Macron urges Putin to agree to Ukraine ceasefire in first phone call since 2022 — Novaya Gazeta Europe
According to a statement from the Palace, Macron 'emphasised France's unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity' during the two-hour conversation and called for 'the establishment, as soon as possible, of a ceasefire and the launch of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for a solid and lasting settlement of the conflict'.
The Kremlin, meanwhile, said in its own statement that Putin had told Macron that the war in Ukraine was a 'direct consequence of the policies of Western states' towards Russia.
The Russian leader, it said, 'reminded' the French president that the West had 'for many years … ignored Russia's security interests, created an anti-Russian bridgehead in Ukraine, condoned violations of the rights of Russian-speaking residents, and is now pursuing the course of prolonging the hostilities by supplying the Kiev regime with various modern weapons'.
Putin also stressed that any peace settlement should be 'comprehensive and long-term', the Kremlin said, as well as 'address the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis and be based on new territorial realities' — implying acceptance of Russia's annexation of large swaths of eastern Ukraine.
Macron had informed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky of his plans to speak with Putin and called Zelensky afterwards to discuss his conversation with the Russian leader, Reuters reported.
During the call, Putin and Macron also discussed Iran, with the Kremlin saying they had agreed on the country's 'legitimate right to develop peaceful nuclear energy' and both sides stressing that Tehran should 'continue to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including cooperation with the IAEA'.
The conversation came after US President Donald Trump rejected an offer by Putin for Moscow to help mediate the conflict between Israel and Iran last month, telling the Russian leader instead that he should 'mediate Russia first' by ending the war in Ukraine.
Macron travelled to Moscow in February 2022, just weeks before Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in an attempt to dissuade Putin from launching the war. He then continued to speak with the Russian leader by phone after the invasion began, with the last call between them taking place in September that year.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Balkan Insight
20 hours ago
- Balkan Insight
Russia's psychological operations in Georgia: a multifaceted strategy of control
July 4, 2025 - Grigol Julukhidze - Articles and Commentary A man standing next to barbed wire on the separation line between Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia in Khurvaleti. Photo: Shutterstock Psychological operations (psyops) are planned activities designed to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning and behaviour of individuals, groups or societies to achieve strategic objectives. This is often achieved through the use of information, symbols and actions. In military and geopolitical contexts, psyops aim to weaken an adversary's resolve, sow confusion, or shape perceptions to align with the operator's goals. Unlike propaganda, which primarily focuses on disseminating information – often biased or misleading – to shape public opinion through mass media, psyops encompass a broader range of tactics. For example, they can involve physical actions, psychological manipulation and targeted messaging, often with a specific strategic intent. While propaganda seeks to persuade through widespread narratives, psyops are more calculated, often covert, and may involve direct interventions like troop movements or staged events to create psychological effects. Since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Moscow has employed a sophisticated array of psychological operations aimed at weakening Georgia's sovereignty, eroding societal resilience, and reinforcing its dominance in the South Caucasus. These operations, often orchestrated with the involvement of Russian military intelligence (GRU), exploit Georgia's historical traumas, geopolitical vulnerabilities, and aspirations for western integration. This article explores three key psychological operations Russia has conducted in Georgia since 2013: the creeping annexation and kidnappings along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL); the persistent threat of war to instil fear; and the propagation of narratives that demoralize Georgian society while promoting the myth of an invincible Russia with a legitimate claim to regional dominance. Creeping annexation and kidnappings: eroding sovereignty and societal resolve One of Russia's most visible psychological operations in Georgia is the strategy of a 'creeping annexation' along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) separating Georgia from the Russian-occupied regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Since 2013, Russian and separatist forces have incrementally advanced the ABL deeper into Georgian territory, often under the cover of night, by moving border markers, installing barbed wire fences, and erecting 'State Border' signs. This process, known as 'borderization', has resulted in the loss of farmland, homes and livelihoods for Georgian villagers, who sometimes wake up to find their