‘Extreme wealth corrodes democracy' — making the case for a maximum wealth limit
Think about these facts for a moment.
There are slightly more than 3,000 billionaires in the world and it is expected that we are only a few years away from the world's first trillionaire. Between 1989 and 2018 this top 1% grew their wealth from $8.4-trillion to $29.5-trillion, while the bottom 50% incurred a net loss of wealth of $900-billion.
On the other hand, according to new calculations from the World Bank, there are more than 808 million people worldwide living in extreme poverty – that is less than $3 per day. Thirty million people live in poverty in South Africa and of that number nearly 14 million live below the food poverty line of R796 per month.
Is this just the natural order of things?
According to Ingrid Robeyns, the author of Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth (Penguin, 2024), most certainly not!
In her quest to unpack the deleterious effects of extreme wealth Robeyns has produced a meticulously researched and referenced book. Drawing on her disciplines as an expert in economics and philosophy, and as a one-time student of Amatya Sen, in Limitarianism she unleashes reason in the case against wealth, through the splicing of economics, philosophy, history, morals and ethics.
In addition, Robeyns bases her analysis in part on interviews with several billionaires, particularly those who are trying to limit their own wealth by calling for higher taxation and who have deep insights into the behaviours of their own class. In the US they have formed an organisation called Patriotic Millionaires.
In an argument that is structured with the precision of a founding affidavit her chapters calmly deconstruct extreme wealth on the grounds that:
'It's Keeping the Poor in Poverty While Inequality Grows';
'It's Dirty Money';
'It's Undermining Democracy';
'It's Setting the World on Fire'; and
'Nobody Deserves to Be a Multimillionaire.'
Having set out the evidence, the core of Robeyn's argument is that there should be a limit (she suggests of 10 million) on individual wealth and that inheritance above a certain amount should be forbidden.
Pointing to 'a massive intergenerational wealth transfer' – amounting to 'a staggering $84-trillion that will be transferred to the next generation by 2045' – she quotes philosopher DW Haslett: 'We abolished inheritance of political power; when, then, should we not abolish the inheritance of economic power, too?'
The excess should be returned to the state which, among other options, could recycle it into a universal basic income grant, or savings account for young people, available as a leg-up when they reach adulthood.
Robeyns finishes by making seven proposals for measures to limit wealth, including that there should be a 'balance of economic power':
'[In liberal democracies] We all agree that we need a system of checks and balances; if we delegate political power to one institution, then we need countervailing power in others. Why then don't we have such a balance of economic power? That economics is a domain of power was first recognised by thinkers centuries ago.'
And there's the crux of our modern dilemma. In the neoliberal era elected politicians have surrendered to the economic power of the wealthy and by doing so they have surrendered their ability to carry out the will of the people on the most basic human rights, such as access to healthcare services, education and meaningful employment.
These might seem like a set of radical arguments. They are not. I think they are utopian, in the best sense of utopianism, that is, thinking the 'impossible' in order to make it possible. This was an approach advocated for by people like Rick Turner, the philosopher assassinated by apartheid state agents in January 1978.
We only think it's a radical proposal because we have normalised extreme wealth, just as we have normalised extreme poverty and inequality.
Yet, there are other ways to organise society and economy, and if you accept Robeyns's evidence, that is more a matter of necessity than choice.
At the time I contemplated buying the book, I ummed and ahhed, struggling with a sense of déjà vu. 'I've read these books before. I've heard these arguments before. Is there anything new to be said about wealth and inequality? ' I asked myself.
But I was wrong. Limitarianism is fresh. It's accessible. It's full of facts, analysis and dot-joining. I would particularly recommend it to those who might think that extreme wealth is okay, and I would plead that you read it with an open mind.
We are 10 years after Thomas Piketty's magnum opus, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, and little has changed. In fact the opposite. Extreme wealth accumulation is now supercharged, what John Berger denigrated as the 'inalienable right to profit' now the driving political philosophy of the leader of the world's largest economy.
