The Red East!
Anyone observing the region today will detect a new common thread stretching from Iran to Lebanon, passing through Gaza, Yemen, and Iraq: disarmament. Or, more precisely, the convergence of disarmament trajectories. The point is not whether these efforts will succeed or fail, but rather that this is the moment we are in, and perhaps this is the current strategy.
Take Iran, for example. US envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated that any agreement around Tehran's nuclear program would hinge primarily on verifying uranium enrichment levels and assessing weaponization capabilities. "This includes missiles," he added, "and the detonators used to trigger bombs."
The Revolutionary Guard's spokesman, Ali Mohammad Naeini, wasted no time in responding: "National defense, security, and military power are red lines for Iran. These cannot be negotiated—under any circumstances."
Meanwhile, in Gaza, Hamas has received new Israeli proposals for a ceasefire. For the first time, these include the disarmament of Hamas as part of a second phase of negotiations. Sami Abu Zuhri, head of the group's political bureau abroad, responded unequivocally: Hamas would not agree.
"Handing over Hamas' weapons," he said, "is a red line. A million red lines. It's not something we'll even listen to, let alone discuss." He said this while Israel still occupies roughly a third of the Gaza Strip.
In Yemen, American strikes continue to target Houthi weapons stockpiles. Just yesterday, The Wall Street Journal reported that these attacks are now fueling plans for a ground war in Yemen, led by government-aligned forces and other Houthi rivals.
In Lebanon, the entire conversation has now shifted to the need for Hezbollah to hand over its weapons to the state. The Lebanese army has deployed to several areas that were once Hezbollah strongholds, as Israel continues to strike the party and its arsenal across the country. Lebanon, it's worth noting, has also come to an agreement with Syria to curb smuggling and secure the border.
In Iraq, silence reigns. The Popular Mobilization Forces and other Iran-aligned militias have gone conspicuously quiet under the weight of American and Israeli threats. Insiders note that Iraq is far from insulated. The weapons question there, too, is only a matter of time.
All of this suggests a clearer picture: following the neutralization of the "Axis" and Syria's effective exit from this theater of malign coordination, the region has entered a new phase, one marked by the pursuit of weapons. Chief among the targets: Iran's missile program, increasingly treated as inseparable from the nuclear issue.
As Witkoff put it: "The devil is in the details." He's right. But once the Iranians are sitting across the table from those they once called the "Great Satan"—the Americans—then we are no longer in a theater Tehran can comfortably stage-manage.
Add to this the new Israeli latitude, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now strikes wherever he pleases, including areas that once prided themselves on being part of a "unified front." The result is the erosion of the weapons equation, and the shrinking of all those so-called red lines—even the ones that, as Hamas now insists, number "a million."
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Al Arabiya
27 minutes ago
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What Netanyahu fears the most in Gaza
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Al Arabiya
27 minutes ago
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Saudi Gazette
3 hours ago
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US used about a quarter of its high-end missile interceptors in Israel-Iran war, exposing supply gap
WASHINGTON — The United States blew through about a quarter of its supply of high-end THAAD missile interceptors during Israel's 12-day war with Iran in June, according to two sources familiar with the operation, thwarting attacks at a rate that vastly outpaces production. US forces countered Tehran's barrage of ballistic missiles by firing more than 100 THAADs (short for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) – and possibly as many as 150 – a significant portion of America's stockpile of the advanced air defense system, the sources said. The US has seven THAAD systems, and used two of them in Israel in the conflict. Using so many THAAD interceptors in such a short period exposed a gap in the US missile defense network and depleted a costly asset at a moment when American public support for Israeli defense has reached historic lows. Former US defense officials and missile experts told CNN that the rapid drawdown has also raised concerns about America's global security posture and ability to regenerate supplies at speed. Last year, the US produced only 11 new THAAD interceptors and is expected to receive just 12 more this fiscal year, according to the 2026 budget estimates from the Department of Defense. In response to questions regarding the US's THAAD stockpile and the expenditure of interceptors during the 12-day conflict, Pentagon Press Secretary Kingsley Wilson said the US military 'is the strongest it has even been and has everything it needs to conduct any mission anywhere, anytime, all around the world. If you need further