properties suddenly within occupied territory. For instance, in the village of Tamarasheni, South Ossetian troops and their Russian allies shifted border poles overnight, forcing farmers to harvest crops under a 72-hour ultimatum before being expelled. Unlike propaganda, which might amplify these actions through media, this psyop relies on the physical act of borderization to instil fear and helplessness directly in affected communities. The psychological impact of this operation is profound. By repeatedly violating Georgia's territorial integrity in small, incremental steps, Russia tests the resilience of Georgian society and its government. The constant threat of losing more land creates a pervasive sense of insecurity. Villagers living near the ABL face the daily risk of arbitrary detention or kidnapping by Russian-controlled forces, with over 126 Georgians illegally detained in 2017 alone for 'illegal border crossing'. These detentions, sometimes involving minors or elderly individuals, are rarely investigated by the de facto authorities, fostering a climate of impunity that further demoralizes local communities. The deliberate use of kidnappings as a psyop tactic, rather than mere propaganda, targets specific communities to create a direct psychological effect, amplifying fear beyond what media narratives alone could achieve. This strategy is designed to exhaust Georgian resistance over time. By 2013, the initial outrage over borderization began to wane as communities grew fatigued by the unrelenting pressure. The lack of a robust international response – beyond statements from the EU and US – has amplified this fatigue, as Georgians perceive their plight as being ignored by the global community. The psychological toll is evident in the stagnation of villages near the ABL, where economic activity has plummeted, and residents live in fear of straying too far from home. The message Russia sends is clear: Georgia's sovereignty is fragile, and resistance is futile against a determined occupier. The threat of war: exploiting Georgia's traumatic past Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, another psychological operation has gained prominence: the deliberate amplification of war rhetoric to scare Georgians into submission. Georgia's traumatic history with Russia, particularly the devastating 2008 war that resulted in the loss of 20 per cent of its territory, makes its population highly susceptible to fears of renewed conflict. Russian psyops exploit this trauma by perpetuating narratives that warn of imminent war unless Georgia aligns with Moscow's interests. This operation intensified in 2022, as Russia's actions in Ukraine served as a stark reminder of its willingness to use military force against perceived adversaries. The Kremlin has promoted the idea that pursuing NATO or EU membership will provoke Russia into another devastating war. For example, in 2024, political campaigns in Georgia featured billboards contrasting peaceful Georgian cities with devastated Ukrainian ones, implying that resistance to Russia risks a similar fate. This messaging taps into the collective memory of the 2008 war, where Russian forces overwhelmed Georgia in just five days, displacing thousands and leaving lasting scars. By framing Russia as a guarantor of peace, the Kremlin seeks to deter Georgia from pursuing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. While propaganda might spread these narratives through media, the psyop incorporates real-world actions, such as Russian troop movements near the ABL, to heighten the perceived threat. Russian military intelligence has played a key role in amplifying these threats. The GRU has been linked to disinformation campaigns, including statements from Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) accusing the West of plotting a 'Tbilisi Maidan' to destabilize Georgia. These claims, disseminated through Russian media, aim to sow fear of western-induced chaos and position Russia as a stabilizing force. The psychological effect is to paralyze Georgian society, making alignment with Moscow seem like the only path to avoid catastrophic conflict. Demoralization and the myth of invincible Russia Perhaps the most insidious psychological operation is Russia's effort to demoralize Georgian society by promoting the narrative that resistance is pointless and that Moscow is an invincible force with a legitimate right to dominate the South Caucasus. This operation, which gained momentum in 2024, seeks to erode Georgia's national morale and undermine its democratic aspirations. By portraying Russia as an unstoppable power, the Kremlin aims to instil a sense of futility, convincing Georgians that no matter their efforts – whether political, economic or military – Russia will ultimately prevail. Unlike propaganda, which might rely solely on media to spread this narrative, this psyop includes tangible actions like asset transfers to reinforce Russia's dominance. This narrative is propagated through a combination of disinformation and economic coercion. Russian-backed media and organizations in Georgia, reportedly numbering in the dozens, spread anti-western messages, downplay Russia's occupation of Georgian territories, and whitewash its aggression. For instance, in 2024, statements emerged claiming that Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine were defensive responses to