logo
When US wanted Iran and China to help Pakistan in war against India

When US wanted Iran and China to help Pakistan in war against India

Indian Express22-06-2025
The United States has bombed Iran using its strategic bomber aircraft fleet. This is an opportune time to recall the past friendship of the US with Iran and how at one point in the India-Pakistan war in December 1971, it wanted Iran to help Pakistan with urgent fuel supplies and also fighter aircraft to save the country from decimation at India's hands.
Declassified US State Department documents include minutes of a meeting held in Washington on December 9, 1971, which was chaired by Henry Kissinger, then national security advisor to US President Richard Nixon. In this meeting, the US officials worried about the lack of fuel reserves in West Pakistan and the fact that the Pakistani military would soon come to a standstill because its major fuel reserves had been destroyed by Indian attacks on the Karachi port.
Kissinger asked the officials if fuel supplies could be rushed from Tehran to Pakistan so that West Pakistan could be saved from being captured by India after the successful conquest of East Pakistan. In the same meeting, discussions were also held on supplying Pakistan with fighter aircraft from Iran and asking China to make threatening mocks on the border with India.
CIA Director Richard Helms informed the participants that in the last few hours, he had received a report from Karachi that the oil tanks there had been hit again, in the 12th or 13th air raid, and that six or eight of them had been burning.
'An ESSO representative has indicated that this means the loss of 50% of Karachi's oil reserves, which amounts to over 80% of the POL [petrol, oil, lubricants] for all of Pakistan. He estimates that they are left with a two-week supply, possibly less at the rate at which POL is now being consumed,' he said.
Kissinger asked the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H Moorer for his estimate of the military situation. Moorer stated that in East Pakistan, in the absence of a ceasefire, it was just a matter of time until the Pakistan Army would be essentially ineffective.
'Their supplies are cut off and they have no air left. Any serious fighting could be over in ten days or two weeks, depending on whether the Paks continue to fight to the last man or whether they begin to surrender in large numbers, which does not seem to be in the cards now,' he said.
The admiral added that in West Pakistan, the Pakistanis are trying to occupy enough of Kashmir to give them a bargaining chip if and when there is a ceasefire. 'They are trying to block the main lines of communication. South of the Kashmir area, the Indians outnumber the Paks two-to-one, and they may plan to move south to Lahore, although there is no indication of that now. The best Pakistan can do is to gain as much control of Kashmir as possible,' he said.
Moorer added that the Pakistanis can operate for about three weeks or so. 'However, if there is a period of attrition, with no ceasefire, the Indians can hold out longer and the Paks have had it. Mrs. Gandhi has stated that her objective is to destroy the Pak military forces,' he said.
Kissenger asked whether in that case in a prolonged war, even if Pakistan got Kashmir, it would be unable to hold it and it would lead to the destruction of the Pakistan Army.
'Exactly. When East Pakistan is gone, the Indians will transfer their divisions to West-possibly four of the six divisions now in the East. This will take one to three weeks, depending on how much air they use. If the war continues to the end, the outcome for Pakistan is inevitable,' said Admiral Moorer.
At this point, John N Irwin, the undersecretary of state, mentioned a CIA paper, Implications of an Indian Victory Over Pakistan, that predicts the possible acceleration of the breakup tendencies in West Pakistan— possibly into as many as four separate states.
The admiral pointed out that the Indian objective was to take out the Pakistani tanks and planes. 'If they run out of POL and can't move, they'll be sitting ducks,' he said.
The meeting then discussed the possibility of trucking POL from Tehran. 'There is one road. We have one report that indicates that Chinese trucks are coming in but we don't know what they are carrying. Iran is the logical source of POL. I talked to the Turkish Chief of Staff at NATO and asked him how much assistance he thought Iran was prepared to give to Pakistan. He said he thought the Shah wanted to be helpful, but had one eye cocked on Iraq. In the end, he didn't believe the Shah would give significant assistance,' said the Admiral.
The documents also reveal that on instructions from Washington, a senior embassy official met the Shah of Iran in Tehran on December 8, 1971, to discuss the possibility of Iranian military support for Pakistan. The Shah stated that he had informed the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran that, in light of the treaty of friendship signed by India and the Soviet Union, he could not send Iranian aircraft and pilots to Pakistan. He was not prepared to risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union.
The Shah proposed an alternative way to support the hard-pressed Pakistani Air Force. He suggested that the United States urge King Hussein to send Jordanian F-104 fighters to Pakistan. The Shah in turn would send two squadrons of Iranian aircraft to Jordan to defend Jordan while Jordanian planes and pilots were in Pakistan engaged in support of fellow Muslims.
'The Embassy official indicated that, because of legal constraints regarding the use of military equipment provided by the United States, it would be difficult for officials in Washington to give permission for the transfer of the F-104s from Jordan to Pakistan, or to overlook their absence in Jordan. The Shah said that the United States could not hope to achieve the objective of bolstering Pakistan while maintaining that it was not involved in the effort,' the document says.
President Nixon, Attorney General John N Mitchell, and Henry Kissinger had earlier met on the afternoon of December 8, 1971, for an extended discussion of the crisis in South Asia.
Turning to the situation in East Pakistan, Kissinger warned that 'the Indian plan is now clear. They are going to move their forces from East Pakistan to the west. They will then smash the Pakistan land forces and air forces.' He added that India planned to 'annex the part of Kashmir that is in Pakistan.'
Kissinger went on to attribute to the Gandhi government the goal of balkanising West Pakistan into units such as Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. West Pakistan would become a state akin to Afghanistan and East Pakistan would equate with Bhutan.
Nixon said that he had given Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a warning during his dinner in Washington with her. 'I told her that any war would be very, very unacceptable.' Kissinger observed that any such warning obviously fell on deaf ears. 'She was determined to go.'
'As I look at this thing, the Chinese have got to move to that damn border. The Indians have got to get a little scared,' said Nixon. He instructed Kissinger to get a message to that effect to the Chinese.
Kissinger suggested that another pressure move would be to move a US aircraft carrier force into the Bay of Bengal. Summarising the decisions they were considering, Kissinger said, 'We should get a note to the Chinese, we should move the carrier to the Bay of Bengal.' Nixon interjected, 'I agree.'
Kissinger also pointed to the threat to West Pakistan, 'At this stage, we have to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan.' Nixon agreed. Kissinger continued, 'We have to maintain the position of withdrawal from all of Pakistan.' He stated that by introducing its military power into the equation, in the form of a carrier and other units from the Seventh Fleet, the US was seeking to prevent 'a Soviet stooge, supported by Soviet arms' from overrunning an ally.
Nixon returned to his conviction that China could exercise a decisive restraining influence on India. 'The Chinese thing I still think is a card in the hole there. I tell you a movement of even some Chinese toward that border could scare those goddamn Indians to death.' Kissinger agreed, 'As soon as we have made the decision here, we can then talk to the Chinese.'
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger engaged in conversation outside the Oval Office. Source: US National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project Photo Collection)
Orange background

