Hamas Says It Is Consulting With Palestinian Factions Over Gaza Ceasefire
The statement came ahead of a visit on Monday by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, where President Donald Trump is pushing for an end to the war now in its 21st month.
The conflict in Gaza began with Hamas's unprecedented attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, which sparked a massive Israeli offensive aimed at destroying Hamas and bringing home all the hostages seized by militants.
Two previous ceasefires brokered by Qatar, Egypt and the United States have seen temporary halts in fighting, coupled with the return of Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.
Hamas said in a statement early Friday it was "conducting consultations with leaders of Palestinian forces and factions regarding the proposal received... from the mediators".
Hours earlier, Netanyahu vowed to bring home all the hostages held by militants in Gaza, after coming under massive domestic pressure over their fate.
"I feel a deep commitment, first and foremost, to ensure the return of all our abductees, all of them," Netanyahu said.
Trump said on Thursday he wanted "safety for the people of Gaza".
"They've gone through hell," he said.
- 60-day truce proposal -
A Palestinian source familiar with the negotiations told AFP earlier this week that the latest proposals included "a 60-day truce, during which Hamas would release half of the living Israeli captives in the Gaza Strip" -- thought to number 22 -- "in exchange for Israel releasing a number of Palestinian prisoners and detainees".
Out of 251 hostages seized by Palestinian militants during the October 2023 attack, 49 are still held in Gaza, including 27 the Israeli military says are dead.
Nearly 21 months of war have created dire humanitarian conditions for the more than two million people in the Gaza Strip, where Israel has recently expanded its military operations.
The military said in a statement it had been striking suspected Hamas targets across the territory, including around Gaza City in the north and Khan Yunis and Rafah in the south.
- Civil defence says aid-seekers killed -
Gaza civil defence official Mohammad al-Mughayyir said Israeli strikes and gunfire killed at least 52 people on Friday.
The Israeli military said it was looking into reports, except a handful of incidents for which it requested coordinates and timeframes.
In a separate statement, it said a 19-year-old sergeant "fell during combat in the southern Gaza Strip".
Media restrictions in Gaza and difficulties in accessing many areas mean AFP is unable to independently verify the tolls and details provided by the civil defence agency.
Mughayyir said the Palestinians killed included five who were shot while waiting for aid near a US-run site near Rafah in southern Gaza and several who were waiting for aid near the Wadi Gaza Bridge in the centre of the territory.
They were the latest in a spate of deaths near aid distribution centres in the devastated territory, which UN agencies have warned is on the brink of famine.
At Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, crowds mourned 16 people killed on Thursday by what the civil defence agency said was shooting close to a nearby aid centre.
"I lost my brother in the American distribution centre that they set up to feed people," cried one mourner, Narmin Abu Muammar.
"They are killing people, not feeding them."
Medical aid charity Doctors Without Borders said Abdullah Hammad, who recently finished a contract working for it, was among those killed in Thursday's shooting.
It said he was the 12th colleague the group had lost in the Gaza war.
"We demand an end to this bloodshed," MSF said in a statement.
The US- and Israeli-run Gaza Humanitarian Foundation has distanced itself from reports of deadly incidents near its sites.
- Displaced civilians -
The civil defence official told AFP that eight people, including a child, were killed in an Israeli air strike on the tents of displaced civilians near Khan Yunis.
Mughayyir said eight more people were killed in two other strikes on camps on the coast, including one that killed two children early Friday.
The Israeli military said it was operating throughout Gaza "to dismantle Hamas military capabilities".
The Hamas attack of October 2023 resulted in the deaths of 1,219 people, mostly civilians, according to an AFP tally based on Israeli official figures.
Israel's retaliatory military campaign has killed at least 57,268 people in Gaza, also mostly civilians, according to the Hamas-run territory's health ministry. The United Nations considers the figures reliable.
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