western provocation. Such narratives aim to shift blame from Moscow and erode trust in western institutions. The myth of Russia's invincibility is further reinforced through symbolic actions, such as the transfer of strategic assets like the Bichvinta Dacha in Abkhazia to Russian control in 2024. This move, framed as a legitimate assertion of Russian influence, signals to Georgians that Moscow can act with impunity in their territory. The GRU's involvement in these operations is evident in the sophisticated coordination of propaganda, which often portrays Russia as the natural hegemon of the South Caucasus, entitled to dictate Georgia's foreign policy. Economic interdependence is another tool in this psychological arsenal. Russia's trade with Georgia reached 2.39 billion US dollars in 2023, a 47 per cent increase from 2021. This fostered a dependency that undermines Georgia's ability to resist Russian influence. By controlling key economic levers, Russia reinforces the perception that Georgia cannot thrive without Moscow's approval. This economic coercion, combined with disinformation, creates a demoralizing narrative: Georgia's efforts to align with the West are doomed to fail, and submission to Russia is inevitable. The role of Russian military intelligence Russian military intelligence, particularly the GRU, has been instrumental in orchestrating these psychological operations. The GRU's expertise in hybrid warfare – combining disinformation, cyber operations and proxy activities – has enabled Russia to wage a relentless campaign against Georgia's national psyche. From coordinating borderization efforts to disseminating propaganda through various channels, the GRU ensures that these operations are executed with precision and maximum psychological impact. The 2008 war itself was a precursor to these tactics, with Russian forces rehearsing operations in the Caucasus 2008 exercise and deploying proxies like the Vostok Battalion to sow chaos. A battle for Georgia's soul Russia's psychological operations in Georgia since 2013 represent a calculated effort to undermine the country's sovereignty and demoralize its people. Creeping annexation and kidnappings erode territorial control and societal resilience; the threat of war exploits historical traumas to deter western alignment; and the myth of Russia's invincibility fosters despair and submission. These operations, driven by Russian military intelligence, have pushed Georgia to a crossroads, where it must choose between succumbing to Moscow's influence or rallying international support to preserve its democratic aspirations. Grigol Julukhidze is the director of the Foreign Policy Council, a think tank in Tbilisi. He specializes in security studies and propaganda research. He is also an Associate Professor at Caucasus University. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. borderization, Georgia, Georgian politics, Russian foreign policy, Russian interference, South Caucasus, South Ossetia
Novaya Gazeta Europe
a day ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
European spy agencies accuse Russia of ‘widespread' chemical weapons usage in Ukraine — Novaya Gazeta Europe
A Russian Emergency Ministry employee checks radiation levels and potential chemical air pollution in Kursk, Russia, 6 September 2024. Photo: EPA-EFE/STRINGER The Netherlands and Germany have accused Russia of ramping up its chemical weapons usage in Ukraine following a joint investigation of the two countries' intelligence services, according to a joint press release published on Friday. According to the investigation's findings, it is now 'standard practice' for Russia to use tear gas, as well as more serious substances like chloropicrin, high doses of which can be fatal, to force Ukrainian troops to leave cover 'to be killed [with] conventional weapons'. While tear gas is used for law enforcement purposes, its usage in warfare is banned by the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a party. "The main conclusion is that we can confirm Russia is intensifying its use of chemical weapons … it is part of a trend we have been observing for several years now, where Russia's use of chemical weapons in this war is becoming more normalized, standardized, and widespread,' Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans said in an interview with Reuters on Friday. Russian chemical weapons had been tied to at least three Ukrainian deaths on the battlefield, with over 2,500 injured casualties also reporting chemical weapons-related symptoms, Brekelmans told Reuters. While Moscow has not yet responded to the latest claims, it has previously denied Kyiv's allegations regarding the illegal use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. Most recently, in March, a Ukrainian delegation to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), accused Russia of 'systematically violating' the CWC, having used chemical munitions over 6,900 times since 2022. On Wednesday, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had discovered a Ukrainian storage site containing chloropicrin-equipped weapons in the east of the country, and blamed the OPCW for turning a 'blind eye' to Ukraine's 'flagrant breaches' of international law. In May 2024, the OPCW stated that accusations from both Russia and Ukraine regarding the use of chemical weapons were 'insufficiently substantiated'.
