The US is about to hit ‘Add to cart' on another forever war

Russia Today

14-06-2025

In spring 2025, Somalia, the easternmost country in Africa, offered to give the US control over two crucial ports and two airbases. However, all four sites are located in two self-declared, unrecognized regions – Puntland and Somaliland – that remain effectively outside the control of the federal government in Mogadishu.
In March, a letter from Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to US President Donald Trump was leaked to the press. In the letter, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud offered Washington exclusive control over the airbases in Balidogle and Berbera, as well as the ports of Berbera and Bosaso. The proposal is believed to enhance US military and logistical presence in the Horn of Africa, and aid in the fight against the jihadist group Al-Shabaab – an affiliate of Al-Qaeda – which has recently escalated its offensive operations against government forces.
'These strategically positioned assets provide an opportunity to bolster American engagement in the region, ensuring uninterrupted military and logistical access while preventing external competitors from establishing a presence in this critical corridor,' the letter states.
The Somali government cited rumors of Al-Shabaab's growing ties with Yemen's Ansar Allah movement (Yemen's Houthis), against whom the US is engaged in a conflict in the Red Sea. At the end of April, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud accused the Houthis of supporting terrorist groups in Somalia, claiming that Somali intelligence had intercepted shipments of explosives and drones from Yemen.
Mohamud's proposal was strongly opposed by Somaliland, which has operated as a de facto independent state since 1991, but has not been officially recognized by any other country. Somaliland's foreign minister, Abdirahman Dahir Aden, described the actions of the Somali federal authorities as a 'desperate' attempt to maintain relevance on the global stage.
'They can do nothing to prevent Somaliland's impending recognition,' Aden wrote on social media.
Later, in an interview with Reuters, he said, 'The USA is not stupid. They know who they need to deal with when it comes to Berbera port.'
Mohamud's offer came in response to reports concerning alleged negotiations between Washington and Somaliland's presidential administration regarding a potential deal to officially recognize the African state in exchange for establishing a military base near the port city of Berbera on the Red Sea coast.
In mid-March, citing sources, the Financial Times reported that these discussions were part of Trump's plan to relocate Palestinians from war-torn Gaza to countries in East Africa and create what he called a 'Middle Eastern Riviera' in Gaza.
'These are very tentative, initial contacts,' the publication's source noted.
The possibility of controlling the Berbera base puts the Trump administration in a difficult position: It could either strike a deal with Mogadishu, which would undoubtedly spark conflict between the Somali government and Somaliland, which effectively controls the port, or move toward recognizing the self-declared state, severing ties with the federal government of Somalia.
Berbera is strategically located along the vital Gulf of Aden, one of the world's key shipping routes. The city hosts an international airport with one of Africa's longest runways – measuring 4,140 meters – which was built by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. At one point, NASA leased the airstrip as a backup landing site for its space shuttles. In recent years, DP World logistics company from the UAE renovated the port, but it currently remains unused.
Somaliland, which effectively governs the Berbera port, is an enclave with a population of around 5 million people. During the colonial era, the region was a British protectorate. On June 26, 1960, it gained independence for just five days but then merged with the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration to form the Somali Republic. However, Somaliland did not stop fighting for independence; on May 18, 1991, in the middle of the Somali Civil War, which continues to this day, it unilateraly declared independence.
Since then, Somaliland has operated as a de facto state with its own government, army, and institutions. It has its own currency and passport and independent domestic and foreign policies. The region has held several presidential elections to date.
Despite the lack of international recognition, Somaliland has managed to maintain internal stability and establish partnerships with foreign countries, including the UAE. In its capital, Hargeisa, consulates and diplomatic missions from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Taiwan, the UK, and EU are present.
In its foreign policy, the government of Somaliland pursues one primary goal: International recognition. It came closest to achieving this goal in early 2024 when it signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia, granting the latter access to the sea via the Berbera port in exchange for potential recognition of the self-proclaimed state. This rapprochement with Addis Ababa has brought the region to the brink of a renewed conflict, with neighboring countries like Egypt potentially getting involved.
If the deal with Washington for leasing the port and runway in Berbera is concluded, Somaliland will finally have its long-awaited opportunity to attain statehood. Locals believe that support from a powerful global player like the US could attract significant foreign investment, enhance diplomatic and defense ties, and ultimately end the region's international isolation.
On the flip side, recognizing Somaliland could further destabilize the region and upset allied countries such as Egypt and Türkiye, as well as the African Union (AU), creating a precedent for separatist movements across Africa.
Mogadishu's proposal to the US also mentions the port of Bosaso, located in Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia. Bosaso is a rapidly growing city with a population of around 500,000. The city's seaport was built in the 1980s, and it boasts an international airport that has been modernized by the Dubai-based Lootah Group. The UAE maintains military and logistical facilities in both Berbera and Bosaso as part of agreements with the regional authorities.
Puntland is also de facto an independent state that provides access to the Gulf of Aden. On March 31, 2024, amid a constitutional crisis in Somalia, Puntland's authorities announced they would no longer recognize the federal government based in Mogadishu and would withdraw from Somali federal institutions. They declared that Puntland would function as an independent state until a federal government is formed and a constitution is approved in a referendum in which Puntland would take part.
While Puntland's leadership has not publicly commented on the potential deal between Washington and Mogadishu, it's easy to see how this move could exacerbate tensions with the Somali government, especially if it proceeds without consultation with the local authorities.