Try Our AI Features

Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:

Comments

No comments yet...

Related Articles

Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line
Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line

News18

time35 minutes ago

  • News18

Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line

Last Updated: From January 1, 2026, Pakistani nationals undertaking pilgrimages to Shia sacred sites in Iran and Iraq will no longer be allowed to travel independently In a move justified through bureaucratic reasoning but deeply rooted in longstanding sectarian inequalities, the Pakistani government has unveiled extensive new measures that will significantly affect the country's Shia community. On July 15, interior minister Mohsin Naqvi announced that, starting from January 1, 2026, Pakistani nationals undertaking pilgrimages to Shia sacred sites in Iran and Iraq will no longer be allowed to travel independently. Instead, such religious journeys must be conducted exclusively in closely monitored groups, overseen by government-certified operators known as Zaireen Group Organisers (ZGOs). Presented as a necessary reaction to diplomatic concerns from Iran and Iraq regarding visa overstays and unauthorised activities, the newly announced policy has raised more concerns than clarity, drawing attention to the pronounced sectarian bias embedded within it. The government's rationale fails to hold under closer examination, particularly when contrasted with its tolerant approach to similar violations committed by Sunni pilgrims visiting Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this directive represents more than a mere procedural alteration—it conveys a veiled message to Pakistan's Shia population that they are not deemed trustworthy to travel independently. The double standard is unmistakable. For example, in December 2024 alone, Saudi Arabia deported nearly 5,000 Pakistani citizens in just one month—primarily Sunni pilgrims who had overstayed their Umrah visas and were found begging. This issue is not limited to Saudi Arabia; other Gulf nations such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also deported hundreds of Pakistanis for similar infractions. In fact, in April 2025, Saudi authorities imposed a temporary visa ban on 14 countries, including Pakistan, citing the need to curb unauthorised Hajj participation and widespread visa violations. Despite these developments, the Pakistani government has not implemented any restrictions on individual Sunni pilgrimages to Mecca or Medina, nor has it introduced a system of regulated group travel for them. If the core concern truly lies in visa breaches and diplomatic pressures, it raises a pressing question: why has only one sect been subjected to such punitive regulation, particularly when Gulf monarchies have consistently expressed concerns about Pakistani nationals engaging in begging and other illicit activities? The stance adopted by the Pakistani government reveals a clear sectarian inclination and forms part of a broader, long-standing pattern of discriminatory practices against the Shia minority, which constitutes an estimated 15-20 per cent of the national population. For decades, Pakistan's Shia citizens have faced state-backed marginalisation —ranging from explicit exclusion in key government positions to more covert institutional apathy that overlooks violence perpetrated by the Sunni majority, as notably seen in Parachinar within the Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While many such forms of bias are subtle, others have been overt and violently repressive. Viewed within the broader historical context, the newly introduced pilgrimage regulation is merely another addition to a persistent trend of policies that have implicitly, if not explicitly, relegated the Shia community to a subordinate status. This so-called 'administrative requirement" fails to withstand scrutiny when placed against the wider backdrop of the state's consistent alignment with Sunni orthodoxy. For many Shia Muslims, visiting the sacred sites of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, as well as Qom and Mashhad in Iran, represents more than merely a religious duty—it serves as a profound emotional, spiritual, and cultural connection. These pilgrimages, primarily undertaken during the Islamic months of Muharram (for Ashura) and Safar (for Arbaeen), are vital expressions