, when he noted the absence of caste discrimination in an RSS camp. That kind of testimony says something about the kind of social experiment Hedgewar was quietly running. I don't have enough reliable data to fully assess how successful the RSS has been in dismantling caste barriers within the RSS – but we do have clarity on the Hedgewarian intent and method. Why was Hedgewar opposed to Gandhi's strict adherence to nonviolence? What were some of these private disagreements with Gandhi in the context of communal and colonial violence during India's struggle for independence and their influence on the ideological foundations of RSS? Gandhi was a political nationalist. In that sense, he wanted to capture the state and then build a new India. Hedgewar was a cultural nationalist who had felt that the fundamental bonds between individuals were weak, and the society too fractured to build a state that could be held accountable. So Gandhi was top down; Hedgewar was bottom up. Furthermore, Hedgewar believed in diffused power; the RSS in his time was highly devolved and each Shakha was an autonomous outfit working independently, held together by the Prachaarak order, which is akin to the friars of medieval Europe. Gandhi was dictatorial – this is well evidenced; and often used his veto to drive policies he believed in even when his committees held differing views. The national flag controversy is a case in point. Also, Gandhi naively later sidelined nationalists such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), while pandering to Deobandi conservative clerics. In his final speech to the RSS Prachaaraks before his death, you quote Hedgewar telling RSS workers that the 'final redemption of Hindu society will only happen through the Sangh.' What did he mean by that? The Sangh means community. Community implies a surplus of social capital. The redemption of 'Hindu society' could only come through rebuilding the social capital amongst the vastly divergent Hindu groups.
Business Recorder
12-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
US and Pak-India peace process
EDITORIAL: The brief but intense four-day Pakistan-India military conflict has underscored the volatile nature of relations between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, and the need for diplomatic engagement in the greater interest of regional peace. After he brokered a ceasefire President Donald Trump had offered to work with both Pakistan and India to achieve a 'solution' of the Kashmir dispute. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and PPP Chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari — on visit to the US at the head of a delegation — have lauded the US President for deescalating the military confrontation, and once again, reached out to him for mediating talks with India. Said Bilawal in Washington, 'if the US is willing to help Pakistan maintain this ceasefire, it is reasonable to expect that an American role in arranging a comprehensive dialogue would also be beneficial for us.' India, however, denies President Trump helped bring about ceasefire. It also bristles at being re-hyphenated with Pakistan it had worked hard to unravel, insisting on its usual stance of rejecting third-party mediation on bilateral issues. Its ultra-Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi is too embarrassed to admit that he had accepted mediation due to the unfavourable turn of events in 'Operation Sindoor' he had launched accusing Pakistan of orchestrating the terrorist attack in Pahalgam. He has called the ceasefire 'a pause' but knows ending it won't be easy, and that his side had miscalculated two vital factors: One, Pakistan's conventional military capability reinforced by cutting edge technology, provided by Chinese friends, which helped establish its superiority even over his prized Rafale jets. In fact, some military analysts have opined that it may take six months to a year for Pakistan better prepare and do a return favour to Modi regarding his 'new normal' doctrine. Secondly, India had attacked Pakistan blaming it for the Pahalgam atrocity without providing convincing evidence to the world. In so doing it failed to realise that the world has moved on since 2001, hence the unsubstantiated allegation won't work. It had the support of only Israel and Afghanistan. No less important is a latest development; Pakistan has been named Vice Chair of the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee, which monitors implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001), a core component of the UN's global counter-terrorism architecture. Above all, an unindented consequence of Modi's 'new normal' is that it has propelled the Kashmir issue to front and centre of international attention. In his previous term Trump had indicated an interest in resolving Kashmir 'if' the two sides were willing. He is more emphatic this time around. 'I will work with you both, to see if, after a 'thousand years' a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir', he said in a post on his Truth Social platform. There already exists blueprint of a draft agreement on Kashmir the late Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and president Gen Pervez Musharraf were preparing to sign when sabotaged by some hawks within the BJP. Later, Congress Party PM Dr Manmohan Singh had also tried to push the same out-of-box solution. Narendra Modi, who came to power nearly 11 years ago, and his men need to get over their ego hurt and let President Trump's offer be a stepping stone to a comprehensive dialogue process to settle the Kashmir question so that there is durable peace and stability in South Asia. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Business Recorder
10-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
Proxy war
EDITORIAL: During his recent visit to Quetta accompanied by Army chief Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif addressed a grand jirga of tribal elders, highlighting the issue of terrorism backed by India he called 'fitna al-Hindustan' — a reference to insurgent groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which have been involved in a series of high-profile terrorist attacks targeting the security forces, Chinese interests — especially those tied to CPEC — as well as innocent civilians from other provinces. A few days ago, a suicide bombing on a school bus in Khuzdar claimed six lives, four of them children, and wounded 40 other children. In his conversation at the jirga, the Army chief said that Indian-sponsored proxy war is no longer hidden; it is an open malicious act of terrorism waged on our people, our progress, and our peace. 'We have concrete proof of India's hand behind terrorist networks operating in Balochistan', he averred, adding 'these nefarious attempts of the enemy will fail.' As a matter of fact, India's role in fomenting terrorism has been an open secret since the ultra-Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. A while ago, his national security advisor had publicly declared his government's new 'Offensive Defence Strategy' aimed at destabilising Pakistan by waging hybrid warfare — inflicting harm on this country without engaging in a direct military confrontation. This the Indian government has been doing by providing funding, arms and training to BLA and other such groups through its intelligence agency RAW operatives, like the naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav, who was arrested while aiding and instigating acts of terrorism in Balochistan. After the humiliating setback suffered in its 'Operation Sindoor' against Pakistan, the Modi government has an even stronger urge to try and undermine Pakistan via its proxies, some of whom have no hesitation to show the connection. The day after cessation of hostilities on May 10, BLA openly asked, in a press release, India to take action against Pakistan, promising to act along with other Baloch militant groups as its 'military arm' on the western side. India hurts Pakistan to achieve its strategic objective of weakening a traditional rival by exploiting its fault lines. But the current approach to the security environment in that troubled province, to say the least, is unproductive. Use of force for the past two decades has not helped resolve the situation, and calls for course correction. What is needed is a multi-dimensional approach to address longstanding grievances of the Baloch people, which play into the hands of hostile forces. It is good to note that in his speech to the jirga PM Sharif emphasised the need for talks to bring back those 'misled' by terrorists, and redress the wider issues plaguing the province. That though can happen only if true representatives of the Baloch people are duly empowered to hold meaningful talks with leadership of the dissidents. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
