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The Unexpected Consequences of War Between Iran and Israel on Afghanistan

The Unexpected Consequences of War Between Iran and Israel on Afghanistan

The Diplomat17 hours ago
The direct conflict between Iran and Israel severely impacts Afghanistan, which is struggling with fragile governance, economic crisis, and insecurity under Taliban rule.
Iran and Israel have a long history of military rivalry and hostility. However, until June 13, 2025, no direct, full-scale military conflict had occurred between them. Most of the confrontations between Iran and Israel have taken place indirectly, through proxy wars on the soil of other countries, especially in the Middle East.
After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran severed diplomatic ties with Israel and handed over its embassy to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Iran labeled Israel the 'Zionist regime,' and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's leader, called Israel a 'cancerous tumor' and declared its destruction an ideal goal of the Islamic system.
Since then, Iran has pursued a proxy strategy, targeting Israel's interests in the Middle East and beyond. In response, Israel has carried out numerous attacks against Iran's interests and its proxy groups, which Iran calls the 'Axis of Resistance.'
The recent 12-day military conflict between Iran and Israel marked a turning point in their hostile relations, as it was the first time the two countries engaged in direct, full-scale military combat.
This war, besides its immediate regional and global consequences, has also had secondary effects on neighboring fragile countries like Afghanistan. Due to its geographic proximity to Iran, fragile political structure under the Taliban regime, dependence on cross-border trade, and the presence of extremist groups, Afghanistan faces heightened security and economic risks.
Afghanistan has largely maintained a neutral stance in past proxy tensions and even during the recent direct conflict between Iran and Israel. Has this neutrality protected Afghanistan from harm caused by the conflict? Can the Taliban manage the situation and the security and political consequences of the Iran-Israel war? And finally, what strategies can address the extant challenges?
Iran-Taliban Relations
Iran has always had a complex and multilayered relationship with Afghanistan, especially under the Taliban regime. During the Taliban's first period of rule in Afghanistan (1994–2001), the group attacked the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif, killing several Iranian consular staff and journalists. This incident nearly led to military confrontation between the two countries.
However, over the past two decades, Iran and the Taliban have shared an unspoken agreement, considering foreign forces – especially the United States – as common enemies and threats to their interests. This has led to covert cooperation aimed at defeating the West in Afghanistan. While Iran officially maintained diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, its support for and cooperation with the Taliban were evident.
Taliban leaders, including Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, traveled to Iran multiple times; Mansour was killed in a 2016 U.S. airstrike in Pakistan while returning from Iran. Afghan Republic forces repeatedly reported finding Iranian-made weapons in the hands of Taliban fighters, and multiple sources confirmed the regular movement of Taliban members into Iran.
Following the fall of the Afghan Republic government in the wake of the Doha Agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban and the withdrawal of international forces in August 2021, Iran's approach to the Taliban has combined realism with ideological concerns. Iran expanded economic and diplomatic engagement with the Taliban but simultaneously voiced worries about the suppression of the Persian language and Shiite minorities, increased drug trafficking, widespread illegal migration, and border security issues.
The Taliban's presence has completely altered the security dynamics between Iran and Afghanistan. Despite official Iranian statements, security costs are sharply rising. Iran has spent millions of dollars constructing walls along its eastern borders and is hosting thousands of Afghan refugees who fled Taliban oppression.
So far, the Taliban have refrained from taking a clear stance on the war between Iran and Israel. They have only issued a press statement condemning the U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities in support of Israel. Over the past three years, unlike many Islamic countries, the Taliban have not allowed Afghan citizens to hold demonstrations in support of the people of Gaza in response to Israeli attacks, with only one limited protest recently permitted in Kabul.
Additionally, over the past three years, the Taliban have not allowed groups aligned with the Iranian government to hold rallies in Afghanistan on the occasion of International Quds Day (the last Friday of Ramadan), which is annually organized at the initiative of the Iranian government.
Given the ideological differences between the two regimes – the Taliban's emirate with its radical Sunni interpretation versus the Islamic Republic of Iran's Shia-based governance rooted in the concept of Wilayat-e Faqih – it is unlikely that the Taliban will take action in support of Iran under the current sensitive security conditions. At most, they are expected to continue maintaining an apparent policy of neutrality, as they have done thus far.
