Japan's new hypersonic missile aims at China's navy, NoKo nukes
Japan has unveiled a mobile hypersonic missile system designed to outmaneuver China's layered carrier defenses and threaten North Korea's survivable nuclear arsenal, marking a decisive shift from a purely defensive posture to a counterstrike capability.
This month, Asian Military Review reported that at Fuji Firepower 2025, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) unveiled the ground-launched Hyper Velocity Guided Projectile (HVGP), a mobile hypersonic strike missile system developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under contract from Japan's Advanced Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA).
The HVGP program, launched in 2018, marked its first successful test firing in early 2024 at a US range. Its operational deployment has been advanced to 2026. The Block 1 HVGP, mounted on an 8×8 tactical truck with two containerized, solid-fuel boost-glide missiles, has a range of 500–900 km and reaches Mach 5.
Upgraded variants, Block 2A and 2B, are planned for 2027 and 2030, with their ranges extended to 2,000 kilometers and 3,000 kilometers, respectively. The HVGP employs satellite and inertial navigation, with a naval-targeting variant using RF imaging derived from Doppler shift and a land-attack version deploying explosively formed projectiles. Both are designed for high-speed maneuvering post-boost.
Planned deployments in Kyushu and Hokkaido underscore its strategic intent to counter regional threats. Concurrently, Japan is also developing the scramjet-powered Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCV) to extend strike capabilities further. These systems are at the core of Japan's revised defense strategy, which aims to safeguard its territorial integrity amid increasing regional security pressures.
Previously, Asia Times reported that Japan announced four hypersonic missile tests conducted in California between August 2024 and January 2025. These systems are envisioned for strategic interdiction, counterforce, and even counter-leadership operations.
In line with developing strategic interdiction capabilities, Japan has recently conducted the first domestic test firing of its short-range Type 88 anti-ship missile and plans to develop the long-range Type 12.
However, James Conway and Jerry McAbee mention in a March 2024 RealClearDefense article that by 2030, subsonic cruise missiles and supersonic ballistic missiles may become obsolete against the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Japan's current arsenal of subsonic cruise and ballistic missiles faces significant limitations: subsonic cruise missiles allow a longer intercept window despite their maneuverability, while ballistic missiles, though fast, follow predictable arcs that are easier to track. These constraints justify Japan's shift toward maneuverable hypersonic systems, such as the HVGP.
Underscoring this point, Daniel Rice's December 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) highlights that the PLAN carrier strategy is built around a three-layer defense system, enabling increasingly autonomous and far-reaching blue-water operations.
Rice explains that the carrier battlegroup's defenses are arranged in concentric zones: the 'Outer Defense Zone' (185–400 kilometers), maintained by submarines and J-15 fighters for long-range strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); the 'Middle Defense Zone' (45–185 kilometers), secured by destroyers and frigates equipped with radar, vertical launch systems (VLS), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities; and the 'Inner Defense Zone' (100 meters–45 kilometers), protected by close-in weapons and point-defense systems.
Aside from strategic interdiction, Japan's hypersonic weapons may be poised to play a critical role in its counterstrike capabilities against North Korea's nuclear arsenal.
In a March 2024 article for the United States Studies Center (USSC), Masashi Murano notes that Japan's counterstrike capability focuses on long-range, conventional counterforce strikes against military assets, such as missile bases, rather than leadership or cities. To that end, Murano mentions that Japan is acquiring Tomahawk cruise missiles, improved Type 12 missiles, and hypersonic missiles.
However, Murano cautions that Japan still faces deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to hit time-sensitive targets such as transporter erector launchers (TEL), its counterstrike doctrine is still a work in progress, and the risks of escalation remain major issues it should tackle in building its counterstrike capabilities.
In addition, North Korea has taken several measures to harden its nuclear arsenal against a pre-emptive counterforce strike.
Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a July 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that North Korea is actively pursuing solid-fuel rocket intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-based platforms such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and tactical nuclear weapons, which together enhance survivability by making its arsenal more mobile, concealable, and less reliant on vulnerable fixed launch sites.
Kristensen and others note that North Korea's deeply buried enrichment sites, continued fissile production, and development of tactical warheads all point to a doctrine that embraces redundancy and dispersion, hallmarks of a survivable deterrent.
Given that sanctions and threats of military action have failed to dissuade the North Korean regime from continuing its nuclear program and stopping its belligerent behavior, some strategists argue that targeting the regime itself might compel behavioral change.
In an April 2023 NK News commentary, Bruce Bennett notes that the Kim regime's prioritization of military buildup over basic human needs, along with exhortations to the North Korean public to sacrifice for the country's defense, reflects deep anxiety over regime survival and control.
Bennett observes that deployments like MQ-9 Reaper drones in Japan, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from B-52s flying over the Korean Peninsula, and Japan's new hypersonic systems may concern the Kim regime over its survival.
Yet, as Lauren Sukin points out in a February 2024 article for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), North Korea's nuclear policy calls for automatic nuclear retaliation should its command and control system, including Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, be attacked.
Sukin adds that the US, and by extension, its allies, forcing regime change on North Korea could end, at best, in an even more anti-US regime than that headed by Kim Jong Un. At worst, she says such attempts could result in regional instability or North Korea using chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Japan's rollout of hypersonic strike weapons marks a significant moment in Northeast Asian security. While they offer a powerful conventional deterrent against China's carrier strike groups and North Korea's dispersed nuclear forces, they also heighten the risk of arms racing, strategic miscalculation, and regional instability.
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Japan's new hypersonic missile aims at China's navy, NoKo nukes
Japan has unveiled a mobile hypersonic missile system designed to outmaneuver China's layered carrier defenses and threaten North Korea's survivable nuclear arsenal, marking a decisive shift from a purely defensive posture to a counterstrike capability. This month, Asian Military Review reported that at Fuji Firepower 2025, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) unveiled the ground-launched Hyper Velocity Guided Projectile (HVGP), a mobile hypersonic strike missile system developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under contract from Japan's Advanced Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA). The HVGP program, launched in 2018, marked its first successful test firing in early 2024 at a US range. Its operational deployment has been advanced to 2026. The Block 1 HVGP, mounted on an 8×8 tactical truck with two containerized, solid-fuel boost-glide missiles, has a range of 500–900 km and reaches Mach 5. Upgraded variants, Block 2A and 2B, are planned for 2027 and 2030, with their ranges extended to 2,000 kilometers and 3,000 kilometers, respectively. The HVGP employs satellite and inertial navigation, with a naval-targeting variant using RF imaging derived from Doppler shift and a land-attack version deploying explosively formed projectiles. Both are designed for high-speed maneuvering post-boost. Planned deployments in Kyushu and Hokkaido underscore its strategic intent to counter regional threats. Concurrently, Japan is also developing the scramjet-powered Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCV) to extend strike capabilities further. These systems are at the core of Japan's revised defense strategy, which aims to safeguard its territorial integrity amid increasing regional security pressures. Previously, Asia Times reported that Japan announced four hypersonic missile tests conducted in California between August 2024 and January 2025. These systems are envisioned for strategic interdiction, counterforce, and even counter-leadership operations. In line with developing strategic interdiction capabilities, Japan has recently conducted the first domestic test firing of its short-range Type 88 anti-ship missile and plans to develop the long-range Type 12. However, James Conway and Jerry McAbee mention in a March 