ASEAN-GCC-China summit: a civilized vision in a fractured world
More than just a diplomatic novelty, the summit signaled a concerted effort to reimagine global cooperation from the perspectives of three enduring civilizations—Southeast Asia, the Arabian Gulf and China.
Each region brings to the table not only vast economic potential but also a deep civilizational ethos. Their alignment is not one of ideology or strategic confrontation; rather, it is rooted in a desire to resist the deepening fragmentation of the global order.
What comes next, therefore, is not merely about policies or agreements but about shaping the architecture of a multipolar future through mutual respect, pragmatic trade and institutional innovation.
With the summit hosted under Malaysia's ASEAN chairmanship, the message was deliberate: this is a partnership driven by regional voices, not external dictates.
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim made it clear that the gathering was not a geopolitical bloc but a 'platform of mutual convergence.' It is a subtle yet significant distinction.
The summit did not yield grandiose communiqués or sweeping defense pledges. Instead, it focused on the pragmatic: trade flows, free trade negotiations, investment corridors and digital and green economy cooperation. In a world overrun by war rhetoric, sanctions and tariff threats, the emphasis on cooperation and long-term planning was notable.
But what are the tangible takeaways—and what lies ahead? ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and China collectively represent a market of over two billion people and a combined GDP of nearly US$25 trillion.
Yet, despite this heft, their intra-regional trade remains surprisingly low. Currently, trade between the GCC and ASEAN remains minute. GCC is but the 7th trading partner of ASEAN. However, it is up to the two of them to improve themselves.
Similarly, while China is a key trading partner for both regions, much of the engagement remains bilateral, not triangulated. That is poised to change. Among the key priorities outlined during the summit were: The advancement of a GCC-China Free Trade Agreement, with negotiations expected to conclude by mid-2026. The upgrade of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) to its 3.0 version, incorporating digital trade, ESG standards, and green technology collaboration. The proposed development of joint industrial zones, such as a GCC-funded logistics hub in East Malaysia, which would serve as a strategic maritime node connecting the Strait of Malacca to the Arabian Gulf.
These economic plans aim to diversify trade dependencies and reduce the outsized reliance on Western markets. Notably, they offer ASEAN and GCC states an opportunity to deepen south-south cooperation—long viewed as a slogan more than a strategy.
The Kuala Lumpur Summit was also the unofficial launchpad for ASEAN's Vision 2045, a comprehensive blueprint crafted to guide the region into its second half-century.
This vision focuses on: Strategic autonomy – ensuring ASEAN can maintain equidistance in the US-China rivalry while advancing its own security and economic priorities. Institutional deepening – upgrading the ASEAN Secretariat, creating more binding dispute settlement mechanisms, and improving the implementation of regional frameworks. Proactive external engagement – especially with emerging powers, such as the GCC, and reinforcing ASEAN centrality in larger fora like the East Asia Summit.
Vision 2045 is not a mere wish list. It builds upon the Hanoi Declaration (2020), Labuan Bajo Statement (2023) and the Vientiane Strategic Plan (2024).
With Malaysia at the helm in 2025, the vision gains additional traction through Kuala Lumpur's technocratic rigor and Anwar Ibrahim's moral authority as a regional elder statesman.
Of course, visions without execution are hallucinations. The challenge ahead is to translate these long-term ambitions into actionable strategies. The next few years will be crucial.
First, ASEAN will need to finalize the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) and integrate it with GCC digital governance standards—no small feat given the wide variations in data protection laws and digital infrastructure across the three regions.
Second, the industrial cooperation plans require political will and institutional capacity. While Chinese financing is ample and Gulf sovereign wealth funds are liquid, the on-ground realities in some ASEAN states—including land acquisition, corruption and bureaucratic inertia—can derail even the most ambitious projects.
Third, all parties will need to navigate the increasingly delicate geopolitical terrain. While the summit stressed that 'no side is being taken,' the optics of GCC and Chinese leaders standing together under the ASEAN banner could trigger anxieties in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo.
Defensive signaling—whether through naval exercises, tariff regimes or investment restrictions—is not inconceivable. To pre-empt this, ASEAN must reinforce its position as a convenor, not a competitor.
Malaysia's leadership in proposing an ASEAN-US Special Summit, free from preconditions, is a step in the right direction. If successful, it will help offset suspicions that ASEAN is drifting into a China-led orbit.
What makes this trilateral platform unique is its underlying civilizational approach. ASEAN represents a model of pluralistic coexistence and flexible institutionalism.
The GCC, despite internal differences, offers resource wealth and religious significance. China, with its Confucian legacy and economic clout, brings scale and technological ambition.
Together, these regions can forge a model of cooperation distinct from the Atlanticist framework, one that privileges consensus over coercion, trade over tariffs and resilience over rivalry.
However, none of this is guaranteed. The structural weaknesses are real and glaring. Intra-ASEAN trade is still below 25%. The GCC is facing generational transitions and potential instability in oil prices. China's domestic economy is rebalancing under stress.
But in aligning their trajectories, these regions signal that interdependence is still possible in an era of decoupling.
The upcoming East Asia Summit in October 2025, also to be held in Kuala Lumpur, will be a key test. It offers an opportunity to link this trilateral vision with the broader Indo-Pacific community. More importantly, it could set the stage for embedding these civilizational dialogues into permanent economic institutions.
The ASEAN-GCC-China Summit is not a full circle yet. It is the beginning of a spiral—open-ended, evolving and fraught with uncertainties. But it is also a reminder that amid the cacophony of conflict and competition, quiet diplomacy, anchored in historical awareness and mutual respect, can still illuminate the path forward.
Phar Kim Beng, (PhD) is professor of ASEAN Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia and senior visiting fellow, Homerton College University of Cambridge
Luthfy Hamza is senior research fellow, Institute of Internationalization and ASEAN Studies
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