of faith and identity within the Shia tradition. Under the newly imposed regulations, such pilgrimages must now be conducted exclusively through state-approved organisers, many of whom impose prohibitively high charges and operate with little transparency. Independent travel options, which tend to be more affordable and allow for greater flexibility, will be rendered unlawful under this system. As a result, this policy effectively marginalises low-income Shia families and places additional constraints on their already restricted religious liberties. The disparity is striking. Sunni pilgrims travelling to Saudi Arabia for Umrah continue to benefit from a largely unmonitored travel framework, despite persistent reports of visa overstays, unlawful employment, and even infractions such as widespread begging. The government's reaction has typically been to ignore these issues or, at most, issue mild advisories—without imposing any broad restrictions or invoking claims of 'administrative necessity". Although it is accurate that the Iranian and Iraqi authorities have raised concerns about certain pilgrims, particularly during mass gatherings like Arbaeen, it is misleading to argue that the new restrictions are solely a response to these issues. If that were genuinely the case, the Pakistani government would have already put in place a regulatory policy addressing Umrah travel to Saudi Arabia—especially given Riyadh's repeated complaints regarding visa violations and begging by Pakistani citizens. Yet, instead of devising such a framework, Islamabad has consistently chosen to overlook these infractions committed by Sunni nationals deported from these Gulf states. The sole discernible distinction appears to lie in sectarian affiliation. Pakistan's centres of power—particularly its military-intelligence apparatus and dominant Sunni religious institutions—have long influenced the definition of full citizenship. Consequently, this measure does not merely constitute a travel regulation; it symbolises what appears to be a litmus test for citizenship, wherein a Pakistani Shia is denied the right to undertake pilgrimages independently, while a Sunni remains free to do so. By implementing such exclusionary travel protocols, the state not only marginalises a segment of its population but also risks exacerbating sectarian divisions in a nation already burdened by deep polarisation, political suppression, and widespread instability. Historically, Pakistan's constitution guaranteed equal rights to all citizens regardless of their faith or sect, although it has explicitly discriminated against the Ahmadiyya community—another oppressed group alongside Hindus, Shias, and Christians. Yet, for many within the Shia community, as with other religious minorities, that constitutional assurance has rarely translated into practice. The introduction of the new travel regulation serves as a stark reminder that in the Islamic Republic, religious liberty is not a universal entitlement but rather a tightly controlled and selectively granted privilege, managed and rationed by the state. Although visa enforcement, like border control, is a legitimate responsibility of the state, its impartiality is compromised when its execution aligns with sectarian fault lines. At that point, it no longer remains a neutral administrative act but becomes a vehicle for discrimination. If Pakistan genuinely seeks to foster national unity, it must reject the selective application of the law and commit to governance grounded in fairness—applying rules uniformly across all communities without favour or prejudice. This approach should also support, rather than restrict, religious expression, regardless of sectarian identity. Crucially, it requires avoiding the misuse of bureaucratic mechanisms as tools of sectarian exclusion. top videos View all Until such principles are upheld, the concept of 'equal citizenship" in Pakistan will continue to ring hollow—serving more as a bitter irony than a constitutional assurance. This is particularly evident for communities that are repeatedly compelled to demonstrate their loyalty, even in their most sacred journeys of faith. The writer is an author and a columnist. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : pakistan Shia sunni view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 22, 2025, 19:32 IST News opinion Global Watch | Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.