proof, look no further than Operation Midnight Hammer and the total obliteration of Iran's nuclear capabilities.' CNN reported that an early intelligence assessment determined the US' strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities last month did not destroy the core components of the country's nuclear program and likely only set it back by months. The US administration dismissed the assessment, and the CIA later said it had evidence Iran's nuclear program was 'severely damaged.' A defense official declined to provide information on the THAAD inventory due to operational security concerns, but said the Defense Department 'remains postured to respond to any threat.' The number of THAADs spent in the 12-day war was first reported by The Wall Street Journal. Despite the heavy use of THAADs during the 12-day war to help fend off Tehran's assault last month, dozens of Iranian missiles still struck Israel. THAAD is a mobile system that can engage and destroy short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles both inside and outside of the Earth's atmosphere during their final phase of flight. Each battery is operated by 95 American soldiers, armed with six launchers, and 48 interceptors. The interceptors are manufactured by Lockheed Martin and cost roughly $12.7 million, according to the 2025 Missile Defense Agency budget. The US plans to acquire 37 THAAD interceptors next year, according to the 2026 Department of defense budget estimates, financed partially by the latest addition to President Donald Trump's so-called 'big, beautiful bill.' A defense official said the 2026 budget 'prioritizes funding in the defense industrial base, a core strategic asset that provides and sustains our military's technology, equipment, and supplies.' 'The budget includes an additional $1.3 billion for industrial based supply chain improvements, and an additional $2.5 billion for missiles and munitions production expansion,' the official said. 'The Department's role is to ensure that the President is armed with the best possible military options for any scenario – and all options remain on the table.' But experts and former defense officials warn that supplies need to be ramped up significantly to deal with the shortfall. 'It is important to recognize the level of commitment and the level of expenditure here in defense of Israel is significant,' said a missile defense expert who has been tracking the US government's expenditure. 'The reports about THAAD expenditure are concerning. This is not the sort of thing that the US can afford to continue to do on and on,' he added. 'It was a major commitment to our Israeli ally, but missile defense interceptor capacity is definitely a concern, and THAAD is a very scarce resource.' A senior retired US army officer who asked not to be named said around 25% of THAAD's total inventory was used by US forces in Israel participating in the war effort. 'The (Department of Defense) is looking at wartime stockage levels of critical munitions and attempting to significantly increase annual production capacity, an effort that is long overdue,' the source said. US interceptor stockpile concerns preceded the 12-day war, according to four former senior US defense officials who say that the problem is most acute in inventories of high-end interceptors that are a key part of deterrence against China. 'What I can say without giving any numbers is I was surprised at how low some of the levels of readiness were,' said one former defense official who left his post in the last year. 'Stockpiles are dropping. We need more. We need them faster than they are being built,' said the same ex-official. 'This is a concern. It was a concern during the Biden administration. I'm sure it's a concern now during the Trump administration,' one former senior Biden defense official said. 'Air defense is relevant in all of the major theaters right now. And there's not enough systems. There's not enough interceptors. There's not enough production and there are not enough people working on it,' said Mara Karlin, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities under Biden. 'You have the challenge of something being both incredibly relevant and also there's a dearth of them,' she added. There are nine active THAAD batteries globally, according to manufacturer Lockheed Martin. The US military has seven of those and plans to have an eighth active by 2025, according to the Congressional Research Service. Data available in 2019 showed that five of the US' THAADs were stationed at bases in Texas, one in Guam and one in South Korea; by last year, the Pentagon had moved two of those batteries to the Middle East to protect Israel. Two others were delivered to the United Arab Emirates and have been used to intercept Houthi militant ballistic missiles. While most of Iran's missiles were downed by Israeli and US air defenses, experts, open-source data and video from the ground reviewed by CNN showed that dozens did manage to get through. Tehran's success rate rose as the war raged on, amounting to some of the worst damage Israel has seen in decades. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said Iran fired over 500 long-range ballistic missiles, and it was able to intercept around 86% of those – with 36 Iranian missiles striking built-up areas. Major cities like Tel Aviv suffered extensive damage, whole apartment buildings were destroyed, sensitive military sites targeted, parts of the power grid were taken out and 29 people were killed. Israel's tax authority estimated in late June that the war would cost the country at least $1.8 billion in damage, but with claims still yet to be filed that number was expected to rise. Analysis conducted by DC-based think tank Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) estimated that THAADs – alongside Israel's Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 interceptors – downed 201 of Iran's 574 missiles, with 57 hitting populated areas. The report estimated that the US' THAAD system accounted for almost half of all interceptions, indicating that Israel's Arrow interceptor stockpiles were insufficient. Israel's Iron Dome system was designed to deflect shorter-range rockets than those being fired by Iran. 'After burning through a large portion of their available interceptors, the United States and Israel both face an urgent need to replenish stockpiles and sharply increase production rates,' Ari Cicurel, author of the report, wrote, estimating that it would take three to eight years to replenish at current production rates. According to data compiled by JINSA, interception rates lagged as the war wore on. Only 8% of Iranian missiles penetrated defenses in the first week of the war. That doubled to 16% in the second half of the conflict and eventually culminated at 25% on the final day of the war before the ceasefire. Analysts say there are several possible reasons for the trend, including an Iranian shift of focus from military targets to populated urban areas, where interception is less robust. Iran also fired more sophisticated missiles as the war progressed. '(Iran) increasingly employed more advanced systems,' said Mora Deitch, head of the data analytics center at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). 'These included newer missiles with multiple warheads or decoys, which may individually cause less damage but can overwhelm and saturate air defense systems.' Deitch also suggests that Israel may have deliberately relaxed its interception rate. 'Israel's air defense policy may have evolved over time to accommodate a protracted engagement with Iran,' said Deitch. 'What appears as a decline in interception effectiveness might instead reflect a deliberate shift in strategy rather than a technological shortfall.' Still missile defense analysts say they saw clear signs of air defense depletion. 'The presence of the THAAD battery in the first place suggests that the Israelis don't have a super deep interceptor magazine,' said Sam Lair, research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Lair published analysis of interceptors seen in a series of social media video taken by a Jordanian photographer, Zaid Abbadi, from his rooftop in an Amman suburb as the missiles flew overhead. Lair counted 39 THAAD among 82 advanced interceptors in the sample, which consisted of sporadically recorded night-time recording. CNN was able to verify the THAAD tally from the videos. Over half a dozen experts say the number represents a very conservative baseline. Drawing on calculations about publicly available data on batteries, interceptor reloads, and the number of Iranian ballistic missiles fired, experts believe that the US military fired at least 80 THAAD interceptors. 'The 12-day war in June of this year essentially saw the first significant expenditure of THAAD interceptors,' said Timur Kadyshev, a senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. 'Israel was relatively successful in defending (with the US assistance) against unsophisticated Iranian missiles – at the cost of depleting available arsenals of interceptors.' The problem for the US is especially acute in the Indo-Pacific where China has tried to keep the US navy at arm's length, experts say. 'From a narrowly military standpoint, the Chinese are absolutely the winners in that these last almost two years in the Middle East have seen the US expend pretty substantial amounts of capabilities that the American defense industrial base will find pretty hard to replace,' said Sidharth Kaushal, senior research fellow at Royal United Services Institute. Ex-defense officials said dwindling defensive capabilities in the Indo-Pacific was a growing concern for the former administration of President Joe Biden as they used the US stockpile to battle Yemen's Houthi rebels. 'God forbid there should be a conflict in the Pacific, for example, then it really will put a huge strain our missile capacity and the ability for our military to have the munitions necessary to keep up,' said one former senior Biden administration defense official with direct knowledge of the US campaign against the Houthis. 'You have to make choices,' said Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities. 'The Biden administration also should have thought about these trade-offs, but they were able to shrug them off because it was early in these wars... stockpiles were still deep enough that they could turn a blind eye to it.' 'But the Trump administration now is getting to a point where they're not going to be able to ignore the trade-offs.' — CNN