Novaya Gazeta Europe
a day ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Off the rails. Disused trains, record-low cargo and engine shortages: how the war has impacted Russian Railways — Novaya Gazeta Europe
State-owned monopoly Russian Railways is at a crisis point, the company's worst since the Great Recession almost two decades ago, with freight volumes at a record low due to the combined effects of Western sanctions and dwindling flows of agricultural goods and construction materials. Nevertheless, Russia's rail network is congested, not only with trains rushing to deliver military supplies urgently needed at the front, but with unused carriages. It also critically lacks both the personnel and locomotives required to keep the rail system running smoothly, and these problems only seem to be getting worse. This matters not only because Russian Railways is one of Russia's largest and richest state-owned enterprises, but because railway transport activity is also a bellwether for the wider economy — freight must be moved today in order for business to be done tomorrow. When rail traffic is disrupted, it usually signals that an industrial slowdown is imminent. So what, then, can the dysfunction of Russia's national rail system tell us about the health of the country's economy in 2025? And will Russian Railways be able to get itself back on track any time soon? Tankers at a railway yard in Tobolsk, Tyumen region, Russia, 24 September 2012. Photo: Sergey Ilnitsky / EPA Track record The origins of the national rail service's current crisis can be traced back to February 2022. Within the first 12 months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, transport flows in two key categories of goods had collapsed. Raw materials, such as timber, ferrous metals, ores and minerals, came under sanction by the West, while international demand for fertilisers — despite being unsanctioned — also fell significantly after Russia's major banks were excluded from the SWIFT international payment system. As the war entered its second year, Russian Railways appeared to be surviving financially, although clear signs of strain had begun to appear. The national rail service had seen total freight transports fall 4% in 2022, marking the worst-ever drop-off since the global financial crisis hit Russia's economy in 2008. However, transport flows stabilised in 2023 as export numbers for non-sanctioned goods recovered. In particular, fertiliser exports rose as global buyers moved quickly to hedge against possible sanctions, while a strong wheat harvest kept Russia's grain flowing steadily to foreign markets, where demand soared amid low prices. All totalled, shipments have now fallen for 20 consecutive months, and the trend is accelerating. But in 2024, the downturn returned, with freight volumes plummeting by 4% once again, and the situation has only worsened so far this year. Grain transportation, one of the biggest drivers of growth in 2023, dropped sharply last year, as did ferrous metal — usually a reliable category of transport — for the first time. The decrease in traffic is partially due to the decline in both steel smelting and exports, which have fallen for 11 months prior to early 2025, primarily due to sanctions. But it also reflects the struggling Russian construction industry, which usually consumes large amounts of steel. In 2025, the number of new residential construction projects has already declined by a quarter, and the government expects the trend to worsen. That means Russian Railways is hauling fewer metals, construction materials, and cement, all of which hurts transport figures. All totalled, shipments have now fallen for 20 consecutive months, and the trend is accelerating. Last year, freight volumes dropped by just over 4%, matching a post-Soviet record. But they have continued to fall by more than 7% in the first five months of 2025 alone, nearly equalling the total decline since the war began, and painting a bleak picture for the future. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA Freight to firepower There is one transportation item, however, that grew steadily from 2022 to 2024. Labelled vaguely as 'Other goods, including in containers,' Russian Railways does not specify what this category actually entails in its official data, but transport analysts generally believe it refers to military cargo, from ammunition and equipment to materials used in arms production. In fact, the prioritisation of military freight is likely one of the most important reasons for the decline in other categories of haulage. But, as the Russian macroeconomic analysis Telegram channel MMI put it, it is 'a factor that is not customarily spoken about'. North Korean shells are being transported in containers from east to west. Given the state's prioritisation of all things military, it's no surprise that civilian freight volumes have fallen, military expert Yury Fedorov told Novaya Gazeta Europe. 'Clearly, some of the 'other goods' very likely relate to military production — there may be ammunition in the containers. North Korean shells are being transported in containers from east to west. Trains with tanks and artillery are travelling from factories and repair plants to the front and from the front back to the enterprises that repair them.' The exact volume of weapons and ammunition shipments, as well as raw materials for their manufacture to military factories, has, of course, not been disclosed by Russian Railways. Haul or nothing But Russian Railways' falling freight volumes cannot be explained by the uptick in 'other goods'; these figures have also fallen so far in 2025, despite the Russian military's widely anticipated summer offensive in Ukraine. The problem would appear to lie deeper and likely stems from the structure of Russia's rail network, in which few sections operate independently, so when problems arise in one area, they quickly spread to the others. The Western parts of the rail network, on the other hand, now primarily transport military supplies, with little in the way of exports since the imposition of sanctions in 2022. This can happen incrementally