Indeed, the irony is that it seems the more people have become acquainted with the facts the more numb and disempowered we seem to have become.
As a social justice activist, I drew the following conclusions from reading it: It's time activists focused sustained attention on the case for wealth control, as much as we do on poverty elimination. While we may have debunked the neoliberal idea that wealth trickles down (or rather, it has debunked itself), the more important point is in fact the opposite: that unlimited wealth accumulation creates poverty.
As Robeyns says: 'Extreme wealth concentration is, first and foremost, a structural problem. We should therefore focus above all else on the structural changes that are needed. We shouldn't become fixated on rich individuals per se, unless they are actively hampering the structural changes that are needed.'
It's time for a measured, evidence-based campaign against extreme wealth that helps make people aware of how wealth is being abused in many ways that threaten democracy, human life and ultimately the planet itself. DM
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The Star
5 days ago
- The Star
Sudan's war is an economic disaster: here's how bad it could get
The Conversation | Published 2 days ago Khalid Siddig Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. What began as a struggle for power has turned into a national catastrophe. More than 14 million people have been displaced. Health and education systems have collapsed and food insecurity threatens over half the population of about 50 million. The war has disrupted key sectors, triggering severe economic contractions, and worsening poverty and unemployment levels. Sudan's finance minister reported in November 2023 that the war had resulted in economic losses exceeding US$26 billion – or more than half the value of the country's economy a year earlier. The industrial sector, which includes manufacturing and oil refining, has lost over 50% of its value. Employment has fallen by 4.6 million jobs over the period of the conflict. More than 7 million more people have been pushed into poverty. The agrifood system alone has shrunk by 33.6%. These estimates exclude informal economy losses. My research applies economy-wide models to understand how conflict affects national development. In a recent study, my colleagues and I used this approach to answer the question: what will happen to Sudan's economy and poverty levels if the war continues through 2025? To assess the economic impact of the conflict, we used a Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model. This is a tool that captures how shocks affect different sectors and other agents of the economy, such as firms, government and households. Based on our modelling, the answer is devastating: the conflict could shrink the size of Sudan's economy by over 40% from 2022 levels, plunging millions more into poverty. We modelled two scenarios to capture the potential trajectories of Sudan's economy. The extreme scenario assumes a sharp initial collapse, with a 29.5% contraction in the size of the economy in 2023 and 12.2% in 2024, followed by a 7% decline in 2025, reflecting some stabilisation over time. The moderate scenario, based on World Bank projections, applies a 20.1% contraction in 2023 and a 15.1% drop in 2024, also followed by a 7% reduction in 2025, indicating a slower but more prolonged deterioration. We estimated the annual figures and report only the aggregate impacts through 2025 for clarity. We found that if the conflict endures, the value of Sudan's economy will contract by up to 42% from US$56.3 billion in 2022 (pre-conflict) to US$32.4 billion by the end of 2025. The backbone of livelihoods – agriculture – will be crippled. And the social fabric of the country will continue to fray. Our Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model used data from various national and international sources to show the impact of conflict on the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare. We connected this to government and World Bank data to reflect Sudan's current conditions. This allowed us to simulate how conflict-driven disruptions affect the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare. Under the extreme scenario, we found: Gross domestic product collapse : Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the total value of all goods and services produced in a country within a year. It's a key indicator of economic health. We found that the value of Sudan's economy could contract by up to 42%. This means the country would be producing less than 60% of what it did before the conflict. This would affect incomes, jobs, government revenues and public services. The industrial sector – heavily concentrated in Khartoum – would be hardest hit, with output shrinking by over 50%. The value of services like education, health, transport and trade would fall by 40%, and agriculture by more than 35%. Job losses : nearly 4.6 million jobs – about half of all employment – could disappear. Urban areas and non-farm sectors would be worst affected, with over 700,000 farming jobs at risk. Incomes