Iran's multi-front war against the West is going badly – but not in this one theatre

Telegraph

21-07-2025

And now the Houthis and their smuggler allies are complicating this further by fitting the wrong sort of AIS transponder. Vessels over 300 tons should have a full Class A transponder, but smuggling ships are fitting themselves with Class B transponders intended for yachts and small craft. These don't require as much data to be transmitted. Class B kit does transmit a Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number which is supposed to be unique to each vessel but this also can be falsified. A Lloyds List investigation has shown that one vessel in particular, the Almas, had both Class A and Class B systems fitted and was toggling between the two. This is hardly sophisticated electronic warfare but it's definitely deceptive and, a lot of the time, effective given the sheer volume of ships at sea at any one time.
Even calling in to Djibouti and being inspected prior by the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) is no guarantee of righteousness. Vessels have done this and then met up with any one of a thousand non-AIS-fitted dhows between there and their destination port in Yemen and transferred systems at sea. It's a needle-in-a-haystack job that a small UNVIM team with no enforcement capability would struggle to keep up with even before the needles start making themselves look like hay. And this is only one route in.
There are two solutions that will help with this. First is to reinvigorate an international inspection regime off the ports like the one Saudi Arabia had in place prior to 2022. As with dark fleet ships and those cutting cables, you still need something of a legal mechanism in place to board and detain them, but unless we get that in place, we will forever be playing catch up.
The ships doing this will need to be defended and armed. I'm not talking about a US Arleigh Burke class destroyer level, but something with teeth.
Of note, during the last two attacks, there were no warships in the area to either intercept the attacks or assist afterwards. All allied navies now, even the US Navy, cannot spare resources for 'just in case' tasks and the supposed ceasefire saw everyone move away from the area. Ultimately it comes down to international cooperation and funding and what's clear in this case, is that both are insufficient.
The second solution is to stop trusting AIS as providing accurate records of where a ship has been. It can't do that. It was designed primarily as an anti-collision system, informing nearby vessels of a ship's presence and its course and speed, and for that it works pretty well. But twenty years ago its lack of accuracy made it inadmissible in UK courts even for fishery protection cases. Today it has shown itself as vulnerable to jamming, spoofing and general misuse as you'd expect from a system designed so long ago and never intended to be used for identification and tracking over entire journeys.
What's frustrating is that there are many better sources of data, and sometimes these are used, but invariably, due to the diversity of sources they use, the end product is classified and cannot be publicly revealed. This needs to be rectified or weapons smugglers, sanctions busters and cable cutters will continue to exploit the holes in the current system. That brings us back to international cooperation and funding, which itself will be determined by priorities. You can cost what closing the Bab El Mandeb means for shippers and consumers, and for many classes of goods we are now paying that price and have been for a long time. You can't cost the principle of allowing a major chokepoint to remain closed.
It's not all doom and gloom. Just this week, the Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF), led by General Tareq Saleh and loyal to the internationally recognised Yemeni government which continues to resist the Houthis, conducted what US Central Command described as 'the largest seizure of Iranian advanced conventional weapons in their history.' Some 750 tons of munitions and military hardware, much of which sat at the higher end of the capability spectrum outlined above, has now been impounded. Much will be learned from this haul, as well as denying its use to the Houthis.
Ultimately, what is needed here is what has been needed all along – a comprehensive solution. I've outlined just two parts of this – more aggressive interdiction and more accurate vessel monitoring, but these need to be merged with ongoing intelligence gathering, diplomatic efforts with surrounding countries and an economic squeeze on the facilitators and beneficiaries, of which there are many. Only then will we be sure that a ceasefire isn't just an opportunity for one side to rearm.