France Refocuses Its Indo-Pacific Strategy Amid a Shifting Global Order
The release marks the third iteration of France's Indo-Pacific vision since 2019. The last update, in 2022, came on the heels of the AUKUS shock — which saw Australia abruptly cancel a French submarine contract in favor of U.S.- and U.K.-backed nuclear subs — and coincided with the European Union's own adoption of an Indo-Pacific strategy. France, then presiding over the EU Council, hosted the first EU Indo-Pacific Forum just two days before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The world has not been the same since.
The new Indo-Pacific document, shaped in the wake of the updated French National Strategic Review, should be read as a strategy for times of crisis, reflecting the severe deterioration of the international order in recent years – the war in Ukraine, escalating Middle East tensions, intensifying China-U.S. rivalry, and political unrest in France's overseas territories.
In this context, this article seeks to answer this question: how can France sustain its engagement in the Indo-Pacific — a region vital to global economic growth and strategic balance — under such tight economic and geopolitical constraints?
Sovereignty First
One key answer lies in a sharp refocusing of France's approach around the protection of its own sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific, namely its overseas territories and the country's vast maritime domain – France holds the second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world, 90 percent of which is in the Indo-Pacific.
This point is critical: it is France's overseas territories that underpin its legitimacy as a resident Indo-Pacific nation. In addition, La Réunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia host sovereignty forces that play a significant, well-recognized, and valued role in security cooperation within their respective neighborhoods. At the same time, these territories face growing vulnerabilities and mounting threats – from climate insecurity and resource predation to transnational crime, foreign interference, and disinformation.
The Indo-Pacific strategy devotes substantial attention to these territories – their challenges, needs, and agency – clearly addressing past criticism that they had been sidelined by a Paris-centric approach. This time, the strategy emphasizes co-construction, implementation coordination, and the tangible benefits that overseas territories can derive in terms of sustainable development and regional engagement. These priorities align with another central pillar of France's approach: the promotion of multilateralism, notably through active participation in and empowerment of regional organizations.
That said, the document stays silent on certain sensitive issues – chiefly, the question of decolonization. Uncertainty remains about the future status of New Caledonia, as the recently agreed Bougival Accord that proposes creating a 'State of New Caledonia' within the French Republic still has to be endorsed by the FLNKS, the principal pro-independence coalition.
Partnerships and Multidimensional Engagement
A second notable feature of the new strategy is its emphasis on partnerships and a comprehensive, multidimensional – rather than purely military – approach, in light of constrained resources.
By leveraging strategic partnerships, France seeks to amplify its efforts to uphold international law, ensure freedom of navigation, and respond to transnational risks. Key partners are named: India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates.
A full chapter is dedicated to the so-called 'sovereignty partnerships' by which France aims to strengthen the capacity, autonomy, and resilience of its regional partners, enabling them to better withstand hegemonic pressures and make sovereign decisions. It resonates with the 'coalition of independents' suggested by Macron in his landmark speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May.
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, if the text mentions the frequent military deployments in the region – building trust with partners is key to secure a stronghold and enable French long-distance military dispatch – there is no reference to industrial defense cooperation, actually a cornerstone of France's Indo-Pacific engagement. This omission may reflect a deliberate effort to downplay the military dimension within this whole-of-government strategy – an aspect that has, until now, been the most visible and widely recognized feature of France's Indo-Pacific posture. A dedicated defense strategy for the region is expected to be developed separately at the ministerial level.
The Indo-Pacific document underscores France's broad and multifaceted engagement in the region. It promotes cooperation in sustainable development, climate adaptation, connectivity, and health, while highlighting the mutual benefits of partnerships to advance digital and green transitions, trade, and the security, resilience, and de-risking of supply chains. The message is clear: France's presence in the Indo-Pacific serves regional stability but also its own economic interests, to mobilize the private sector.
In this light, the updated strategy underscores synergy with the broader European strategy – crucial given the EU's exclusive competence over trade policy – and highlights that the EU and its member states are the leading providers of development aid, foreign direct investment, and trade in the Indo-Pacific. References to instruments such as the Global Gateway and efforts to deepen ties with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) reinforce the notion that France's Indo-Pacific approach is aligned with, and strengthened by, collective European initiatives.
Sharper Tone Toward China – But Strategic Autonomy Remains
Perhaps the most notable shift in the new strategy is France's more explicit criticism of China, mentioning Beijing's 'growing assertiveness,' the rapid buildup of the People's Liberation Army, and its advancing nuclear capabilities. It warns that a high-intensity conflict in the Taiwan Strait would carry major global consequences – marking the first time France's Indo-Pacific strategy has so clearly and directly addressed the Taiwan issue. The document also implicitly targets China in its references to unilateral reinterpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and to 'certain arbitration decisions not being respected,' a clear allusion to Beijing's rejection of the 2016 South China Sea ruling.
Beyond the region, the document explicitly acknowledges China's role as a facilitator of Russian aggression since 2022. For the first time, France's Indo-Pacific strategy also refers to NATO, calling on 'regional powers to act responsibly by not supporting Russia's war effort or undermining European security.' While France has consistently opposed a greater NATO role in the Indo-Pacific, this reference marks a shift in tone. The rhetoric echoes Macron's recent speech in Singapore, where he reaffirmed and warned that China's inaction – especially on North Korean participation in the Ukraine war – could invite greater NATO involvement.
At the same time, the strategy reaffirms France's key position of strategic autonomy, advocating for a 'close and rigorous' dialogue with China at the highest level, while seeking convergence on global challenges 'when possible.'
Vis-à-vis the United States, France reaffirms its posture as 'allied but not aligned.' The strategy expresses concerns over U.S. President Donald Trump's 'peace through strength' approach, his containment-driven China policy, and a transactional diplomacy that risks disrupting regional alliances and economic stability.
A Realist Strategy for Turbulent Times
Strictly speaking, the document does not constitute a full-fledged strategy, as it lacks a clear articulation of objectives, means, and a dedicated budget. It reflects a conservative posture shaped by tighter geopolitical and fiscal constraints, with a clear intention to showcase France's concrete engagement – though at times this approach makes it resemble a catalogue of ongoing initiatives.
This sober, pragmatic approach is welcome, reflecting an effort to make France's Indo-Pacific presence more coherent, credible, and realistically aligned with its actual resources. Ultimately, the strategy aims to build lasting legitimacy by grounding rhetoric in tangible national priorities and constraints, while avoiding overpromising that could lead to disappointment. More grounded and restrained than earlier versions, it embodies hard lessons learned and seeks a careful balance between ambition and limitations.
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