China's propaganda coup and the danger of US indecision

AllAfrica

15-04-2025

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Cartooons: Horsey / Seattle Times
China is a master of twisting narrative.
On April 11, Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Dai Bing posted on his X account in Korean claiming that South Korea should be thankful to China for the 90-day postponement of US tariffs on Korean exports. He wrote:
'The so-called 'mutual tariffs' have been postponed for 90 days. Is that a good thing?! Don't forget, if it weren't for China's decisive counterattack and strong deterrence, this 90-day grace period would never have existed! And don't forget, this is only a 90-day grace period!'
이른바 '상호 관세'가 90일간 유예됐다고 합니다. 좋은 것이라고 할 수 있을까요?!잊지 마십시오. 중국의 단호한 반격과 강력한 저지가 없었다면 이 90일 유예기간은 아예 존재하지도 않았을 것입니다!
그리고 잊지 마십시오. 이것은 단지 90일의 유예일 뿐입니다! https://t.co/FDWu68vfpP — Dai Bing 戴兵 다이빙 (@AmbDaiBing) April 11, 2025
While many South Koreans responded with outrage, my reaction wasn't anger. It was awe. I thought to myself, 'They've turned narrative manipulation into an art form.'
But it's not all skill. China has been able to steal the narrative in part because the US left the door open.
The initial blanket imposition of tariffs on countries around the world – including the uninhabited, penguin-inhabited islands near Australia – has undermined US credibility, not just economically but diplomatically as well.
By acting without strategic clarity, Washington has given Beijing the space to present itself as the only adult in the room. China now claims that it is absorbing the blow of US tariffs – and that its retaliation is the very reason neighbors like South Korea have received a temporary reprieve.
And now, nations like South Korea are caught in a confusing middle ground. China's narrative partly holds water, because Washington's actions have been hard to defend.
This kind of strategic ambiguity opens the door for Beijing to offer a twisted form of clarity. When allies are unsure whether Washington is friend or foe, Beijing's message suddenly seems more reasonable, even when it's revisionist. Perception becomes power.
Compare today's strategy with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's approach during the Cold War. Eisenhower understood the stakes of pushing vulnerable allies into economic crisis – and potentially, into the arms of totalitarian adversaries. Scholar William S. Borden wrote about it in his 1984 book The Pacific Alliance.
At a pivotal cabinet meeting on August 6, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reminded his listeners that Japan in the 1930s had chosen the path of military expansion 'to get control of their own markets and their own materials.' He argued that if the US offered tariff concessions, it could 'keep Japan on our side'; otherwise, 'Japan could very soon go bankrupt.' He urged every agency to support such concessions.
Eisenhower agreed, stating that 'this kind of trade should not only be allowed but encouraged, particularly as far as Japan is concerned with the neighboring Red areas in Asia.' He warned, 'We can't force them back beyond the point of no return. If we do, they will say 'To Hell with you' we'll go Communist.' That's what this is all about. We must hold Japan for the free world or we must go to war to keep it in the free world. This is a world problem. We have got to work on a broad front. We have got to do a considerable job of education.'
Acknowledging domestic economic concerns, Eisenhower added, 'Don't let us let Japan reach a point where they want to invite the Kremlin into their country. Everything else fades into insignificance in the light of such a threat.'
The Eisenhower administration understood that economic sacrifice in the short term was a necessary investment in long-term American hegemony and geopolitical stability.
In contrast, the current tariff approach prioritizes short-term political optics over strategic unity. Worse, it risks undermining the very coalition needed to confront China's growing aggression.
If the US appears unreliable in its commitments, both allies and adversaries will begin planning for a world in which American leadership is conditional, temporary and transactional.
What allies are learning now is dangerous: that Washington might treat them the same as its rivals, with little warning or differentiation.
The key lesson for US partners from this tariff war isn't about trade – it's about trust.
If America wants to lead, it must show that its leadership is reliable. China is filling the void where US clarity should be. And unless Washington re-centers its foreign economic policy around long-term alliance-building – the way Eisenhower once did – more partners are likely to look elsewhere for stability.
The world is watching closely. Allies are calculating risks. And while China pushes its version of the truth, America's greatest danger is not Chinese propaganda – it's the silence created when allies feel they have no one to count on.
If Washington wants to preserve its place in the world order, it needs more than strong policy. It needs consistency, conviction, and the courage to treat its friends like friends – not just when it's easy, but when it's hard.
Hanjin Lew, a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs, is a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.