2024 RealClearDefense article that by 2030, subsonic cruise missiles and supersonic ballistic missiles may become obsolete against the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Japan's current arsenal of subsonic cruise and ballistic missiles faces significant limitations: subsonic cruise missiles allow a longer intercept window despite their maneuverability, while ballistic missiles, though fast, follow predictable arcs that are easier to track. These constraints justify Japan's shift toward maneuverable hypersonic systems, such as the HVGP. Underscoring this point, Daniel Rice's December 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) highlights that the PLAN carrier strategy is built around a three-layer defense system, enabling increasingly autonomous and far-reaching blue-water operations. Rice explains that the carrier battlegroup's defenses are arranged in concentric zones: the 'Outer Defense Zone' (185–400 kilometers), maintained by submarines and J-15 fighters for long-range strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); the 'Middle Defense Zone' (45–185 kilometers), secured by destroyers and frigates equipped with radar, vertical launch systems (VLS), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities; and the 'Inner Defense Zone' (100 meters–45 kilometers), protected by close-in weapons and point-defense systems. Aside from strategic interdiction, Japan's hypersonic weapons may be poised to play a critical role in its counterstrike capabilities against North Korea's nuclear arsenal. In a March 2024 article for the United States Studies Center (USSC), Masashi Murano notes that Japan's counterstrike capability focuses on long-range, conventional counterforce strikes against military assets, such as missile bases, rather than leadership or cities. To that end, Murano mentions that Japan is acquiring Tomahawk cruise missiles, improved Type 12 missiles, and hypersonic missiles. However, Murano cautions that Japan still faces deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to hit time-sensitive targets such as transporter erector launchers (TEL), its counterstrike doctrine is still a work in progress, and the risks of escalation remain major issues it should tackle in building its counterstrike capabilities. In addition, North Korea has taken several measures to harden its nuclear arsenal against a pre-emptive counterforce strike. Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a July 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that North Korea is actively pursuing solid-fuel rocket intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-based platforms such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and tactical nuclear weapons, which together enhance survivability by making its arsenal more mobile, concealable, and less reliant on vulnerable fixed launch sites. Kristensen and others note that North Korea's deeply buried enrichment sites, continued fissile production, and development of tactical warheads all point to a doctrine that embraces redundancy and dispersion, hallmarks of a survivable deterrent. Given that sanctions and threats of military action have failed to dissuade the North Korean regime from continuing its nuclear program and stopping its belligerent behavior, some strategists argue that targeting the regime itself might compel behavioral change. In an April 2023 NK News commentary, Bruce Bennett notes that the Kim regime's prioritization of military buildup over basic human needs, along with exhortations to the North Korean public to sacrifice for the country's defense, reflects deep anxiety over regime survival and control. Bennett observes that deployments like MQ-9 Reaper drones in Japan, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from B-52s flying over the Korean Peninsula, and Japan's new hypersonic systems may concern the Kim regime over its survival. Yet, as Lauren Sukin points out in a February 2024 article for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), North Korea's nuclear policy calls for automatic nuclear retaliation should its command and control system, including Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, be attacked. Sukin adds that the US, and by extension, its allies, forcing regime change on North Korea could end, at best, in an even more anti-US regime than that headed by Kim Jong Un. At worst, she says such attempts could result in regional instability or North Korea using chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Japan's rollout of hypersonic strike weapons marks a significant moment in Northeast Asian security. While they offer a powerful conventional deterrent against China's carrier strike groups and North Korea's dispersed nuclear forces, they also heighten the risk of arms racing, strategic miscalculation, and regional instability.
