Why A Mega Dalit Outreach Is Part Of BJP's Plan For Poll-Bound Bihar From June 20
Caste arithmetic and an unfavourable result in the elections last year have prompted the party to take steps to win the poll battle
The BJP has decided to go all out to woo Dalits of poll-bound Bihar, even before seat-sharing talks have begun among the NDA constituents for the upcoming election.
Starting June 20, the party will target the Ravidas community by organising the Sant Shiromani Ravidas Sammelan-cum-honour ceremony in Bihar. Sant Ravidas, a 15th-century Bhakti saint, is a significant figure in the Dalit community and is widely recognised as a Dalit icon. Last year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi commemorated Ravidas' 647th birth anniversary in his Lok Sabha constituency Varanasi. Now, with Bihar election around the corner, BJP has decided to hold such conclaves in different districts and created a schedule for that.
News18 has learnt that BJP has fixed conclave dates for Begusarai on June 20, Samastipur on June 22, Madhubani on June 25, Bagaha and Bhagalpur on June 29, Saharsa on June 30, Muzaffarpur and Siwan on July 6, Darbhanga on July 7, Gaya on July 13, Banka on July 16, Arwal on July 18, Khagaria and Sitamarhi on July 20 and Gopalganj on July 31, which will be the season finale.
There will also be a special conclave through which Dalit outreach efforts will be made in Bihar's capital Patna though the date for it is not yet finalised. The party wants the Patna conclave to be a show-stopper with big names in attendance, and hence, the date will depend on their availability, say BJP sources.
But why the focus on Dalits? Sources in the know suggest there are two reasons behind it. One is pure caste arithmetic. Though the Ravidas community constitutes just 5 per cent of Bihar's voters, if the total Dalit pie in Bihar is taken into consideration, the number jumps to 19 per cent. While BJP is confident about upper castes and OBC support of a few, JDU too brings OBC strengths. Even NDA's smaller allies like Rashtriya Lok Morcha leader Upendra Kushwaha can influence OBC votes. Only former Bihar CM Jitin Ram Majhi's Hindustan Awam Morcha-Secular(HAM-S) and LJP (RV) Chirag Paswan have limited sway over those known as the backwards.
The second reason stems from an unfavourable experience in last year's Lok Sabha election when the BJP-led NDA lost nine Lok Sabha seats in Bihar. In 2019 Lok Sabha polls, NDA won 39 seats while in 2024, it managed to win 30. In neighbouring Uttar Pradesh, the situation was even more grim. The BJP-led NDA lost a whopping 28 seats. Later, BJP went on record to accept that Congress managed to twist BJP's '400 paar' campaign slogan as fear mongering among Dalit voters, suggesting their reservation rights are on the line. This worked against the BJP in the two Hindi heartland states.
Since June 4 last year, when the results were declared, BJP has taken corrective measures to win the narrative war. However, the party feels that with no big alliance partner that has a solid grip among the Dalit community, the outreach is the best way forward.
Sources in the BJP say the plan to carpet-bomb the Ravidas Sammelans was conceived in mid-May when Leader of Opposition Rahul Gandhi alleged that the Bihar Police stopped him on his way to Ambedkar hostel in Darbhanga, adding that 'they could not stop me because your power (minority community) is watching over me".
Back then, Bihar BJP president Dilip Jaiswal had hit out at Gandhi, saying: 'He should use his mind. If he had to use a government building or hostel, he should have sent an official itinerary. He is the Leader of Opposition and a state president of a party has to teach this?"
However, it is learnt that this visit may have worked as a catalyst for the state BJP to pre-emptively launch a mega Dalit outreach, having learnt its lessons last year.
First Published:
June 04, 2025, 10:29 IST
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