Meanwhile, the militant group Al-Shabaab launched an offensive in the Middle Shabelle province of southern Somalia in February 2025 and has made significant territorial gains, threatening the capital region and pushing Mogadishu to seek increased support from the US, Türkiye, and the AU. The situation is worsened by ongoing attacks by Islamic State-Somalia, particularly in the northeastern region of Puntland. The unstable internal situation in the country is contributing to the success of these terrorist groups.
In the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions, attacks by Al-Shabaab have surged by around 50% compared to last year. Militants have managed to capture several strategic towns and locations, while government forces are overstretched, battling terrorists on multiple fronts.
On March 18, the groups unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Mogadishu as his convoy headed to the capital's international airport to join troops on the front lines in Hirshabelle state.
Since 2022, the government's counterterrorism strategy has relied on international support and forging alliances with clan militias operating in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab. However, this approach has proven unreliable due to the continuous recruitment of new militants and the involvement of allied clans in political struggles.
Despite the tough international sanctions imposed against it, Al-Shabaab boasts a substantial military budget. Some analysts believe that the group generates a significant portion of its revenue through customs duties, forced taxation, extortion in the territories it controls, and illicit trade in livestock, sugar, charcoal, drugs, and other goods.
The situation has been further complicated by clashes that erupted in December 2024 between federal forces and military factions from the semi-autonomous Jubaland region, sparked by the recent presidential elections. During these conflicts, hundreds of Somali soldiers, including members of the elite Gorgor special forces trained in Türkiye, either surrendered or fled toward the Kenyan border, while Jubaland fighters seized strategic locations in the region, including the port of Kamboni.
Amid this precarious security environment, piracy off the coast of Somalia (which had been curbed by US, EU, and NATO naval patrols) has resurged since 2023. Over the past two years, Somali pirates have been involved in numerous incidents.
Meanwhile, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which began its operations on January 1, 2025, aims to bolster the Somali Armed Forces in their fight against Al-Shabaab but, like its predecessors, faces significant financial challenges.
In April 2025, the US openly rejected a UN proposal to fund AUSSOM, casting doubt on its future activities. The US argues that Somalia is not an appropriate testing ground for the proposed 'hybrid' funding model, which would allow UN assessments to cover up to 75% of AUSSOM's budget.
Ethiopia's involvement in the mission is also uncertain due to tensions stemming from the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland in 2024. While relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa have improved with Turkish assistance, they remain fragile.
Since the start of Trump's second term, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has significantly ramped up airstrikes against both Al-Shabaab and local Islamic State affiliates. These attacks are typically coordinated with the Somali National Army and Puntland Security Forces.
This trend highlights the inability of the US to assist the local authorities in addressing the terrorist threat, despite nearly two decades of military involvement in the region. In April, the New York Times reported that the territorial gains made by Al-Shabaab in central and southern Somalia prompted discussions within the US State Department about potentially closing the embassy in Mogadishu and withdrawing much of the American staff. Many officials in the US recalled Washington's foreign policy failures, particularly in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, an increase in airstrikes targeting militant strongholds indicates that the US still favors military solutions.
The struggle to defeat terrorists has led the Somali government to strengthen its military cooperation with Türkiye. Shortly after a recent attack, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud traveled to Ankara to discuss bolstering their partnership in the fight against Al-Shabaab with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Türkiye has been an ally of Somalia since the early 2010s and is now seeking to position itself as a key regional power in the Horn of Africa. In Mogadishu, it operates its largest overseas military base, Camp TURKSOM, and a recent agreement with Somalia allows for the deployment of up to 5,000 personnel from the SADAT International Defense Company.
In comparison, the US has only around 500-600 servicemen stationed in Somalia, as it aims to cut costs by limiting troop deployments and relying mainly on Somali and other African forces. In the past few years, the US has also trained, equipped, and funded an elite Somali unit known as Danab, which consists of 3,000-5,000 soldiers. In February 2024, it was announced that Mogadishu and Washington signed an agreement for the construction of military centers in five cities across the country to enhance the capabilities of the Somali Armed Forces.
While the federal government struggles to contain the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland have been quite successful in combating terrorist groups. Unlike Mogadishu, Hargeisa has successfully resisted the infiltration of Islamists, preventing them from establishing a foothold in the region.
As part of Operation Hilaac, since November 2024, Puntland's regional forces have regained control over several towns captured by Islamic State-Somalia. These types of achievements make the regions attractive partners for collaboration.
The US currently operates the Camp Lemonnier base in Djibouti under a lease which is in effect until 2034 (and may be extended further). This is the largest US military base on the African continent. By accepting Mogadishu's proposal, Washington could expand its presence in the Gulf of Aden and strengthen its position against its main competitor – China, which established its own naval support facility in Djibouti in 2017.
However, ongoing negotiations between Washington and Somaliland regarding its recognition as a sovereign state in exchange for establishing a military base suggest that the US may not be interested in collaboration with Mogadishu. Recognizing this, in December 2024, Somalia signed a contract with an American lobbying firm to bolster its relations with the US.
Even if Washington agrees to Hargeisa's offer without officially recognizing Somaliland as an independent state, the region would still benefit significantly, as a deal with such a major power would de facto imply its recognition.
However, this move could jeopardize the efforts of the central government in Somalia to combat extremist groups that rely on external support. Moreover, Mogadishu is currently grappling with increasing defiance from two federal regions – Puntland and Jubaland; the official recognition of Somaliland might encourage other countries to acknowledge its sovereignty, setting a precedent that could lead to further decentralization. Consequently, the fate of Somalia – a nation already torn apart by endless conflict, political strife, and social instability – will largely depend on America's decision.