US should negotiate a successor to JCPOA with Iran. Now is the time

Indian Express

4 hours ago

The American strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan have brought to the fore three major issues: The success of the strikes, the future of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the nature of US-Israel-Iran dealings going forward.
It is too early to know the extent of the damage inflicted on the Iranian facilities. Of greatest interest is Fordow. Twelve GBU-57 bombs were used against the main ventilation shafts in an attempt to destroy the centrifuges and control centre, which are 80 metres underground. The GBU-57s are effective to a depth of 60 metres. It is unlikely, therefore, that the bombs penetrated through to the centrifuge hall and control room.
The question, though, is: Did the hits severely damage the main underground facilities through the concussive effects of the bombs? If the main ventilation shafts collapsed, what happened to the personnel within the facility? If power supplies were interrupted, were the centrifuges damaged and is anything operating? Is the Iranian admission of severe damage a ruse?
If Fordow has effectively been sealed and control over the centrifuges is lost, a direct hit on the centrifuge hall may not matter. The centrifuges will, over time, simply become inoperable. In this sense, the US President may be at least partly right: Fordow may have been obliterated functionally.
The second question is: What has become of the HEU, which by all accounts is enriched to 60 per cent (and can be quickly enriched further to make a bomb)? Reports suggest there were about 160 kg of it at Fordow and perhaps 400 kg in total. The stockpiles were apparently moved before the strikes (though the Trump administration now contests this). If the stockpiles were removed, they would be dispersed to several sites to increase survivability. Nonetheless, given Israeli and US intelligence capabilities, the location of the HEU may soon be known. If Israel can find and kill top Iranian nuclear scientists and generals, it should eventually be able to find the HEU.
Once the HEU is located, what can the US and Israel do? They could choose to do nothing, on the calculation that Iran will have difficulty in enriching the HEU for the bomb. Most analysts, however, conclude that Iran can sufficiently enrich the HEU, at a secret facility (assuming one exists), within months. So, doing nothing is probably not an option.
Once the locations of the HEU are known, the US and Iran could resume their attack. The problem is that any direct strikes on the HEU would be tantamount to unleashing 'dirty bombs', in which radioactive materials are vented without a nuclear chain reaction. The global outcry would be significant were this to occur, and both the US and Israel may be wary of the blowback. Plus, Israel must worry that its own nuclear reactors could be targeted someday to produce a similar result. It may not, therefore, want to legitimate such an action.
If a direct attack on the HEU is dangerous, Washington and Tel Aviv must instead gain control of the stockpile. Tehran would have to be persuaded to reveal the locations of the HEU, and full-scope safeguarding would follow. This, in turn, means that the IAEA inspectors must have access to Iranian nuclear facilities, as was envisaged by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between the US and Iran during President Barack Obama's time. In addition, the various 24/7 surveillance mechanisms under the accord would have to be installed and operated.
For a new deal to be struck on Iran's nuclear activities, the United States will need to negotiate a successor to the JCPOA. In his comments on the strikes on Iran, US President Donald Trump drew a parallel to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks during World War II, seeming to suggest that Iran is similarly prostrate. In fact, the parallel is far from accurate. Iran is not an occupied country.
Both sides face limits. The US wants to avoid another 'forever war', not least due to domestic opposition. In addition, its supplies of defensive missiles and other war materials are under stress from provisioning Ukraine and Israel. Israel's famous air defences are strained, perhaps to breaking point, and it will be increasingly vulnerable to retaliatory missile attacks. Iran's options, too, are limited. Tehran must worry that both Israel and the US will resume attacks, and not just on nuclear facilities, and that internal dissent will boil over.
The conditions are ripe, therefore, for a new nuclear deal. That said, the ceasefire must hold, and Iran must have an authority figure that can deliver a deal. Neither is certain. In addition, the US may have to sweeten the deal economically by lifting sanctions. This will depend on Trump overcoming domestic and Israeli opposition. In short, there is a road ahead, but it is a rocky one.
The writer is Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies and vice dean, Research and Development, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore