Trump's Iran attack shows what it takes to win his military support
The attack may have triggered tectonic shifts in the Gulf region, and the rivalry between Iran, the United States and Israel is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. While global attention may now turn to the possibility of a Gaza cease-fire or more U.S. strikes on Iran, my focus is elsewhere.
The most significant point about this incident is the lesson it offers U.S. allies, especially in the Indo-Pacific, about how to convince a hesitant U.S. president to take military action abroad. Israel managed to persuade Trump — who had long avoided foreign intervention — to strike Iran. As a former diplomat, I was struck by the extent of Israel's diplomatic influence, especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political and negotiating skills, which surpassed all expectations.
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The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
The Great Wall Between China and the EU
In times of evolving transatlantic dynamics under the second Trump administration, and in response to shifting global power balances, some within the European Union have shown interest in exploring a more nuanced engagement with China. However, there are structural obstacles to a warming up between Brussels and Beijing, considering China's unfair trade practices in the economic sphere, its troubling human rights record, and its alliance with Russia and support for Moscow's war on Ukraine in the security sphere. China's leadership is not willing to change course. Instead, China is gambling on the EU's weakness and hoping that Brussels will simply give in. While the EU is indeed in a tough spot currently, it cannot agree to a 'grand deal' if China is unwilling to make major concessions on its unfair economic practices and support for the war in Ukraine. Now all eyes are on the upcoming China-EU summit to take place in Beijing on July 24, an important gathering that will mark 50 years of diplomatic relations. But if the summit demonstrates anything, it will be the fact that China is unwilling to play by the rules of the international order and that it is in neither in the EU's nor in the United States' interests to try to make a grand deal with Beijing without a major paradigm shift in China's behavior. The months-long discourse about an China-EU rapprochement and the China-EU summit take place against the backdrop of major divisions between the EU and the United States in recent months. The second Trump administration's initial ambiguity on support for Ukraine and the assertive approach toward the EU in its trade policy created uncertainty in Europe, encouraging the advocates of European 'strategic autonomy.' On the trade front, Trump started with the introduction of 25 percent tariffs on EU auto, steel, and aluminum imports, followed by the warning of a 50 percent tariff on all EU goods in absence of a trade deal. Finally, a July 12 announcement placed a 30 percent tariff on EU imports. These policies have created worries in Europe about the future of the transatlantic economy. Trying to capitalize on the transatlantic rift, Beijing started a charm offensive toward Europe last February with tailor-made messages such as 'your best friend has abandoned you' and 'China and the EU should serve as the world's anchors of stability.' Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and two of his deputies have been touring Europe, accusing the United States of abandoning the international order while touting that China was interested in maintaining that order. An important part of their agenda was to convince the Europeans to revive the previously abandoned Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and to rescind EU sanctions against China. These diplomatic overtures resonated with some decision-makers in the EU, while others, like Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, signaled openness if China was ready to commit to real change on structural issues. As a result, there were several steps taken by both sides toward a potential rapprochement. In March, EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic met with Chinese leaders in Beijing to discuss ways 'to improve and rebalance China-EU trade and investment relations.' In April, von der Leyen held a phone call with Chinese Premier Li Qiang to discuss how to improve bilateral relations. In May, China and the European Parliament agreed to lift restrictions on mutual exchanges, including China's sanctions on some members of European Parliament. However, what the Europeans have been waiting for has not arrived from Beijing. Citing China's lack of reciprocity and unfair trade practices, the EU skipped the usual High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, signaling clear frustration and skepticism. The Chinese government has not put a serious offer on the table, which would require major change on structural economic and security issues. On the economic front, the list of deep structural issues that have prevented the EU from creating some kind of détente with China is long and includes chronic trade deficits, restricted access for European companies to the Chinese market due to non-tariff barriers and opaque regulations, market asymmetries, forced technology transfer, and currency manipulation. A major issue for the EU is Chinese industrial overcapacity, aided by state subsidies, which leads to export dumping in EU markets, depressing prices and undermining European industries. In a notable example, the EU hit Chinese electric vehicles with penalties of running from 17 percent to 45.3 percent over dumping allegations. However, Chinese electric vehicle and battery manufacturers have established production capabilities in EU countries, thereby seeking to establish their goods as 'made in the EU,' threatening European industries. While China has been a major trading partner for the EU for years, the EU's trade deficit with China has increased in the last decade, exceeding 300 billion euros ($350 billion) in 2024. Another structural issue faced by the EU for decades is China's restrictions on market access. The head of the European Chamber of Commerce recently spoke out on one of the problems in this area, saying that 'a lack of fair access to government procurement in China has been a long-standing issue for European companies operating in the country.' The EU has responded to these obstacles with a new tool of its de-risking strategy, the International Procurement Instrument (IPI). In the first-ever use of the IPI, the EU recently restricted the access of Chinese medical device manufacturers to the EU's sizable procurement market for five years. At the summit, the EU and China are expected to tackle another pressing issue: China's restrictions on rare earth exports to the EU. While these critical minerals are crucial for the EU's auto, defense, and