due to several factors. Freight traffic to the southern ports of Novorossiysk and Taman has declined, for example, partly because frequent bombings have led to their closure, resulting in fewer ships docking and a sharp drop in dry cargo shipments by rail. The Western parts of the rail network, on the other hand, now primarily transport military supplies, with little in the way of exports since the imposition of sanctions in 2022. Western Russia had continued to export coal, which accounts for one-third of Russian Railways' overall cargo volumes, but those exports have fallen since last year's coal price collapse and the recent appreciation of the ruble made it unprofitable for Russian Railways to transport the cargo. The same phenomenon has also occurred in Russia's Far East, according to Alexander Polikarpov, managing partner at Rollingstock Agency, a Russian consultancy specialising in rail logistics and infrastructure, which means that the company's three key corridors to the global market are now more or less closed to coal exports. Russian servicemen and military equipment at a railway station in the Rostov region, Russia, 23 February 2022. Photo: EPA Trains in vain Two additional problems explain why less freight is being transported. First, Russian Railways lacks sufficient staff due to the war, which has left Russia's economy facing a significant personnel shortage. Some workers have been mobilised and many others have enlisted after being offered significant financial incentives, while many more have simply left the country. According to the company's own figures, Russian Railways currently has a shortfall of approximately 2,500 engineers and around 3,000 locomotive crews, resulting in it being unable to run some 200 trains each day. Second, locomotives are in short supply as well. In fact, according to a survey conducted last year, one-third of Russian industrial enterprises with non-public tracks lack locomotive engines, although Russian Railways has denied that the problem exists. In January–April 2025, the production of mainline electric and diesel locomotives in Russia fell by 13% and 6%, respectively. By contrast, there are plenty of carriages, but this could be causing more harm than good. Shortages of workers and locomotives are causing bottlenecks, as carriages remain stationary for weeks at a time, often blocking traffic. According to internal data collected by Russian Railways, 300,000 wagons had accumulated on the network as of March 2025, almost a fifth of the rail service's entire fleet. Photo: Maxim Shipenkov / EPA Sky-high investment According to estimates made by Russian Railways, the company will need to purchase approximately 1,000 electric and diesel locomotives annually until 2035, as half of its 20,000-strong fleet of locomotives will require replacement by then. At current prices, therefore, it needs to be spending at least 220 billion rubles every year (€2.4 billion) to meet this vital goal. However, despite the fact that its basic tariff rate for transporting goods has been increased over one and a half times, and passenger transportation profits have continued to grow since the start of the war in Ukraine, the operator's net total profits fell threefold in 2024 compared to the previous year. The company's main problem is that it earns relatively little while simultaneously borrowing and spending a lot — though not on the infrastructural improvements it needs. Last year, for example, of the 1.5 trillion rubles (€16.47 billion) Russian Railways allocated for investments, approximately 200 billion (€2.2 billion) was spent buying a skyscraper in the prestigious Moscow-City commercial development to house new office space. Due to this purchase and a drop in profits from the transportation of freight and cargo, projections show that Russian Railways will have to cut 40% — some 600 billion rubles (€6.59 billion) — of its investment budget this year in order to stay afloat, despite its pressing need for more engineers and locomotives. Rolling on empty In some ways, Russian Railways is simply facing the consequences of economic stagnation, which began in late 2024 and is expected to continue until at least 2027. But even if the war in Ukraine ends, sanctions are lifted, and exports to the West resume, it would take years for the state rail monopoly to recover from its deepening crisis. 'Even in the most optimistic scenario of an improvement in the geopolitical situation and the prompt end to the [war in Ukraine], a real effect on rail transportation will still be noticeable for 1.5–2 years,' Rollingstock's Polikarpov writes. This year, the downturn in construction materials is expected to be the most significant drag on overall freight volumes. Coal transport may recover following a disastrous 2024, which, along with fertiliser (which is still not subject to Western sanctions) and container shipments, will drive some growth. But that won't be enough to compensate for lost freight flows, especially not to the extent needed to keep the system afloat. Russian Railways needs cash to buy more locomotives, hire more workers, and invest in basic infrastructure maintenance. To do that, Russian Railways needs cash — to buy more locomotives, hire more workers, and invest in basic infrastructure maintenance. With profits dwindling and debt rising, the company may have only one option left: to persuade the government once again to raise tariffs above the rate of inflation, as it has done every year of the war so far. Yet, even in this strategy there is a paradox. After raising its tariffs, Russian Railways often resorts to offering steep discounts to cargo customers to ensure its trains don't run empty, according to analysts from Russian Telegram channel Lab, which covers the transport industry with a focus on logistics. If this practice continues, the experts warn, Russian Railways could face an even worse scenario and find itself forced to dismantle parts of its rail network entirely — lines for which there is no longer sufficient demand, and which have become too costly to sustain, both for Russian Railways itself and for the economy as a whole.
