After Operation Sindoor, calculate

Indian Express

07-06-2025

Writing a postscript to a military engagement that is barely four weeks old may seem premature, more so since Prime Minister Narendra Modi has declared that Operation Sindoor has only been paused. It may, therefore, erupt again. Picking through the smoke-and-mirrors accounts of the four-day clash of arms, one may still reach tentative conclusions and derive some lessons for the future.
The aftermath of the four-day 'war' should be read together with the observations I made post-Pahalgam on the strategic calculus driving Pakistani actions, especially the intent of the remarks made by Pakistan Army Chief Asif Munir ('Desperate steps in desperate times', IE, April 24).
Irrespective of which side caused more losses to the other, Pakistan has succeeded, at least temporarily, in 're-hyphenating' itself with India in the international arena, the great leveller being its nuclear status. There were heightened external concerns following the Indian attack on Pakistan's Nur Khan base, which is reportedly located near a nuclear command and control centre. Nuclear brinkmanship, implicit or explicit, will always be present in any India-Pakistan war or threat of war. One should also be cautious in claiming to have found 'space' for conventional retaliation under the nuclear overhang. No two military events are the same. The danger of nuclear war will persist as long as atomic weapons are deployed by both sides. The so-called 'space' is notional. In a different war scenario, it may evaporate without warning.
A robust Indian response to a cross-border terrorist attack, which India wants to keep limited and non-escalatory, may be interpreted (though not intended) as India acknowledging Pakistan's capacity to hit back and raise the ante. India being committed to 'non-escalatory' action suits Pakistan fine. Is it necessary to make such a declaration? Perhaps India needs to adopt its own version of 'strategic ambiguity' in relation to Pakistan on the lines of the US posture in relation to Taiwan. We should also stop making repeated assertions that the next terrorist attack will invite Indian military retaliation. We should reserve the right to choose whatever may be the most appropriate response. Why tie our hands in advance? Creating a public expectation of a military response limits the options available to a leadership. There should be a whole suite of possible options to choose from — coercive, diplomatic, economic and financial, and combinations thereof. The pursuit of deterrence may be better served by keeping the other side guessing.
Operation Sindoor has made it amply clear that China will keep upgrading Pakistan's military capabilities to serve as an effective proxy against India. China was instrumental in enabling Pakistan to acquire a nuclear deterrent even before India and Pakistan became declared nuclear weapon states. But it had been coy about this. With its enhanced military and economic capabilities, it is no longer defensive about its military alliance with Pakistan. The two-front challenge, which India has always been concerned about, is already here. Our strategic calculations and defence preparedness must reflect this reality. Operation Sindoor has provided valuable insights into the technological capabilities of Chinese weapons, the effectiveness of Indian weaponry in outsmarting some Chinese systems deployed by Pakistan and the battle tactics that Pakistan has learnt from its 'iron brother'. These lessons must be internalised in our military strategy and tactics.
Credibility is the indispensable asset in handling the diplomatic and domestic fallout from any such crisis. Credibility, in turn, is a function of transparency. What the CDS very sensibly said recently about losses suffered by India in the military exchanges could have been conveyed in the earlier briefings by the Ministry of External Affairs and the armed forces. The'appropriate' time for such information to be released is before the inevitable deluge of misinformation takes hold. The question also arises: Did the all-party delegations sent out to various countries to present India's case have the same brief as the CDS? India still has a lot to learn about information management. One's own learning from several years of diplomatic work is that credibility is indispensable to good diplomacy. This applies to friend and adversary alike.
There are some other points to consider. US President Donald Trump's unpredictability is a reality, as is his narcissist penchant for self-adulation. There is no need to rise to the bait and keep denying his role in brokering a ceasefire. A polite refutation having been made, one should move on. The partnership with the US remains important for India's economic and technological capacity building. Indications are that this partnership remains largely intact.
One may have views about the efficacy of sending all-party delegations to various countries to present India's case, but it is a surprise that no such demarche was thought necessary for our immediate subcontinental neighbours. This contradicts the Neighbourhood First Policy. Engagement and a structured dialogue must be part of India's Pakistan policy. If nothing else, such dialogue may provide useful insights into the thinking of its rulers. Reliance on coercive instruments alone has not worked so far and is unlikely to in the future. Cross-border terrorism and the status of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir should be part of the agenda, but there should be a deliberate effort to reach out to other constituencies in Pakistan beyond the military and the political and bureaucratic elites. Pakistan is not a monolithic entity and one should not paint its people with the same brush as its entrenched elites.
Domestic politics will influence foreign policy but foreign policy should not become a tool to be used in domestic politics. Diplomacy is outward-oriented. Its audience is the international community, including friends and adversaries alike. Inward-oriented diplomacy, seeking validation from a domestic audience, will undermine the pursuit of national interests. Pakistan has become an issue not just in, but of, domestic politics. It has become entangled with the politics of communalism. Pakistan should be dealt with as just another state that poses a foreign policy and security challenge to India. Its identity as an Islamic state should be irrelevant.
Finally, while punishing Pakistan over cross-border terrorism, should there not be accountability for the security lapses that made ordinary Indian citizens vulnerable to the violent outrage in Pahalgam? Retaliation against Pakistan must not deflect attention away from the urgent need to plug the gaps that give our adversaries the opportunity to deliver such humiliating blows against us.
The writer is a former foreign secretary