renewable energy industries, China has been slow-rolling rare earth licenses for months, in an outgrowth of the China-U.S. trade war. In the security domain, the primary source of tension in China-EU relations is China's role in supporting Russia's war against Ukraine. Von der Leyen sharply criticized China's 'unyielding support for Russia,' warning it is fueling instability in Europe and 'de facto enabling Russia's war economy' – a stance she said the EU 'cannot accept.' Von der Leyen further warned that 'how China continues to interact with Putin's war will be a determining factor for China-EU relations going forward.' Ignoring European criticisms, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently told the EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, that it was not in China's interest for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine. Wang said the war currently keeps the focus of the United States on Russia and Eastern Europe, and a Russian loss would shift U.S. attention back on China and the Indo-Pacific. The China-EU summit will coincide with the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two sides, but the occasion is unlikely to be celebratory given the many divisions that currently strain their relationship. Chinese leadership has made clear in recent months that, while it wants a rapprochement with Europe, it is unwilling to make sacrifices for it by significantly modifying China's conduct on structural issues in the economic, technology, and security domains. It is time the EU's decision-makers and opinion-leaders recognized that China continues to be a strategic competitor and systemic rival that is intent on perpetuating its unfair economic practices and doubling down on its alliance with Russia and support for the Ukraine war. As a result, China-EU rapprochement is an unrealistic pipedream. Even if the transatlantic relationship is going through a rough patch, it is worth remembering that the United States and its European allies were the founders of the liberal international order, built on the values of human rights, democracy, free markets, the rule of law, and non-aggression. Communist Party-ruled China, contrary to what its leaders like to say during their charm offensives, does not embrace these values and seeks to transform the international order in its own authoritarian image. As long as China continues to flout the rules of the international order with its unfair economic practices, widespread human rights violations, and support for unlawful aggression, it is not in the EU's interest to warm up its relations with Beijing. The China-EU summit will hence serve to confirm how differently the two sides see the world, how different are the values they hold dear, and how widely their interests diverge. Held in the proximity of the Great Wall, the discussions between European and Chinese leaders will once again demonstrate that there continues to be a great wall between the EU's values and interests and those of China's.
The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Philippine President Marcos to Meet with Trump in Washington
The Philippine leader is the first Southeast Asian leader to be invited to Washington by President Trump since the start of his second term. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. will depart on Sunday on a state visit to the United States, during which he will fortify Manila's security alliance with the U.S. and finalize a deal on tariffs. In a statement from Washington, Philippine Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez said that Marcos would visit Washington, D.C. from July 2o t0 22, during which he will 'reaffirm the Philippines' commitment to its alliance with the U.S., explore opportunities for greater security and economic cooperation, and discuss regional and international issues of common concern,' GMA News Online reported. The trip was first announced by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio during last week's ASEAN Regional Forum in Kuala Lumpur, and was subsequently confirmed by the Presidential Palace and the Department of Foreign Affairs. With the visit, Marcos will become the first Southeast Asian leader to be invited by Trump to Washington. It will also be his fifth visit to the country since taking office in mid-2022. These included visits to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2022, and two more visits in 2023, once for a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden, and the second for the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting. He then visited again to attend the inaugural U.S.-Philippines-Japan Trilateral Summit in April 2024. The visit also comes shortly after the Trump administration threatened to impose a 20 percent tariff on the country's imports, up from the initial 17 percent announced by Trump in April. Like many of its neighbors, Manila is rushing to broker a more advantageous deal prior to August 1, when the White House has said its tariffs will come into effect. Negotiations between the U.S. and the Philippines are reportedly ongoing, although Marcos' visit, coming a week before the tariff deadline, could well see the announcement of a final deal between the two allies. In his statement, Romualdez did not elaborate on what topics would be discussed, but in a separate comment to GMA News Online, said that 'sensitive matters will likely be discussed.' Aside from an in-person meeting with Trump, Marcos will have several engagements with senior U.S. officials and business leaders during his visit, the ambassador added. One issue that will almost certainly be on the agenda is the maritime and security cooperation between Washington and Manila, which has increased in recent years as a result of China's growing maritime power and ambition. During Marcos' three years in office, Beijing has increased the frequency and intensity of its incursions into Philippine-claimed waters, resulting in a string of dangerous encounters between the two nations' coast guards. As a result, the Philippines and the U.S. have increased their security cooperation, and expanded it with other similarly concerned nations, such as Japan and Australia. Under Marcos, the Philippines has opened more of its military facilities to a rotational U.S. presence under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and increased military exercises and joint patrols. Both the Biden and Trump administrations have also reaffirmed that the U.S. will come to the Philippines' defense under the Mutual Defense Treaty if its forces, ships and aircraft come under an armed attack, including in the South China Sea. Most recently, earlier this week, the U.S. Embassy announced that the U.S. Navy will construct two facilities for the repair and maintenance of Philippine military vessels on Palawan, the Philippine island closest to the Philippine-claimed islands and features in the South China Sea.