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Advice to Tokyo about that US debt weapon: Use at your own risk
Japan's hint at selling US debt may be a bluff — but pulling the trigger would still mean collaborating with China against America's position. Japan holds over $1 trillion in United States Treasury debt. Or, in other words, the US owes Japan a trillion dollars, borrowed to fund America's profligate spending. Last week, Japan's finance minister, Katsunobu Kato, suggested Tokyo might use its treasury holdings — and the threat to unload them — as a card against Washington. This would be part of upcoming talks over the Donald Trump administration's tariffs recently imposed on Japan and most other countries. One understands Japan's frustration over being 'tariffed.' Japan has been a good ally. And US officials routinely describe ties with Japan as rock-solid, the most important bilateral relationship. So it's got to sting to be treated like the People's Republic of China (PRC), a country that aims to destroy America, and has killed well over half a million Americans with fentanyl over the last decade plus. But Japan ought to be careful about issuing threats, even veiled ones, about its US debt, much less acting on them. This is not a US-versus-Japan winner-takes-all situation. And Tokyo, while loath to recognize the fact, needs the US more than America needs Japan, both militarily and financially. Take away American support and Japan would find itself under unbearable pressure from the PRC. Foreigners potentially wielding America's debt as a weapon is a well-known danger, though nobody much wants to think about it. The usual scenario is China (which holds around $800 billion in US debt) dumping its T-bills on the market to hurt the Americans. But few people envisaged Japan initiating a chain reaction that leaves the US fiscally and morally incapable of responding to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the Philippines and/or Japan itself. The Japanese destroyer Kaga (center) with American and French aircraft carriers sail alongside each other in waters east of the Philippines on February 12, 2025. Photo: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Weaponize debt, and the US-Japan alliance will end. Americans in large parts of the country will view the Treasury's sell-off as treachery. Moreover, if Japan pulls the debt trigger, it will be collaborating with China to undermine US preeminence. This could weaken America's ability to sustain the military presence that has maintained an equilibrium in the Far East and protected Japan. Japan ought to view its actions not in terms of trade negotiations. Instead, as one observer puts it: 'What Japanese missteps will fill the Panda with glee and excite the dragon's appetite for conquest? China is an active corrosive agent. Why would Japan wish to become an accelerant or a collaborator in its own demise?' One gets the impression that Japanese officials and their political class have too narrow an understanding of America and Americans. Their view is largely shaped by the diplomats, think-tankers, academics and lobbyists they brush elbows with in Washington. Japan does not grasp how large swaths of the US have little trust in the government and little interest in foreign wars. Warren Buffett presiding at the 2023 Berkshire Hathaway meeting on May 6. Photo: screenshot During the recent Berkshire Hathaway annual shareholders meeting, Warren Buffett made specific comments on Japan, business opportunities, and tariffs. He made a 'free trade' comment, basically supporting the deportation of US jobs, which was received with hearty applause. That response shows not the divide, but the chasm between the investor class and middle America, so-called flyover country. Hint to the Japanese who were tuned in: the US investor class is not the US warrior class. The wealthiest top 10% of Americans own 88% of equities. In contrast, the next 40% hold the remaining 12%. As for the bottom 50%, they don't own stocks — they own debt. That's also where the military recruiting offices are concentrated. The smug elite can no longer claim that the peasant class will simply go where they're dispatched. After the Afghanistan debacle – 20 years of body counts, expended national wealth and lost opportunity costs – Americans have adopted a post-World War I attitude toward the world. There's growing hostility toward the globalists and neocons. Many are just waiting for the wrong person to throw patriotism in their faces. Especially after the Joe Biden years of burning flags and the era of toppling statues. The Japanese who are taking cues from their friends in Washington should be informed that the Gulfstream-riders and the coastal elites are clueless when it comes to citizens outside their narrow class. Issuing threats might feel good, but it will be poorly received by the people Japan counts on to protect it. Don't think so? The Japanese ambassador can head to Akron, Ohio, or Erie, Pennsylvania, and explain things to the local Rotary Clubs. Mention the trillion dollars in US debt and the implied threat that comes with it. The audience will point out that a US serviceman who dies defending a country whose young people won't join the military is worth a lot more than a trillion dollars. Tokyo would do better to act as an 'attending physician' to help America recover from the insane spending sickness of the last 25 years. It should help support America as the US tries to rebuild its military and its industrial base. If the patient recovers, it will be grateful – and far more willing to protect Japan. Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America . This article, originally published by JAPAN Forward, is republished with permission.
