Ukraine's Zelensky visits Austria for first time since Russia's full-scale invasion of his country
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This is Stocker's first high-profile visit from a foreign dignitary since he took office in March at the head of a previously untried three-party coalition after a record five-month wait for a new administration.
Zelenskyy's wife, First Lady Olena Zelenska, and Doris Schmidauer, Van der Bellen's spouse, will also host a discussion about the role of women in promoting peace and security during the trip.
Austria, which was annexed by Nazi Germany in the run-up to World War II, declared neutrality after the war under pressure from Western allies and the Soviet Union. It sought a role as a mediator between East and West, developing ties with Moscow that outlasted the Cold War.
The Austrian government has condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine but also stressed the need to maintain diplomatic relations with Moscow. Vienna has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine but no weapons.
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Former Chancellor Karl Nehammer was the first EU leader to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face after the war started. Nehammer traveled to Moscow in April 2022 in a fruitless attempt to persuade the Russian leader to end the invasion.
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The Hill
24 minutes ago
- The Hill
In the US, a factual National Archives still exists — but for how long?
When I arrived in New York City two years ago — a Russian journalist fleeing my country after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine — I was routinely asked: 'Do all Russians support Putin?' A good question, perhaps, but I'm unable to provide a fact-based answer. When a regime like Russia silences the press, takes control of all branches of government and installs loyalists to oversee historical records, the truth quickly disappears, becoming accessible only to the ruler's inner circle. Since Trump's inauguration, conversations in the U.S. have changed. Now, when I meet Americans, they rarely mention Russian politics outside of the Ukraine war. Instead, they share their anxieties about their own country, often with a nervous laugh. I recognize that laugh. In Russia, independent journalists and human rights activists spent years laughing over worst-case scenarios — until every single one of them came true. My Ukrainian friends have become masters of gallows humor. Then Americans ask: 'What should we do? What advice do you, who have seen this happen in your country, have for us here in the U.S.?' This again makes me laugh, given we weren't exactly successful in stopping our own dictator. Still, hindsight does provide some clarity, and while I don't have immediate solutions, I do have two urgent suggestions: Safeguard your independent media and defend your national archives. The war in Ukraine shows how, without a strong independent press and by employing a warped version of history, a dictator can act however they please. While outsiders struggle to understand how Russians accept Putin's justification for the invasion as a mission to 'de-Nazify' Ukraine, a country led by a Jewish president, or as the reclamation of historically Russian territory (a claim that quickly unravels under serious historical scrutiny), the reality is that within Russia these narratives are now embedded in the national story. This is the result of a deliberate reshaping of the historical narrative by the government. Putin's first steps in controlling Russia's narrative was dismantling the post-Soviet independent media. It began with television, shuttering the independent NTV channel under the pretense of a business dispute. He then tightened his grip on the media through laws, including the ' foreign agent ' designation, jailing reporters he disagreed with. Three days after invading Ukraine in 2022, he imposed military censorship, forcing over 1,500 journalists into exile. Today, it is illegal for journalists to contradict the government's version of events. This is why, in 2023, a few fellow exiled journalists and I launched the Russian Independent Media Archive: to preserve the fact-based journalism the Kremlin was so intent on erasing. Today, the archive holds 3.5 million documents from 131 (and counting!) independent national, regional and investigative outlets dating back to Putin's first years in office. Designed to resist takedowns and censorship, with a powerful search engine, the Russian Independent Media Archive is open to all, empowering readers, researchers and historians to challenge propaganda about a particular era with truth, and to answer questions with verified facts. Others are better placed than I to say if a similar closing down of free speech and independent media is possible in the U.S.. The signs are certainly there in the Trump administration's accelerated book banning campaign, ending federal funding for NPR and PBS and shutting down Voice of America. Beyond that, Trump has unleashed a wave of chaotic actions that have directly harmed innocent people and disrupted businesses both in the U.S. and around the world — from mass deportations and abrupt firings to sweeping tariffs and threats of international conflict. Amid this endless barrage of harmful actions, one seemingly benign yet potentially extremely dangerous move risks slipping by unnoticed: Trump's bid to take control of the National Archives' leadership. Putin closed Russia's archives stealthily, cloaking his actions in language that maintained an illusion of transparency. In 2004, he signed a Federal Archives Law restricting access to anything labeled a 'state secret.' Today, that list includes 119 broad categories — enough to conceal almost anything from public view. As a result, we Russians no longer have access to a trusted record of our country's past. If Americans know the National Archives, it's usually as the home of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. But it's much more than a home for documents. It safeguards billions of records vital to government transparency, public accountability, historical preservation, veterans' services and the integrity of elections. These documents hold facts upon which a great many important decisions are made. If access were restricted or content altered or erased, as is already happening on numerous government websites, truth, as in Russia, begins to disappear. For as Orwell presciently wrote in 1984, 'he who controls the past controls the future.' Covering tracks, destroying evidence, blocking websites, interfering in elections, distorting history — it's hard to say who does it better, Putin or Trump. But there's still a crucial difference between my country and yours: In the U.S., your institutions are intact enough that if I ask, 'Do all Americans support Trump?' you could still answer based on facts. The question now becomes: For how much longer?
