Denmark arrests man wanted in Germany for allegedly gathering information on Jews for Iran
By GEIR MOULSON
A man suspected of gathering information on Jewish locations and individuals in Berlin for Iranian intelligence, possibly with a view to attacks, has been arrested in Denmark, German prosecutors said Tuesday.
The Danish national, identified only as Ali S. in line with German privacy rules, was arrested on Thursday in the Danish city of Aarhus, federal prosecutors said in a statement.
The man was tasked by an Iranian intelligence service early this year with gathering information on 'Jewish localities and specific Jewish individuals' in Berlin, prosecutors said. They didn't elaborate.
He spied on three properties in June, 'presumably in preparation of further intelligence activities in Germany, possibly including terrorist attacks on Jewish targets,' prosecutors said.
German Justice Minister Stefanie Hubig said that 'if this suspicion is confirmed, we are dealing with an outrageous operation," adding in a statement that 'the protection of Jewish life has the highest priority for the German government.'
German security authorities stepped up protection for Jewish and Israeli facilities after a 12-day war broke out between Israel and Iran in June.
The suspect is accused of working for an intelligence service of a foreign power. The information leading to his arrest came from Germany's domestic intelligence service, prosecutors said.
He will be brought before a judge in Germany to determine whether he's kept in custody pending formal charges after extradition from Denmark. It wasn't immediately clear when that will happen.
Iranian Ambassador Majid Nili Ahmadabadi was summoned to the German Foreign Ministry after prosecutors announced the arrest.
The Iranian Embassy in Berlin rejected what it called 'unfounded and dangerous allegations' of an apparent plan for an attack on Jewish facilities. It said in an emailed statement that they 'appear to be part of a deliberate campaign' to divert attention from 'the recent aggression of the Israeli regime against Iranian territory' and the killing of Iranians.
Germany is a staunch ally of Israel and has a history of tense relations with Tehran, though it has been one of the three leading European powers trying to engage Iran in diplomacy over its nuclear program.
In October, Germany ordered the closure of all three Iranian Consulates in the country in response to the Iranian judiciary's announcement of the execution of Iranian German prisoner Jamshid Sharmahd, who lived in the United States and was kidnapped in Dubai in 2020 by Iranian security forces. That left the Islamic Republic with only its embassy in Berlin.
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