Can the Houthis split the US carrier force and let Iran close Hormuz?

Telegraph

a day ago

o over 90 per cent for the more valuable ships. Some 16 months of US strikes and coalition defensive operations followed but these figures barely changed.
Then, on 15 March this year, President Trump turned the strike dial up to eleven. It cost the US war machine in excess of a billion dollars in expended munitions but by 6 May the bombardment had apparently worked, and the near daily missile firings stopped. The uneasy ceasefire held despite the 12-day war between Iran and Israel that followed.
So why start again now? The anti-shipping campaign put the Houthis on the map, generating significant international attention and local status for them. It's perfectly possible that they just want to keep that going.
That they didn't use missiles is interesting. This was by far the most common method before the ceasefire. Is that because the surge in US strikes in March has taken most of their missiles out, or are they keeping them back for another day? It's fair to assume that their supply lines from Iran have dried up, but it has also been assessed that the Houthis are now so proficient at making drones and missiles that they are in fact net exporters. My bet is that they are indeed down on missile stocks so thought they would try another way, though it isn't the first time. Anonymous OSINT account Intelschizo usefully reports 59 USV attacks have taken place since October 23 (compared to 866 drones and 319 missiles). But if you actually want to sink a ship rather than just cause a ruckus by hitting it, a USV at the waterline will often be more effective than the Houthis' lower-yield missiles, many of which have previously glanced off or been absorbed.
But this may not just be Houthi grandstanding: it may be part of a coordinated plan to split the attention of US forces in the region. If Iran were minded to close the Strait of Hormuz or just mount interference there, this is how they would start off. There are two US aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Oman (GOO) just now, the USS Carl Vinson and the USS Nimitz. Asking, or directing, the Houthis to start up again will inevitably draw one of those ships West to cover that threat again, possibly even restarting US counter strikes where they left off in May. Then, with only one carrier left in the GOO, Iran is under less threat if it starts harassment and disruption in the Strait of Hormuz.
I still wouldn't fancy trying to operate within reach of a hostile US carrier group, but better one than two. Also, by my maths, the USS Vinson only has a couple of months left on task and the Nimitz is on loan from the Pacific Command who will be keen to have her back. The USS Gerald R Ford is steaming across the Atlantic as we speak, ready to take up position in the Mediterranean but could, in theory, be pulled into the Red Sea. For the price of a few USVs, the Houthis are back in the game, although at a cost as Israeli rockets hit their ports in retaliation.
What is clear between this attack and the subsequent counter, is that a key international chokepoint that appeared to have been pacified is under fire again. Whether it's the first move in a new Iranian campaign or simply the Houthis attention-seeking, what we have here is a terrorist organisation with a stranglehold over a major world shipping route – and that can't be a good thing.