During the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, the Taliban reportedly held a high-level meeting to examine possible scenarios, including the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its implications for their own regime. Credible reports indicate that the Taliban are concerned that Iran's current government could collapse and be replaced by a secular, democratic state in their neighborhood. Despite the deep-rooted ideological differences between the two, the Taliban have a preference for the existing regime over the unknown. They understand that if such a scenario materializes, their circle of regional allies would shrink, and a democratic government in Iran would never support the Taliban as the Islamic Republic currently does.
Security Consequences for Afghanistan
Experts have mostly focused on the Middle Eastern and the economic dimensions of the Iran-Israel war, with less attention to its security and economic effects on neighboring countries like Afghanistan.
Afghanistan, under Taliban control, lacks sufficient support structures for its citizens and depends heavily on neighboring countries, especially Iran, for essential goods such as food, oil, and gas. Any disruption in this trade can quickly endanger food security and purchasing power. During the 12-day war, significant changes were observed in Afghan markets.
Meanwhile, Iran accelerated forced deportations of Afghan migrants even during the war. A significant number were detained and forcibly returned to Afghanistan. Media reports have shown images and coverage of mass round-ups and deportations in Iran's Khorasan Razavi province and other areas, depicting a harsh situation. Afghan refugee camps in Iran, such as the Tembako Pass camp, are witnessing a crisis, with thousands awaiting forced expulsion. In the past month, media reports estimated that nearly 250,000 Afghan migrants were deported from Iran.
The sudden influx of this population into Afghanistan, combined with similar deportations from Pakistan, will undoubtedly bring serious security and economic consequences. Experts warn that in the absence of support and infrastructure, terrorist groups like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al-Qaida could exploit these migrants.
According to UNICEF, about 5,000 Afghan children were separated from their families during these deportations and now face security threats and abuse by radical Islamic groups and even the Taliban.
A local source in Herat province reported that housing rental prices have sharply increased, with many deported families homeless and forced to live on city streets and roads. These people are exposed to social insecurity and risks of sexual abuse of women and children. Criminal activities such as home and vehicle thefts have also risen, while the Taliban offer no effective support programs.
Another concern is the possible transfer of al-Qaida members and other radical groups aligned with Iran and the Taliban into Afghanistan. There have been previous reports that al-Qaida encourages its supporters to settle in Afghanistan, where the Taliban offer protection.
Economic Crisis and Humanitarian Risks
Iran is one of Afghanistan's largest trade partners, especially for fuel, food, medicine, and construction materials. The Iran-Israel war can disrupt this vital trade and worsen Afghanistan's livelihood crisis. Price increases, reduced access to essential goods, and inflation are expected consequences.
Afghanistan's dependence on imported goods from Iran, especially food and medicine, is unusually high. Even a short-term disruption in this trade can severely harm people's lives. Replacing Iran as Afghanistan's main trading partner with other regional and global countries would be difficult in terms of both time and cost. Although some goods come from Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia, Iran's nearby and stable land routes remain especially important.
In addition to economic impacts, humanitarian problems in Iran have increased due to migrant conditions, sanctions, inflation, and shortages in healthcare facilities. This situation could increase pressure on the Afghan migrant community in Iran and lead to a new wave of forced migrations and human trafficking.
Conclusion
The direct conflict between Iran and Israel severely impacts Afghanistan, which is struggling with fragile governance, economic crisis, and insecurity under Taliban rule. Disruptions in trade routes and massive deportations of Afghan migrants from Iran not only worsen humanitarian crises but also increase the risk of further regional instability by fueling insecurity and extremist activities.
For Western policymakers and international actors, Afghanistan's situation requires a coordinated and comprehensive approach that addresses immediate humanitarian needs while considering broader geopolitical realities. Supporting Afghanistan's stability is not only a regional matter but also a key part of preventing extremism's spread, managing migration flows, and maintaining security in a volatile region.
Ignoring these complexities means allowing the Taliban to continue wide-scale human rights violations, enabling various regional and global terrorist groups, and ultimately turning Afghanistan into a canter of instability with repercussions beyond its borders.
Now is the time for active engagement, humanitarian support, and strategic cooperation to build an inclusive, legitimate government. This will revive the positive achievements of the past two decades and allow Afghanistan to be a worthy member of the international community without being a source of security threats.
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