Fox News
37 minutes ago
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Illegals DO NOT Deserve the Benefit of the Doubt
Democrats don't seem to get it, if you are in this country illegally, you are, in fact, up for detention and then deportation. I'm Tomi Lahren, more next. The preferred and purposely misleading narrative from the Democrats is that those in this country illegally should not be detained and deported so long as they haven't been caught red-handed committing a heinous crime. Well, that's not the law and it's not what we voted for either. You don't need to commit further crimes once you've already come here illegally (though many do) to be detained and deported. When Democrats cry and whine that ICE shouldn't be detaining illegals at the Home Depot or on the farms, what they're really saying is that we should all just play Russian roulette with the illegal alien invaders and give them the benefit of the doubt until they rape and murder someone and then, even then, Democrats will STILL often turn the other cheek! These people were not vetted when they came to this country ILLEGALLY. Why should they be given the benefit of the doubt? Someone please tell me. Nah. The benefit of the doubt is given to family, friends, and milk that's a couple days old, not illegal alien invaders! I'm Tomi Lahren and you can watch my show 'Tomi Lahren is Fearless' at Learn more about your ad choices. Visit
The Hill
an hour ago
- The Hill
What China really wants for Russia and Ukraine
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was probably dissembling when he recently confided in Kaja Kallas, the European Union's High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, that China 'can't accept Russia losing its war against Ukraine as this could allow the United States to turn its full attention to China.' Why might Wang have been less than fully truthful? For starters, he's a diplomat, and all diplomats have a tendency to express less than fully truthful views. To confuse adversaries and keep them guessing is a lesson that diplomats in all countries have mastered. In addition, Wang represents a totalitarian state with a huge propaganda apparatus which, like all such entities, is prone to prefer manipulation to truth telling. But the misleading nature of Wang's private comments is most evident in the fact that, contrary to his suggestion that the U.S. is China's greatest worry at the moment, it is actually Russia. Yes, China certainly wants the U.S. off its back, and any distraction is therefore a good distraction. But America isn't next door, and it isn't involved in a debilitating war. Despite the Trump administration's loud barks, it has yet to resort to biting. Nor is it clear, as the ongoing tussle over tariffs shows, just what biting China would entail. In contrast, Russia is a far more immediate security concern, and maybe even threat, for China. Consider these three possible outcomes in terms of China's security interests. If Russia wins in Ukraine — however victory is defined — Putin will be flush with self-confidence and arrogance, his imperialist adventure having proven to be successful in making Russia great again. Such a Russia might be foolhardy enough to attack a NATO country or attempt to annex northern Kazakhstan, neither of which would benefit China. Next would be a change in tone. A triumphant Russia could begin to flex its muscles and challenge its sworn 'no limits' friendship with China. Perhaps the terms of the partnership could be amended to reflect Russia's new status? Perhaps Beijing might consider paying more for energy from Russia? Perhaps China could stop publishing irredentist maps with Chinese names for Russian cities? The eternal friendship might not evaporate overnight, but this would surely create a more complicated relationship that could test China's patience. If Russia loses in Ukraine — however loss is defined — a whole raft of highly destabilizing scenarios could emerge. An utterly defeated Russia could descend into internal violence, thereby destabilizing Eurasia. Vladimir Putin could be ousted in a coup and his regime could collapse. Elite infighting would be inevitable, and civil war could raise its head. Non-ethnic Russians might take advantage of the chaos to declare independence, and Russia's federation could meet its inglorious end. True, China could annex large chunks of the Russian Far East, but those gains would be overshadowed by the security threats that would emanate from its decaying northern neighbor. A war that bloodies but does not beat Russia is China's obvious favorite choice. A weak Russia implicated in an unwinnable war would be chastised but still exist as Beijing's vassal and have no alternative to kowtowing to its Chinese overlord. That kind of Russia suits China perfectly. And the war need not be protracted for this goal to be achieved. It could end tomorrow, because Russia is already a pale shadow of its former self. Its army has been mauled, its economy is on the verge of a major crisis and its people, though largely supportive of the war, are experiencing increasing economic pain. Significantly, a weakened Russia would also suit America's, Europe's and Ukraine's interests, even if such a Russia might not be their first choice. All of which suggests that Wang may have been telling the West that what China wants is what the West should want. The implications for American policy are evident. The U.S. should actively pursue what China wants: a weak Russia. That's easy to achieve by helping Ukraine stop Putin, as the Trump administration may finally be doing. Chances are that Wang will shed crocodile tears and pat poor Putin on the head — but he won't object. Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as ' Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires' and ' Why Empires Reemerge