plummet : household incomes would decline across all groups – rich and poor, rural and urban – by up to 42%. Rural and less-educated households suffer the most. Poverty spikes : up to 7.5 million more people could fall into poverty, adding to the 61.1% poverty level in 2022. In rural areas, the poverty rate could jump by 32.5 percentage points from the already high rural poverty rate pre-conflict (67.6% of the rural population). Women, especially in rural communities, are hit particularly hard. Urban poverty, which was at 48.8% pre-conflict, increases by 11.6 percentage points. The agrifood system – which includes farming, food processing, trade and food services – would lose a third of its value under the extreme scenario. Sudan was already in a fragile state before the war. It was reeling from decades of underinvestment, international sanctions and institutional breakdown. The war has reversed hard-won gains in poverty reduction. It is also dismantling key productive sectors – from agriculture to manufacturing – which will be essential for recovery once the conflict ends. Every month of continued fighting adds to the damage and raises the cost of rebuilding. Our projections already show major economic collapse, yet they don't include the full extent of the damage. This includes losses in the informal economy or the strain on household coping strategies. The real situation could be even worse than what the data suggests. First and foremost, peace is essential. Without an end to the fighting, recovery will be impossible. Second, even as conflict continues, urgent action is needed to stabilise livelihoods. This means: supporting agriculture in areas that remain relatively safe. Food production must be sustained to prevent famine. restoring critical services where possible – particularly transport, trade and retail – to keep local economies functioning protecting the most vulnerable, such as women in rural areas and the elderly, through expanded social protection and targeted cash assistance. Third, prepare for recovery. The international community – donors, development banks and NGOs – must begin laying the groundwork for post-conflict reconstruction now. This includes investment in public infrastructure, rebuilding institutions and re-integrating displaced populations. Sudan's war is more than a political crisis. It is an economic catastrophe unfolding in real time. One that is deepening poverty, destroying livelihoods and erasing years of progress. Our research provides hard numbers to describe what Sudanese families are already experiencing every day. The country's economy is bleeding. Without a shift in the trajectory of the conflict, recovery could take decades – if it happens at all. | The Conversation Khalid Siddig is Senior Research Fellow and Program Leader for the Sudan Strategy Support Program, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
IOL News
29-07-2025
- IOL News
Sudan's war is an economic disaster: here's how bad it could get
People walk past destroyed vehicles on the grounds of a hospital in Sudan's capital Khartoum in April 2025. Image: AFP In the two years of civil war in Sudan the country has lost more than 50% of it's economy. Image: AFP Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading My research applies economy-wide models to understand how conflict affects national development. In a recent study, my colleagues and I used this approach to answer the question: what will happen to Sudan's economy and poverty levels if the war continues through 2025? To assess the economic impact of the conflict, we used a Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model. This is a tool that captures how shocks affect different sectors and other agents of the economy, such as firms, government and households. Based on our modelling, the answer is devastating: the conflict could shrink the size of Sudan's economy by over 40% from 2022 levels, plunging millions more into poverty. We modelled two scenarios to capture the potential trajectories of Sudan's economy. The extreme scenario assumes a sharp initial collapse, with a 29.5% contraction in the size of the economy in 2023 and 12.2% in 2024, followed by a 7% decline in 2025, reflecting some stabilisation over time. The moderate scenario, based on World Bank projections, applies a 20.1% contraction in 2023 and a 15.1% drop in 2024, also followed by a 7% reduction in 2025, indicating a slower but more prolonged deterioration. We estimated the annual figures and report only the aggregate impacts through 2025 for clarity. We found that if the conflict endures, the value of Sudan's economy will contract by up to 42% from US$56.3 billion in 2022 (pre-conflict) to US$32.4 billion by the end of 2025. The backbone of livelihoods – agriculture – will be crippled. And the social fabric of the country will continue to fray. How we did it Our Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model used data from various national and international sources to show the impact of conflict on the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare. We connected this to government and World Bank data to reflect Sudan's