Free Trade Agreement, Investment Treaty On Agenda For PM Modi's Maldives July 25 Visit
Free Trade Agreement, Investment Treaty On Agenda For PM Modi's Maldives July 25 Visit

NDTV

timean hour ago

  • NDTV

Free Trade Agreement, Investment Treaty On Agenda For PM Modi's Maldives July 25 Visit

New Delhi: Prime Minister Narendra Modi's two-day State visit to Maldives this week will not only contribute further to consolidating strong ties between the two nations but also enhance peace, prosperity and security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said on Tuesday. Both countries, he revealed, are also in discussions to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement and an investment treaty. Prime Minister Modi will undertake a State Visit to Maldives from July 25-26, on the invitation of the Maldives President, Mohamed Muizzu. This will be Prime Minister Modi's third visit to Maldives - he had visited the Indian Ocean archipelago in 2018 and 2019, earlier - and the first by a Head of State or Government to Maldives during the Presidency of Muizzu which began in November 2023. PM Modi will arrive in Maldives on July 25 which would be the second and final leg of his two-nation visit, following the visit to the United Kingdom, starting Wednesday. Besides holding discussions on issues of mutual interest with President Muizzu, Prime Minister Modi will also be the 'Guest of Honour' at the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the Independence of Maldives on July 26. 2025 also marks 60 years of the establishment of diplomatic relations between both countries. President Muizzu was on a State Visit to India in October 2024. He also visited New Delhi to attend the swearing-in ceremony of the new government that had been elected earlier in the year. Both leaders had also met on the sidelines of the COP meeting in Dubai. "The relationship with the Maldives is comprehensive and multifaceted. It's been paid attention to by leadership at the highest levels and we believe that this visit by the Prime Minister will contribute further to consolidating these strong ties and contribute to peace, prosperity and security in the Indian Ocean Region that both of us inhabit," Foreign Secretary Misri stated during a special media briefing held in New Delhi on Tuesday ahead of PM Modi's two-nation visit. The two leaders will also take stock of the progress in the implementation of the India-Maldives Joint Vision for a 'Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership', adopted during the State Visit of the President of Maldives to India in October 2024. With PM Modi slated to inaugurate some infrastructure projects and also announce new initiatives, the visit reflects the importance India attaches to its maritime neighbour, Maldives, which continues to hold a special place in India's 'Neighbourhood First' policy and Vision MAHASAGAR. "We have always been the first on hand to respond to the needs of Maldives in times whenever it has faced crisis, natural or man-made. There has been a robust, political relationship which has been bolstered by regular visits at high-levels," said Misri. "This joint vision, in a sense, has become the guiding framework for our ties. This year already, in the first six months, we have seen nearly half a dozen ministerial level visits from the Maldives. The speaker of the Maldives Parliament visited India. In fact, the very first engagement this year that the External Affairs Minister held was with the Foreign Minister of Maldives," he added. A High-Level Core Group (HLCG) has been constituted to oversee the progress towards implementation of the joint vision between both countries. The HLCG has met twice, at Male and Delhi in January and May 2025, respectively. Since then, there has been regular political visits from Maldives to India, especially, in 2025, covering Ministers of Finance, Foreign, Defence, Environment, Information and Arts, Health etc as well as that of a delegation led by the Speaker of the Maldivian Majlis. Misri stated that India is one of the largest trading partners of the Maldives and the bilateral trade currently stands at nearly 500 million dollars. "On the economic front, one recent development which I would like to share with you is that both countries are in discussions to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement and an investment treaty as well and new areas of cooperation including renewable energy, fisheries etc are also being worked on. One of the largest areas of bilateral cooperation is the development partnership between the two countries. India has been a traditional development partner of the Maldives, executing various initiatives through a mix of Lines of Credit at concessional rates, grants, buyers credit facilities, as also conducting capacity building programmes in a number of areas. "The flagship project that is underway currently is the Greater Male connectivity project which has the potential to be an infrastructure gamechanger in the Greater Male region, connecting four islands of the Maldives. There are also projects underway in the area of roads, airports, fisheries, processing units and others. We are also alleviating the pressure by helping with social housing as per the needs and priorities of Maldives." He also mentioned India's financial assistance to Maldives government through instruments like twin currency swap arrangements. The Foreign Secretary stated that Maldives is one of largest beneficiaries of India's capacity building programmes. "We also have between the two countries a robust defence and security cooperation. India continues to assist Maldives in building its capacity, training Maldives defence personnel and a lot of this is done through regular training programmes, naval exercises between the two countries. We've been helping Maldives enhance its capacity for EZ surveillance and maritime domain awareness through the provision of ships and assets and the two countries are also cooperating under the ambit of the Colombo Security Conclave," the Foreign Secretary said.

Supreme Court rejects PIL against political parties using national tricolour in their flags
Supreme Court rejects PIL against political parties using national tricolour in their flags

New Indian Express

timean hour ago

  • New Indian Express

Supreme Court rejects PIL against political parties using national tricolour in their flags

NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Monday in its order refused to entertain a PIL seeking action against political parties for allegedly using flags with the tricolour along with party symbols. "Since when are they (Political parties) doing it? Some parties are doing it before Independence, dismissed," said the top court's three-judge bench, headed by the Chief Justice of India (CJI) B R Gavai and Justices K Vinod Chandran and N V Anjaria. The apex court passed the order, after hearing a PIL (Public Interest Litigation) filed by a petitioner-in-person, Sanjay Bhimashankar Thobde, against using the tricolour of the National Flag as part of their political campaign, replacing the Ashoka Chakra with their symbols. The petitioner, Thobde, who appeared in person, to argue his case submitted before the apex court that certain political parties have been using flag designs closely resembling the national tricolour in their political campaigns, often replacing the Ashoka Chakra with party symbols.

DOWNLOAD THE APP

Get Started Now: Download the App

Ready to dive into a world of global content with local flavor? Download Daily8 app today from your preferred app store and start exploring.
app-storeplay-store