The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
What Underlies High US Tariffs on Bangladesh
Dhaka's trade deficit with the US is smaller than that of Vietnam. Yet it has been slapped with a higher tariff rate. On July 8, the U.S. imposed a revised 35 percent tariff on Bangladeshi goods. 'Please understand that the 35% tariff is far less than what is needed to eliminate the Trade Deficit disparity we have with your Country,' Trump wrote in a letter to Muhammad Yunus, chief advisor of Bangladesh's interim government. Earlier in April, the U.S. had imposed a 37 percent tariff, increasing it from 15 percent. To understand the implications and politics of tariffs, a comparative look at Bangladesh's business competitors is essential. Bangladesh exports around $8 billion worth of goods to the United States — the highest volume to a single country. Over $6 billion of that consists of garments, meaning the industry would be heavily impacted. Vietnam is Bangladesh's key competitor, and the United States has offered them a reduced tariff rate of 20 percent. Finance Advisor Salehuddin Ahmed noted that Bangladesh's trade deficit with the U.S. is only about $5 billion, while that of Vietnam's with the U.S. stands at $125 billion. 'Even so, the U.S. has agreed to offer Vietnam some concessions,' he said. Bangladesh has a 'much smaller deficit,' he pointed out, adding that 'there is no justification for imposing such a high tariff on us. We will continue to negotiate.' Clearly, politics are at play. This is evident from the statement of Power and Energy Adviser Fouzul Kabir Khan. 'Not just tariffs, there have been discussions on non-tariff barriers as well. They [the U.S.] are prioritising their national security… A framework is being worked out in this regard, and the matter is under discussion', he said. According to business leaders and economists in Dhaka, Bangladesh's China dependency and U.S. strategic interests in Bangladesh drove Washington's tariff decision regarding Bangladesh. With the rise of China, the Indo-Pacific has become a center of global conflict. This prompted the U.S. and other major regional powers to reform the Quad in 2017. During his visit to Bangladesh in 2020, Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun formally invited Bangladesh to join the grouping. 'The U.S. sees Bangladesh as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region,' he said. The Burma Act of 2021, which authorizes the 'Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development activities in Burma and the surrounding region to support democracy activists, humanitarian assistance, and reconciliation efforts,' also reflects the strategic interest of the U.S. in Bangladesh. The U.S. is keen on sending humanitarian assistance to Arakan in Myanmar. In April, the United Nations requested Bangladesh to facilitate a 'humanitarian corridor' to the conflict-ridden Rakhine State in Myanmar. Although the Bangladeshi government initially agreed to support the initiative, it was ultimately unable to proceed due to divergent opinions among political parties and the military. The U.S. also has long been pushing Bangladesh to sign two agreements — the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). American officials describe these agreements as 'foundational agreements' to modernize the Bangladesh military by 2030. In the run-up to the 2024 general elections in Bangladesh, the then Foreign Minister A K Abdul Momen ruled out the possibility of signing these agreements. In 2024, Prime Minister Hasina said that the U.S. wanted to establish an airbase in Bangladesh. Bangladesh's repeated refusal to sign these agreements and democratic backsliding under the former Hasina regime seemed to have prompted the U.S. to take a series of actions against Bangladesh. These included imposition of sanctions on its Rapid Action Battalion in 2021, exclusion from the 2020 Democracy Summit, and the announcement of a visa policy targeting individuals in the Hasina government, who were deemed to be undermining the democratic process. Although the 2024 election was widely perceived as rigged, the U.S. ultimately refrained from enforcing the visa policy, reportedly due to diplomatic intervention by India. China, which has been pushing Bangladesh to join its Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative for some years now, has stepped up engagement with the Yunus government. It has accelerated people-to-people connections by allowing Bangladeshis to avail health services in China, providing scholarships to Bangladeshis, and inviting politicians and educationists to China. Beijing is also eager to fund the Teesta river project, which India has opposed. China's expanding footprint in Bangladesh is of concern to the U.S. Thus, it appears that the United States is using the tariff issue to pressure Bangladesh against embracing China too closely. But Bangladesh remains heavily dependent on China, which is its largest trading partner. In the fiscal year 2022-23, Bangladesh imported nearly $23 billion worth of goods from China, accounting for over 33 percent of its total imports and firmly establishing China as its primary source of imports. These imports include refined fuel, capital machinery, electrical equipment, cotton, synthetic fibers used in garment production, fabrics, raw materials for plastics, iron and steel, fertilizers, chemicals, and other essential inputs for various industrial sectors. Bangladesh is caught between two competing powers. The country's economy is deeply intertwined with both the United States and China. Besides, its export basket is heavily dependent on a single commodity—readymade garments. This overreliance leaves Bangladesh vulnerable to external pressures and shifting geopolitical dynamics. To navigate this complex landscape, Bangladesh will need to make some hard strategic choices to diversify its export markets and expand exports beyond the garment industry into other value-added sectors. Importantly, it will need to pursue balanced and proactive diplomatic negotiations to safeguard its economic interests.