current conditions. This allowed us to simulate how conflict-driven disruptions affect the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare. What we found Under the extreme scenario, we found: Gross domestic product collapse : Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the total value of all goods and services produced in a country within a year. It's a key indicator of economic health. We found that the value of Sudan's economy could contract by up to 42%. This means the country would be producing less than 60% of what it did before the conflict. This would affect incomes, jobs, government revenues and public services. The industrial sector – heavily concentrated in Khartoum – would be hardest hit, with output shrinking by over 50%. The value of services like education, health, transport and trade would fall by 40%, and agriculture by more than 35%. Job losses : nearly 4.6 million jobs – about half of all employment – could disappear. Urban areas and non-farm sectors would be worst affected, with over 700,000 farming jobs at risk. Incomes plummet : household incomes would decline across all groups – rich and poor, rural and urban – by up to 42%. Rural and less-educated households suffer the most. Poverty spikes : up to 7.5 million more people could fall into poverty, adding to the 61.1% poverty level in 2022. In rural areas, the poverty rate could jump by 32.5 percentage points from the already high rural poverty rate pre-conflict (67.6% of the rural population). Women, especially in rural communities, are hit particularly hard. Urban poverty, which was at 48.8% pre-conflict, increases by 11.6 percentage points. The agrifood system – which includes farming, food processing, trade and food services – would lose a third of its value under the extreme scenario. Why these findings matter Sudan was already in a fragile state before the war. It was reeling from decades of underinvestment, international sanctions and institutional breakdown. The war has reversed hard-won gains in poverty reduction. It is also dismantling key productive sectors – from agriculture to manufacturing – which will be essential for recovery once the conflict ends. Every month of continued fighting adds to the damage and raises the cost of rebuilding. Our projections already show major economic collapse, yet they don't include the full extent of the damage. This includes losses in the informal economy or the strain on household coping strategies. The real situation could be even worse than what the data suggests. What needs to be done First and foremost, peace is essential. Without an end to the fighting, recovery will be impossible. Second, even as conflict continues, urgent action is needed to stabilise livelihoods. This means: supporting agriculture in areas that remain relatively safe. Food production must be sustained to prevent famine. restoring critical services where possible – particularly transport, trade and retail – to keep local economies functioning protecting the most vulnerable, such as women in rural areas and the elderly, through expanded social protection and targeted cash assistance. Third, prepare for recovery. The international community – donors, development banks and NGOs – must begin laying the groundwork for post-conflict reconstruction now. This includes investment in public infrastructure, rebuilding institutions and re-integrating displaced populations. The bottom line Sudan's war is more than a political crisis. It is an economic catastrophe unfolding in real time. One that is deepening poverty, destroying livelihoods and erasing years of progress. Our research provides hard numbers to describe what Sudanese families are already experiencing every day. The country's economy is bleeding. Without a shift in the trajectory of the conflict, recovery could take decades – if it happens at all. | The Conversation Khalid Siddig is Senior Research Fellow and Program Leader for the Sudan Strategy Support Program, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
Daily Maverick
27-07-2025
- Daily Maverick
‘Extreme wealth corrodes democracy' — making the case for a maximum wealth limit
'The challenge is not just that we're seeing large and increasing inequalities across the world. The challenge is that there is a well-connected group of people who are actively rigging the political rules in order to grow the capital they already have.' Think about these facts for a moment. There are slightly more than 3,000 billionaires in the world and it is expected that we are only a few years away from the world's first trillionaire. Between 1989 and 2018 this top 1% grew their wealth from $8.4-trillion to $29.5-trillion, while the bottom 50% incurred a net loss of wealth of $900-billion. On the other hand, according to new calculations from the World Bank, there are more than 808 million people worldwide living in extreme poverty – that is less than $3 per day. Thirty million people live in poverty in South Africa and of that number nearly 14 million live below the food poverty line of R796 per month. Is this just the natural order of things? According to Ingrid Robeyns, the author of Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth (Penguin, 2024), most certainly not! In her quest to unpack the deleterious effects of extreme wealth Robeyns has produced a meticulously researched and referenced book. Drawing on her disciplines as an expert in economics and philosophy, and as a one-time student of Amatya Sen, in Limitarianism she unleashes reason in the case against wealth, through the splicing of economics, philosophy, history, morals and ethics. In addition, Robeyns bases her analysis in part on interviews with several billionaires, particularly those who are trying to limit their own wealth by calling for higher taxation and who have deep insights into the behaviours of their own class. In the US they have formed an organisation called Patriotic Millionaires. In an argument that is structured with the precision of a founding affidavit her chapters calmly deconstruct extreme wealth on the grounds that: 'It's Keeping the Poor in Poverty While Inequality Grows'; 'It's Dirty Money'; 'It's Undermining Democracy'; 'It's Setting the World on Fire'; and 'Nobody Deserves to Be a Multimillionaire.' Having set out the evidence, the core of Robeyn's argument is that there should be a limit (she suggests of 10 million) on individual wealth and that inheritance above a certain amount should be forbidden. Pointing to 'a massive intergenerational wealth transfer' – amounting to 'a staggering $84-trillion that will be transferred to the next generation by 2045' – she quotes philosopher DW Haslett: 'We abolished inheritance of political power; when, then, should we not abolish the inheritance of economic power, too?' The excess should be returned to the state which, among other options, could recycle it into a universal basic income grant, or savings account for young people, available as a leg-up when they reach adulthood. Robeyns finishes by making seven proposals for measures to limit wealth, including that there should be a 'balance of economic power': '[In liberal democracies] We all agree that we need a system of checks and balances; if we delegate political power to one institution, then we need countervailing power in others. Why then don't we have such a balance of economic power? That economics is a domain of power was first recognised by thinkers centuries ago.' And there's the crux of our modern dilemma. In the neoliberal era elected politicians have surrendered to the economic power of the wealthy and by doing so they have surrendered their ability to carry out the will of the people on the most basic human rights, such as access to healthcare services, education and meaningful employment. These might seem like a set of radical arguments. They are not. I think they are utopian, in the best sense of utopianism, that is, thinking the 'impossible' in order to make it possible. This was an approach advocated for by people like Rick Turner, the philosopher assassinated by apartheid state agents in January 1978. We only think it's a radical proposal because we have normalised extreme wealth, just as we have normalised extreme poverty and inequality. Yet, there are other ways to organise society and economy, and if you accept Robeyns's evidence, that is more a matter of necessity than choice. At the time I contemplated buying the book, I ummed and ahhed, struggling with a sense of déjà vu. 'I've read these books before. I've heard these arguments before. Is there anything new to be said about wealth and inequality? ' I asked myself. But I was wrong. Limitarianism is fresh. It's accessible. It's full of facts, analysis and dot-joining. I would particularly recommend it to those who might think that extreme wealth is okay, and I would plead that you read it with an open mind. We are 10 years after Thomas Piketty's magnum opus, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, and little has changed. In fact the opposite. Extreme wealth accumulation is now supercharged, what John Berger denigrated as the 'inalienable right to profit' now the driving political philosophy of the leader of the world's largest economy. Indeed, the irony is that it seems the more people have become acquainted with the facts the more numb and disempowered we seem to have become. As a social justice activist, I drew the following conclusions from reading it: It's time activists focused sustained attention on the case for wealth control, as much as we do on poverty elimination. While we may have debunked the neoliberal idea that wealth trickles down (or rather, it has debunked itself), the more important point is in fact the opposite: that unlimited wealth accumulation creates poverty. As Robeyns says: 'Extreme wealth concentration is, first and foremost, a structural problem. We should therefore focus above all else on the structural changes that are needed. We shouldn't become fixated on rich individuals per se, unless they are actively hampering the structural changes that are needed.' It's time for a measured, evidence-based campaign against extreme wealth that helps make people aware of how wealth is being abused in many ways that threaten democracy, human life and ultimately the planet itself. DM
