Sunny Joseph meets Samastha's Jifri Thangal in Kozhikode
The meeting happened at the office of the Samastha in the city. Mr. Joseph later told the media that it was part of his attempts to meet prominent community leaders and political veterans. 'The meeting was cordial, and we discussed political issues as well. His suggestions and advice will help the party,' he added. Mr. Joseph was accompanied by All India Congress Committee secretary Roji M. John, MLA, and K. Praveenkumar, Kozhikode District Congress Committee president.
The visit assumes significance against the backdrop of reports that the Samastha leadership is not happy with the support offered by the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind-linked Welfare Party of India (WPI) to Aryadan Shoukath, the United Democratic Front (UDF) candidate in the bypoll. The Thangal, however, claimed that the bypoll was not discussed during the meeting. He said that Mr. Joseph had sought suggestions to strengthen the Congress party. 'All the political parties, including the Congress, should go ahead with a secular perspective. That is what I told him,' the Thangal said.
Meanwhile, he declined to comment on the WPI's support to the UDF. 'We do not need to comment on that. The respective political fronts will try to get votes to win the elections. We do not politically support anyone. In Nilambur, the fight is between two strong political fronts. We are not the ones to give either a good certificate or a bad certificate to the Jamaat-e-Islami-Hind. Our differences with it are ideological, not political,' he added.
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By implementing such exclusionary travel protocols, the state not only marginalises a segment of its population but also risks exacerbating sectarian divisions in a nation already burdened by deep polarisation, political suppression, and widespread instability. Historically, Pakistan's constitution guaranteed equal rights to all citizens regardless of their faith or sect, although it has explicitly discriminated against the Ahmadiyya community—another oppressed group alongside Hindus, Shias, and Christians. Yet, for many within the Shia community, as with other religious minorities, that constitutional assurance has rarely translated into practice. The introduction of the new travel regulation serves as a stark reminder that in the Islamic Republic, religious liberty is not a universal entitlement but rather a tightly controlled and selectively granted privilege, managed and rationed by the state. Although visa enforcement, like border control, is a legitimate responsibility of the state, its impartiality is compromised when its execution aligns with sectarian fault lines. At that point, it no longer remains a neutral administrative act but becomes a vehicle for discrimination. If Pakistan genuinely seeks to foster national unity, it must reject the selective application of the law and commit to governance grounded in fairness—applying rules uniformly across all communities without favour or prejudice. This approach should also support, rather than restrict, religious expression, regardless of sectarian identity. Crucially, it requires avoiding the misuse of bureaucratic mechanisms as tools of sectarian exclusion. top videos View all Until such principles are upheld, the concept of 'equal citizenship" in Pakistan will continue to ring hollow—serving more as a bitter irony than a constitutional assurance. This is particularly evident for communities that are repeatedly compelled to demonstrate their loyalty, even in their most sacred journeys of faith. The writer is an author and a columnist. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : pakistan Shia sunni view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 22, 2025, 19:32 IST News opinion Global Watch | Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
